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I cannot place my compatriots in so low a scale of humanity as to think such is their temperament.

Lastly, I would inquire, are we so contented, happy and proud of our glorious inheritance as to strive for its retention in our own hands, and under present conditions?

Again I feel sure of your support in affirming that we are ready to fight for the continuance of our present constitution, inheritance, and flag, to the bitter end.

With such determination in view let us now analyze the situation and learn in what condition we are in to successfully maintain such a patriotic resolve.

At the present moment we have available for the purpose the Army and Navy of Great Britain and our own Militia, a combination that might naturally be thought fit to cope with any nation likely to attack us single handed.

Unfortunately, however, nations do not choose to engage in despoiling others, when the objective is strong and able to defend itself, but rather delays until the victim is under a handicap and certain to be more or less easily subjugated.

The time of real danger then for Canada will arise through the Mother Country becoming involved in Europe or elsewhere, and is unable to assist us with either Army or Navy, or only to a very limited extent. A contingency that is liable to happen at any moment, and constantly imminent.

Under such circumstances we shall then have to depend upon our own Militia for the country's safety.

As I shall now deal with the Militia only, the question may be asked: For what purpose is it maintained? The reply is: Obviously for defence: for if only to guard against internal troubles; we have been and are throwing vast sums away annually, because such bodies as the N.W.M.P. are fully capable of dealing with riots, while the personnel of the Militia is least of all adapted to such work for obvious reasons.

We are now arriving at the crucial point of my address, viz., to what extent is our Militia prepared to alone undertake the task of repelling an invader?

Its present strength is roughly 4,000 officers and 50,000 men, a total of 54,000, divided, governed and administered in accordance with the system adopted by the British Army; and for the purposes of training their strength the necessary guns, rifles, ammunition, clothing and equipment are available and serviceable.

However, no one for a moment can suppose that this comparatively small force would be found capable of holding its own against an enemy well armed, equipped, disciplined, trained, and of the strength that an invader would certainly prepare for the conquest of Canada.

It is the undeniable opinion of competent British authorities that the task of protecting Canada needs at least a force of 9,000 officers, and 250,000 men, so that after deducting our present numbers there would remain the large balance of 5,000 officers and 200,000 men to be found immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, together with a full complement of arms, ammunition, equipment and food, as well as the means of moving these necessary accessories; and then, to follow with the assembly of a Reserve of officers and men equal to half the above, from which to replace casualties occurring through death, wounds and disease; contingencies that follow in the path of war with amazing rapidity, particularly the latter.

Having so far been general in my remarks, let me now go more into detail, and endeavour to show you the principal difficulties to be encountered in placing our Militia in a fit state to perform the duty required for effective defence.

These may be classified as follows:

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Taking each of these subjects in rotation I will proceed to elaborate upon them in as few words as possible. In the matter of Personnel (Officers and Men) our deficiencies and requirements have perhaps astonished

you; but they are real nevertheless, and the most important factor in any scheme of defence must certainly be a sufficiency of officers and men.

In finding the men when the occasion requires, I do not think much difficulty will arise save in their training. But in the case of officers we face an apparently hard problem, for even now with our small establishment the trouble of procuring them is very great, while that of their training is much more so for the reason of the individual time and means necessary to prepare themselves for their responsible duties-when the number has to be suddenly doubled with no time available for education, the situation becomes alarming.

An officer, like a business or professional man, or a mechanic, must know his job: because in his hands are the lives of men, and if not trained to a knowledge of his responsibilities, and a preparation enabling him to meet them under varying circumstances, he is worse than useless.

I will now go on to the subject of "Material" under which is included such articles as Arms, Ammunition, Clothing, and Equipment, all of which I have intimated must be at hand when the personnel has been obtained. This, for the existing force, I admit, is available and serviceable, but with increase to war conditions the deficiency was found by General Sir Ian Hamilton at his official inspection in June last as under:

Guns, 300 (60 under order).

Machine guns, 287 (50 under order).

Rifles, 100,000.

Ammun., guns, 250,000 rds. (50,000 under order). small arms, 150,000,000.

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Clothing (suits), 200,000.

Knapsacks, 120,000.

Water bottles, 140,000.

Mess tins, 150,000.

In this list I have only noted such articles as require special manufacture and are not obtainable at a moment's notice; for blankets, rubber sheets, entrenching tools and tents, all necessary on mobilization, and more

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or less now short in numbers, have not been included, as they are easily procurable when needed.

My next subject is "Transport," or the means of moving supplies and stoves from rail head to the various bodies of troops in the field, for which purpose horses and mechanical transport in the form of motor-driven vehicles are the usual means.

Of the latter there are a large number, but I fear that roads fitted for their necessities are lacking, and therefore horses would likely have to be resorted to almost entirely.

Of that useful beast, the horse, there would be required alone for the transport services of our war forces at least 35,000-a small number to find, you will say, when told that there are something like 2,500,000 horses in the country.

But the difficulty that will here stare us in the face is that no system of registration is now in operation by which suitable animals could be quickly procured, or without deranging ordinary business requirements, consequently serious congestion would ensue.

I now come to the question of "Training." Under present conditions this consists of 9 actual days for the Cavalry and Infantry and 12 days for the other branches in each of the three years' enlistment: but as our population is a shifting one, it follows that the larger number of the men do not remain for more than two years with their units and therefore receive only from 18 to 24 days' training according to the branch to which they belong.

The importance of training for both officers and men may, in the words of an authority upon the subject, be summarized thus: "A sound system of training, like a good organization, must be built up systematically from the bottom."

In Switzerland where a militia system is adopted, the training of the recruit lasts for several weeks before he is permitted to engage in Company, Battalion or Brigade work. Again in Australia, the militiaman begins as a boy of 14, and before being considered fit to take his place in the lowest ranks of a Battalion, has had equal

to 150 days. In the Territorial force of Great Britain the very least time it is considered a man can be made fit for the duties of defence is 180 days.

Compare these examples with our requirements of 36 days at most, but of which we seldom obtain more than 24, and that of a somewhat desultory character in the endeavour to give a smattering of every phase of military service, and the result is a confirmation of the adage, “A little learning is a dangerous thing," for that "smattering" creates the impression of full knowledge.

Another weakness in our training system is the lack of suitable grounds for the purpose, particularly in Eastern Canada where the bulk of our forces exist. Only one such can be found up to the mark, viz., Petewawa, while for the troops centreing on London, Toronto, Kingston, Montreal, Quebec, St. John and Halifax, the practice of drill, rifle shooting and manœuvres are restricted to areas varying from 200 to 1,000 acres in their respective neighbourhoods, a condition in itself which renders abortive any successful attempt in the efficient education of our force.

The final subject in our category of deficiencies is Discipline which has perhaps a greater bearing upon success in war than it is credited with; for without this quality victory or defeat will be equally dangerous, as in either case troops will get out of hand and the unity of the military machine disappear.

Discipline essentially means obedience to authority, and imparts a reliable courage which would be otherwise wanting to large bodies of men. In peace time laxness of discipline causes inconvenience, annoyance, and trouble; in war it means ruin and disaster.

It must

Real discipline cannot be made to order. spring from a frequent practice in the art of obedience which grows by degrees into a tradition.

Any number of instances might be given you in proof of the enormous value of this trait did time permit, and for our own case, nowhere can better examples of failures through its absence be found than in the History of the Civil War in the United States.

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