of the possession of goods stolen from a different person. -Reg. vs. Oddy, 2 Den. 264. Where the stolen goods are goods that have been found, the jury must be satisfied that the prisoner knew that the circumstances of the finding were such as to constitute larceny.-R. vs. Adams, 1 F. & F. 86. Belief that the goods are stolen, without actual knowledge that they are so, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.-Reg. vs. White, 1 F. & F. 665.

Recent possession of stolen property is not generally alone sufficient to support an indictment under this section,-2 Russell, 555. However, in Reg. vs. Langmead, L. & C. 427, the judges would not admit this as law, and maintained the conviction for receiving stolen goods, grounded on the recent possession by the defendant of stolen property.-See also Reg. vs. Deer, L. & C. 240.

A partner stole goods belonging to the firm, and rendered himself liable to be dealt with as a felon, under the 31-32 Vict., ch. 116 (sect. 38, ante, of Canadian Larceny Act) and sold the same to the prisoner, who knew of their having been stolen. Held, that the prisoner could not be convicted on an indictment for feloniously receiving under the 24-25 Vict., ch. 96, s. 91, (sect. 100 of Canadian Larceny Act) but might have been convicted as an accessory after the fact under the 24-25 Vict., ch. 94, sect. 3, (31 Vict., ch. 72, sect. 4, Canada) on an indictment properly framed.-Reg. vs. Smith, 11 Cox, 511. It is observed, in Archbold, 436, that in this last case, if the only thing that could have been proved against the prisoner was the receiving with a guilty knowledge, he ought to have been indicted for the common law misdemeanor of receiving stolen property. Sed quære?

An indictment charged S. with stealing eighteen shillings and sixpence, and G. with receiving the same. The

facts were: S. was a barman at a refreshment bar, and G. went up to the bar, called for refreshments and put down a florin : S. served G. took up the florin, and took from his employer's till some money, and gave G. as his change eighteen shillings and six pence, which G. put in his pocket and went away with it. On leaving the place he took some silver from his pocket, and was counting it when he was arrested. On entering the bar, signs of recognition took place between S. and G., and G. was present when S. took the money from the till. The jury convicted S. of stealing and G. of receiving. Held, that this was evidence which the judge ought to have left to the jury as reasonable evidence upon which G. might have been convicted as a principal in the second degree, and that therefore the conviction for receiving could not be sustained. Reg. vs. Coggins, 12 Cox, 517.

PRINCIPALS IN THE SECOND DEGREE AND ACCESSORIES, HOW PUNISHABLE. ABETTORS IN MISDEMEANORS, AND IN OFFENCES PUNISHABLE ON SUMMARY CONVICTION.

Sect. 107. In the case of every felony punishable under this Act, every principal in the second degree, and every accessory before the fact, shall be punishable in the same manner as the principal in the first degree is punishable, and every accessory after the fact to any felony punishable under this Act, except only a receiver of stolen property, shall be liable to be imprisoned for any term less than two years, with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary confinement, and every person aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring the commission of any misdemeanor punishable under this Act, shall be liable to be indicted and punished as a principal offender.— 24-25 Vict., ch. 96, sect. 98, Imp.

Sect. 108.-Whosoever aids, abets, counsels or pro

cures the commission of any offence, which is by this Act punishable on summary conviction, either for every time of its commission, or for the first or second time only, or for the first time only, shall, on conviction before a Justice of the Peace, be liable for every first, second or subsequent offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring, to the same forfeiture and punishment to which a person guilty of a first, second or subsequent offence as a principal offender is made liable.-24-25 Vict., ch. 96, sect. 99, Imp.

See post, sect. 122, as to fine and sureties for the peace in misdemeanors under this Act, and sureties for the peace in felonies under this Act. See sect. 94 of the Procedure Act of 1869, as to solitary confinement. See post, sect. 123, as to summary convictions under this Act.

See 31 Vict., ch. 72, an Act respecting accessories to and abettors of indictable offences. (1868).

REGULATIONS FOR DEALERS IN MARINE STORES.

Sect. 109.-Every person dealing in the purchase of old marine stores of any description, including anchors, cables, sails, junk, iron, copper, brass, lead, and other marine stores, shall conform to the following regulations:

1st. He shall not, by himself or his agent, purchase any old marine stores from any person under the age of sixteen years, and on conviction of any such offence before a Justice of the Peace, shall be liable to a penalty of four dollars for the first offence, and of six dollars for every subsequent offence.

2dly. He shall not purchase or receive into his stores, premises or places of deposit, any old marine stores except in the day-time, between sunrise and sunset, under a penalty of five dollars for the first offence, and of seven dollars for every subsequent one, and if any old marine

stores, which had been stolen, are found secreted in the premises of any person purporting to be a dealer in such stores, such persons shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punishable therefor in any manner by law prescribed for misdemeanor.

This clause is not in the English Act. It seems rather defective. The punishment for misdemeanor, under it, would be by fine and imprisonment, either or both at the discretion of the Court. By this clause, it would appear, the simple fact of a dealer in marine stores having in his premises any stolen old marine stores would constitute him guilty, whether he knows that they have been stolen or not. But, undoubtedly, no Court nor jury would condemn a man who would innocently and without fraud or guilty knowledge be found with such stores in his possession, and the word "secreted" might then be distinguished from "found."

As to summary convictions under this Act, see post,

sect. 122.

DEFRAUDING A PERSON OF THE ADVANTAGE, POSSESSION OR USE OF HIS PROPERTY.

Sect. 110.-Whosoever unlawfully and with intent to defraud, by taking, by embezzlement, by obtaining by false pretences, or in any other manner whatever, appropriates to his own use or to the use of any other person, any property whatsoever, real or personal, in possession or in action, so as to deprive any other person temporarily, or absolutely of the advantage, use or enjoyment of any beneficial interest in such property in law or in equity, which such other person may have therein, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable in like manner as simple larceny, and if the value of such property exceeds two hundred dollars, then such misdemeanor shall be

punishable by imprisonment in the Penitentiary for any term not exceeding fourteen years or in any manner in which simple larceny is punishable; and if on the trial of any person for larceny, for embezzlement, or for obtaining by false pretences, the jury are of opinion that such person is not guilty of the offence charged in the indictment but are of opinion that he is guilty of an offence against this section, they may find him so guilty, and he shall be liable to be punished as herein provided, as if he had been convicted on an indictment under this section; and in any case in which any person is convicted of an offence against this Act by stealing, embezzling or obtaining by false pretences any property whatever, then if the value of the property be over two hundred dollars, the offender shall be liable to be punished by imprisonment in the Penitentiary for a term not exceeding seven years, in addition to any punishment to which he would be otherwise liable for such offence.

This clause is not in the English Act.

It is probable that no Court would feel authorized to inflict the additional punishment provided for in the last part of this clause, unless it be alleged in the indictment and duly proved upon the trial that the property stolen, embezzled or obtained by false pretences is over two hundred dollars in value. See Bishop, 1 Cr. Proced. 79, 538, and 2 Cr. Proced. 569, 713.

As to the punishment for the misdemeanor created by this section, see ante, sect. 4, and post, sect. 122.

As to the meaning of the word "property," see ante, sect. 1.

As to the meaning of the words "property in possession" and "property in action," see 2 Stephen's Commt.

10.

It has been remarked that the most striking defect of