a Department, but was merely an appointee of the surveyorgeneral, without definite employment and subject to removal at the will of that officer. The employment of the appellee is alleged to be no different than the ordinary engagement of master and servant, and it is urged that the attempted suspension by the surveyor-general was tantamount to dismissal by an employer of one who was engaged without definite term and subject to dismissal at any time.

The provisions of the act of Congress of January 16, 1883, to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States, 1 Supp. Rev. Stat. 392, are broad and comprehensive. By section 6 of the act the power is conferred upon the President of the United States to require the heads of Executive Departments to classify for the purposes of the act and the examination therein provided for, and to include in one or more of said classes, so far as practicable, subordinate places, clerks and officers in the public service pertaining to their respective departments, not before classified for examination. The order of the President of May 6, 1896, Rule III, provides that the departmental service classified under the act should include officers and employés, among others, "All executive officers and employés outside the District of Columbia of whatever designation, whether compensated by fixed salary or otherwise, who are serving in a clerical capacity, or whose duties are in whole or in part of a clerical nature." In accordance with the statute and under the provisions of this order the Secretary of the Interior, on June 9, 1896, made an order classifying the officers and employés of his Department, Class E, including persons receiving $1,000 or more of salary, or compensation at the rate of $1,000 or more, but less than $1,200 per annum. On September 26, 1896, under the extension order referred to and the action of the Secretary of the Interior, the Acting Secretary of the Interior filed a list of positions and employés with the Civil Service Commission, which, among others, in the list of employés in the offices of surveyorsgeneral, contained the name of the appellee as a stenographer

and typewriter, the date of his appointment, salary and residence, as stated in the findings of fact. By the action recited on the part of the President and the head of the Department of the Interior, Wickersham was brought within the protection of the law and the President's order afforded to persons duly entered in the classified civil service. While he may not technically have been an officer of the United States with a fixed term and compensation, he certainly was within the subordinate places provided for in the statute, and within the "employés outside the District of Columbia," covered by the President's order of May 6, 1896. That order expressly included officers and employés, whether compensated by a fixed salary or otherwise, serving in a clerical capacity or whose duties were in whole or in part of a clerical nature. The Secretary of the Interior certified the name of the claimant to the Civil Service Commission as an employé in the office of the surveyor-general, within the terms of the statute and the Executive order. He was, therefore, entitled to the protection of the President's order of July 27, 1897 (14 An. Rep. Civ. Serv. Comm. 133): "No removal shall be made from any position subject to competitive examination except for just cause and upon written charges filed with the head of the department or other appointing officer, and of which the accused shall have full notice and an opportunity to make defense." If the contention of the Government be correct, and the attempted suspension by the surveyor-general was equivalent to a dismissal from office, such action would run counter to the requirements of the Presidential order just quoted. The action of the surveyor-general was not upon written charges, and no notice or opportunity to make defense was given to the accused, as provided in that order. The appellee being entitled to the protection of this order, and to have notice of the charges preferred, and an opportunity to make defense, the attempted removal, if such it was, was without legal effect; nor can we find any authority, statutory or otherwise, authorizing the suspension in the manner undertaken in this case. The at

tempted suspension was held to be without authority by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and the surveyorgeneral was directed to reinstate the claimant and to proceed by regular charges against him. In the meantime the record shows that the claimant was ready and willing to discharge the duties of his position, and had received no compensation therefor during the time of his wrongful suspension. Whether he could have been summarily removed or suspended by the President or other competent authority is not the question now before the court, but the question is whether the employé during his wrongful suspension by a subordinate officer is entitled to the compensation provided by law. We see no reason in such an attitude of the case, where the wrongful suspension is clearly established, and the ability of the incumbent to discharge the duties of his office affirmatively found, for withholding from him the compensation given by law to an incumbent of the place. If this be not so, then a regular and duly qualified employé in the public service, protected by the statute and the orders of the President made in pursuance thereof, can be deprived of the benefit and emolument of his position by a wrongful and illegal suspension from his duties. We do not think such a contention can be sustained either by reason or authority. Where an officer is wrongfully suspended by one having no authority to make such an order, he ought to be, and is, entitled to the compensation provided by law during such suspension. Throop on Public Officers, § 407; Emmitt v. Mayor &c. of New York, 128 N. Y. 117. This was the view entertained by the Court of Claims in deciding Lellmann's case, 37 C. Cl. 128, on the authority of which the case at bar was decided by that court. We think the ruling was correct.

The case comes to this: The appellee, by his appointment, practically made by the Secretary of the Interior in entering his name in the classified list and designating him for the service required, was entitled to the privileges and emoluments of his position until he was legally disqualified by his own action or that of some duly authorized public authority. The at

tempted suspension without authority of law, he remaining ready and willing to discharge the duties of the place, could not, during the period of such wrongful suspension, have the effect to deprive him of the compensation legally belonging to one entitled to hold the position.

Judgment affirmed.

BLAIR v. CITY OF CHICAGO.

NORTH CHICAGO CITY RAILWAY COMPANY v. BLAIR.

CITY OF CHICAGO v. FETZER.

BLAIR v. CITY OF CHICAGO.

CHICAGO WEST DIVISION RAILWAY COMPANY v.

BLAIR.

CITY OF CHICAGO v. FETZER.

APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.

Nos. 331, 332, 333, 334. 335 and 336. Argued January 11, 12, 15, 1906.-Decision announced March 12, 1906.-Opinion filed April 2, 1906.

Where notes are made by a corporation payable to the order of its own treasurer, a citizen of the same State, as a matter of convenience and custom, and indorsed and delivered by him to a bona fide holder who, a citizen of a different State, furnishes the money represented by the note directly to the corporation, the treasurer is not in fact an assignee of the note within the meaning of the act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, and suit may be brought by such holder in the Circuit Court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, notwithstanding such diversity does not exist as to the treasurer first indorsing the note. Falk v. Moebs, 127 U. S. 597; Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U. S. 150. Where there is a proper cause of action and diverse citizenship, jurisdiction of the Federal courts exists, and the motive of the creditor who desires to litigate in that forum is immaterial, and does not affect the jurisdiction; nor is such jurisdiction if it actually exists, affected by the fact that a

receivership was in view when judgments were entered. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286.

Where, as in this case, the attitude and claims of the municipality cast a cloud upon the title to property consisting largely of franchises in the hands of receivers and to be administered under orders of the court, the receivers may, with the authority of the court, proceed by ancillary bill to protect the jurisdiction and right to administer the property, and to determine the validity of claims of parties which cast a cloud upon such franchises and in such a case it is proper to grant an injunction until the rights of the parties can be determined. Whether a corporation having a limited and definite capacity to purchase and hold real estate has exceeded those limits concerns only the State within whose jurisdiction the property is situated; the question cannot, unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication authorizes it, be raised collaterally by private persons. Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U. S. 282. The generality of the title of a state statute does not invalidate it under a provision of the constitution of the State that private and local laws shall only embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the title, so long as the title is comprehensive enough to reasonably include within the general subject or the subordinate branches thereof, the several objects which the statute seeks to effect, and does not cover legislation incongruous in itself and which by no fair intendment can be included as having any necessary and proper connection. Montclair v. Ramsdell,, 107 U. S. 147. Although decisions of the highest court of a State are not binding on this court in determining whether a contract was made by legislative action of that State which is entitled to protection under the impairment of obligation clause of the Federal Constitution, it will consider decisions of that court on the point in question.

One asserting private rights in public property under grants of franchises must show that they have been conferred in plain terms, for nothing passes by the grant except it be clearly stated or necessarily implied. Legislative grants of franchises which are in any way ambiguous as to whether granted for a longer or a shorter period are to be construed strictly against the grantee.

As a rule of construction a statute amended is to be understood in the same sense exactly as if it had read from the beginning as it does amended. Although a corporation be organized under a charter for a limited period it may receive a grant inuring to the benefit of its lawful successors for a period beyond its corporate life, but the right granted must be construed with reference to the system of which it is a part and where that general system is for a limited period a single ordinance, not naming a specific term, will not be construed as granting a franchise in perpetuity. A declaration in the title of state statutes that they concern horse railways, where it is apparent that these terms were intended to indicate street railways as distinguished from steam railways, will not, because of a constitutional provision that the object of the statute must be expressed in the title, prevent the city from exercising its powers under the statute in VOL. CCI-26