accident, we are of the opinion that he took from the jury the question of negligence on the part of the conductor in charge of the train at the time, which negligence the jury might have found, from the evidence, caused the accident. Both parties agree that under the law of Illinois, where this injury to the plaintiff occurred, an employee cannot recover for an injury happening to him by reason of the negligence of one of his co-employees, nor is there any dispute that the conductor in charge of the train at the time, and the fireman, were coemployees within the meaning of the law.

There is evidence that the conductor was advised before he went to work on this road, that it was not in a very safe condition, and that he was cautioned to run slow over the same; it also shows that when the accident happened, he was running the train at a speed which the conductor himself considered unsafe, taking into consideration the condition of the track, and the fact that the train was backing instead of going forward, and the evidence tends also to show that the accident happened by reason of the lateral pressure against the rails, occasioned by the backing of the train at a speed which was not safe. Upon this evidence, we think it was for the jury, and not for the court, to say whether there was neglieence on the part of the conductor, in the running of the train, and whether such negligence caused the accident which resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The case of Durgin v. Munson, 9 Allen, 396, decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, was similar in principle to the case at bar, and that court held that the question as to whether the negligence of the co-employee caused the injury should have been submitted to the jury.

In that case, the plaintiff, an employee of the company, had been injured by an engine running off a turn- table, when such employee was engaged in turning the same. His claim to recover against the company was based upon an alleged insufficiency of the brake on the engine, to keep the same in place whilst it was being turned upon the table. The court held that it was competent for the defendant to show, as a matter of defense, that the person who had charge of all of the engines, had given instructions to the engineers in charge of the engines, before the accident happened, to have the wheels of their engines blocked while turning on the turn-table, and that the accident occurred from the failure of some servant of the defendant to obey such instruction, was not known to the plaintiff, and notwithstanding there was proof of the insufficiency of the brake on the engine. The learned judge who delivered the opinion of the court in that case, says: "The defect in the engine, which the plaintiff alleged as the cause of his injury, was the insufficiency of the brake to prevent the engine from running off while it was turned on the turn-table. The defendant proposed to show that the person who had charge for him of all the engines on the road, had given instructions, before the accident, to the engineers, to have the wheels of their engines "chocked" while turning on the turn-table, and that this accident occurred by failure of some

servant of the defendant to obey such instructions. The court ruled the evidence incompetent, as it was not shown that the instruction was given or known to the plaintiff. But proof that the accident which caused the injury to the plaintiff was caused by the neglect of a fellow-servant, would have been a defense to the action; and the offer went to that extent. The defects of the engine in the abstract were not the gist of the plaintiff'scomplaint, but its defects at the time, and for the service in which the defendant allowed it to be used when it ran on the plaintiff. If it were fit and sufficient for use in the manner in which the defendant then allowed it to be used, its insufficiency for other service at other times would not concern the plaintiff. Now it is plain that a machine may be safe and fit for one use, when it is not for another."

Applying the principle of that case to the case at bar, there was certainly some evidence in the case to go the jury, upon the question as to whether the accident did not happen by the negligence of the conductor of the train. It is probable that it would not be negligence on the part of the company, for which they could be held responsible to their employees, that they did not keep this short track of road which was seldom used, and then only for a particular purpose, in that complete state of repair in which the law would require them to keep that part of their road which was used constantly for all the purposes of transportation of passengers and freight. The question in the case at bar is, whether it was in a reasonable state of safety for the purpose for which it was used, and if, in the use of this track, the company had directed their conductors and engineers to run carefully and slowly over the same, and the track was in such a state of repair that it might be used safely in the manner their employees were required to use it. We are of the opinion that the company would not be liable for an injury which happened to one of its employees by reason of the negligence of a coemployee in running with great speed over such track, contrary to the orders of the company.

We have examined, with much care, the question as to whether mere contributory negligence on the part of a co-employee or servant of the defendant, would be a good defense for the master in an action by an employee or servant for an injury received on account of the alleged negligence of the master. We have been able to find but one case in which the question has been plainly before the court-it is the case of Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 5. Vroom. 151. The court held in that case "that where the track of the company over a trestlework, was not capable of supporting an engine, and the engineer in charge had orders not to put his engine thereon, which orders he disobeyed, and the intestate of the plaintiff, who was a fireman on said engine, and who was unaware of said orders or of the danger, was thereby killed, the said trestle-work giving way, the plaintiff was entitled to recover, on the ground that such death was occasioned in part by the want of care in the defendant, the railroad company, with respect to said trestle-work;" and it was further held as a general

rule of law, "that where a servant receives an injury occasioned in part by the negligence of his master, and in part by that of a fellow-servant, he can maintain an action against his master for such injury, and that contributory negligence to defeat a right of action" must be that of the party injured.

This case may appear to be in conflict with the opinion cited in 9 Allen, supra, but it is not so in fact. Chief Justice Beasley, who delivered the opinion, announces the same principle which was announced in the case in Allen. He says: "The principal ground on which a new trial is asked in this case is, that it was clearly shown by the evidence that the accident by which the intestate lost his life was occasioned, not by the negligence of the defendants themselves, but by that of their employees. They said that their road-bed extended over the water, was properly constructed, in view of the purpose for which it was designed, and that it was misapplied to another purpose by their servants contrary to their orders. If these were the facts of the case the position would be well taken." The learned Chief Justice afterward gives his reasons for holding that the rule above claimed by the defendant was not applicable to the facts of the case, and that the defendants were guilty of negligence, although they had directed their engineers to stop their locomotives at the end of the trestle-work, and not run them on to it. He says: "Stripped of all verbal disguises, the arrangement is this, that by their arrangements they required their employees almost hourly to run their engines to the brink of danger, and that their orders were to stop there. The road-bed over the water was supported by wood-work, which the defendants admit was dangerous to a locomotive, and what they required was that the locomotive should be stopped on the fast land. As occasion called for it, in pushing the loaded cars out over the water, the engines were brought necessarily to this line between the water and land. Here was a danger constantly recurring— just as imminent as though the requirement had been to run these engines unto the edge of a precipice. And to make the matter worse, the danger in this case was entirely latent; there was nothing to indicate that this part of the road extending beyond the land would not support a locomotive. It is obvious that it required the constant exercise of skill and vigilance to avoid this unnecessary risk, and yet it is not pretended that there was any notification to the engineers and other employees of the insecurity of this part of the road-bed. It is manifest, from the evidence on both sides, that adequate means to inform the parties in charge of these locomotives of the peril at hand were not used, for several of the engineers themselves testify that occasionally they put their engines upon this insecure structure. Some of them said they were not aware of its insecurity. These circumstances seem to me to constitute a legal default in the defendants." In this case it was properly held to be negligence on the part of the corporation to require its employees to run their engines to the very edge of a great danger, without providing

*

any proper means for arresting the locomotives at the exact point of danger, and without informing their employees that if they passed the point indicated for stopping the locomotives there would be imminent danger of the destruction of both themselves and the engines in their charge. The reasoning in this case, as applied to the facts of the case at bar, would go to this extent and no farther, that if the conductors and other employees of the defendant, who were directed to run trains over this short track, and when directed to do so, they were also directed to run slow, did not understand, and ought not, from the fact of such direction, to have understood that such track was not in a condition to permit of the running of trains rapidly over the same without incurring danger, then the fact that the conductor or engineer disobeyed the order to run slowly would be no defence to the action if the jury found that the track was not in such a state of repair, in view of the purposes for which the track was used, as to permit trains, used with ordinary care, to pass over the same with safety. After giving the question such considera. tion as we have been able to, we are inclined to hold as was held in the case of Paulmier v. The Erie R. Co., supra, that where the negligence of the railroad company directly contributes to the injury of an employee, the company must be held liable, though it also appears that the negligence of a coemployee contributed to such injury, and that the rule is universal that contributory negligence to defeat an action must be the negligence of the plaintiff or of some other person for whose acts he is responsible.

Upon the question of damages, we are unable to say from the evidence and verdict whether they are excessive or not, as the amount of damages which should be given depends very much upon the nature of the injuries received. If they are in fact permanent in their nature, and materially interfere with the natural and ordinary use of the plaintiff's arm, we would not feel justified in holding that they were excessive, whereas, if the injuries were temporary in their nature, and resulted in no permanent disablement of the plaintiff in any respect, we might be constrained to hold the damages were excessive. We do not, however, wish to be understood as giving any opinion upon that subject.

For the error of the court in taking away from the jury the question as to whether the negligence of the conductor in charge of the train caused the accident and the injury to the plaintiff, the judgment must be reversed.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.

July Term, 1879.

TAX CERTIFICATES -RECOVERY OF MONIES BY HOLDERS OF TAX TITLES. In order that a petition shall state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, under sec. 120, ch. 107, Gen. Stats. 58, against a board of county commissioners of a county, in favor of the holder of a tax certificate, granted upon a sale, where such an error or irregularity exists that the land ought not to be conveyed, it must allege a want of funds in the hands of the county treasurer, or some valid reason for his inability to refund, or else some action on the part of the commissioners in the way of direction to the county treasurer or other interference, whereby the holder of the tax certificate is delayed or denied of his right to have his money repaid. Judgment reversed. Opinion by HORTON, C. J.Commrs. v. Geis.

TAX PROCEEDINGS INSUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION -LIABILITIES OF COUNTIES.-1. Where lands are levied on, placed on the tax roll, advertised for sale, sold and entered in the book of tax sales, and described in the tax certificate only as "137 A of s. e. 1-4 section 27, town. 19, range 12." "2 1-2 A of W 1-2 of W, 1-2 of S. W. of S. E. 1-4 section 8, town. 19, range 12," and "5 AN. W. 1-4 section 2, town. 19, range 12," and there is nothing outside of such description to identify the land, the descriptions are so uncertain in each case that the assessment and all the subsequent tax proceedings are void. The irregularities are so great that the county.clerk ought not to convey any portion of the same by tax deeds. 2. A county does not guarantee tax titles, except as the statute may provide for it. Neither the board of commissioners of a county, nor the county treasurer can refund any moneys upon the failure of tax titles, except as some statute requires it. Judgment reversed. Opinion by HORTON, C. J.-Commrs. v. Lyon Co.

PRACTICE-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS- NON-RETURN OF A PLEDGE.-1. Where a defendant attempts by plea to raise the question as to whether the plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations or not, and both parties and the court below treat the plea as sufficient: Held, that the Supreme Court will also treat the plea as sufficient, although it may not be as formal and elaborately circumstantial as it might be. 2. Where B owes A and gives to A his promissory note for the amount, and pledges and delivers to A a city bond as security for the payment of the note, and afterwards the note is paid, but the bond is not returned to B: Held, in the absence of anything showing that A has converted the bond to his own use, that no cause of action accrues in favor of B and against A for the value of the bond until B has made a demand for the bond, and therefore that the statute of limitations does not begin to run against B's cause of action for the value of the bond until there has been such demand and a refusal by A to return the bond. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by VALENTINE, J. BREWER, J., concurring. HORTON, C. J., not sitting. -Auld v. Butcher.

11 Kas. 32, followed, 3. Where the court has jurisdiction of the person of the prisoner, and of the offense with which he is charged, and the verdict is valid, and the judgment pronounced is not void, but merely irregular: Held, that such prisoner can not be relieved under a petition for habeas corpus. Prisoner remanded. Opinion by HORTON, C. J.-Ex parte

Petty.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSA

EVIDENCE

CHUSETTS.

[Filed June, 1879.]

TESTIMONY OF PERSON AS TO HIS OWN AGE.-A person may testify as to his own age, and such weight may be given to his testimony as the court or jury trying the case may think it entitled to receive. PER CURIAM.-Hill v. Eldridge.

NEGLIGENCE-RECOVERY OVER.-At the trial of an action of tort, the plaintiffs offered evidence tending to show that, at the time of the accident hereafter described, there was a hatchway leading from the sidewalk to the store of which the plaintiffs were the lessees and occupants, which hatchway they left in a reasonably safe condition; that a servant of the defendants, in the course of their business, without theknowledge of the plaintiffs, removed the cover and left without replacing it or providing any barrier or warning, and that while it was thus open one M fell in and was injured; that M brought an action against the plaintiffs for the injury, and recovered a judgment, which they paid. The plaintiffs brought this. action to recover the amount of such judgment paid by them, but the presiding judge ruled that the above facts would not support the action, and reported the case for the consideration of the full court. Held, that the case must stand for trial. The liability of the plaintiffs depended upon the question whether the hatchway was dangerous to travelers under such circumstances that the occupant of the building was responsible for the injury suffered, and not upon the question as to who negligently did the act which created the danger. If the defendants or a servant in the prosecution of their business, negligently uncov-. ered the hatchway and allowed it to remain unguarded, without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, whereby the plaintiffs from their relation to the building were made liable to the person injured, the rule as to joint tortfcasors does not apply, but the plaintiffs can maintain this action. Opinion by MORTON, J.-Churchill v. Holt.

RIGHT OF WAY PREMISES BOUNDED UPON A "SQUARE."-In an action of tort for obstructing a way it appeared that the plaintiff claimed title under a mortgage deed foreclosed at the time of this suit, conveying to it a lot of land "beginning at the corner of Cedar Square and Cedar street, and thence running by said Cedar street," etc., "then by said Cedar Square one hundred and twenty-five feet to the point of beginning," being the premises "lately known as the Hotel Flanders." Before this deed was made, Reed, the mortgagor, being the owner of the land now claimed by the plaintiff and the defendant, had laid out and graded over the land claimed by the defendant on the northerly front of the plaintiff's premises, a way called Cedar Square thirty feet wide, running from Cedar street to McLean Place. This way was graded, finished and curved, curb-stones having been set up by the city at the corners of Cedar street, and was intended and used by the defendant and by the plaintiff after its foreclosure as a private foot and carriage-way and means of access to said Hotel Flanders.

The defendant claimed under a subsequent mortgage from said Reed. Held, that the plaintiff took by implication a right of way over the thirty feet passageway. Tobey v. Taunton, 119 Mass. 404; Lewis v. Beattie, 105 Mass. 410; Howe v. Alger, 4 Allen, 206. Opinion by MORTON, J.-Franklin Ins. Co. v. Cousins.

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.

April Term, 1879.

NEGLIGENCE-QUESTION FOR THE JURY - CON-TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-Plaintiff was a citizen of the town of Canton, and fell at night from a bridge over a ravine in one of its streets, and his leg was broken. The bridge was sixteen feet square but had no side railings. Held, that whether the failure to erect side railings was negligence or not was a question for the jury to determine from the surroundings of the bridge, its width, length, travel over it and other circumstances, and the court erred in instructing the jury that the want of railings was negligence per se. The court also erred in an instruction that if the night was so dark as to prevent plaintiff from seeing his way safely across, and in consequence he fell from the bridge, the jury should find for him. This ignored the defense of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. One knowing a bridge to be dangerous in the dark, because it has no side railings, and that he can not see his way over it, can not, without using any precaution for his safety, make the attempt and recover damages for the fall. Reversed. Opinion by HENRY, J.-Staples v. Town of Canton.

JURISDICTION BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.-Plaintiff brought suit to set aside deed of E L to co-defendant J L, because I made to defraud creditors, obtained a judgment and purchased the land under execution sale. E L had been adjudged a bankrupt,but subsequent to the judgment and levy of execution. The assignee in bankruptcy also instituted suit in the United States District Court to set aside said above deed to JL for fraud. The court found for defendant. Held, that the sale though made after adjudication of bankruptcy was valid (Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S. 524, 3 Cent. L. J. 250), and the judgment against the assignee was not binding on plaintiff who was not a party thereto, and who acquired a lien, and for all that appears in the record a title, before suit by the assignee was instituted. The plaintiff, by virtue of his judgment lien, had such an interest as to make him a necessary party, nor was plaintiff, because a creditor of the bankrupt, represented by the assignee, for the reason that the creditor had acquired by his judgment lien an interest in the property other than that of a general creditor. E L was not involved at the time of conveyance, yet having determined to engage in a hazardous business which would probably require him to incur debts, a conveyance to protect his property against future debts was properly set aside. Affirmed. Opinion by HENRY, J.-Fisher v. Lewis.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-POSSESSION OF PART OF TRACT.-Plaintiff brought ejectment February 25, 1875, claiming under S. Defendant claimed under R, who claimed to have purchased interest of S at an execution sale August 22, 1863. Deed of R to defendant -dated April 13, 1865. The sheriff's deed conveyed no title, and the question was as to defense of statute of limitations. R never was in actual possession of any portion of the land, nor ever exercised any of the usual acts of ownership, except paying taxes and on one occasion expelling a trespasser. Defend

ant never took possession, nor exercised acts of ownership, except to pay taxes till 1866 or 1867, when he had a house built and fenced a truck patch of half an acre. Held, that defendant's taking possession at the date of deed to him would not avail him unless R's possession together with his own answered the requirements of the statute, and that there had not been for the statutory period such a visible, open and notorious or actual possession of a part of the premises as would have unmistakably and continuously informed the owner for six years next before suit brought that K or defendant was in actual or adverse possession of a portion of the tract sued for. The possession of part of tract, under W. S. Mo. Stats. p. 917. sec. 5, means actual possession, and two things must concur to make good the statu. tory bar: first, actual possession must be taken of a part in the name of the whole tract claimed; second, there must be an exercise during the time of such partial possession of the usual acts of ownership over the entire tract claimed. Affirmed. Opinion by SHERWOOD, C. J.-Norfleet v. Hutchins.

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

[Filed at Springfield June 20, 1879.]

PROMISSORY NOTE - INTEREST FROM DATE IF NOT PAID AT MATURITY DEATH OF MAKER BEFORE MATURITY.-The claim in this case is based on a promissory note made by S, since deceased, bearing date February 1st, 1876, payable ten months after date, with interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum from date if not paid when due, and by the payee assigned to claimant. The maker of the note died May 15, 1876, and appellant was appointed administrator. The note was presented for allowance as a claim against the estate Dec. 21, 1876. The county clerk allowed the principal with interest at the rate of ten per cent. after the maturity of the note, but on appeal the circuit court allowed claimant the face of the note with interest from the date of the note to the date of allowance. The appellate court affirmed this judgment, and the administrator brings the case to this court on appeal. SCOTT, J., says: "The defense insisted upon is that the interest reserved in the note from the date thereof, unless paid at maturity, is a penalty, and as the maker died before the note matured, it is contended that the estate equitably ought not to be held for it. The fallacy of the position taken lies in the assumption that the rate of interest reserved from the date of the note, which was evidently intended to secure prompt payment, is a penalty and not liquidated damages. Whether the sum named in an agreement to secure performance will be treated as liquidated damages or as a penalty is often a question of much difficulty, but the authorities are to the effect that it must be determined in accordance with the intention of the contracting parties when that can be ascertained. 76 Ill. 157. It is very clear that the parties in this case iutended the interest reserved should be the measure of damages in case the note was not paid when due. The parties called it neither penalty nor liquidated damages, but that is a matter of no consequence. It is simply a rate of interest which is lawful by contract under our statute from the date of the note, inserted with a view to secure prompt payment. • It is said that because of the death of the maker he could not pay the note so as to avoid the interest from date. Were that a valid objection, it might be urged with equal propriety against paying interest on any interest bearing obligation after maturity in case of death of the

maker ―a proposition that finds no sanction either in reason or authority." Affirmed.-Reeves v. Stipp.

ELECTION-MANDAMUS-CERTIFICATE OF ELECTION-INFORMALITY IN RETURNS.-At the general election held in November, 1878, there was submitted to the voters of the county of Jersey, in this State, to be voted upon at said election, the question of the adoption of township organization in that county. The result of the vote taken being claimed to have been in favor of township organization, the petition for a writ of mandamus was filed in this court to compel the respondents who constitute the board of county commissioners of that county, to proceed and act under the township organization law. The whole question rests upon the vote of Grafton precinct, as to whether or not it shall be counted. At that precinct the certifieate of the elective officers was made upon the poll books on printed blanks furnished, and was in the usual form. After the certificate appeared the statement of the number of votes cast at that precinct for and against the township act. The same figures also appeared on a tally sheet which was kept at that precinct, and returned with the poll books. SHELDON, J., says: "The 'return' consists of the certificate of the officers conducting the election entered in the poll books, together with a list of voters and one of the tally sheets, all of which are to be carefully enveloped and sealed up and delivered to the county clerk. The tally sheet is a constitutional part of the return, and it properly showed the number of votes for and against township organization. On comparing the certificate and tally sheet there could be no doubt as to the number of votes given for and against township organization. As said in People v. Hilliard, 29 Ill. 425: The plain duty of the board was to make the abstract from the return and give the certificate to the person who appeared to have received the highest vote. Form should be made subservient to this inquiry, and should not rule in opposition to substance." " Mandamus awarded. SCHOLFIELD, J., dissents.Powell v. Evans.

REPLEVIN-CONTRACT EVIDENCE OFFERED TO SHOW THAT LEASE IS A BILL OF SALE-RECEIPT.— Appellants commenced an action of replevin against appellee before a justice of the peace to recover an organ. It was manufactured by appellants, and they in the early part of 1872 leased it to M for $3.50 a month. After holding it some time, appellants took possession of the same and entered into an agreement with ap

order, on lease, one organ, manufactured by A, for which I agree to pay rent at the rate of $10 per month for ten and one-half months, payable monthly in advance, and return said organ on demand in as good order as received, usual wear excepted." Appellee received the organ and paid $50, under the written agreement. Upon a refusal to pay more and restore the organ appellants brought this suit. Judgment bedow went for defendant. Appellee claims, and the court below permitted him to introduce evidence to prove that the agreement was a contract of sale and not a lease. WALKER, J., says: "There is no rule more familiar than that parties can not introduce verbal evidence to contradict, change or vary written contracts. But it is said that to the rule there is the exception that a receipt may be thus explained. And this is no doubt true of such instrument. Can it however be said this is only a receipt? We think it can by no means be so held. It is true the instrument commences by saying that appellee received of appellants on lease one organ. But it is manifest that as to the rent, the times of payment, etc., it is and can only be a contract without any element of a receipt. We apprehend no one would say that because a promissory note should, at its commencemeut, state that the

maker had received value from the payee, instead of at the end of the instrument that it would thereby become a receipt. See 37 Ill. 66; 38 Ill. 553; 46 Ill. 187. The court therefore erred in admitting this evidence. Had this been a bill properly framed to reform this contract, then the question would be presented whether the evidence would be admissible. But it is not at law." Reversed.-Andrus v. Mann.

PROMISSORY NOTE-DAMAGES FOR NON-PAYMENT AT MATURITY-PROMISE OF EXTENSION OF TIME.The declaration is on a promissory note bearing date April, 1874, made by defendant F for $3,000, payable to plaintiff B, with interest at the rate of ten per cent., and if not paid promptly at maturity fifteen per cent. per annum. At the time of executing the note, a power of attorney to confess judg.nent was given by F. On the 1st of June, 1875, the sum of $300 was paid and indorsed as a credit on the back of the note. At the March term of court an attorney appeared and confessed judgment for defendant in accordance with the power of attorney, including interest after maturity, at the rate of fifteen per cent. per annum. At the same term, defendant appeared and moved to vacate the judgment and for leave to plead to the merits of the action. On the hearing of that motion, defendant proved by plaintiff that when F paid plaintiff the $300 credited on the note, he pressed plaintiff not to sue, and plaintiff told him he would not as long as he could help it, but did not give him any definite time. The court overruled the motion to vacate the judgment. Defendant appeals. CRAIG, C. J., says: "It is very clear from the evidence preserved in the record that there was not the slightest intention on the part of the plaintiff to waive any right to exact damages for the non-payment of the note at maturity. He was not asked to do so. Nor was there any valid extension for the payment of the note for any definite period that indicated it was a mere device to secure a greater rate of interest than the statute allows. What was done was done simply to oblige defendant for the time being as a personal favor, and must have been so nnderstood by him. Plaintiff consented to no extension of payment for any definite period, nor did he waive his right to sue defendant at any time. It was the privilege of defendant to pay the note at his pleasure and thus avoid the payment of the damages agreed upon on account of the failure so to do. The case in all its essential features is within the rule declared in 78 Ill. 53." Affirmed.-Fink v. Buck.

CORRESPONDENCE.

JUDGE DILLON AND THE ARKANSAS BAR. LITTLE ROCK, ARK., July 1, 1879.

HON. JOHN F. DILLON:

My Dear Sir-I have the honor herewith to transmit to you the proceedings of our bar, in relation to your retiring from the bench, which you have occupied so long, so faithfully, so honorably and so grandly. The enclosed resolutions were adopted with an unanimous and most hearty aye, and sincerely express the sentiments of our bar.

While personally I exceedingly regret the resignation of your judgeship, and doubtingly look to see where a peer may be found for your successor, yet permit me to wish for you, in your new vocation, all the success, emoluments, honor and happiness to which your great industry, your broad and deep knowledge of the law, and your many personal ac