Opinion of the Court. knowledge which others possess; but, also, because, if the witness may be permitted to state-as, undoubtedly, he would be, where his opportunities of observation have been adequate"that he has known the individual for many years; has repeatedly conversed with him and heard others converse with him; that the witness had noticed that in these conversations he was incoherent and silly; that in his habits he was occasionally highly pleased and greatly vexed without a cause; and that, in his conduct he was wild, irrational, extravagant, and crazy, what would this be but to declare the judgment or opinion of the witness of what is incoherent or foolish in conversation, what reasonable cause of pleasure or resentment, and what the indicia of sound or disordered intellect? If he may not so testify, but must give the supposed silly and incoherent language, state the degrees and all the accompanying circumstances of highly excited emotion, and specifically set forth the freaks or acts regarded as irrational, and thus, without the least intimation of any opinion which he has formed of their character, where are such witnesses to be found? Can it be supposed, that those, not having a special interest in the subject, shall have so charged their memories with these matters, as distinct independent facts, as to be able to present them in their entirety and simplicity to the jury? Or, if such a witness be found, can he conceal from the jury the impression which has been made upon his mind; and when this is collected, can it be doubted, but that his judgment has been influenced by many, very many, circumstances which he has not communicated, which he cannot communicate, and of which he himself is not aware?" Clary v. Clary, 2 Iredell's Law, 78, 83. The jury, being informed as to the witness' opportunities to know all the circumstances, and of the reasons upon which he rests his statement as to the ultimate general fact of sanity or insanity, are able to test the accuracy or soundness of the opinion expressed, and thus, by using the ordinary means for the ascertainment of truth, reach the ends of substantial justice. These views are sustained by a very large number of adjudications in the courts of this country, some of which are cited Opinion of the Court. in the margin.* In several of those cited the whole subject was very fully considered in all its aspects. While the cases are, to some extent, in conflict, we are satisfied that the rule most consistent with sound reason, and sustained by authority, is that indicated in this opinion. Counsel for the plaintiff in error calls our attention to the case of Wright v. Tatham, 5 Clark & Fin. 670, as an authority for the broad proposition that non-professional witnesses cannot give their opinions and impressions concerning the state of a person's mind, even in connection with the facts within their personal knowledge, upon which such opinion is based. On a question of the competency of a party to make a will, certain letters, written to that party by third persons, who had died before they were offered as evidence, and which letters were found many years after their date among the testator's papers, were held, in that case, not to be admissible without proof that he acted on them. Whether the opinions of non-experts, in connection with a statement, under oath, of the facts, are admissible upon an in * Clary v. Clary, 2 Iredell's Law, 83; Dunham's Appeal, 27 Conn. 192; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Ib. 203; Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227, substantially overruling Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120; State v. Pike, 49 Id. 399, and State v. Archer, 54 N. H. 465 Hathaway's Adm'r v. National Life Ins. Co., 48 Vt. 335; Morse v. Crawford, 17 Ib. 499; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio, 483; Gibson v. Gibson, 9 Yerg. 329; Potts v. House, 6 Geo. 324; Vanauken's Case, 2 Stock. Chy. 186; Brooke v. Townsend, 7 Gill, 10; De Witt v. Barly, 17 N. Y. 340, explaining decision in same case in 5 Selden, 371; Hewlett v. Wood, 55 Id. 634; Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 Id. 190; Rutherford v. Morris, 77 Ill. 397; Duffield v. Morris, 2 Harrington, 375, 384; Wilkinson v. Pearson, 23 Penn. St. 117; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Id. 342; Doe v. Reagan, 5 Blackf. 217; Dove v. State, 3 Heisk. 348; Butler v. St. Louis Life Ins. Co. 45 Iowa, 93; People v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29; State v. Klinger, 46 Mo. 224; Holcombe v. State, 41 Tex. 125; McClackey v. State, 5 App. (Tex.) 320; Norton v. Moore, 3 Head. 480; Powell v. State, 25 Ala. 26, 28; 1 Bishop's Crim. Pro. § 536-40; 1 Warton & Stille's Med. Juris., § 257; Warton's Law of Evidence, § 510 et seq.; 1 Redfield on Wills, Ch. 4, Part 2, in a recent edition of which (p. 145, n. 24), it is said, touching the decision in Hardy v. Merrill, ubi supra: "There will now remain scarcely any dissentients among the elder States; and those of recent origin, whose decisions have been based upon the authority of the earlier decisions of some of the older States, which have since abandoned the ground, may also be expected to change." See also May v. Bradlee, 127 Mass. 414; Com. v. Sturtevant, 117 Id. 122. Opinion of the Court. quiry as to the insanity of an individual, was not involved or determined in that case. On the contrary, the observations made by some of the judges, in illustration of their opinions upon the precise point in judgment, would indicate a concurrence in the general views we have expressed. After stating that the letters were offered as evidence of the opinions of the writers, Baron Alderson said: "The objection to their admissibility is that this opinion is not upon oath, nor is it possible for the opposite party to test by cross-examination the foundation on which it rests. The object of laying such testimony before the jury is to place the whole life and conduct of the testator, if possible, before them, so that they may judge of his capacity; for this purpose you call persons who have known him for years, who have seen him frequently, who have conversed with him or corresponded with him. After having thus ascertained their means of knowledge, the question is put generally as to their opinion of his capacity. I conceive this question really means to involve an inquiry as to the effect of all the acts which the witnesses have seen the testator do for a long series of years, and the manner in which he was, during that period, treated by those with whom he was living in familiar intercourse. This is not properly opinion, like that of experts; but rather a compendious mode of putting one instead of a multitude of questions to the witness under examination, as to the acts and conduct of the testator." 5 Clark & Fin. 720. And Baron Parke: "These letters are sufficiently proved to have been written and sent to the house of the deceased by persons now dead, and they indicate the opinion of the writers that the alleged testator was a rational person, and capable of doing acts of ordinary business. But it is perfectly clear that, in this case, an opinion not given upon oath in a judicial inquiry between parties is no evidence; for the question is, not what the capacity of the testator was reputed to be, but what it really was in point of fact; and, though the opinion of a witness upon oath as to that fact might be asked, it would be only a compendious mode of ascertaining the result of the actual observation of the witness, from acts done, as to the habits and demeanor of the deceased." Ibid, 735. Opinion of the Court. One other assignment of error remains to be considered. It relates to the admissions of the statements made by two witnesses of what passed between each other on the occasion of their seeing and conversing with the deceased, within an hour or two before he shot himself. They detailed what passed between them and the deceased, describing the latter's appearance and condition as indicating, in their judgment, that he was not in his right mind. As he left the presence of these witnesses, one of them remarked to the other that "Pitkin is not himself; George looks kind of crazy." The other, in response, expressed substantially, though in different language, his concurrence in that opinion. To the admission of this brief conversation between the witnesses on the occasion referred to, the defendant objected, but the objection was overruled, and an exception taken. We do not think there was in this any error to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the company. The witnesses when under oath expressed the same opinion as to the condition of the deceased. What passed between them at the time to which their testimony referred was a part of what occurred on the occasion when they saw the deceased, and may well have been repeated to the jury, as showing that their opinion as to the mental condition of the deceased was not then presently formed, but was one formed at the very moment they saw him, within a very few hours before his death. Upon the whole case we perceive no error in the proceedings of which plaintiff in error may complain, and the judgment is Affirmed. ROBB v. CONNOLLY. IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. Submitted April 7th, 1884.-Decided May 5th, 1884. Constitutional Law-Fugitives from Justice-Conflict of Law. An agent, appointed by the State in which a fugitive from justice stands charged with crime, to receive such fugitive from the State by which he is surrendered, is not an officer of the United States within the meaning of former adjudications of this court. Statement of Facts. Congress has not undertaken to invest the judicial tribunals of the United States with exclusive jurisdiction of issuing writs of habeas corpus in proceedings for the arrests of fugitives from justice, and their delivery to the authorities of the State in which they stand charged with crime. Subject to the exclusive and paramount authority of the national government by its own judicial tribunals to determine whether persons held in custody by authority of the courts of the United States, or by commissioners of such courts, or by officers of the general government acting under its laws, are so held in conformity with law, the States have the right, by their own courts, or by the judges thereof, to inquire into the grounds upon which any person, within their respective territorial limits, is restrained of his liberty, and to discharge him, if it be ascertained that such restraint is illegal, and this notwithstanding such illegality may arise from a violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States. On the 20th day of November, 1883, one C. H. Bayley was arrested in the city of San Francisco, California, and delivered to W. L. Robb, who had been empowered by the Governor of the State of Oregon to take and receive him from the proper authorities of the State of California, and convey him to the former State, to be there dealt with according to law. The arrest and delivery were in pursuance of the warrant of the Governor of California, as follows: "STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Executive Department. "The people of the State of California to any sheriff, constable, marshal, or policeman of this State, greeting: "Whereas it has been represented to me by the Governor of the State of Oregon that C. H. Bayley stands charged with the crime of embezzlement, committed in the county of Clatsop, in said State, and that he has fled from the justice of that State, and has taken refuge in the State of California; and the said Governor of the State of Oregon having, in pursuance of the Constitution and laws of the United States, demanded of me that I shall cause the said C. H. Bayley to be arrested and delivered to W. L. Robb, who is authorized to receive him into his custody and convey him back to said State of Oregon; "And whereas the said representation and demand is accompanied by a certified copy of the information filed in the office of the justice of the peace of the precinct of Astoria, Clatsop county, State of Oregon, whereby the said C. H. Bayley stands charged with said crime, and with having fled from said State and taken VOL. CXI-40 |