Opinion of the Court. less of its stockholders, is unimportant; and the plaintiff cannot be concluded by the failure of any number of its stockholders to do what unfaithful directors ought to have done, unless a case is shown of such acquiescence, assent or ratification as would make it inequitable to permit what has been done to be set aside, or unless the rights of innocent purchasers have subsequently intervened, to an extent creating an equitable bar to the granting of relief. The bill in this case does not show such a state of things. While stockholders, more or less in number, may be allowed to interpose, if they have the means or the inclination to take upon themselves the burden of such gigantic controversies as are involved in the railroad transactions of the present day, it would go far to legalize condonation of such transactions as are set forth in this bill, if mere knowledge by helpless stockholders of the fraudulent acts of their directors were to prevent the corporation itself from seeking redress, if it acts promptly when freed from the control of such directors. Fruitlessly requesting unfaithful directors to resign and to employ other counsel, so far from throwing on the stockholders the peril of losing their rights, represented by the company, if they do not personally assert them in place of the directors, operates of itself, without more, only to aggravate the wrong. At the same time, it by no means follows that parties who have become interested in the plaintiff's corporation with knowledge of the matters set forth in the bill, are entitled to the same standing, as to relief, with those who were interested in the corporation when the transactions complained of occurred. As to the matters alleged which are extrinsic or collateral to the issues in the Ketchum suit, to what extent, greater or less, there is jurisdiction to examine them under this bill, is a question not to be decided on these demurrers to the whole bill. The bill is sufficient in regard to the other frauds alleged. But, in regard to one of those extrinsic matters, the bill states that specific property not covered by the mortgage was put into the decree without the knowledge of this plaintiff. Upon the question of jurisdiction, there can be no doubt that the Circuit Court, as the court which made the Ketchum decree, Opinion of the Court. and had jurisdiction of the Ketchum suit, as this court, in Pacific Railroad v. Ketchum, 101 U. S. 289, held it had, has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit to set aside that decree on the grounds alleged in the bill, if they shall be established as facts, and if there shall be no valid defence to the suit, although the plaintiff and some of the defendants are citizens of Missouri. The bill falls within recognized cases which have been adjudged by this court, and have been recently reviewed and reaffirmed in Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276. On the question of jurisdiction the suit may be regarded as ancillary to the Ketchum suit, so that the relief asked may be granted by the court which made the decree in that suit, without regard to the citizenship of the present parties, though partaking so far of the nature of an original suit as to be subject to the rules in regard to the service of process which are laid down by Mr. Justice Miller in Pacific Railroad v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 1 McCrary, 647. The bill, though an original bill in the chancery sense of the word, is a continuation of the former suit, on the question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall. 609, 633. We do not see any force in the second and third grounds of demurrer, nor, at present, in the eighth. The seventh ground of demurrer alleges what is, if true, matter for exception, and so does the ninth, in part. As to the rest of the ninth, it is matter for an answer. All the demurring parties seem to be proper parties. If, as has been strenuously argued for the defendants, there are complete defences, on the merits, to the bill, answers should have been put in and proofs taken. We can act only on what the bill brings before us, and all it alleges is admitted, for present purposes. The future proceedings in the case may show that the allegations of the bill are untrue, or may disclose perfect defences to the suit. But, as the suit now stands, the plaintiff is entitled to have the matters it alleges inquired into and adjudicated. The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court, with direction to overrule the demurrers, with costs, and to take such further proceedings in the suit as shall be proper and not inconsistent with the opinion of this court. Statement of Facts. BARRETT v. FAILING & Wife. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON. Argued April 16th, 17th, 1884.-Decided May 5th, 1884. Conflict of Law-Dower-Divorce. A divorce from the bond of matrimony bars the wife's right of dower, unless preserved by the lex rei sitæ. Under § 495 of the Oregon Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by the statute of December 20th, 1865, providing that whenever a marriage shall be declared void or dissolved the party at whose prayer the decree shall be made shall be entitled to an undivided third part in fee of the real property owned by the other party at the time of the decree, in addition to a decree for maintenance under § 497, and that it shall be the duty of the court to enter a decree accordingly, a wife obtaining a decree of divorce in a court of another State, having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, acquires no title in the husband's land in Oregon. This is a bill in equity, filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Oregon, by Mary E. Barrett, a citizen and resident of the State of California, against Charles D. Failing and Xarifa J. Failing, his wife, citizens and residents of the State of Oregon. The bill alleged that on September 25th, 1866, the plaintiff was, and for more than two years theretofore had been, the wife of Charles Barrett, and was a citizen and resident of the State of California; that on that day she commenced a suit for divorce against him, for his misconduct, in a District Court of the State of California for the Fifteenth Judicial District, that court having jurisdiction thereof, and being authorized to grant divorces according to and by virtue of the laws of that State; that he was duly served with process and appeared and made defence; and that on April 18th, 1870, the plaintiff being still a citizen of that State, that court rendered a decree in her favor, dissolving the bond of matrimony between him and her. The bill further alleged that at the time of the commencement of that suit Charles Barrett was not the owner of any real estate in the State of California, but was the owner in fee Opinion of the Court. simple of certain land (particularly described), in Portland, in the State of Oregon; that on February 4th, 1868, he fraudulently conveyed this land to his daughter, the female defendant, without consideration, and with intent to defraud the plaintiff of her just rights in it, and for the purpose of preventing her from asserting her claim thereto or interest therein; that at the time of the commencement of the suit for divorce the plaintiff did not know that he was the owner of this land; that he died in Oregon in July, 1870; and that by the laws of the State of Oregon, and under and by virtue of the decree of divorce, the plaintiff became and was entitled to one-third of this land. The bill prayed for a decree that the plaintiff was the owner in fee simple of one-third of this land and that the defendants held it in trust for her, and for a conveyance, a partition, an account of rents and profits, and further relief. The defendants filed a general demurrer to the bill, which was sustained by the Circuit Court, and the bill dismissed. See 6 Sawyer, 473. The plaintiff appealed to this court. Mr. W. W. Chapman, Mr. W. S. Beebee, and Mr. Sidney Dell submitted for appellant on their brief. Mr. J. N. Dolph for appellees. MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the facts in the foregoing language, and continued: It is not doubted that the decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony, obtained by the plaintiff in California, in a court having jurisdiction to grant it, and after the husband had appeared and made defence, bound both parties and determined their status. The question considered by the court below and argued in this court is whether, by virtue of that decree, and under the law of Oregon, the wife is entitled to one third of the husband's land in Oregon. Unless otherwise provided by local law, a decree of divorce by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, dissolving the bond of matrimony, puts an end to all obligations of either party to the other, and to any right which either has Opinion of the Court. acquired by the marriage in the other's property, except so far as the court granting the divorce, in the exercise of an authority vested in it by the legislature, orders property to be transferred or alimony to be paid by one party to the other. In estimating and awarding the amount of alimony or property to be so paid or transferred, the court of divorce takes into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including the property and means of support of either party; and the order operates in personam, by compelling the defendant to pay the alimony or to convey the property accordingly, and does not of itself transfer any title in real estate, unless allowed that effect by the law of the place in which the real estate is situated. Accordingly, it has been generally held that a valid divorce from the bond of matrimony, for the fault of either party, cuts off the wife's right of dower, and the husband's tenancy by the curtesy, unless expressly or impliedly preserved by statute. Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 260; Hood v. Hood, 110 Mass. 463; Rice v. Lumley, 10 Ohio St. 596; Lamkin v. Knapp, 20 Ohio St. 454; Gould v. Crow, 57 Missouri, 200; 4 Kent Com. 54; 2 Bishop Marriage & Divorce (6th ed.), §§ 706, 712, and cases cited. In each of the Massachusetts cases just referred to, the divorce was obtained in another State. The ground of the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Wait v. Wait, 4 N. Y. 95, by which a wife was held not to be deprived of her right of dower in her husband's real estate by a divorce from the bond of matrimony for his fault, was, that the legislature of New York, by expressly enacting that "in case of divorce dissolving the marriage contract for the misconduct of the wife, she shall not be endowed," had manifested an intention that she should retain her right of dower in case of a divorce for the misconduct of the husband. See also Reynolds v. Reynolds, 24 Wend. 193. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Colvin v. Reed, 55 Penn. St. 375, and in Reel v. Elder, 62 Penn. St. 308, holding that a wife was not barred of her dower in land in Pennsylvania by a divorce obtained by her husband in another State, proceeded upon the ground that, in the view of that court, the court which granted the divorce |