depends chiefly on the character and disposition of the person engaged on the one hand, and the persons entitled to exercise the power of dismissal on the other. Whatever be the policy, it is certain that the law is adverse to permanent appointments unless where clearly arising from statute or the nature of the office, or made so by express contract. This is well illustrated in the case, 27th February, 1862, Shaw v. Barony Parochial Board, 34 Jurist, 305. There is also an English case where a clergyman was first taken on probationary trial for three months, and then regularly called to a Dissenting church. But though he and one of the deacons deposed that they considered the appointment to be for life, the revising barrister refused to recognise the appointment as one for life, and his decision was affirmed by the Bench of Common Pleas. There are a variety of cases as to appointments of managers of banks and teachers of schools, and institutions more or less of a public character; but in none of them were there any general rule, principle, or presumption recognised of an appointment for life. Each case was decided on the terms of the special appointment.

The only writings which constitute the basis of the contract in this case is Mr Clark's letter of 19th September, 1845, No. 22 of process, a copy of which (the original having now become very fragmentary), is No. 30 of process. The original minute of the kirk-session of Coupar-Angus has not been recovered, but the letter must be held (and indeed is proved) to have been the correct statement of the resolution of the kirk-session of the Free Church of Coupar-Angus, who were then the trustees. That letter very clearly limits the period of appointment "certain for one year, and to be put on a more permanent footing if after that trial both parties are pleased." This, obviously, was an engagement for one year only. It is quite impossible to hold that at the end of the year, if parties were pleased, or rather did not express their displeasure, the agreement at once, and without any new arrangement, passed into one for life. At the end of the year parties might have made another agreement for a term of years-say five, or ten, or for life-had they choosed. It is not alleged that any new agreement was made at the end of the year, and, therefore, the case falls to be decided by the original agreement as contained in Mr Clark's letter, founded on the resolution of the then trustees. If no new agreement was made, the original appointment for one year by force of law was annually renewed, leaving it to either party to dissolve their connection by a proper and timely notice before the running out of any subsequent annual term. A point was taken by the pursuers that, in the absence of the original trust-deed to the Coupar-Angus session, there was no evidence of their power to make any appointment. But it is fair to hold that the original trust which has disappeared, through no fault of the defender, gave the same powers to the first-named trustees as were subsequently conferred on those to whom the trust was transferred. The new body took the trust with all its existing privileges and burdens as at the date of its transfer. It is sound law that a contract of service for more than a year cannot be constituted otherwise than by writing; and, therefore, the Substitute ventures humbly to doubt the strict competency of much of the parole evidence led on both sides. Assuredly, neither party can complain of restriction in latitude of probation or pleading, and still less in undue haste in the procedure. The defender rests his case on a letter said to be written by him whenever he made it an express condition of his acceptance that it should be for life. This position might be good if clearly established, but it is very vulnerable, because (1) the original of such letter has not been recovered, nor any copy; (2) the evidence of its tenor rests by no manner of means on the clear testimony of uninterested witnesses; (3) it would become an independent offer to serve on a certain condition contradictory to the terms offered by the trustees. It therefore was a rejection of that offer, aud an independent offer of service, which required distinct acceptance by the trustees. There is no evidence of the letter being communicated to the trustees, and of their acceptance of the offer; but there is much evidence which tends to the contrary. The second inquiry is the fact of dismissal. Conceding that the original agreement was for a year certain, but renewable by the silent operation of the law then as before mentioned, it could be dissolved by either party without reasons assigned, on due notice prior to the close of any annual period. There was no necessity for any formal meeting of trustees to resolve on dismissal; sufficient that in

any way they, or a majority of their number, exercised and notified the right of dismissal. In conclusion, the Substitute has only to observe that he has dealt with the case according to strict rules of law. He has been nowise moved on either side by considerations either of public policy or individual wrong urged in the debate. He is not aware how this very special case can in any way operate on the scholastic institutions of the country. He may lament that such a dispute has arisen, but cannot perceive how it can possibly lower the status of that most useful class of public functionariesthe schoolmasters. But all such considerations are beside the question; but he only ventures thus to allude to them, with the hope that even yet some arrangement. may be made whereby, if the defender must retire, he may do so under circumstances less distressing than those which have been disclosed in this most tedious litigation, which has outlived by far any case in this Court for many years.

This Interlocutor was appealed, and thereafter the Sheriff pronounced the following Interlocutor:

Perth, 4th May, 1864.-The Sheriff having considered the appeal for the defender on the merits of the cause, with reclaiming petition in support thereof, and answers for the pursuers, and also the appeal for the pursuers as to expenses, Dismisses the defender's appeal: Affirms the Interlocutor appealed from, except as regards expenses, and subject to this qualification, that execution shall be suspended till the term of Whitsunday next: and in regard to the pursuers' appeal as to expenses, Finds them entitled to expenses of process generally, subject to modification, and remits the amount thereof to the auditor to tax and report, and decerns.

NOTE.-The Sheriff thinks that there are no grounds for holding that, apart from special agreement, the defender's appointment was one ad vitam aut culpam, or for a more lengthened period than from year to year. In consequence of the loss of the defender's letter of acceptance, and of the minutes or jottings of the resolutions of the trustees, the defender was allowed to prove by parole testimony the contents of his letter, and of these minutes or jottings; but the Sheriff thinks the evidence adduced by the defender is not sufficient to establish that his letter of acceptance and the subsequent resolution of the trustees secured for him (if the parties were satisfied with him after the lapse of a year) an engagement ad vitam aut culpam. The evidence as to this is conflicting; and the Sheriff has been materially influenced in coming to the conclusion that the defender has failed to prove a special agreement for an engagement ad vitam aut culpam, by the consideration that in the fourth statement of his revised defences, the defender avers that Mr Clark's letter offering him the situation of teacher in September, 1845, conveyed to him that it was to be "for one year certain, and if both parties were satisfied after that trial, the appointment was to be permanent," being almost the very words used by the defender and by his wife when deponing as to the terms of the defender's letter of acceptance. But on reference to Mr Clark's letter, it will be seen that its terms are not as averred by the defender; for in that letter Mr Clark stated that "in regard to the period of appointment, the kirk-session's rule is to make it certain for one year, and to put it on a more permanent footing, if after that trial both parties are pleased, on the understanding, how. ever, that both parties, managers, elders, and teachers, are to be equally free-if the teacher is to be at liberty to dissolve the engagement on specified notice, the managers are to have the same liberty." The misdescription by the defender of the terms of Mr Clark's letter (which pointed at some farther agreement being made before the tenure could be made more permanent) renders the defender's evidence as to the contents of his own letter not entitled to the weight it might otherwise have had, especially as in the same article of his defences he avers that his written answer was to the effect, that, "on the conditions above set forth" (these being in accordance with Mr Clark's letter), he accepted of the said situation. This uncertainty as to the contract, as averred by the defender, taken in connection with the evidence of the pursuer's witnesses, that if the defender had stipulated expressly for a life appointment they must have taken notice of it, and refused to agree to it, leads to the conclusion that it would not be safe to hold that the defender has proved that it was absolutely agreed he should hold the appointment for life after the first year. The next question is, was the defender dismissed by a quorum of the trustees? Three are declared a quorum, and that

although there should be six or seven trustees holding office. The resolution to dismiss the defender was agreed to by three trustees, being the only persons who attended the meeting. That meeting was called by notice from the pulpit, the usual manner in which meetings of the trustees were called. In addition to this, the ordinary notice, a special note was sent to the defender and to Mr Scott, but neither of them thought proper to attend the meeting. The resolution to dismiss the defender was, therefore, the resolution of a quorum entitled to act even if there were six trustees holding office. Farther, the original number of the trustees was seven, but it is admitted that Mr Charles Stewart had resigned his office as a member of the kirk session, and as only members of the kirk-session could be trustees, he consequently then ceased to be a trustee. The Sheriff is not prepared to hold that the defender was not entitled to vote on the question, having been appointed trustee while he held the office of schoolmaster. But he thinks it must be held that Mr M'Arthur is no longer a trustee, having given in his resignation as such, which was accepted by a quorum of the trustees; and the resolution of those trustees accepting his resignation standing unreduced, must in this case be held as a valid and subsisting resolution. The result is, that even if the question of the defender's dismissal could now be considered apart from the resolution of the quorum present at the meeting which dismissed him, there are three acting trustees insisting, in this action, against the wishes of two, including the defender himself as one of the two. This is altogether apart from any weight which might be given to the concurrence of the two members of the kirk-session who have been elected in room of Messrs Stewart and M'Arthur. In regard to the question of expenses, the Sheriff regrets that he is unable to relieve the defender from the usual penalty of unsuccessful litigation, except to the effect of reserving for future consideration the amount of modification which ought to be made of the expenses found due to the pursuers, on account of costs which may have been caused by their having lost the defender's letter of acceptance and the minutes of their meetings. While the defender has been unsuccessful in retaining his office and possession of the schoolhouse and premises, it must be distinctly kept in view that the pursuers have prevailed solely in respect of their legal right to terminate the defender's engagement without reasons assigned, and not in respect of any misconduct on his part proved or even alleged by the pursuers.

Act. W. L. YOUNG, Auchterarder.
Alt. JAMES WATSON, Coupar-Angus.

23D JUNE, 1864.

SHERIFF COURT, LANARKSHIRE-GLASGOW.

(SHERIFFS ALISON AND SMITH.)

fact, Finds that the pursuers sue for the value of certain goods, valuable apparatus, and materials which they entrusted to the defenders to carry for them from Glasgow to Dunfermline, and which they allege were broken in the transit; and also for damages which they allege they suffered in consequence of the breakage of said goods, apparatus, and materials: Finds that the pursuers themselves state that the goods, apparatus, and materials consisted chiefly of glass, and exceeded the value of £10, and they do not aver that they declared the nature and value of the goods to the defenders, nor do they aver that they gave any notice to the defenders of any special circumstances which would render the loss of the goods or delay in delivering them productive of more than ordinary injury and damage to them: In law, Finds, 1st, That by statute 1st Will. IV., cap. 68, commonly called the Carriers' Act, it is enacted, "That no common carrier by land for hire shall be liable for the loss of, or injury to, any gold or silver coin, or any gold or silver in a manufactured state, or any precious stones, jewellery, watches, clocks, or timepieces, trinkets, bills, orders, notes, or securities for payment of money, stamps, maps, writings, title deeds, paintings, engravings, pictures, gold or silver plate, or plated articles, glass, china, silks in a manufactured or unmanufactured state, and whether wrought up or not wrought up with other materials, furs, or lace, contained in any parcel or package which shall have been delivered either to be carried for hire or to accompany the person of any passenger in any public conveyance, when the value of such articles or property con tained in such parcel or package shall exceed the sum of ten pounds, unless at the time of the delivery thereof at the office, warehouse, or receiving house of such common carrier, or to his book-keeper, coachman, or other servant, for the purpose of being carried, or if accompanying the person of any passenger, the value or nature of such articles or property shall have been declared by the person sending or delivering the same; and the increased charge therein after-mentioned, or an engagement to pay the same, accepted by the person receiving such parcel or package." (2d), That when any special circumstance exists which renders the loss of goods or delay in delivering of them productive of more than ordinary injury or damage to the owner, those special circumstances ought to be communicated to the carrier at the time the goods are delivered to him, in order to make him responsible for the special and extraordinary damages in case of loss or non-delivery: Finds, therefore, that the pursuers have not set forth a relevant ground of action, sustains the defences, assoilzies the defenders: Finds the pursuers liable in expenses, of which allows an account to be given in, and remits the same to the auditor to tax and report, and decerns.

The pursuer appealed, and the Sheriff thereafter pronounced the following Interlocutor:

Glasgow, 27th May, 1864.--Having heard parties' procu

RAILWAY COMPANY.

Railway company-Public carrier-Carriers' Act, 1 William IV., cap. 68.-Certain brittle materials were packed in a railway truck specially hired by the senders. They were moved by the railway company without authority into another truck, and on their arrival at their destination they were found broken. In an action of damages-held that the contract was special, and did not come under the valuation clause of the Carriers' Act.

THIS was an action of damages, the pursuers alleging that they had specially hired a truck, and that in it they had carefully packed the materials by which they produced what is called "the Ghost;" but that the defenders had shifted them into another truck, without leave asked or obtained, and had not packed them properly.

appealed against, and made avizandum, and considered the record and whole process, Finds that this is an action at the instance of the pursuers, the proprietors of "the Ghost," for injuries done to it, or rather the large sheets of plate glass, by the reflection of which the appearance of the Ghost is produced, in its transit along the defenders' railway from Glasgow to Dunfermline: Finds it alleged that an exhibition of the Ghost had been advertised at Dunfermline, and that, to convey the apparatus necessary to produce it, the pursuers hired and paid for an entire truck from Glasgow to Dunfermline, in which the apparatus was carefully and securely packed by the pursuers: Finds it alleged by the pursuers that the defenders changed this truck and put the apparatus into another, which was packed improperly by their servants, and the consequence was that the glass, when it arrived at Dunfermline, was found they told the defenders' servants what the packages contained, broken in pieces: Finds it not alleged by the pursuers that or that it was unusually brittle or valuable, or that they paid any extra sum for the carriage on that account: Finds that it is pleaded in defence that, in these circumstances, the pursuers, under the Act of 1st Will. IV., cap. 68, sect. 1, cannot recover more than £10 as the value of the articles, and that

Glasgow, 1st March, 1864.- Having heard parties' procurators on the closed record and whole process, in point of

their case entirely on the alleged changing of the truck, and the defenders packing the apparatus themselves without any communication to the pursuers, or even intimation that such a change was intended: Finds it alleged, though no special

negligence is averred, that the glass was broken to pieces by the effects of the change, and the improper packing of the apparatus by the railway company's servants, and that the pursuers sustained serious loss thereby, which was the result of an illegal and unauthorised act on the defenders' part in changing the truck in which the apparatus had at first been properly packed by the pursuers: Finds it pleaded further that the pursuers did not contract with the defenders as common carriers, but that they hired a special conveyance, and were deprived of it by the unauthorised act of the defenders: Finds this species facti is different in a material matter from that contemplated by the Carriers' Act above referred to, and therefore that the defenders are not entitled to plead in limine that the case of the pursuers is excluded by the statute, whatever may be the result of it when considered along with the evidence on the merits; therefore recalls, hoc statu, the Interlocutor complained of, sustaining the first defence as prejudicial to the action, and reserves the same to be con sidered along with the evidence on the merits; reserves the second defence, and all questions regarding consequential damage, in the event of any damages being found due; and before answer, allows both parties a proof of their respective allegations, and to each a conjunct probation, grants diligence against witnesses and havers, and remits to the SheriffSubstitute to fix a diet for taking the proof, and to proceed further in the cause as to him may seem just.

NOTE.-The consequential damage alleged seems in a great part to be overstrained and excessive in the most favourable view for the pursuers; but all pleas regarding that matter are reserved till the whole case comes to be considered along with the proof in the merits.

Tпis was an action of damages for having charged the pursuer with theft of ribbons in his shop, and giving her into custody of the police, who took her to the police office, but, on her arrival there, no charge was made against her, and she was liberated. The record was made up by condescendence and defences.

The defender pleaded-Preliminary-(1) the action was irrelevant, in so far as laid upon acts or words of any parties other than the defender himself; (2) the action was irrelevant, in so far as want of probable cause is not libelled; Peremptory-(3) under the circumstances stated, the proceedings of the defender were privileged; (4) the statements in the summons, in so far as inferring liability against the defender, being unfounded in fact, the defender was entitled to absolvitor with expenses.

After a proof and hearing, the Sheriff-Substitute pronounced the following Interlocutor:

Glasgow, 11th August, 1863.-Having heard parties' procurators, and resumed consideration of the proof, productions, and whole process, Finds that, by the Interlocutor of 21st January last, the preliminary defences were of mutual consent reserved until the case came to be advised on concluded proof: Finds, as regards the first preliminary defence, namely, that "the action is irrelevant, in so far as laid upon the acts or words of any parties other than the defender himself," that said defence is well-founded, in as far as it is not averred that the acts and words of other parties were adopted by the defender, but it is not well-founded, in as far as such averment is made, and under this explanation, and to this limited extent, sustains said defence, but quoad ultra repels the same:

Finds as regards the second preliminary defence, namely, that "the action is irrelevant, in so far as want of probable cause is not libelled," that whilst there are certain privileged situations in which individuals are absolved from legal re sponsibility for injury caused by statements made, or acts done, unless it be averred and instructed that they were made or done without probable cause; in the present instance the defender ex facie of the summons, and in the circumstances disclosed by the proof, was not so situated, not having acted in the discharge of any official, professional, or personal duty, and therefore it was not necessary to libel in this case the want of probable cause for the wrong complained of, seeing that probable cause is no defence (though it may go to a mitigation of damages) to an action founded on a culpa committed by an unprivileged person, even without an animus injuriandi (Borthwick on Libel, p. 190 and 311): Therefore, and in respect the summons bears that the wrong complained of was done "wickedly, falsely, calumniously, and maliciously," repels the said defence: Finds, upon the merits, that it is proved that the pursuer having entered the defender's shop on the evening libelled, with the view of purchasing a piece of ribbon, was suspected by the defender's then shopman, John Chalmers, of having abstracted a piece of ribbon from the counter, and secreted it about her person, and he publicly stated to the defender that he was convinced the pursuer had committed an act of theft: Finds that the defender has failed to prove that this was a true statement, or that the pursuer had taken or concealed any ribbon: but Finds it proved that the defender, having somewhat hastily come to the conclusion that Chalmers' statement was to be believed, desired that the pursuer and her sister should be detained, and went himself in search of a police officer, and notwithstanding that he was told by one of the two officers who were brought to the shop that he (the officer) personally knew the pursuer to be perfectly respectable, and that her sister was a teacher in the Rev. Mr Blyth's school, he nevertheless sent the pursuer and her sister up stairs along with a policeman and some of the shopmen, with a view to farther investigation, and when he found that the pursuer could not be searched in his premises, he gave her and her sister in charge, and they were taken in custody to the police office, through the public streets, after having been branded as shoplifters in the presence of a good many customers and others who had been attracted by the altercation: Finds that the said John Chalmers, who went to

the police office, refused to make any charge there against the pursuer and her sister, and they were forthwith liberated: Finds that although Chalmers was the party primarily to blame for this treatment of the pursuer, and though there is no reason to believe that the defender acted from any preconceived malice, he is nevertheless liable in solatium to the pursuer for the part he took in the above defamatory and injurious proceedings: Therefore repels the defences, and decerns against the defender for the sum of twenty pounds in name of damages and solatium: Finds the defender also and remits the same to the auditor to tax and report. liable in expenses; allows an account thereof to be given in,

This Interloctuor was appealed, and after a hearing the Sheriff pronounced the following judgment:

Glasgow, 26th April, 1864.-Having heard parties' procurators under their mutual appeals upon the Interlocutor appealed against, and having made avizandum with the debate, and thereafter considered the record, proof adduced by the parties, and whole process, in respect it is necessary to libel want of probable cause, as well as malice and injury, in an acts done against a private party as well as a public officer; in action of damages for injury caused by statements made or respect the proof established that the defender in the present case was informed that the theft which was charged against the pursuer had been committed, and it is proved that the information was founded on probable cause, seeing the theftous act is distinctly sworn to by one witness, and a corroboratory fact by another: Finds that, both on the question of relevancy and on the proof, the defender founded on the want of probable cause being averred in the libel, and the presence of probable cause is established on evidence: Finds farther, that there is no malice established against the defender, nor any act done by him which was not warranted in the circumstances, and that the defence against the action is well-founded; therefore, alters the Interlocutor appealed against, sustains the defences, and assoilzies the defender from the conclusions of

the action; but on the question of expenses, on the whole circumstances of the case, finds no expenses due, and decerns. NOTE.-The preliminary defence, founded on the want of any allegation on the summons of want of probable cause, was of mutual consent reserved to be considered along with the merits, otherwise it would have been adjudicated upon by the Sheriff-Substitute before letting the case go to proof. It is established by the proof which has been led, that the pursuer offered to be searched, and that she was taken to the police office for that purpose, as it could not legally be done except there, and by the police officials; but as the defender's shopman, Chalmers, who accompanied the party to the police office, did not insist on the charge against the pursuer and her sister, they were forthwith liberated, and no search took place. But enough seems to be established in the proof to make out that the omission to allege in the libel want of probable cause was not done ex preposito, as probable cause has been sufficiently established. As the charge made against the pursuer was not insisted in by the defender or his shopman when the pursuer was taken to the police office, the presumption is, that although the defender had probable cause for what he did, yet the pursuer was in reality not guilty of the charge which had been made against her; and therefore, although the defender seems entitled to absolvitor, he has no claim for expenses. And as no charge affecting the pursuer's character has thus been made out, it is to be hoped she will not be permanently deprived of the situation which it is said she had lost, or was in danger of losing, in consequence of the proceedings which gave rise to the present action. Act. R. M'CULLOCH. Alt. J. NAISMITH.

27TH JUNE, 1864.

SHERIFF COURT, LANARKSHIRE-GLASGOW. (MR SHERIFF STRATHERN.)

BROWN & Co. v. HARDIE AND LIVINGSTON. Sequestration-Competing hypothecs.-Sequestration was executed against a tenant in February, 1863, for rent due for the year commencing Whitsunday, 1862. He defended the sequestration process, which was not disposed of till November, 1863. He was warned away in April, and removed at Whitsunday, 1863. The landlord was not aware of the removal till June. The effects had been removed to another house occupied by a son of the tenant. In the sequestration process warrant was obtained to bring back and sell the effects removed. The new landlord applied for interdict against the sale. Held, that the nexus of sequestration rendered the first landlord's right of hypothec special; that there was no mora; and that his right was preferable to the second. THIS was interdict to prevent the sale of certain sequestrated effects, which had been placed in a dwelling-house, the property of the defenders. The defenders sequestrated this tenant in February, 1863, for the year's rent, commencing at Whitsunday, 1863. The tenant defended the sequestration, and it was not decided till November. Meantime, the tenant had been warned away, and had removed at Whitsunday, his removal with his furniture being unknown to the defenders. The furniture had been removed to another house, tenanted by his son, the new landlord believing that the furniture was his tenant's property. The old landlords obtained warrant to remove and sell; the new landlords applied for interdict. Both parties had agreed to abide by the judgment of the Sheriff-Substitute.

Having considered the closed record with reference to the joint minute of admission for the parties, they having therein agreed to take and abide by the Sheriff-Substitute's judgment, Finds it admitted that, about February 13, 1863, the defenders, on a petition for sequestration at their instance against John Campbell, referred to in the defence, obtained warrant sequestrating Campbell's effects, then situated in a dwelling-house at No. 20 St James' Street, Kingston, in security, and for payment of £16, being the rent thereof, due the defenders for the year commencing at the term of Whitsunday, 1862; and under that warrant the effects

sequestrated were inventoried and secured by an officer of Court, but the tenant Campbell appeared and defended the sequestration process thus instituted: Finds it admitted that, in April following execution of the sequestration, the defenders caused the tenant to be warned to remove from said dwelling-house at the ensuing term of Whitsunday, 1863, and he accordingly did remove, taking with him the sequestrated effects and others at that fitting term; nevertheless, the defenders were unaware of the removal until the month of June: Finds that having so removed, the tenant Campbell placed said effects in a dwelling-house be longing to the pursuers, situated at St James' Terrace, Pollokshaws, and which had been let by their factor to Walter Campbell, the tenant's son, for the year from Whitsunday, 1863, the factor believing that these effects belonged to him, and were put in said last-mentioned house subject to the pursuers' right of hypothec: Finds that the defenders were also ignorant of the place to which the tenant had carried said effects until the month of September or October: Finds that in said sequestration process the tenant's defences were repelled, and final judgment pronounced on 27th November, shortly after which the defenders obtained warrant to remove said sequestrated effects from the pursuers' said house: Finds that the pursuers, on the narrative that these effects had become subject to their right of hypothee for the current year's rent, and that that right was in danger of being defeated by the defenders' proceedings, presented this application, wherein interdict of the defenders' intended sale is craved. In these circumstances, Finds, in point of law, that by operation of the sequestration imposed in February, 1863, and the inventorying and securing the same, which succeeded, a nexus was laid on said effects, rendering the defenders' right of hypothec for the rent special, and which no act of the tenant nor of his son could frustrate: Finds that in consequence of the opposition which continued to be offered to the warrant of sale, for which, in said sequestration process, when the rent fell due, the defenders were insisting they were unable to obtain it until the term of Martinmas had passed, and when said effects had already been in the pursuers' house about six months, but that delay not having been occasioned by mora, or by any fault attributable to the defenders, they have not thereby been prejudiced: Finds that said effects, although placed in the pursuers' said dwelling-house while under a nexus of sequestration, of which at the time they knew nothing, were subject notwithstanding to their claim of hypothec subordinate to and only after the defenders' claim sustains the defences, recalls the interim interdict, and for rent and consequents had been fully satisfied: Therefore assoilzies the defenders from the conclusion of the action: Finds the pursuers liable in expenses, allows an account thereof to be lodged, and remits the same to the auditor to tax and report, and decerns.

after sequestration unless by acts of his own in dealing with NOTE. A landlord will not forfeit his right of hypothec the tenant, or by excessive mora, for example, dealing with the tenant, by accepting a bill for the past due rent in rev. M'Culloch & Niren, 25th May, 1831, 1 Shaw, 30; and spect of which sequestration had been used, as in Stevenson by such delay as would, on the principles of common law, infer a loss of the privilege, 2 Bell's Com., 3d edition, p. 34. What amount of delay would lead to the result is a question of circumstances. The privilege might also be forfeited, perhaps by the landlord tacitly acquiescing in the sequestrated effects being removed from his own to another proprietor's house without asserting his right-a point which seems to have been raised but was not decided in an un

named case referred to in Bell on Leases, 4th ed., p. 392, foot note. But here the delay was not caused by the deof litigation would admit, and they in no respect dealt with fenders. They appear to have been as diligent as the progress the tenant so as to weaken their right. Then the fact that the defenders did not know of the effects having been removed till June, after the term at which the removal occurred, and effects had been taken till September or October following, were unacquainted, besides, with the place to which the precludes the idea that the defenders were acquiescing in what had been done. In about a month after they came to know where the sequestrated furniture had been carried to, they took the steps which led to this action.

Act. AIKMAN.

Alt. W. BELL LEITCH.