that is to say, either by a person armed, or by several persons together, or accompanied with wounding is charged in the indictment, the jury may convict of an assault with intent to rob, attended with the like aggravation, the assault following the nature of the robbery.-Reg. vs. Mitchell, 2 Den. 468, and remarks upon it, in Dears. C. C. 19.

By sect. 51 of the Procedure Act of 1869, a verdict of common assault may be returned, if the evidence warrants it. And by sect. 49, if the offence has not been completed, a verdict of guilty of the attempt to commit the offence charged may be given, if the evidence warrants it.

Upon an indictment for robbery charging a wounding, the jury may under the 32-33 Vict., ch. 20, s. 19, an Act respecting offences against the person, see ante, p. 249, convict of unlawfully wounding and thereupon the prisoner is liable to be imprisoned in the Penitentiary for any term not exceeding three years and not less than two years, or in any other gaol for any term less than two years.-2 Russell, 144.

LETTERS DEMANDING MONEY WITH MENACES.

Sect. 43.-Whosoever sends, delivers or utters, or directly or indirectly causes to be received, knowing the contents thereof, any letter or writing demanding of any person with menaces, and without any reasonable or probable cause, any property, chattel, money, valuable security, or other valuable thing, is guilty of felony and shall be liable to be imprisoned in the Penitentiary for life, or for any term not less than two years, or to be imprisoned in any other gaol or place of confinement for any term less than two years, with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary confinement.--24-25 Vict., ch. 96, sect. 44, Imp.

As to requiring recognizances and sureties for keeping the peace, in felonies under this Act, see post, s. 122. As to solitary confinement, see sect. 94, of the Procedure Act of 1869.

An indictment on this clause should always contain a count for uttering without stating the person to whom the letter or writing is uttered.-Greaves, Cons. Acts, 135. As to the meaning of the words " property," "valuable security" see ante, sect. 1.

Indictment for sending a letter, demanding money with menaces. -The Jurors for Our Lady the Queen, upon their oath present, that J. S. on......feloniously did send to one J. N. a certain letter, directed to the said J. N. by the name and description of Mr. J. N. of... ...demanding money from the said J. N. with menaces, and without reasonable or probable cause, he the said J. S. then well knowing the contents of the said letter; and which said letter is as follows, that is to say, (here set out the letter verbatim) against the form....

..And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present, that the said J. S. on the day and in the year aforesaid, feloniously did utter a certain writing demanding money from the said J. N. with menaces and without any reasonable or probable cause, he the said J. S. then well knowing the contents of the said writing; and which said writing is as follows, that is to say (here set out the writing verbatim,) against the form....Archbold, 422.

See remarks under sect. 15, ch. 20, 32-33 Vict., on clause relating to letters threatening to murder, of the Act respecting offences against the person.

Where the letter contained a request only, but intimated, that, if it were not complied with, the writer would publish a certain libel then in his possession, accusing

the prosecutor of murder, this was holden to amount to a demand.-R. vs. Robinson, 2 Leach, 749. The demand must be with menaces, and without any reasonable or probable cause, and it will be for the jury to consider whether the letter does expressly or impliedly contain a demand of this description. The words "without any reasonable or probable cause" apply to the demand of money, and not to the accusation threatened by the defendant to be made against the prosecutor; and it is, therefore, immaterial in point of law, whether the accusation be true or not.-R. vs. Hamilton, 1 C. & K. 212; R. vs. Gardner, 1 C. & P. 479.-A letter written to a banker, stating that it was intended by a cracksman to burn his books and cause his bank to stop, and that if 250 pounds were put in a certain place, the writer of the letter would prevent the mischief, but if the money were not put there, it would happen, was held to be a letter demanding money with menaces.-R. vs. Smith, 1 Den. 510. The judges seemed to think that this decision did not interfere with R. vs. Pickford, 4 C. & P. 227. Nevertheless, it is said, in Archbold 424, that it is difficult to admit that. In R. vs. Pickford, the injury threatened was to be done by a third person. Now, sect. 49 would cover that case, see post. It is immaterial whether the menaces or threats hereinbefore mentioned be of violence, injury or accusation to be caused or made by the offender, or by any other person.

DEMANDING MONEY WITH MENACES OR BY FORCE WITH

INTENT TO STEAL.

Sect. 44-Whosoever with menaces or by force demands any property, chattel, money, valuable security or other valuable thing, of any person with intent to steal the same is guilty of felony, and shall be liable to be impri

soned in the Penitentiary for the term of two years, or to be imprisoned in any other gaol or place of confinement for any term less than two years, with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary confinement.—24-25 Vict., ch. 96, sect. 45, Imp.

See observations under last preceding section.

Indictment.-. . . .feloniously with menaces did demand of J. N. the money of him the said J. N. with intent the said money from the said J. N. feloniously to steal, take and carry away, against....Archbold, 421.

The prosecutor must prove a demand by the defendant of the money or other thing stated in the indictment "by menaces or force" with intent to steal it. It is not necessary to prove an express demand in words: the Statute says "whosoever with menaces or by force demands," and menaces are of two kinds, by words or by gestures: so that, if the words or gestures of the defendant at the time were plainly indicative of what he required, and tantamount in fact to a demand, it should seem to be sufficient proof of the allegation of demand in the indictment. -R. vs. Jackson, 1 Leach, 269.—If a person, with menaces, demand money of another, who does not give it him, because he has it not with him, this is a felony within the Statute; but if the party demanding the money knows that it is not then in the prosecutor's possession, and only intends to obtain an order for the payment of it, it is otherwise.-R. vs. Edwards, 6 C. & P. 515.

The intent to steal must of course be presumed from circumstances: it is a question entirely for the jury to determine, and which they will, in general, have to presume from the circumstances attending the demand, the expression or gestures of the prisoner, when he made it, and the like.-Archbold, 422.

In order to bring a case within this section, the demand, if successful, must amount to stealing, and to constitute a menace within this section, it must be of such a nature as to unsettle the mind of the person upon whom it operates, and to take away from his acts that element of voluntary action which alone constitutes consent: it must, therefore, be left to the jury to say whether the conduct of the prisoner is such as to have had that effect on the prosecutor and in this case, the Judge having directed the jury as a matter of law, that the conduct of the prisoner constituted a menace within the statute, the conviction must be quashed.-R. vs. Walton, L. & Cave, 288.

In Reg. vs. Robinson, L. & Cave, 483, 10 Cox, 9, it was holden that a threat by a policeman to imprison a man upon a fictitious charge is a menace within this section, and though the money had in fact been obtained and the prisoner could, in consequence, also have been indicted for stealing the money, yet the conviction, under the present section, was right. On the ruling in Reg. vs. Walton, suprà, Greaves remarks: "This decision requires reconsideration, as it obviously proceeds upon the fallacy of supposing it necessary that the menaces should be such that if property were obtained by them, the offence would be larceny. Now the words of the clause warrant no such construction."

The words are "Whosover shall by menaces or by force, demand any property with intent to steal the same." (With menaces not by menaces): any menaces or any force therefore, clearly satisfy the terms of the clause, provided there be an intent to steal. It might just as well be said that on an indictment for an assault with intent to rob or for wounding with intent to murder, it was necessary to prove such an assault in the one case, or such wounding in the other, as would be sufficient to effectuate the