authorized committee or member would be a question of fact.

As to both these demands the board says in its return to the order to show cause that it refused to allow them "upon careful consideration, and only because it became convinced that said Freeling W. Peck had no legal or equitable claim upon the county in these matters, and that said claims ought not to be paid."

This is a sufficient statement of the case for the purposes of our action, and quite sufficient to show that the relator has made out no case.

Mandamus issues only to compel the recognition of a clear legal right or the performance of a legal duty; it does not issue so long as the right or the duty is disputable. If this court had general authority to review the decisions of boards of supervisors on questions of law and fact, it would be open to controversy on this record whether the relator had shown that the board erred. But the court has no such general authority.

The Constitution confers upon boards of supervisors exclusive power to adjust all claims against their respective counties, and takes away the appellate supervisory authority which before was vested in the courts. Const. art. 10, § 10. Whether this provision is wise or unwise, it is conclusive upon us, and will be maintained in intent and spirit. There are some apparent exceptions, which were enumerated and commented on in Endriss v. County of Chippewa 43 Mich. 317, but they are not numerous. A case of claim for services performed or money expended for the county is certainly not among them.

It is the duty of the supervisors, when a claim is made against the county, to give the claimant an opportunity to present his case, and then to decide it according to the law and the facts. The performance of this duty may be compelled by mandamus. But we cannot coerce the judgment of the board when we happen to differ with its members in opinion, or set aside their action because we think it erroneous or unjust. There must be a final authority in all matters

somewhere, and in these matters the final authority has been vested in the board. Mixer v. Sup'rs of Manistee 26 Mich. 426; Clark v. Sup'rs of Ingham 38 Mich. 658; Macdonald v. Sup'rs of Muskegon 42 Mich. 545.

The claims in controversy were such as it would be peculiarly proper that the board should dispose of. As to both of them there were or might be disputed questions of fact. As to both of them, also, the antecedent presumptions were against the claimant. A sheriff who is paid for keeping the jail and the prisoners is expected to keep them properly guarded at his own expense, unless the circumstances are very exceptional. He is also expected to accommodate his business to such room as shall be furnished for him by the county. If he claims that the circumstances are exceptional, and such as to give him authority to hire servants or rent rooms at the expense of the county, the supervisors will be likely to understand the facts better than can any distant court from any showing that can be made by affidavit. But if this were otherwise it could not aid the claimant. The board had the final authority and has exercised it.

The writ is refused.

The other Justices concurred.

IN THE MATTER OF FRANK CANNON.

Extradition between states-Arrest-Bail-Bastardy.

One cannot be extradited between States of the Union except for offences that are strictly criminal, and with which he has been legally charged as a fugitive from justice.

One cannot be detained within the jurisdiction to which he is extradited, to answer for some other offense than that for which he was taken, and for which extradition could not be allowed. This is especially so where the first charge cannot be maintained.

One who has been extradited, and is on bail for the offense, is not subject, meanwhile, to arrest by the same prosecuting authority for some other offense, as if he had been at liberty to withdraw from the jurisdiction.

47 MICH.-31

The bail of an accused person are entitled to his custody, and may deliver him to the authorities at any time; the legal duress does not cease until the prisoner is discharged.

Bastardy proceedings involve no indictable offence on which a conviction can be had in the course of the proceedings, and they are not strictly criminal.

Personal liberty is not held subject to State comity or on any less tenure than Constitutional right.

Every one in legal custody is entitled to legal protection.

A State court cannot arrest a person detained within its jurisdiction, under federal process, whether the federal court interferes in his behalf or not.

Courts should refuse, in cases that are entirely free from doubt, to allow any use to be made of extradition proceedings whereby good faith would be plainly violated, and the measures necessary to bring the accused within their jurisdiction would be perverted.

HABEAS CORPUS.

charged Jan. 18.

Submitted Jan. 10. Petitioner dis

W. A. Underwood for the petitioner, cited Spear on Extradition, 341; Watson v. Judge of Superior Court 40 Mich. 729; Com. v. Hawes 13 Bush 697; when the commitment is fair on its face the court can go behind it to learn whether there was jurisdiction to issue it: Matter of Morton 10 Mich. 208: Matter of Hall id. 210.

Richard A. Watts against. Bastardy proceedings are quasi criminal: Cross v. People 8 Mich. 113; Connelly v. Burrill 10 Cush. 492; and the rule by which persons under extradition are privileged, meanwhile, from arrest, does not apply where the later process is criminal or quasi criminal: Whart. Cr. Pl. §§ 27, 37; 2 Phil. Ev. (C. & H. ed.) 822; and would not, even though the second arrest had been made while the person is attending court: Williams v. Bacon 10 Wend. 636: Lucas v. Albee 1 Den. 667; Moore v. Green 73 N. C. 394: 21 Am. 470; Key v. Jelto 1 Pitts. (Pa.) 117; Dow's Case 18 Penn. St. 37; Ham v. State 4 Tex. App. 645; Goodwin v. Lordon 1 Ad. & El. 378; Hare v. Hyde 16 Q. B. 394: and it certainly would not apply if he was neither under actual arrest at the time

or attending, going to or returning from court: Clark v. Grant 2 Wend. 257; Chaffee v. Jones 19 Pick. 260; Corey v. Russell 4 Wend. 204.

CAMPBELL, J. Cannon obtained a writ of habeas corpus from this court to examine into the cause of his detention by the Sheriff of Lenawee county. It now appears that on proceedings of a criminal nature under a complaint for seduction, at the instigation of the prosecuting attorney for Lenawee county, a requisition was made by the governor of Michigan on the governor of Kansas, by whom Cannon was delivered over to the authorities of this State, who took him to Lenawee county, where he was arrested on a criminal warrant under said charge of seduction, and brought before a justice of the peace on the 12th day of December, 1881, for examination. On that day the justice adjourned the hearing until December 27th, and Cannon failing to give bail for his appearance on that day, was committed to prison, but on the 15th day of December gave bail and went to the house of his father, who was his security. On the 16th day of December, 1881, the prosecuting attorney commenced bastardy proceedings for the same transaction involved in the previous complaint for seduction, and a warrant was issued for his arrest and served on the 17th day of December, when he was brought before the justice, who adjourned that proceeding until December 20th, and Cannon failing to give bail for his appearance on that day was committed to jail. On the 20th Cannon refused to plead to the merits, but made a showing and application for discharge, based on his exemption from any prosecution except for the crime for which he was delivered up by the governor of Kansas. The justice refused to discharge him, and ordered him to recognize for his appearance at the next term of the circuit court, to answer the bastardy charge. Refusing to do so, he was committed and kept in custody until the present writ was sued out. On the 27th day of December he was brought before the magistrate on the seduction charge, when it was at once discontinued on the admitted ground that it was not founded on any legal reasons.

The only question before us is whether under these circumstances, the imprisonment for bastardy was lawful.

For the purposes of the present hearing it is not made a point that the prosecuting attorney, when he obtained the extradition, procured it with an actually fraudulent design to get the prisoner within the jurisdiction for different. proceedings. It may be assumed that he supposed the seduction complaint would lie. It is admitted, however, that the attorney became satisfied of the contrary on the 16th, and that he without supposing it was improper set on foot the bastardy proceedings, and caused the arrest with that knowledge.

It was claimed on the argument that when arrested for bastardy, Cannon was not under legal restraint, but at large, and therefore that he was no longer under the operation of the extradition proceedings. This position is not true. He was bound to appear before the justice on the 27th of December, and would forfeit his bail if he did not. His bail were in law entitled to his custody, and could at any time have handed him over to the authorities. The legal duress in such a case is not ended until the prisoner is discharged.

The admitted facts show, then, that the criminal proceedings were kept on foot for more than ten days after they were known to be groundless, and until the bastardy examination had been ended, and the prisoner bound over and committed on that. And they show also that the second arrest was made under the same control and management as the first, and by the same prosecuting attorney.

The question then becomes narrowed to the inquiry whether an arrest made for a different purpose, on which no extradition could have been demanded, was lawfully made, when the prisoner was brought into this State under a requisition, and no proceedings had or attempted for the crime on which he was delivered up to this State.

Under the laws of this country, and of most civilized countries, no person can be lawfully claimed, and here-at least-no person can be lawfully delivered over to another