But would these cases still remain moral, if we allow Taste to have any influence on them? Suppose then, the one in the first case, who was tempted to commit a bad action, and omitted it out of regard for justice, had a taste so cultivated, that all shameful and violent actions awakened within him an abhorrence, which nothing could overcome, at the moment when the impulse of preservation would urge towards a shameful action, the merely aesthetic sense would condemn it immediately-it would not even make its appearance before the moral Forum, before conscience, but would be judged finally in the Court of first resort. But the æsthetic sense controls the will merely by feeling, not by laws. Thus that person refused to entertain the agreeable feeling of preserved life, because he could not endure the repugnance he felt against committing a base action. The whole affair is thus already discussed in the forum of Sensibility, and the conduct of this man, as legal as it is, is yet indifferent in a moral sense-it is a beautiful effect of nature.

Suppose, now, the other one, to whom his reason commanded that he should do a certain thing, against which his natural impulse revolted, had also a susceptible sense for beauty, for all those things which are great and perfect, enraptured with enthusiasm, even Sensuality would comply with the claims of Reason, at the moment those claims were suggested, and he would, with the concurrence of his inclination, do that which he must have done in opposition to his inclination, without this tender sensibility for the Beautiful. But would we consider him less perfect on that account? Certainly not for his action sprang originally out of pure regard for the precept of Reason, and it is no infringement of the moral purity of his deed, that he obeyed the precept of Reason joyfully. He is therefore as accomplished morally, whereas physically he is by far more accomplished: for he is a very judicious subject for

virtue.

Taste, therefore, gives to the disposition-of-the-mind a tone appropriate for virtue, because it removes the inclinations which hinder, and awakens such as favor it. Taste cannot derogate from true virtue, though in all cases, where the impulse of nature produces the first incitement, it concludes every instance before its own tribunal, upon which, otherwise. conscience would have been required to pass judgment, and therefore Taste is the cause that among the actions of those who are controlled by it, far more indifferent, than truly moral ones are discovered. For the excellency of mankind rests by no means on the greater number of single rigorously moral actions, but on the greater congruity of the whole natural condition with the moral laws, and it redounds not so very much to the recommendation of his people or age, when one, in the same, hears so often of morality, and of individual moral actions; much more might one hope that at the end of culture, if such a thing could be imagined, the subject would be scarce

ly ever mentioned. Taste may, on the contrary, be positively useful to true virtue in all cases, where Reason produces the first incitement, and is in danger of being overpowered by the stronger force of the impulse-of-nature. In these cases, for example, it attunes our Sensuality in accordance with duty, and therefore also makes the least amount of the moral power of will capable of the practice of virtue. Now, while Taste, as such, is in no case injurious to true morality, but in many cases is manifestly useful, the fact, that it is in the highest degree conducive to the legality of our conduct, must also be considered of great weight. Suppose now, that fine culture contributes nothing at all to the promotion of morality, to make us better-minded,-it enables us at least, even without a truly moral disposition, to act in such a manner, as that in which a person of truly moral disposition would be induced to act. Now, nothing depends upon our actions before a moral forum, as far as they are an expression of our dispositions; but before the physical forum, and in the plan of nature, the case is just the contrary, nothing depends upon our dispositions, as far as they prompt actions, by which the aim of nature is promoted. But now both orders-of-the-world, the physical wherein powers, and the moral wherein laws govern, are so accurately calculated for one another, and so intimately interwoven with one another, that actions, which are morally judicious in their form, inclose at the same time in their substance a physically judicious aim; and as the whole fabric-of-nature only therefore appears to be existing, so as to render possible the highest of all aims,-that which is the Good, so the Good again acts as a means to sustain the fabric of nature upright. The order of nature is thus made dependent on the morality of our dispositions, and we cannot act in violation of the moral world, without at the same time producing a disturbance in the physical.

When now it is never expected of human nature, so long as it remains human nature, that it will act uniformly and constantly as pure Reason, without interruption or backsliding, and never violate the moral order; when we, with all our convictions as well of the necessity as the possibility of pure virtue, must confess, how very accidental is its real practice, and how little we dare build on the invincibility of our better principles, when we are reminded by this consciousness of our uncertainty, that the fabric-of-nature suffers by every one of our moral faux pas; when we call all these things to remembrance, then would it be the most presumptuous audacity to allow the welfare of the world to depend on this accident of our virtue. Moreover an obligation here rests upon us, to fulfil at least the physical order-of-the-world satisfactorily by the tenor of our actions, even when we might be unable to fulfil the moral order by the form of our actions, at least, as perfect instruments, to discharge the aim of nature, which we, as imperfect persons, owe to Reason, so that we may not be confounded before both tribunals

at the same time. If we, therefore, because it is without moral worth, would establish no order in regard to the legality of our conduct, then, by this means, the order-of-the-world would be disarranged, and before we would be ready with our principles, all the bonds of society would be snapt asunder. But the more accidental our morality is, so much the more necessary is it to take precautions for the legality of our conduct, and a frivolous or proud neglect of the legality may be imputed to us as a moral blemish. Even as the madman who perceiving his approaching paroxism, removes every knife, and freely offers himself to be bound, so that he may not be answerable in his sound condition for the crime he may commit when his mind is disordered; so also are we obligated to bind ourselves by Religion and by æsthetic laws, so that our passions may not violate the physical order during the period of their dominion

I have here placed Religion and Taste in one class, not undesignedly, because both have merit together, according to the effect, if not also according to the inner worth, to serve as a succedaneum for true virtue, and to secure legality there, where one cannot hope morality. Although every one in the rank of Spirits would indisputably adorn a higher position, who neither felt the necessity of the charm of beauty, or of the prospect of immortality to conduct himself in all cases in accordance with Reason, yet even the known bounds of humanity require the most rigid ethical writer to allow something in practice, on the auterity of his system, though he would make no allowance for the same in theory, and they also require that the welfare of mankind, which would be badly guarded by our accidental virtue, should be more firmly protected by both the strong anchors of Religion and of Taste.

In

The principal causes which modify and limit the increase of population, seem not to have been appreciated by the political economists or statesmen of any period in the history of man. every state of society, from the hunter to the highest condition attained by civilized nations, the multiplication of the race demands a continual augmentation of the means of subsistence. This is a condition imposed on man by a law of his nature compelling him by the penalties of famine, war, and expatriation to investigate and develop the boundless resources provided by the Creator for his subsistence and happiness.

Under the operations of this law, even wandering tribes of savages, numbering, it may be, not more than one individual to five square miles of the country which they claim, suffer all the evils of a redundant population. Relying alone upon the game and natural products of the earth for subsistence, their numbers are necessarily Îimited by the extent of these resources; whilst the horrors of famine are only mitigated by exterminating wars, waged for the occupation of more extensive and less exhausted hunting grounds. And thus the increase of savage nations is cut off and limited by the operations of natural laws, the penalties whereof can only be avoided by adopting the arts of civilization.

Civilization is to be regarded as a state of continual progression; and after emerging from a state of barbarism the causes affecting the increase of population become still more numerous and complicated than before. For whatever may be the physical properties or condition of any certain part of the globe, the increase of its inhabitants will now depend upon their intellectual, moral and social condition.

Habits of industry, improvements in the useful arts, and discov eries in physical science, are the obvious means of changing the normal condition of the elements placed under the control of man,

and of giving them such combination and form as render them available as sources of subsistence and comfort. But a people may be industrious; may advance rapidly in improvements of the useful arts; make valuable discoveries in physical science, and yet, radical defects in their civil institutions will retard and limit the increase of their numbers and finally cause a decline of population, even while the physical resources of the country remain abundant and comparatively unexplored.

When from any cause, whether physical, moral, or political, the productions which minister to the primary wants of a people cease to increase for a series of years in succession, famine must ensue as a necessary consequence, unless the redundant population be destroyed by war or emigrate to other lands.

Famine is a natural consequence of a redundant population: war and emigration are human expedients, calculated to avert the immediate danger of impending evils, but do not remove the cause; therefore, when peace shall have been restored or emigration shall have ceased, the danger recurs with an aspect not less threatening than before. But it has rarely occurred in the history of civilized man, that the relations subsisting between different nations were such as to admit of peaceable emigration to an extent sufficient to relieve a country, possessing a redundant population, from the horrors of famine. And hence the population of civilized as well as of savage nations has been kept down chiefly by the combined effects of war and famine.

Peaceable and unrestricted emigration from one country to another, of numbers sufficient to affect materially the condition of both, has so rarely occurred that there is no instance on record from which we can infer the consequences of such a movement. But, it would seem that, unless the causes which tend to limit the increase be removed, the current of emigration, when once set in motion, would continue to be supplied from its original source; at least, until the country to which it flowed could no longer furnish emigrants with the means of subsistence. And, provided the productions of the over populous country should not decline, the ratio of increase would be augmented, and the number of emigrants enlarged from year to year.

We conclude, however, that emigration, so extensive as here supposed, would tend to check improvements in the useful arts, and diminish the production of commodities necessary to sustain those who should remain in their own country; because, by removing the redundant population, the necessities which continually urge mankind to investigate the properties of nature, and invent new methods of educing thence the means of subsistence, would be removed also. So, too, the popular influences which tend to liberalize the political institutions of densely populated countries, would be weakened; while those principles which have heretofore retarded