ciled with each other, constitute, as to that state, the law of this subject.1

$21. Record is Notice to All the World.

The expression that the record is "notice to all the world," or "to all persons," occurs frequently, both in the statutes and decisions. While, in practical application, this is far from being the case, yet the expression nevertheless embodies the true theory and idea of registration. The limitations of the rule that the record is notice to all the world, when properly considered, can scarcely be justly regarded as such. A very small part of the world has any concern with the property to which a given record relates. The record is notice to so many as are to be affected by it, or as can be properly affected by it, without giving to it an effect that does not naturally and rightfully belong to it. The restriction of its operation is a matter of fact rather than of law. The principal limitation is that the record is notice only to those claiming, under the same grantor, or in the same line of title, and not to persons claiming under a different adverse title. The record of a deed is notice that the grantor in that deed has conveyed the property, and that a subsequent conveyance by that grantor of the same property or interest would be fraudulent and unavailing. This notice can justly have no relation to an

1 In favor of this secret lien the courts violate the established rule in Texas, that a judgment lien will be protected against an unrecorded title or equity, and that notice at a sale under the judgment comes too date if the creditor was without notice when his lien attached. Grace v. Wade, 45 Tex. 528; Senter v. Lambeth, 59 Tex. 259; and compare Sharp v. Fly, 9 Baxt. 4; Moore v. Holcombe, 3 Leigh, 397.

2 Rev. Stats. of Tex., 4342; Thompson & Steger's Stats. of Tenn., §2073; Maul v. Rider, 59 Pa. St. 167, 171.

3 Ely v. Wilcox, 20 Wis. 530; Losey v. Simpson, 3 Stock. Ch. 246; Word v. Box, 66 Tex. 596; Maul v. Rider, 59 Pa. St. 167; Corbin v. Sullivan, 47 Ind. 356; Gillett v. Gaffney, 3 Col. 351; Baker v. Griffin, 50 Miss. 158; Leiby v. Wolf, 10 Ohio, St. 80; Iglehart v. Crane, 42 Ill. 261; Page v. Waring, 76 N. Y. 463; Dolin v. Gariner, 15 Ala. 758; Stuyvesant v. Hall, 2 Bark. Ch. 151; Birney v. Main, 29 Ark. 591; Brown v. Simmons, 44 N. H. 475; Patty v. Pease, 8 Paige, 277; s. c. 35 Am. Dec. 683; Cooper v. Bigley, 13 Mich. 463.

entirely distinct title which the grantor did not purport to convey, and with which he had no connection; so that the notice cannot, in the nature of things, properly affect an adverse title having a different source, for in this latter case each title is as distinct as if it related to a different property.1 If the nature of the case is such that third parties can properly be affected by the record, they will be charged with notice, though not claiming in the same line of title. Thus, under the statutes of some of the states, peaceable possession of land under a recorded deed, for a specified time (in Texas five years), gives absolute title, though the grantor in the deed may have had no title whatever, either of record or otherwise. The claim in such cases is usually adverse to every other person, including the legal or true owner, and the record of the deed of the occupying claimant operates as notice to all the world, and is effective against every character of adverse title not asserted by suit within the prescribed period.

$22. Continued-Limitations as to Notice.

There are some other limitations of this doctrine of notice to all the world, of minor importance; a few of them having proper occasion in matters connected with a just and effective operation of the system of registration, and others of them based on technical and trifling considerations, having no substantial merit whatever. They will be considered in detail hereafter; an instance of the latter class

1 The doctrine of bona fide purchasers without notice does not apply as between holders of adverse titles. McArthur v. Thomas, 2 Ohio, 415, 420.

Rev. Stats. of Tex. 3193; Lambert v. Weir, 27 Tex. 359; Tourtelotte v. Pearce (Neb.), 42 N. W. Repr. 915.

3 Flanagan v. Boggess, 43 Tex. 335; Hunton v. Nichols, 55 Tex. 217; Wofford v. McKinna, 23 Tex. 38.

But one claiming only by adverse possession and operation of the statutes of limitation, has no right, under the laws of New Mexico (Comp. Laws, 2761–2763), to dispute the title of a holder of an unrecorded deed merely because it is unrecorded. Armijo v. Armijo, 13 Pacific Repr. 92.

will suffice for illustration here. It is held in some states, and by the greater weight of authority, though denied in others, that a purchaser cannot, by the record, be charged with constructive notice of conveyances made by his grantor before such grantor acquired his written title as disclosed by the record.1 This proceeds on the idea that one, in searching the records, ought not to be required to look back of the point where they show the title as vesting in a given person, for conveyances from that person, as it is not to be supposed that any one has mortgaged or conveyed property prior to acquiring his recorded conveyance, and that such a requirement would be inconvenient, as the searcher would not know how far back to look. As a matter of fact, it is not unusual that equitable interests in land, resting on executory contracts of sale and bonds for title, and even on verbal contracts with possession and improvements, are enjoyed, incumbered and transferred prior to the acquisition of a deed, and prior to the record of the written evidence of such equitable title, if any exists. As a matter of law, the searcher is presumed to know that a conveyance or incumbrance of such equitable interest is authorized and recognized by law, and that, under the rules of law, a conveyance by the party, before he had any interest at all, might afterwards become operative by estoppel as soon as the title had been acquired.3 Having to search the records a little further for a name already under examination, cannot ordinarily impose a very serious hardship, and it is to be regretted that courts should in

1 Ely v. Wilcox, 20 Wis. 523; Trull v. Bigelow, 16 Mass. 418; Somes v. Brewer, 2 Pick. 484; Day v. Clark, 25 Vt. 402; The State v. Bradish, 14 Mass. 291; Farmer's Loan Co. v. Maltby, 8 Paige, 361; Doswell v. Buchanan, 3 Leigh, 365 (23 Am. Dec. 280); Calder v. Chapman, 52 Pa. St. 359; 1 Jones on Mortgages, §576; Losey v. Simpson, 11 N. J. Eq. 246. The rule is denied in Digman v. McCollum, 47 Mo. 372; Tefft v. Munson, 57 N. Y. 101; and see Crane v. Turner, 67 N. Y. 437.

2 The State v. Bradish, 14 Mass. 291.

3 White v. Patten, 24 Pick. 324; Wark v. Willard, 13 N. H. 389; Pike v. Gavin, 29 Me. 183; Jarvis v. Aiken, 25 Vt. 635; Doyle v. Peerless Co., 44 Barb. 239; Philly v. Sanders, 11 O. St. 490; post, 161.

any instance suffer the benefits of registration to be frittered away by considerations of this kind.1

$23. Validating Acts.

Numerous acts have been passed in all the states validating the defective record of conveyances.2 These various statutes have served to cure almost every kind of defect that could occur; as want of acknowledgment, of certificate, of official seal, of the requisite number of witnesses, of certificates of conformity, and of authority in the officers taking the acknowledgment or recording the instrument. These acts have almost uniformly been held a valid exercise of legislative power.3 Some interesting questions have arisen in their construction and application. Thus, where acknowledgment is essential to render the deed operative between the parties to it, as in case of sheriff's deeds in Missouri, and of married women's deeds where a separate examination is required, defects in the acknowledgment in such cases, unless purely formal, are held not to be healed by statutes validating imperfect records. Nor will the legis

1 The original ground of the rule seems to have been that any conveyance by a party before he had acquired the legal title, was but the conveyance of an equitable interest, and not entitled to protection against a bona fide purchaser of the legal estate-a ground no longer tenable. See Lloyd v. Lloyd, 4 D. & W. 369; and also, post, $89, note 7. 2 See Stimson's Am. Stat. Law, §§1585, 1626; Rev. Stats. of Tex., 4356; Rev. Code of Iowa (1873), §§1966-1968; Cooley's Const. Lim. 462, 463.

3 Bishop v. Schneider, 46 Mo. 472; s. c. 2 Am. Rep. 533; Stevens v. Hampton, 46 Mo. 404; Raverty v. Fridge, 3 McLean, 230; Gillespie v. Reed, 3 McLean, 377, 383; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Wallace v. Moody, 26 Cal. 387; Logan v. Williams, 76 Ill. 175; Tate v. Stoolzfoos, 16 Serg. & R. 35; s. c. 16 Am. Dec. 546; Buckley v. Earley, 72 Iowa, 289; Brown v. Simpson, 4 Kan. 76; Hughes v. Cannon, 2 Humph. 589; Barton v. Morris, 15 Ohio, 408.

4 Ryan v. Carr, 46 Mo. 483; Elliott v. Pearsall, 1 McLean, 11; contra as to sheriff's deeds in Indiana; Doe v. Naylor, 2 Blackf. 32. Such acts held not to validate tax deeds in Iowa, Goodykootz v. Olsen, 54 Iowa, 174; and cannot impair vested rights; Brinton v. Seevers, 12 Iowa, 389; Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Wall, 513; Logan v. Williams, 76 Ill. 175; nor cure defects in wife's acknowledgment; Alabama Ins. Co. v. Boykin, 38 Ala. 510; nor affect rights of third parties, Green v. Drinker, 7 Watts & S. 440; Gatewood v. Hart, 58 Mo. 261. See, post, §94.

lative adoption of a given form of acknowledgment render valid one theretofore taken, though in the exact form afterwards adopted.1 These validating acts strikingly illustrate the fact that registration is entirely and in every part the creature of the statute; even its rules of construction and judicially engrafted principles being equally subject to legislative control.2 They also demonstrate that the numerous preliminaries of record, the vexatious requirements and details as to acknowledgments and certificates thereof, are of no inherent value or substantial importance; since, if it can be properly declared, after a record has been made in a certain way, that it shall be sufficient, it could not be seriously amiss to have previously authorized the form and method thus adopted. It may be further observed that improvements in the registry laws are also of purely legislative origin, and rarely seem to come from any suggestions of the courts that they are needed, or from any judicial criticism of the existing law as being unwise or impolitic. The statutes not infrequently give undue importance to to minor matters, but whatever magnitude they may ascribe to a given particular, the courts usually declare it to be at least that large, if not somewhat larger, and are content to enforce whatever policy may be indicated by the statute, doubtless from the consideration that the legislative department is the exclusive source of the law on this subject.3

1. Texas Land Co. v. Williams, 51 Tex. 51.

2 The legislature may postpone an elder grantee to a younger, if the prior deed be not recorded within the time limited, and this whether such deed be dated before or after the act. Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280. The provision of the Constitution of Louisiana (1868), requiring existing tacit mortgages and privileges to be recorded, under penalty of ceasing to have effect as against third persons, does not impair the obligation of contracts. Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 514.

3 The courts at an early day engrafted on the law the doctrine that actual notice supplies registration; ante, §1; but judicial improvement of the law seems to have almost ceased with this effort.