both for man and the universe of his person, appearance, and sufferings in time? is a problem the Church has not exhausted. that invites now, as always, devout yet daring thought. Strauss was right in stating and attempting it anew, but he was wrong in too hastily assuming, what his own first principles did not warrant, that the reality of the facts was incompatible with his idea! construction. He endeavoured to solve the problem before he had mastered its factors. His hold of the principles that underlay his interpretation was none of the firmest; his faith in their validity, as well as in the consistency and completeness of his own deductions, wavered, and the result of many changes was the occupancy of a second position which contradicted his first. Theology was now discredited; its doctrines were but illusions, good enough for the vulgar. The truth in form and in fact existed in philosophy, and for the philosopher alone. And in this case the philosophy was an unsound Pantheism, made to walk in uneasy and unequal fellowship with a rational morality. This second position-the position of the Glaubenslehre-Strauss did not long occupy. When he left it we cannot precisely tell; perhaps he himself could not have told. For many years his philosophical conceptions must have been rather fluid, but his ethical more coherent than his metaphysical. His speculative system broke up, and he had no new materials out of which to make a new one. At length evolution became a comprehensive hypothesis as to the origin and order of things, and furnished him with the occasion of his final endeavour to be a religious thinker. It is not too much to say that the last attempt was in everything but the age of the man who made it more juvenile than the first.

Our age has no greater or graver question than, "How are we to conceive the universe?" But certainly nothing can be more impertinent than to make the apotheosis of a still inchoate scientific theory the answer. If, too, the deified theory owes its divine. elements to a conception it claims to supersede, the impertinence is still greater. To dismiss the idea of person while retaining personal qualities is, by a trick of thought, to make a change of names equal to a change of the things named. Reason, goodness, righteousness are personal qualities, and if these, as Strauss argued, belong to the Unity which made and guides the universe, it is less correctly named Force than Person. Our physical science is growing more cautious every day. Our more distinguished evolutionists, like our wiser theologians, are getting less dogmatic the more they discuss their theory. They are coming to see that there is a point where teleology not only may, but must stand, and where science and theology can forget their long feud, and become, like Esau and Jacob on the morning after Peniel, twin brothers once more. The physicist has much to do before he can

complete his conception of the universe, and the theologian no less. They approach the same object from different points, the one from the real, the other from the ideal side; the one from fact, the other from thought; and neither need fear his exclusion by the other. The ultimate truth of the universe can never be an evil thing to know, and every one who helps us towards it does excellently well. If the idea of God be rooted in mind, it can never be expelled from nature. Spirit must always find it there. Meanwhile the man who uses his great opportunity to spring on the unwary a hastily and ill-primed mine, which shall lift their God out of nature, does not only a cruel, but an unjustified thing, · worthy of sad but severe rebuke from every man who loves the true and reveres the holy.

On the whole, we must conclude that David Friedrich Strauss had a great work to do, and, even after every abatement has been made, did it. He has been in our century a minister of God for good. The Church has need, not only to give an account of its stewardship, but show its right to be a steward of the divine mysteries. We ought not to go on believing by custom, living by retrospect. We cannot do it if we would. The Church has debts to the past, but duties to the present. These are summed up in making religion a living power, the supreme vehicle of spiritual realities to our day. We ought to be as patient and fearless in making our theology as were Paul and John, Athanasius and Augustine, Luther and Calvin; and if we are, it will be as thoroughly living for our contemporaries as their theologies were for theirs. Truth lives in conflict, and must not fear it, dread no change of form that can secure permanence and vitality of substance. Our author, as a leader in the great conflict, has forced the Church to feel that she has enemies she must face and fight. To flee, or feign oblivion of their presence, is worse than defeat, for out of defeat may come victory, out of the flight or oblivion only the exhaustion that means death. It were simply a calamity that sceptical thought should leaven society and never win speech. Let the worst be known that the best may be done. Religious thought has everything to gain by being enlightened and progressive; everything to lose by shutting eyes and mind to the lights shining to a more perfect day. The Church in these days ought to win and wear the character that made Aristides so proud

a name

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ ̓ εἶναι θέλλει.

The friends Strauss gathered round him, the response his writings received from the educated laity, warn her that the critic had something to say she ought to hear and understand. While the missionary to the masses, she should not leave the cultured to a

reviving paganism. No success with the oi rooi can compensate failure with the of apoTo not of rank but of intellect. Generations of mutual suspicion and reproach have to be lived down, but let science and religion love as its own the other's truth, and then, though in some still distant future, the day will come when science shall be religious and religion scientific, and these no more twain, but one knowledge and one spirit.

VOL. XXVIII.

U

A. M. FAIRBAIRN.

HOMEROLOGY.

IV. ATHENÈ.

ATHENE, Athenaid: the standard name of the goddess, who is,

without doubt, the most lofty and splendid figure of the entire thearchy of the Poems. Frequently referred to the name of Neith, the Egyptian goddess, as its origin. Neith is rendered “I came from myself." See Bunsen's Egypt i. 385 (transl.), and Sir G. Wilkinson in Rawlinson's Herod. ii. 89.

Derived by Scott and Liddell, "perhaps" from anth, the root of ávéw. Max Müller believes that the root ah, which yielded in ἀνθέω. Sanscrit ahaná, the dawn, ahan and ahar, day, supplied likewise the germ of Athenè.-"Lectures on the Science of Languages," second series, p. 502.

I. TITLES.

Atrutone, the unbroken or unwearied. From årpúry, like Atdóvevs from Αΐδης. Always used in the vocative, and always when appealing to her to perform some act, which she invariably does. Il. ii. 157; v. 115, 714; x. 284; xxi. 420. Od. iv. 762; vi. 324. Glaukopis. Interpreted either (1) as flashing-eyed, gleaming-eyed, according to the analogy of yλavkiáw, Il. xx. 172, used of a lion in wrath, and from the root Xáw to see. This meaning is adopted by L. and S. (2) Blue-eyed; but the idea of colour seems to be later; (3) owl-eyed or owl-faced, with reference to the fact that the owl was in later times her symbol, and to the theory that she had been worshipped in Troy (vide Schliemann) or elsewhere under the form of the owl. The word glaux is not in Homer; and it

would be most difficult to prove from the Poems the connection between the goddess and the bird. On the other hand, if the theory just mentioned be sound, it would be quite in keeping with Homer's manner to throw it into the shade, as he has dealt with the Egyptian worship of Horos as a figure with a hawk's head (Homeric Synchronism, p. 246). The representation, however, of Athenè as taking the form of a vulture to witness the duel of Hector and Aias (Il. vii. 58-61) appears to indicate that the Poet was unaware of any connection of Athene with the owl.

It is declined in the Iliad with the genitive in dos; but the form Taúκwπ occurs once in the Odyssey (i. 156).

Glaukopis is used about ninety times, commonly as an epithet, but as a title in some few passages, as Il. viii. 373, 406, 420; xxiv. 26; and Od. xiii. 389.

Obrimopatre, "daughter of a mighty sire" (L. and S.).

Tochter des schrechlichen Vaters" (Voss). Perhaps, "having the might, or terrors, of her sire."

This name is given only to Athenè; nor has any other deity an appellation of quality thus related to Zeus. It seems then to designate a special relation to her father, and it may be founded on the legend of the "head-born." (See inf. Tritogeneia.)

Obrimopatre is, in my opinion, a title only, and is used II. v. 747; viii. 391. Od. ì. 101; iii. 135; xxiv. 540.

Pallas is referred to the virgin character of Athenè, having the same root as aλλáκis and máλag. In Strabo (816) Pallades are virgin priestesses, of whatsoever deity. (See L. and S.)

The word grew afterwards into a title, and is always so rendered, but with doubtful propriety, for it is invariably annexed in Homer to Athenè or Athenaiè. Il. i. 200, 400, et al. Od. i. 125, 327, et al. In all between fifty and sixty times. Tritogeneia, or Trito-born. Derived by some from the lake Tritonis in Libya; by others from a torrent in Boeotia. But we have no trace of either in Homer. On the other hand, the legend of her birth from the head of Zeus, supposed to be signified here from the old word trito for the head ("dubious" L. and S.), is not wholly without support from Homer. First, we remark that there is no trace of any mother for Athenè in the Olympian system, while she is in relations of such harmony and co-operation with Herè that, if they had been mother and daughter, it could hardly have failed to be indicated. But interpreters appear to have overlooked the passage, in which Arès reproaches Zeus for his especial and undue indulgence to Athenè. First, he says in Il. v. 875

σοὶ πάντες μαχόμεσθα, σὺ γὰρ τέκες ἄφρονα κούρην·

which seems to imply something special and peculiar in the fatherhood of Zeus towards Athenè, for the Távτes were likewise in most cases children of Zeus (comp. xv. 196-199, where ous TÉKEV AUTÒS is used to distinguish all his children from his brothers and the other seniors). Then he proceeds to allege that his fatherhood is the cause of the indulgence

ταύτην δ ̓ οὔτ ̓ ἔπει προτιβάλλεα: οὔτε τι ἔργῳ,

ἀλλ ̓ ἀνιεῖς, ἐπεὶ αὐτος ἐγείναο παῖδ' αίδηλον-νν. 379, 380.

The sense of avròs appears here to be solus, alone, as in autós Tep wv, Il. viii. 99. It certainly indicates something special in the fatherhood.