Page images
PDF
EPUB

tween comprehension and apprehension-in which there is no imperfection or incompleteness-on which there can be no alteration, and to which there can be no addition,-and therefore it is knowledge necessarily and for ever beyond the reach of all finite intelligences. "Who by searching can find out God? Who can find out the Almighty unto perfection?"

Pantheism stumbles at the idea of creation. It affirms that creation is inconceivable, and infers that it is impossible. In treating of materialism, I have indicated that the assertion is equivocal and the inference illegitimate. But another argument has been employed. The idea of the creation of a finite universe in time has been pronounced dishonouring to God, as implying that His omnipotence is to a large extent inoperative. What, we are asked, was Omnipotence doing before creation? How and why did infinite power produce only a finite effect? Is power unused not power wasted? Is there not something irrational and repellent in the thought of an omnipotence which originates only a limited sum of results-which has no adequate operation or object? To break or avoid the force. of these questions some theologians have maintained that God does all that He can-that His activity is the full expression of His ability; and others have argued that nature is an eternal and infinite creation. These are views, however, which,

.

far from warding off pantheism, inevitably tend to it; and they grievously offend against reason, which declares it an absurdity that even an infinite power should produce an infinite effect within a finite sphere-within limits of time and space. Is, then, omnipotence never fully exercised? Is infinite power never fully productive? We have no right to think so. Although omnipotence cannot express itself fully in the finite world to which we belong, the Divine nature may be in itself an infinite universe where this and all other attributes can find complete expression. Is either God's power or His activity to be measured exclusively by the production or support of beings distinct from Himself? If so, obviously, unless His power be perpetually and completely exercised about finite things, His activity is not equal to His power, and He is not infinitely active, but only infinitely capable of acting. Even infinite activity, however, and absolutely infinite production, cannot be reasonably denied to the Divine nature. As activity is a perfection, infinite activity may be reasonably held to be a supreme perfection which must be ascribed to God. If an absolutely infinite agent acts according to all the extent of its absolutely infinite nature, it must necessarily produce an absolutely infinite effect; the effect would not otherwise be proportionate to the cause. The production of an absolutely infinite effect must be

a far greater perfection than the creation of any number of finite effects, and the mind may feel constrained to refer such production to God. So be it. But must the infinite effect fall within the realm of contingency, of time, of space? Must it not, on the contrary, belong to the sphere of the essential, the eternal, the absolute? Must it not lie within instead of without the Godhead? Must it not be such an effect as theologians mean when they speak of the eternal generation of the Word or the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit? It cannot, I think, be such an effect as external creation. God can never find or produce without Himself an object equal to Himself and fully commensurate with His essential, necessary activity and love. The Divine nature must have in itself a plenitude of power and glory to which the production of numberless worlds can add nothing.

Any difficulties not merely verbal and manifestly superficial which pantheists have raised as to the nature of the Divine personality likewise lead, I believe, to the conclusion, not that we should reject theism, but that we should reverence and appreciate more highly the Christian doctrine of the Trinity-a mystery indeed, yet one which explains many other mysteries, and which sheds a marvellous light on God, on nature, and on man. I have appealed, however, throughout this course of lectures, only to reason; and I am quite willing

that my arguments against pantheism and all other anti-theistic theories, as well as my arguments on behalf of theism, should be judged of by reason alone, without my reference to revelation.

I now bring these lectures to a close. It is with the trust that they may not have been wholly unprofitable to you, or unaccompanied by the blessing of God. To His name be honour and glory for ever. Amen.

APPENDIX.

NOTE I., page 3.

THE TERMS THEISM, DEISM, ATHEISM, AND

ANTI-THEISM.

THERE is considerable uncertainty as to the derivation of theós, the term from which comes theism. Herodotus (ii. 52) traces it to tithénai, to place or set. The Pelasgians, he says, did not give particular names to their gods, but "called them theoi, because of having placed (thentes) all things in order." Were this etymology correct, the recognition of order was what moved the Pelasgians to designate the objects of their worship theoi. On this supposition the Greek name for God was an immediate creation of the theological principle-an expression or deposit of the design argument. Herodotus believed it to be so.

Plato (Cratylus, xvi. 397) derives theos from theein, to run. He represents Socrates as saying that "the first men connected with Greece considered those only as gods, whom many of the barbarians at present regard as such, the sun, and the moon, and the earth, and the

« PreviousContinue »