The Senator then proceeds to consider the several grounds upon which the lawfulness of the removal of the rebel emissaries, on the capture of the vessel which was carrying them, might be predicated, and shows that

1. By the public law, as uniformly asserted and maintained by the United States, the seizure and removal of the persons of the rebels, without taking the ship into port, was unlawful-inasmuch as a naval officer is not entitled to substitute himself for a judicial tribunal.

2. By the public law, as asserted and maintained by the United States, the neutral vessel was not liable to capture, and could not have been lawfully condemned, if taken into port, for the offence of carrying the rebel emissaries, inasmuch as neutral ships are free to carry all persons, not apparently in the military or naval service of the enemy.

3. By the public law, as asserted and maintained by the United States, the neutral vessel was not liable to seizure for carrying hostile dispatches, inasmuch as such dispatches are not contraband of war. And,

4. By the public law as asserted and maintained by the United States, the Trent was not liable to arrest, as the carrier of hostile dispatches, inasmuch as she was a neutral vessel, sailing, at the time, between neutral ports.

And, first, as to the unlawfulness of the seizure and removal of the rebel emissaries, without taking the ship into port-after reviewing the early and persistent pretension and practice of Great Britain in opposition to the principle asserted and urged by the United States, the senator says:

"Protest, argument, negotiation, correspondence, and war itself-unhappily the last resort of repub lies as of kings-were all employed in vain by the United States to procure a renunciation of this intolerable pretension." "But," he proceeds, "I do not content myself with asserting the persistent opposition of the American government. It be longs to the argument, that I should exhibit this opposition and the precise ground on which it was placed-being identical with that now adopted by Great Britain-and here the testimony is complete." He then cites the authentic records of his govern

ment:

During the administration of Washington, from the letters of Mr. Jefferson, his secretary of state, to Mr. Pinckney, the American Minister at London, of the 11th of June and the 12th of October, 1792.

During the administration of John Adams, from the letter of Mr. Pinckney, his secretary of state, to Rufus King, the American Minister at London, of the 8th of June, 1796; and during the same administration, from the letter of John Marshal, then secretary of state, afterward the venerated Chief Justice, to Rufus King, of the 20th of September,

1800.

During the administration of Jefferson, from the productions of Mr. Madison, his secretary of state, for the eight years of his Presidency, who, in his instructions to Mr. Monroe, then the American Minister at London, on the 5th of January, 1804, exposed the tyranny of the British pretension, in these emphatic and memorable terms:

"Taking reason and justice for the tests of this practice, it is peculiarly indefensible, because it

deprives the dearest rights of persons of a regular trial, to which the most inconsiderable article of property captured on the high seas is entitled, and leaves the destiny to the will of an officer, sometimes cruel, often ignorant, and generally interested, by want of mariners, in his own decisions.

"Whenever property found in a neutral vessel is supposed to be liable, on any ground, to capture and condemnation, the rule in all cases is, that the question shall not be decided by the captor, but be carried before a legal tribunal, where a regular trial may be had, and where the captor himself is liable to damages for an abuse of his power. Can it be reasonable then, or just, that a belligerent commander, who is thus restricted, and thus responsible, in a case of mere property of a trivial amount, should be permitted, without recurring to any tribunal whatever, to examine the crew of a neutral vessel, to decide the important question of their respec tive allegiances, and to carry that decision into execution by forcing every individual he may choose, into a service abhorrent to his feelings, cutting him off from his most tender connections, exposing his mind and his person to the most humiliating discipline, and his life itself to the greatest danger? Reason, justice, and humanity unite in protesting against so extravagant a proceeding."

From year to year, from 1804 to 1812, negotiations were carried on between the representatives of the United States government and British commissioners, for the purpose of procuring a renunciation by Great Britain of this intolerable pretension, by which, in the language of John Adams, in a pamphlet issued by him upon the absorbing

theme, in January, 1809, "naval lieutenants be came judges, midshipmen, became clerks, and boatswains, sheriffs or marshals."

"At last,” resumes the senator, "all redress through negotiation was found to be impossible; and this pretension, aggravated into multitudinous tyranny, was openly announced to be one of the principal reasons for the declaration of war against Great Britain in 1812."

The language of President Madison, in his message to Congress of June 1st, in that year, in which he designates the offensive character of the British pretension, is especially noteworthy, because singu larly coincident with that used by the professional advisers of the British crown, in their exposition of the unlawfulness of the act of the commander of the San Jacinto.

President Madison says: "Could the seizure of British subjects, in such cases, be regarded as within the exercise of a belligerent right, the acknowledged laws of war, which forbid an article of captured property to be adjudged, without a regular investi gation before a competent tribunal, would imperiously demand the fairest trial, when the sacred rights of persons were at issue. In place of such a trial these rights are subjected to the will of every petty commander.”

The British writers say: "It is not to the right of search that we object, but to the following seizure without process of law. What we deny is, the right of a naval officer to stand in place of a prize court, and adjudicate, sword in hand, with a sic volo sic jubeo, on the very deck which is a part of our ter ritory."

With what heartfelt satisfaction would such language, proceeding from the law officers of the British crown, have been hailed by the American statesmen, and how it would have cheered the hearts of the American people, of 1812.

The conclusion of the war, by the treaty of Ghent, brought with it neither renunciation nor modification of the British claim.

To effect this, other negotiations were set on foot, during the administration of President Monroe, in 1818 and in 1823, and in 1827, during the adminis tration of John Quincy Adams. They were alike futile as those undertaken before the war. And at length, in 1842, in the negotiation of the treaty of Washington, Mr. Webster, then the American Secretary of state, announced his abandonment of all idea of further negotiation, having in view the relinquishment by Great Britain of her asserted right, and contented himself with a deliberate declaration of the principle irrevocably adopted by the government of the United States.

แ Such," continues the senator, "is an authentic history of the British pretension, and of the manner in which it has been met by our government. And now, the special argument, formerly directed by us against this pretension, is directed by Great Britain against the pretension of Captain Wilkes,. to take two rebel emissaries from a British packet ship.

"If Captain Wilkes is right in this pretension, then, throughout all these international debates, extending over at least two generations, we have been wrong."

Passing to the second position, of the unlawful