Opinion of the Court. ment of his debts, they passed by the previous deed of assignment and are vested in Buchanan; for the conveyance under which he derives title was made more than two years before the bankruptcy, and has not, on any ground, been assailed as affected by the bankrupt law; so that the foundation of the case asserted in the bill is entirely taken away. It is shown that nothing of what is therein claimed could pass to the assignee in bankruptcy, because it had already passed to another. On the other hand, if nothing passed by the deed under which Buchanan claims, affecting the estate and interests in controversy, it must have been because, under the law of Illinois, which, of course, governs in respect to interests in real estate situated in that State, those interests were not liable to be appropriated to the payment of the debts of the beneficiary, and were, therefore, not embraced in the description of the property conveyed. That such questions are determinable only by the local law where the property has its situs, was expressly decided in Nichols v. Levy, 5 Wall. 433, and was also intimated in Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716-729. The Bankruptcy Act, sec. 5045 Rev. Statutes, expressly adopts the local law of the State as to such exemptions. And in Illinois the subject is regulated by a special statutory provision. By § 49, ch. 22 (Hurd's Rev. Stats. Illinois, 195), of the Chancery Practice Act of that State, providing for creditors' bills of discovery and to reach and apply equitable estates and interests to the satisfaction of debts, property held in trust is made subject to that proceeding, "except, when such trust has, in good faith, been created by, or the fund so held in trust has proceeded from, some person other than the defendant himself." The Tennessee statute, which was applied to the exoneration of the interests sought to be appropriated in Nichols v. Levy, 5 Wall. 433, was substantially the same as this; and both seem to be copies from that of New York, 2 Rev. Stat. 173, §§ 38, 39, although in the last named State, as appears from the decision of the Court of Appeals in Williams v. Thorn, 70 N. Y. 270, and McEvoy v. Appleby, 27 Hun, 44, another statute, 1 R. S. 729, § 57, limits the exemption in cases where income is payable under such a trust, to the principal Opinion of the Court. fund itself, and the beneficial interest of the cestui que trust in the income only to the extent of a fair support of the beneficiary out of the trust estate. The statute of Illinois does not apply merely, as is argued, to cases where a technical discovery is sought, but to all cases where the creditor, or his representative, is obliged, by the nature of the interest sought to be applied, to resort to a court of equity for relief, as he must do, in all cases where the legal title is in trustees, for the purpose of serving the requirements of an active trust, and where, consequently, the creditor has no lien, and can acquire none, at law, but obtains one only by filing a bill in equity for that purpose. If the trust was merely passive, and, therefore, executed by the law of its locality, in the cestui que trust, so as to be subject to the levy of executions at law, and the present was such a case, then the bill would fail, because the remedy at law would be adequate and complete. The case has been argued by counsel as if it depended upon, or at least involved the question, whether, upon general principles of equity jurisprudence, as administered in the courts of the United States, the terms of the trust in favor of Charles U. Shreve under his father's will, exceeded the limits fixed for restraints upon the alienation of property held for the beneficial use of the cestui que trust, and its exoneration from the liability to be taken for payment of his debts. It cannot be doubted, that it is competent for testators and grantors, by will or deed, to construct and establish trusts, both of real and personal property, and of the rents, issues, profits. and produce of the same, by appropriate limitations and powers to trustees, which shall secure the application of such bounty to the personal and family uses during the life of the beneficiary, so that it shall not be subject to alienation, either by voluntary act on his part, or in invitum, by his creditors. The limits, within which such provisions may be made and administered, of course, must be found in the law of that jurisdiction which is the situs of the property, in case of real estate, and in cases of personalty, where the trust was created or is to be administered according to circumstances. And in determining Opinion of the Court. those limits, that law declares how far, and by what forms and modes, the institution of property may be permitted to accommodate itself to the will and convenience of individuals, without prejudice to public interest and policy; by what limitations and instruments its usual incidents may be affected and altered, so as to effectuate the intentions of parties; how far the dominion, implied in the idea of property, may be extended so as to limit the future dominion of those who succeed to its beneficial enjoyment. It follows, therefore, that the judgment in each case must be determined by the positive provisions of the law of the locality which governs it, and the particular terms of the instrument by which the scheme is framed. And applied to the circumstances of the present case, the question would be merely, whether, according to the law of Illinois, the terms of the trust, established under the will of Thomas T. Shreve, created an interest or estate in the beneficiary, which, not having been previously conveyed to another, could be taken at law or in equity for payment of his debts, and which, therefore, vested in his assignee in bankruptcy. That question, as we have already shown, so far as required by the case, is answered by the declaration that, as nothing has been assigned to the appellant, except what had not been previously conveyed and could lawfully be subjected to the payment of his debts; and, as the interest in question was either vested in Buchanan or could not be so subjected, by reason of the positive provisions of the statute of Illinois, to which we have referred, the appellant has shown no right to the relief for which, in his bill, he prayed. · The decree of the Circuit Court is accordingly Affirmed. Opinion of the Court. THORWEGAN v. KING. IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI. Submitted April 15th, 1884.-Decided May 5th, 1884. Court and Jury-Deceit. Where the complaint in an action on the case for deceit by false representations whereby a party was induced to enter into a contract, charged a positive misrepresentation of an existing fact, and all the evidence intended to establish fraud was directed to the proof of that specific misrepresentation, it was error in the presiding judge not to confine his instructions to the point in issue, and when requested by the jury for instruction as to the effect of withholding information concerning the subject of the contract, not to instruct them that there was no evidence in the case which authorized their request for instructions on that point. Mr. Given Campbell for plaintiff in error. Mr. James Carr for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court. This was an action at law brought by the defendant in error to recover damages for an alleged deceit. The cause of action, as set out, was substantially as follows: That Thorwegan, the defendant below, was the owner of a steamboat, called the Grand Republic; that, on or about October 1st, 1876, knowing the boat to be heavily encumbered with liens, claims, and debts to the amount of about $75,000, with a view and design to injure, cheat, and defraud the plaintiff, he falsely and fraudulently represented to the plaintiff that the boat was substantially free from all liens, claims, debts, and liability, except to a small amount, which he, the defendant, would forthwith pay off and cause to be discharged, as a preliminary to merging the title and ownership of said boat in a corporation to be organized by the defendant to receive such title and ownership, and to issue stock therein, representing the full value of said boat, free and clear of all encumbrances, debts, liens, and liabilities then existing, and that if plaintiff would advance to the defendant, at that time, $12,000, he should become interested Opinion of the Court. in said boat, and that the defendant would forthwith organize such corporation, and convey to it the title to said boat, free of all encumbrance and liability, and issue to the plaintiff one hundred and twenty-five shares of stock therein, representing one-eighth of the ownership of the boat, free of all encumbrance, and one-eighth of the capital stock of the corporation; that the plaintiff, relying on said representations and believing them to be true, and especially that the boat was at that time substantially free and clear of all debts, encumbrance, and liability, and that it would be wholly free and clear of the same when merged in and the title and ownership transferred to the corporation, did, on or about October 1st, 1876, advance to the defendant the said sum of $12,000 for the said interest in said boat and the stock of the corporation; that afterwards, about October 6th, 1876, the defendant caused said corporation to be organized under the name of the Grand Republic Transportation Company, with a capital stock of $100,000, in shares of $100 each, and conveyed to it the title to the said boat, but the same was at that time subject to encumbrances and liabilities, as aforesaid, to the amount of $75,000, and of the said capital stock caused to be issued to the plaintiff one hundred and twenty-five shares, being one-eighth of the whole number; that, in consequence of said encumbranees, said stock was, and continued to be, wholly without value, and thereby the said sum paid for the same was wholly lost to the plaintiff. The defendant answered, denying all charges of fraud and misrepresentation, and pleading in bar of the action his subsequent discharge in bankruptcy. To this the plaintiff replied the fraud alleged in the complaint. It is manifest that the case of the plaintiff below, as stated in the pleadings, turned upon the questions whether the defendant made the alleged representation as to the liabilities of the boat, existing at the time of the advance of money, made by the plaintiff, whether such representations, if made, were false and fraudulent, and whether the plaintiff acted on the faith of their truth. Everything else charged in the complaint -that the defendant would pay off the encumbrances and liabilities before transferring the boat to the corporation, and |