or of movable with movable, instanced in Scriptura, Pictura : or of matter with form, seen in Specificatio. Original acquisition dependent on Possession is either further dependent on Time or is not dependent on Time. Original acquisition dependent on Possession and further dependent on Time is seen in Usucapio and Praescriptio. Original acquisition dependent on Possession but independent of Time is seen in Occupatio, including Captio ferarum, Captio hostilis, Inventio derelicti, Inventio thesauri. DE PUPILLIS AN ALIQUID A SE ALIENARE POSSUNT. § 80. Nunc admonendi sumus neque feminam neque pupillum sine tutoris auctoritate rem mancipi alienare posse; nec mancipi vero feminam quidem posse, pupillum non posse. § 81. Ideoque si quando mulier mutuam pecuniam alicui sine tutoris auctoritate dederit, quia facit eam accipientis, cum scilicet ea pecunia res nee mancipi sit, contrahit obligationem. § 82. At si pupillus idem fecerit, quia eam pecuniam non facit accipientis, nullam contrahit obligationem. unde pupillus vindicare quidem nummos suos potest, sicubi extent, id est intendere suos ex iure Quiritium esse; mala fide consumtos vero ab eodem repetere potest quasi possideret. unde de pupillo quidem quaeritur, an nummos quoque quos mutuos dedit, ab eo qui accepit bona fide alienatos petere possit, quoniam is scilicet accipientis eos nummos facere videtur. § 83. At ex contrario res tam WHETHER WARDS CAN ALIENE. § 80. We must next observe, that neither a woman nor a ward can aliene a mancipable thing without their guardian's authority: a ward cannot aliene a non-mancipable thing without the guardian's authority, a woman can. § 81. Thus a woman lending money without the guardian's authority passes the property therein to the borrower, money being a non-mancipable thing, and imposes a contractual obligation. § 82. But a ward lending money without his guardian's authority does not pass the property, and does not impose a contractual obligation, and therefore he can recover back the money, if it exists, by real action, that is, by claiming it as quiritary proprietor; if it has been fraudulently consumed, he can claim it as if it were still in the possession of the borrower; whether he can if it has been innocently aliened by the borrower, who thus has passed the property to the alienee, is a controversy. § 83. On the contrary, both man mancipi quam nec mancipi mulieribus et pupillis sine tutoris auctoritate solvi possunt, quoniam meliorem condicionem suam facere iis etiam sine tutoris auctoritate concessum est. § 84. Itaque si debitor pecuniam pupillo solvat, facit quidem pecuniam pupilli, sed ipse non liberatur, quia nullam obligationem pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate dissolvere potest, quia nullius rei alienatio ei sine tutoris auctoritate concessa est. set tamen si ex ea pecunia locupletior factus sit, et adhuc petat, per exceptionem doli mali summoveri potest. § 85. Mulieri vero etiam sine tutoris auctoritate recte solvi potest: nam qui solvit, liberatur obligatione, quia res nec mancipi, ut proxume diximus, a se dimittere mulier et sine tutoris auctoritate potest quamquam hoc ita est, si accipiat pecuniam; at si non accipiat, sed habere se dicat, et per acceptilationem velit debitorem sine tutoris auctoritate liberare, non po test. cipable and non-mancipable things can be conveyed to women and wards without their guardian's authority, because they do not require his authority to better their position. $84. Accordingly, a debtor who pays money to a ward passes the property therein to the ward, but is not discharged of his obligation, because a ward cannot release from any liability without his guardian's authority, as without such authority he cannot aliene any right: if, however, he profits by the money, and yet demands further payment, he may be barred by plea of fraud. § 85. A woman may be lawfully paid without her guardian's authority, and the payer is discharged of liability, because, as we lately mentioned, a woman does not need her guardian's authority for the alienation of a non-mancipable right, provided always that she receives actual payment: for if she is not actually paid, she cannot feign receipt and release her debtor by fictitious acknowledgment (3 § 169) without her guardian's authority. § 82. For mutuum, see 3 § 90. If the money delivered by a ward could be traced it was recoverable by real action (vindicatio): if it had been consumed in bona fides a personal action, condictio certi, would lie to recover an equivalent sum: if it had been consumed in mala fides a personal action, ad exhibendum, would lie to recover an equivalent sum and damages, Inst. 2, 8, 2. § 85. The pupilage of women after attaining the age of twelve, i.e. the age of puberty, had become obsolete before the time of Justinian, and with it their incapacities of alienation. PER QUAS PERSONAS NOBIS ADQUIRATUR. § 86. Adquiritur autem nobis non solum per nosmet ipsos, sed etiam per eos quos in potestate manu mancipiove habemus; item per eos servos in quibus usumfruc Р § 86. We may acquire property not only by our own acts but also by the acts of persons in our power, hand, or mancipation; further, by slaves in whom we have a usufruct; X tum habemus; item per homines liberos et servos alienos quos bona fide possidemus. de quibus singulis diligenter dispiciamus. § 87. Igitur quod liberi nostri quos in potestate habemus, item quod servi nostri mancipio accipiunt, vel ex traditione nanciscuntur, sive quid stipulentur, vel ex aliqualibet causa adquirunt, id nobis adquiritur ipse enim qui in potestate nostra est nihil suum habere potest, et ideo si heres institutus sit, nisi nostro iussu, hereditatem adire non potest; et si iubentibus nobis adierit, hereditatem nobis adquirit proinde atque si nos ipsi heredes instituti essemus. et convenienter scilicet legatum per eos nobis adquiritur. § 88. Dum tamen sciamus, si alterius in bonis sit servus, alterius ex iure Quiritium, ex omnibus causis ei soli per eum adquiri cuius in bonis est. $89. Non solum autem proprietas per eos quos in potestate habemus adquiritur nobis, sed etiam possessio: cuius enim rei possessionem adepti fuerint, id nos possidere videmur: unde etiam per eos usucapio procedit. § 90. Per eas vero personas quas in manu mancipiove habemus, proprietas quidem adquiritur nobis ex omnibus causis, sicut per eos qui in potestate nostra sunt: an autem possessio adquiratur, quaeri solet, quia ipsas non possidemus. § 91. De his autem servis in quibus tantum usumfructum habemus ita placuit, ut quidquid ex re nostra vel ex operis suis adquirunt, id nobis adquiratur; quod vero extra eas causas, id ad dominum proprietatis pertineat. itaque si iste servus heres institutus sit legatumve quod ei datum fuerit, non mihi, further, by freemen or slaves belonging to another if we are innocent possessors: and let us now examine these cases in detail. $87. The rights of property which children under power or slaves acquire by mancipation or tradition, the rights to a service they acquire by stipulation, and all rights they acquire by any other title, are acquired for their superior; for an inferior is incapable of holding property, and if instituted heir he must have the command of his superior to be capable of accepting the inheritance, and if he has the command of the superior and accepts the inheritance, it is acquired for the superior just as if he himself had been instituted heir: and the same occurs in the case of a legacy. $88. When one man is bonitary proprietor of a slave and another quiritary proprietor, whatever the mode of acquisition, it enures exclusively to the bonitary proprietor. § 89. Not only property is acquired for the superior but also possession, for the detention of the inferior is deemed to be the possession of the superior, and thus the former is to the latter an instrument of usucapion. § 90. Persons in the hand or mancipation of a superior acquire dominion for him just as persons in his power; whether they acquire possession for him, is a controversy, not being themselves in his possession. § 91. Respecting slaves in whom a person has only a usufruct, the rule is, that what they acquire by administering the property of the usufructuary or by their own labour is acquired for the usufructuary; but what they acquire by any other means belongs to their proprietor (the reversioner). Accordingly, if sed domino proprietatis adquiri- such a slave is instituted heir or tur. § 92. Idem placet de eo qui a nobis bona fide possidetur, sive liber sit sive alienus servus. quod enim placuit de usufructuario, idem probatur etiam de bona fide possessore. itaque quod extra duas istas causas adquiritur, id vel ad ipsum pertinet, si liber est, vel ad dominum, si servus sit. § 93. Sed si bonae fidei possessor usuceperit servum, quia eo modo dominus fit, ex omni causa per eum sibi adquirere potest: usufructuarius vero usucapere non potest, primum quia non possidet, sed habet ius utendi et fruendi; deinde quia scit alienum servum esse. $94. De illo quaeritur, an per eum servum in quo usumfructum habemus possidere aliquam rem et usucapere possumus, quia ipsum non possidemus. Per eum vero quem bona fide possidemus sine dubio et possidere et usucapere possumus. loquimur autem in utriusque persona secundum distinctionem quam proxume exposuimus, id est si quid ex re nostra vel ex operis suis adquirant, id nobis adquiritur. § 95. Ex his apparet per liberos homines, quos neque iuri nostro subiectos habemus neque bona fide possidemus, item per alienos servos, in quibus neque usumfructum habemus neque iustam possessionem, nulla ex causa nobis adquiri posse. et hoc est quod dicitur per extraneam personam nihil adquiri posse, excepta possessione, de ea enim quaeritur, anne per liberam personam nobis adquiratur. made legatee, the succession or legacy is acquired, not to the usufructuary, but to the proprietor. § 92. The innocent possessor of a freeman or a slave belonging to another has the same rights as a usufructuary; what they acquire by any other title than the two we mentioned, belonging in the one case to the freeman in the other to the true proprietor. § 93. After a bona fide possessor has acquired the ownership of a slave by usucapion, all acquisitions by the slave enure to his benefit. A usufructuary cannot acquire a slave by usucapion, for, in the first place, he has no true possession, but only a quasi possession of a servitude; in the second place, he is aware of the existence of another proprietor. § 94. It is a question whether a slave can be an instrument of possession and usucapion to a usufructuary, not being himself in his possession. A slave, undoubtedly, can be the instrument of possession and usucapion to a bona fide possessor. Both cases are limited by the distinction recently drawn, that is, the proposition is confined to the things acquired by the slave in the administration of a party's property or by his own labour. § 95. It appears that freemen not subject to my power nor in my innocent possession, and my neighbour's slave of whom I am neither usufructuary nor just possessor, cannot under any circumstances be instruments of my acquisition, and this is the import of the dictum that a stranger cannot be an instrument in the acquisition of anything except, perhaps, possession; for in respect of possession there is a controversy whether an inde § 96. In summa sciendum est iis qui in potestate manu mancipiove sunt nihil in iure cedi posse. cum enim istarum personarum nihil suum esse possit, conveniens est scilicet, ut nihil suum esse per se in iure vindicare possint. pendent person can be instrumental in its acquisition. § 96. Finally, it is to be observed that persons under power, in hand, or in bondage, cannot acquire by surrender before a magistrate, for, being incapable of ownership, they are incompetent to bring a claim of ownership before a tribunal. § 87. Manus and mancipium had ceased to exist before the time of Justinian, and patria potestas was much reduced. Originally, the filiusfamilias was incapable of property: in the peculium, the goods he was allowed to administer, he had no property nor even possession, 4 § 148, but merely detention. The military profession were the first to emerge from this position of inferiority, and in respect of peculium castrense the filiusfamilias was deemed to have the status of paterfamilias. By the introduction of peculium quasi castrense this privilege was extended to certain civil functionaries and liberal professions: and by inventing peculium adventitium Justinian still further emancipated the filiusfamilias. Peculium adventitium, as opposed to peculium profectitium, was what came to the son from any other source than the estate and permission of the father in respect of peculium profectitium the old law continued in force; the paterfamilias remained absolute proprietor: but in respect of peculium adventitium the right of the father was reduced to a life estate or usufruct: in respect of the fee or reversion in remainder after this life estate the filiusfamilias was proprietor, Inst. 2, 9, 1. The reduction of patria potestas, and the abolition of the dependent law of Agnation, may be almost regarded (so fundamental were these institutions in jus civile) as the abrogation of the civil law, and the substitution in its stead of what the Romans called jus gentium or the law of nature. § 94. The question whether an usufructuary slave may be an instrument of acquiring possession is decided in the affirmative, Dig. 41, 2, 1, 8. § 95. All Dispositions or modes of conferring either rights against one (jus in personam), or rights against the world (jus in rem), are divisible, as we have before mentioned, into two parcels ; an essential portion, some mental or internal act, the Intention of the parties; and an evidentiary portion, the Execution of this intention, its incorporation in some overt act. Can these elements |