mind is passive (receptive) while, in the latter, it is spontaneously active; and it is precisely on this ground-the passive reception of them by the mind—that he refers Space and Time to Sensibility rather than Thought. This is repeatedly brought out in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. See in particular Sections 11 (Meiklejohn, p. 80) and 18 (Meiklejohn, p. 90).

I think if Mr. Lewes will turn to the preface to the first edition of the Critick,' he will see that the transcendental logic only (and perhaps I might limit it to the transcendental dialectic) grapples directly with the problem indicated by the title of the book. The Aesthetic is a preliminary inquiry, which proves afterwards of great use; but is not to be considered as a Critick of Pure Reason in this particular department. His using the term concept' of space, is certainly confusing; but its explanation, I think, is to be found in a passage in the 'Transcendental Exposition' of this 'concept' (Meiklejohn, p. 25), where he says, 'It must be originally intuition, for from a mere conception no propositions can be deducted which go out beyond the conception, and this happens in geometry.' In the preceding page he similarly qualifies his statement that Space is an intuition. 'No conception as such,' he says, 'can be so conceived as if it contained, within itself, an infinite multitude of representations.' We may now have a concept as well as an intuition of Space and Time; but the intuition was the original form of the idea, and it is to the intuition that we must always have recourse in mathematics when we wish to discover a new truth.

I think, if Mr. Lewes will again read over the Transcendental Aesthetic and the parts of the Transcendental Analytic which are closely related to it, he will see that Kant never designates the original representations of space and time 'concepts,' or refers their origin to 'pure reason.' W. H. STANLEY MONCK.

Trinity College, Dublin, Jan. 29.

.-ED.]

[This correspondence must now cease.—

In order that the reader may judge of the correctness of the assertions made by Mr. Lewes in his concluding letter, and his general fairness in controversy, I request attention to the annexed catena of passages drawn from the above correspondence.*

No. 1. The AUTHOR.

'It is very common not to say universal with English writers even such authorised' (I meant to say authoritative)' ones as Whewell, Lewes or Herbert Spencer to refer to Kant's doctrine as affirming space to be "a form of thought," or "of the understanding." This is putting into Kant's mouth words which he would have been the first to disclaim.'

No. 2. Mr. G. H. LEWES.

(a) Kant assuredly did teach as Professor Sylvester says, and as I HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED, THAT SPACE IS A FORM OF INTUITION.'

(B) Every student of Kant knows that intuition without thought is mere sensuous impression.'

(7) While therefore anyone who spoke of space as

66

A FORM

OF THE UNDERSTANDING" WOULD CERTAINLY USE LANGUAGE WHICH KANT WOULD HAVE DISCLAIMED, Kant himself would have been surprised to hear that space was not held by him as a form of thought.'

[(a) In no one single instance in his fifty pages of exposition and criticism has Mr. Lewes ever once stated that Space is a Form of Intuition.]

No. 3. The AUTHOR.

'Can Mr. Lewes point to any passage in Kant where Space and Time are designated forms of thought. I shall indeed be

* The words in SMALL CAPITALS are in ordinary print in the original passages.

much surprised if he can do so-as much surprised as if Mr. Todhunter or Mr. Routh in their mechanical treatises were to treat energy and force as convertible terms. To such a misuse of the word energy it would be as little to the point to urge that force without energy is mere potential tendency. It is just as LITTLE TO THE POINT in the matter at issue for Mr. Lewes to inform the readers of Nature that intuition without thought is mere potential tendency?'

No. 4. Mr. G. H. LEWES.

'In the pages of exposition I uniformly speak of Space and Time as forms of intuition; no language can be plainer.' [In no one single instance does Mr. Lewes so speak of Space or Time.] (a) Mr. Sylvester correctly says that intuition and thought are not convertible terms. (B) But he is incorrect in affirming that they differ as potential and actual.'

[These are words put into my mouth by Mr. Lewes, which I disclaim as Kant would have disclaimed the words put into his. I nowhere have stated the truism (a). I nowhere have affirmed the absurdity (B).]

No. 5. Mr. G. CROOM ROBERTSON.

'If indeed any of them ever speaks of space as a "form of the understanding," which was part of the original charge, the case is very different, Kant being so careful with his Verstand. But Mr. Lewes at least would never be caught speaking thus.'

No. 6. The AUTHOR.

(a) If form of sensibility is as good to use as form of intuition, form of understanding ought to be as good to use as form of thought (B), but Mr. Lewes owns that the former is indefensible whilst he avers that the latter is correct.'

[In proof of (8) above see (7) of No. 2. (a) above evidently implies the proportion :

sensibility intuition: understanding thought. The first and third terms representing faculties, the second and fourth the actions of those faculties respectively.]

No. 7. Mr. G. H. LEWES.

'His [the author's] carefulness may be estimated by the (a) fact that the word intuition occurs four times on THE TWO PAGES; his comprehension by the fact that it is perfectly indifferent whether Sensibility or Intuition be the term employed, since Sensibility is the faculty and Intuition the action of that faculty. (B) Mr. Sylvester not understanding this, says, "if form of sensibility is as good to use as form of intuition, form of understanding ought to be as good as form of thought; but Mr. Lewes owns that the former is indefensible whilst he avers that the latter is correct." (7) So far from averring that the former (form of understanding) is "indefensible," it is what I declare to be true.'

(8) 'I said that in my exposition Space and Time were uniformly spoken of as forms of intuition, and I say so still.'

As regards (a) what does Mr. Lewes mean by the use of the definite article THE? The whole question was about the use of the phrase forms of intuition; it was a mere work of surplusage in me to count the number of times that the word intuition unsupported occurs; but I did wade through the whole of the criticism and exposition, covering between them 50 pages, viz. 35 of exposition (439–474), 15 of criticism (474-489). I can only account for my inadvertence in this quite immaterial point by supposing that a clerical or typographical error (no one who knows my handwriting would wonder at this) has crept in, and that I probably meant to say, as I ought to have said, not once' but more than once' or 'often.'

(B) How, in the face of the proportion so plainly indicated in No. 6, Mr. Lewes could have the hardihood to make such an assertion is to me incomprehensible.

(7) This statement is in direct contradiction to what Mr. Lewes has stated in his first letter see No. 2 (y).

(8) This assertion is simply untrue. Mr. Lewes has in no one single instance in his exposition, or his criticism, 3rd edition, 1867, spoken of 'Space and Time as forms of Intuition.' As Mr. Lewes and myself are here at direct variance on a matter of fact, I undertake to pay £50 to anyone who will discover a single instance where the phrase 'form of Intuition' occurs in Mr.

Lewes' article on Kant, chaps. i., ii., iii., p. 436-489, 3rd edition, 1867.

So much, and more than I could have wished, in the way of settling the personal issue raised by Mr. Lewes. The original and only worthy part of the controversy is one of much greater consequence than the proof or disproof of Mr. Lewes' trustworthiness and self-consistency.

The question to be decided was whether a form of language conveying a completely erroneous view of the fundamental principles of Kant's philosophy was to be adhered to by English writers on the ground of prescription and authority. I think that that question, thanks to Dr. Ingleby's intrepidity and Mr. Lewes' persistency, has now been settled for once and for ever.

In looking over Mr. Lewes's article on Kant for the third or fourth time, to satisfy myself (in the face of his positive and reiterated asseverations to the contrary) that he had not in any one single instance used the phrase 'form of intuition,' I came upon the following passage in a footnote:

'Mr. Spencer seems to me less happy in his objection that "if space and time are forms of thought, they can never be thought of; since it is impossible for anything to be at once the form of thought and the matter of thought."-First Principles, p. 49.

Such an observation proceeding from so able a writer as Mr. Herbert Spencer, is a very instructive instance of the serious practical mischief arising from the habit (so obstinately defended by Mr. Lewes) of ascribing to