CHAP. der, which exceeded his worst apprehensions, comXLIV. pelled him to inactivity, from a cause which he was 1775. obliged to conceal from the public, from the army, and even from most of the officers. Sept. Under every discouragement from the conflicting rules and agreements, laws and usages, of separate colonies, he toiled to form an army which he yet knew must fall away from him before victory could be achieved; and "braving the shafts of censure, and pledging a soldier's fame which was dearer to him than life," he silently submitted to the reproach of having adopted from choice the system of inaction, at which his soul revolted. CHAPTER XLV. CONDITION OF THE CENTRAL PROVINCES. JULY-OCTOBER, 1775. XLV. 1775. In the colonies which were not immediately involved CHAP. in the war, the officers of the crown should have shown self-possession and forbearance. Adopting this system, William Franklin, the governor of New Jersey, was ever on the alert to soothe, divide, or confuse the patriots, professed an equal regard for the rights of the people and the royal prerogatives, continued the usual sessions of the assembly, and where the authority of his office was diminished, confined himself to complaint, remonstrance or advice. But the self-organized popular government moved side by side with that of the king; the provincial congress which assembled in May, and again by adjournment in August, directed a general association, took cognizance of those who held back, assumed the regulation of the militia, apportioned a levy of ten thousand pounds, excused the Quakers from bearing arms, though not from con CHAP. tributing to relieve distress; and by providing for the XLV. yearly election of its successors, severed from the co1775. lonial legislature the appointment of future delegates to the general congress. The new provincial congress, chosen with all the forms of law by the qualified voters of each county, came together in October, and while they anxiously prayed for the re-establishment of harmony with Britain, they so far looked to the contingency of war as to offer to raise four thousand minute men, and actually to enrol two regiments for the continental service. It was on this occasion that William Alexander, commonly called the Earl of Stirling, a man of courage, intelligence, and promptitude, though a member of the royal council, entered the army as colonel of the battalion of East New Jersey. The attempt to raise money by taxation having failed, the expenses were met by a reluctant issue of thirty thousand pounds in bills of credit. The disposition of New Jersey to languor was confirmed by Pennsylvania, where, from the first, Dickinson acted in concert with the proprietary government; and the ardent patriots, who had less command of public confidence, less influence with the religious parties, less tried ability in statesmanship, less social consideration in the city which was then the most populous and most wealthy in British America, yielded to his guidance. The first Pennsylvania convention in June, 1774, electing as its president the opulent merchant Thomas Willing, long an opponent of independence, aimed at no continuing political organization, and even referred the choice of the Pennsylvania delegates to congress to the house of representatives, in which loyalists held the majority, and XLV. Galloway exercised unrestricted sway. At the second CHAP. convention, held in January, 1775, the president, Joseph Reed, exerted all his influence, in public and in 1775. private, to defeat the intention of arming and disciplining the province; and to confine the votes as much as possible to the encouragement of manufactures and agriculture; and while with a clear eye he foresaw that the coming summer would form an epoch in history, he desired to be known to the ministry as a person who, though opposed to parliamentary taxation, had such weight and influence in the province, that the British government upon the whole might wish him to be on their side. It was noticed that Dickinson did not make his appearance in the meeting till the day before its dissolution; and then only to ward off the taunts of his enemies. The convention once more left every thing to the legislature; though a motion prevailed, empowering the committee of Philadelphia to give notice, if a provincial congress should again become necessary. The events at Lexington and Bunker Hill did not shake the purpose of Dickinson to prevent the meeting of another convention. His wish that the province should move in unbroken array, led him even to importune his opponent Galloway, not to refuse a seat in the next continental congress; and Galloway was excused only at his own urgent request. Had Pennsylvania entrusted the direction of measures of resistance to a convention, composed of men free from religious scruples about taking up arms and unshackled by oaths of allegiance, all domestic conflict would have been evaded. But the wealth and social CHAP. influence of Philadelphia deprecated a revolutionary XLV. government, which must emanate from undetermined 1775. constituencies and exercise powers undefined; they, therefore, for a time, made common cause with the proprietary. The family of Penn had ceased to be the object of hostile animosities, and had recovered public regard; attached to the Anglican church, their episcopacy was yet of a mild form, free from intolerance and proselyting zeal; and from their interests and their position they were the most sincere friends to conciliation with Britain. Their apostacy from the Society of Friends was so far forgiven, that their policy received the support of the rigid Quakers, whose religious scruples confined them to long-suffering, or peace, or at furthest, to passive resistance. To these elements of power, Dickinson, who still claimed to lead the patriot party of Pennsylvania, added his influence. The system was wise, if nothing was intended beyond efforts for the restoration of harmony; but it did not provide for ulterior measures. The proprietary and his immediate friends had ties of loyalty which they never would break, and to defeat independence, were swayed by interested motives which would increase in strength in proportion as the necessity for independence should appear. Insincerity, therefore, marked the character of the assembly; no vigorous action proceeded spontaneously from its members. Many of them, who had long held their seats and hankered after a re-election, were led step by step to seemingly bold resolutions; the friends of the proprietary desired to keep up such an appearance as would prevent a transfer of the direction of |