stars, and the heavens. Now as they perceived all these moving and running round in a perpetual course, from this nature of running they called them gods (ảño ταύτης τῆς φύσεως τῆς τοῦ θεῖν θεοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπονομάσαι); but afterwards, perceiving that there were others, they called them all by the same name."

When the philological importance of Sanscrit began to be realised, the derivations of the term from Greek fell into disfavour, and it was almost universally supposed to have come from the root div (shining), like the Sanscrit deva, Latin deus, divus, and the Greek Zeus. This derivation is now, however, rejected by some of the highest authorities. Schleicher went back to the etymology suggested by Plato; Hainebach has defended that given by Herodotus; and Curtius inclines to derive from a root es (to beseech). Fick decides in favour of a Sanscrit root dhi, to shine, to look, to be pious. If the last of these views be correct, the root thought of theos and deus is the same, although each has had its own root-word. It seems certain that they cannot have grown out of the same verbal root.

Deism is distinguished from theism by probably all recent theologians in substantially the same manner. Some oppose it to theism; others include it in theism as a species in a genus; but this does not prevent their agreeing as to the distinction to be drawn. Deism is regarded as, in common with theism, holding, in opposition to atheism, that there is a God, and, in opposition to pantheism, that God is distinct from the world, but as differing from theism in maintaining that God is separate from the world, having endowed it with self-sustaining and self-acting powers, and then abandoned it to itself. Writing of my previous volume, Mr Bradlaugh

(Nat. Ref., Jan. 6, 1878) says: "You draw a distinction between deism and theism (p. 91), for which I am not aware that there is any warranty. Surely both deist

and theist mean precisely the same-viz., believer in 'Deus,' 'Theos,' 'God.' You may have any qualifying words to express the character of the belief, as Christian Theism, or Mahommedan Theism, but I do not understand that the use of the Latin or Greek form conveys, or ought to convey, any different or distinguishable meaning." In reply, I would observe that the distinction is not at all of my drawing, but one made use of by all contemporary Christian apologists. The distinction is, further, a real distinction, yet one which, so far as I know, there is no suitable qualifying word to express. Terms like Christian and Mohammedan certainly do not, as they merely characterise different forms of theism. proper, or at least of theism as distinguished from deism. On this account it seems to me that the distinction would have been warranted even had the etymology of deism and theism been the same, whereas this is, as has been already indicated, extremely doubtful.

At the same time it must be admitted that the word "deist," when used in the manner indicated, may occasion injustice. It may be confounded—and in fact often is confounded-with a different application of the term,--with what may be called its historical application. Christian apologists, as a rule, when speaking of the so-called "English deists," represent them as having denied that God was present and active in the laws of nature. This is erroneous and unfair. One or two of them may have done so, but certainly what as a body they denied was merely that God worked otherwise than through natural laws. It is curious that the orthodox writers who first

unjustly accused the deists of representing God as having withdrawn from His universe, and abandoned it to its own resources, have frequently the same charge now brought against themselves. It is very common, for instance, to find Paley and other natural theologians of the eighteenth century censured as having imagined that God made the universe as a watchmaker makes a watch, and then left it to itself, merely looking on to see how it goes. Of course the censure has no foundation whatever, and only shows discreditable carelessness and ignorance in those who pronounce so unjust a judgment.

The terms atheism and anti-theism have been otherwise distinguished than they are in the lecture. Antitheism has sometimes been understood as not a more but a less general term than atheism—as, in fact, a species or division of atheism. For instance, Dr Chalmers (Nat. Theol., ch. ii. p. 59) writes thus: "Judging from the tendency and effect of his arguments, an atheist does not appear positively to refuse that a God may be; but he insists that He has not discovered Himself, whether by the utterance of His voice in audible revelation, or by the impress of His hand upon visible nature. His verdict on the doctrine of a God is only that it is not proven. It is not that it is disproven. He is but an atheist. He is not an anti-theist." And on p. 61:

"Atheism might plead a lack of evidence within its own field of observation. But anti-theism pronounces both upon the things which are and the things which are not within that field. It breaks forth and beyond all those limits that have been prescribed to man's excursive spirit by the sound philosophy of experience; and by a presumption the most tremendous, even the

usurpation of all space and of all time, it affirms that there is no God." Dr Chalmers, it will be perceived, limits atheism to critical and sceptical atheism, and identifies anti-theism with dogmatic atheism. On this account it is surprising that Mr Holyoake (Reasoner, xi. 15, 232) should have written: "The course to be taken is to use the term secularists as indicating general views, and accept the term atheist at the point at which ethics declines alliance with theology; always, however, explaining the term atheist to mean 'not seeing God,' visually or inferentially-never suffering it to be taken. (as Chalmers, Foster, and many others represent it) for anti-theism—that is, hating God, denying God,—as hating implies personal knowledge as the ground of dislike, and denying implies infinite knowledge as the ground of disproof." Chalmers and Foster obviously laboured not to efface but to emphasise the very distinction which Mr Holyoake himself draws.

My chief reason for preferring the distinction between atheism and anti-theism explained in the lecture to that drawn by Dr Chalmers and Mr Holyoake is, that it is of greater practical use. There is little need for a single term to specify dogmatic atheism; there is great need for a single term at once inclusive and distinctive of all theories opposed to theism. The word non-theistic is unsatisfactory, not merely because of its hybrid origin and character, but also because it is far too comprehensive. Theories of physical and mental science are nontheistic, even when in no degree, directly or indirectly, antagonistic to theism.

NOTE II., page 10.

ABSOLUTE ATHEISM IMPLIES INFINITE KNOWLEDGE.

The passage from John Foster to which reference is made in the lecture is the following: "The wonder turns on the great process, by which a man could grow to the immense intelligence that can know there is no God. What ages and what lights are requisite for this attainment? This intelligence involves the very attributes of Divinity, while a God is denied. For unless this man is omnipresent-unless he is at this moment in every place in the universe,-he cannot know but there may be in some place manifestations of a Deity by which even he would be overpowered. If he does not absolutely know every agent in the universe, the one that he does not know may be God. If he is not himself the chief agent in the universe, and does not know what is so, that which is so may be God. If he is not in absolute possession of all the propositions that constitute universal truth, the one which he wants may be that. there is a God. If he cannot with certainty assign the cause of all that he perceives to exist, that cause may be a God. If he does not know everything that has been done in the immeasurable ages that are past, some things may have been done by a God. Thus unless he knows all things-that is, precludes another Deity by being one himself-he cannot know that the Being whose existence he rejects does not exist."-(Essays, P. 35, 15th ed.

The criticism of Mr Holyoake on this argument, to which reference is also made in the lecture, will be found