The false signature by a mark is forgery. R. vs. Dunn, 1 Leach, 57. When the writing is invalid on its face, it cannot be the subject of forgery, because it has no legal tendency to effect a fraud... It is not indictable, for example, to forge a will attested by a less number of witnesses than the law requires. R. vs. Wall, 2 East. 953; R. vs. Moffatt, 1 Leach, 954; 2 Bishop, Cr. L. 538. But a man may be indicted for forging an instrument, which, if genuine, could not be made available by reason of some circumstance not appearing upon the face of the instrument, but to be made out by extrinsic evidence. R. vs. McIntosh, 2 Leach, 833.-So, a man may be indicted for forging a deed, though not made in pursuance of the provisions of particular Statutes, requiring it to be in a particular form, R. vs. Lyon, R. & R. 255. And a man may be convicted of forging an unstamped instrument, though such instrument can have no operation in law.-R. vs. Hawkeswood, 1 Leach, 257; R. vs. Lee, 1 Leach, 258. This question, a few years afterwards, again underwent considerable discussion, and was decided the same way, though, in the meantime, the law, with regard to the procuring of bills and notes. to be subsequently stamped, upon which in R. vs. Hawkeswood, the judges appear in some degree to have relied, had been repealed. The prisoner was indicted for knowingly uttering a forged promissory note. Being convicted the case was argued before the judges, and for the prisoner it was urged that the 31 Geo. 3., ch. 25, S. 19, which prohibits the stamps from being afterwards affixed, distinguished the case from R. vs. Hawkeswood. Though two or three of the judges doubted at first the propriety of the latter case if the matter were res integra, yet they all agreed that, being an authority in point, they must be governed by it; and they held that the Statute 31 Geo. 3. made no difference in the question. Most of them maintained the principle in R. vs. Hawkeswood to be well founded, for the Acts of Parliament referred to were mere revenue laws, meant to make no alteration in the crime of forgery, but only to provide that the instrument should not be available for recovering upon it in a court of justice, though it might be evidence for a collateral purpose ; that it was not necessary, to constitute forgery, that the instrument should be available; that the stamp itself might be forged, and it would be a strange defence to admit, in a court of justice, that because the man had forged the stamp, he ought to be excused for having forged the note itself, which would be setting up one fraud in order to protect him from the punishment due to another. R. vs. Morton, 2 East, P. C 955. The same principle was again recognized in R. vs. Roberts, and R. vs. Davies, 2 East, P. C. 955, and in R. vs. Teague, 2 East, P. C. 979, where it was holden that supposing the instrument forged to be such on the face of it as would be valid, provided it had a proper stamp, the offence was complete. Roscoe, 497, 6th Edit. AS TO THE UTTERING.-These words, utter, uttering, occur frequently in the law of forgery, counterfeiting and the like; meaning, substantially, to offer. If one offers another a thing, as for instance a forged instrument or a piece of counterfeit coin, intending it shall be received as good, he utters it, whether the thing offered be accepted or not. It is said that the offer need not go so far as a tender.-Reg. vs. Welch, 2 Den. 78; Reg. vs. Ion., 2 Den. 475; (See Greaves' remarks on this case, 2 Russell, 838.) But, to constitute an uttering, there must be a complete attempt to do the particular act the law forbids, though there may be a complete conditional uttering, as well as any other, which will be criminal. The words "pay" or "put off" in a statute are not satisfied by a mere uttering or by a tender; there must be an acceptance also.-Bishop, Stat. Crimes, 306. The Forgery Act now describes the offence of uttering by the words " offer, utter, dispose of or put off," which include attempts to make use of a forged instrument, as well as the cases where the defendant has actually succeeded in making use of it.-Archbold, 568. Showing a man an instrument, the uttering of which would be criminal, though with an intent of raising a false idea in him of the party's substance, is not an uttering. Nor will the leaving it, afterwards, sealed up, with the person to whom it was shown, under cover, that he may take charge of it, as being too valuable to be carried about, be an uttering.-R. vs. Shukard, R. & R. 200. But the showing of a forged receipt, to a person with whom the defendant is claiming credit for it, was held to be an offering or uttering, though the defendant refused to part with the possession of it.-R. vs. Radford, 1 Den. 59. In R. vs. Ion., 2 Den. 475, supra, cited by Bishop, the rule laid down by the Court is, that a using of the forged instrument in some way, in order to get money or credit upon it, or by means of it, is sufficient to constitute the offence described in the Statute.-Archbold, 569. Giving a forged note to an innocent agent or an accomplice that he may pass it is a disposing of and put ting it away.—R. vs. Giles, 1 Mood. 166. So, if a person knowingly deliver a forged bank note to another, who knowingly utters it accordingly, the prisoner who delivered such note to be put off may be convicted of having disposed of and put away the same.-R. vs. Palmer & Hudson, R. & R. 72; 2 Leach, 978. On the charge of uttering, the guilty knowledge is a material part of the evidence. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. If there is no guilty knowledge, if the person who utters a forged instrument, really thinks it genuine, there is no mens rea with him: he commits no offence. Therefore, the prosecutor must prove this guilty knowledge by the defendant, to obtain a conviction.-2 Russell, 836. This is not capable of direct proof. It is nearly in all cases proved by evidence of facts, from which the jury may presume it.—Archbold, 570. And by a laxity of the general rules of evidence, which has long prevailed in the English Courts, the proof of collateral facts is admitted to prove the guilty knowledge of the defendant. Thus, on an indictment for knowingly uttering a forged instrument, or a counterfeit bank note, or counterfeit coin, proof of the possession, or of the prior or subsequent utterance, either to the prosecutor himself or to other persons, of other false documents or notes, or bad money, though of a different description, and though themselves the subjects of separate indictments, is admissible as material to the question of guilty knowledge or intent. Taylor, Evid., 1 vol., par. 322.-R. vs. Foster, Pearce & D. 456; R. vs. Harris, 7 C. & P. 429; R. vs. Millard, R. & R. 245; R. vs. Sunderland, R. vs. Hodgson, R. vs. Kirkwood and R.vs. Martin, 1 Lew. C. C. 102-104; R.vs. Hough, R. & R. 122; R. vs. Weeks, 8 Cox 455; R. vs. Aston, 2 Russell 841; R. vs. Lewis, 2 Russell 841; R. vs. Oddy, 2 Den. 264. But in these cases, it is essential to prove distinctly that the instruments offered in evidence of guilty knowledge were themselves forged.Taylor, loc. cit.; R. vs. Whiley and Baines, 2 Leach, 983; R. vs. Ball, R. & R. 132; R. vs. Salt, 3 Fost. & Fin. 834; R. vs. Nisbett, 6 Cox 320; R. vs. Harrison, 2 Lew. C. C. 118; R. vs. Green, 3 C. & K. 209; R. vs. Millard, R. & R. 245. It seems also, that though the prosecutor may prove the uttering of other forged notes by the prisoner, and his conduct at the time of uttering them, he cannot proceed to show what the prisoner said or did at another time, with respect to such uttering; for these are collateral facts, too remote for any reasonable presumption of guilt to be founded upon them, and such as the prisoner cannot by any possibility be prepared to contradict.— Taylor, loc. cit.; R. vs. Philipps, 1 Lewin C. C. 105; R. vs. Cooke, 8 C. & P. 586. In Philipps' case, the judge said: "That the prosecutor could not give in evidence anything that was said by the prisoner at a time collateral to a former uttering in order to show that what he said at the time of such former uttering was false, because the prisoner could not be prepared to answer or explain evidence of that description: that the prisoner is called upon to answer all the circumstances of a case under consideration, but not the circumstances of a case which is not under consideration: that the prosecutor is at liberty to show other cases of the prisoner having uttered forged notes, and likewise his conduct at the time of uttering them; but that what he said or did at another time collateral to such other utterings, could not be given in evidence, as it was impossible that |