foreign affairs. In fact, in some instances, the President supported him against all the balance of the Cabinet — a very, very rare thing for Washington to do so rare that I have no knowledge of his having done it with regard to any of his other Secretaries.

Early in November, America heard with astonishment of the dethronement and imprisonment of the King of France, and a Cabinet consultation was held upon the subject -whether we should suspend our payment of the French debt. Jefferson thus sums up what occurred:

"I admitted that the late Constitution was dissolved by the dethronement of the King; and the management of affairs surviving to the National Assembly only, that this was not an integral legislature, and therefore not competent to give a legitimate discharge for our payment; that I thought consequently that none should be made until some legitimate body came into place; that I should consider the National Convention called, but not yet met, to be a legitimate body. Hamilton doubted whether it would be a legitimate body, and whether, if the King should be re-established, he might not disallow such payments, on good grounds."

The Cabinet meeting ended by an agreement that Jefferson was to write to Gouverneur Morris to suspend payment "till further orders." These further orders were sent, when the National Convention came into place," to the effect that we acknowledge the obligation of the debt and were ready to pay what was due. The policy here outlined, as Jefferson's opinion, became a permanent policy in our Government. Foreign debts ever since have been regarded by us as International, not Inter-dynastic.

On September 19th, in a letter to our Minister in England, Jefferson outlined what he called the "Cath

olic Principle of Republicanism," as regards recognition of governments. It is this:

"We certainly cannot deny to other nations that principle, whereon our own government is founded; that every nation has a right to govern itself internally, under what form it pleases, and to change these forms, at its own will; and, externally, to transact business with other nations through whatever organ it chooses, whether that be a King, Convention, Assembly, Committee, President, or whatever it be. The only thing essential is, the will of the nation. Taking this as your polar star, you can hardly err."

He had already said: "Principles being understood their application will be less embarrassing."

This "Catholic Principle of Republicanism" was not only a "polar star" to guide our then Minister to St. James, but all American Ministers everywhere ever since, and all Secretaries of State. We have never arrogated to ourselves the right, which the coalition of Kings then, and the Holy Alliance later, arrogated to themselves, to sit in judgment upon the form of government and the administration of domestic affairs in any country on the ground that its "principles are dangerous." The only question with us is the truly republican and democratic one: Is the actual government that which the people of the country in question have drawn over themselves?

I think it is well enough here, in view of coming events, then already casting their shadows before them, to treat the question of our treaties with France. France had given us money; lent us money; furnished fleets and armies, to gain our independence, and all the compensation she ever demanded was the fulfillment, not of all, but of some, of the promises contained

in these treaties, which, in many material aspects, became later broken promises. I am not saying that some of the promises ought not to have been broken. Without deciding the question, I am not prepared to take the stand that a nation must abide indissolubly by the written language of treaties, even to its own probable destruction, or very great hurt. Certainly, the first duty of a nation, as well as its most natural desire, is self-preservation. At any rate Washington, a very just man, thought so. And Jefferson, as his Secretary of State, in spite of his love for the French people, and of republican institutions, went with him, in the course of a strict neutrality, which necessarily violated some of the provisions of the French Treaty.

We ought to have paid the French debt, because we owed the money, and we owed much more than the accounts showed; but we could afford to do what Jefferson recommended with regard to the guarantee hold it in abeyance until expressly called upon to make it good.

Thomas E. Watson says that this neutral position "kept us from deriving any benefits from the victories of Napoleon." But it must be remembered that the victories of Napoleon could have done us no good. His victories were on land, and the victories to save us, must have been on sea, where Napoleon could no more have helped us, than he proved able to help Denmark, or Holland, or Spain.

On this point read Jefferson's letter to President Washington, giving his opinion concerning the French treaties, and concerning how the French Minister should be received. It is perhaps the ablest of his

papers treating international affairs. It is dated April 28th, 1793. It is one of the most forceful and lucid statements of the principle, which binds nations to their plighted word, that has ever been penned, and Washington yielded to the reasoning, notwithstanding the special and specious pleading contained in Hamilton's letter supporting the contrary view. He decided that the treaties with France remained in full force, and that the Minister from the French Republic should be received in the usual way and without the qualifications which Hamilton suggested. Ever since it has been our policy to treat Ministers also as National and not as Dynastic agents.

The Federalists immediately began to oppose our observing the French treaties upon two grounds. The first ground, or pretext, was puerile in its character, to wit, that the treaty was "not made with France, but with Louis XVI," or "Louis Capet," as they called him in their arguments, who, being dethroned, left us, as they contended, under no international obligations to France, "except those which flowed from the general principles of international law." The excuses which Aesop's wolf gave for eating up Aesop's lamb are the only precedents which I know, which could justify this bare-faced pretext to breach a solemn covenant. The second reason was that our guarantee came into force only in case of "a defensive war." The reply to that is that the language of the treaty of alliance, in Articles XI and XII, does not bear it out, but expressly declares the opposite.

Clearly, if language be given to express, and not to conceal ideas, Article XVII of the Treaty of Amity

and Commerce gave to French ships of war and privateers the right to enter and harbor themselves in any of our ports, carrying with them their prizes. We surrendered even the right of making examination, as to the lawfulness of the prize. That is not all; there was a clear and distinct promise, on our part, that we would not give shelter, or refuge, to the ships of war and privateers of a nation at war with France, and that even if stress of weather forced them to take temporary refuge with us, they must go out, as soon as possible. On this head two things were afterward contended: first, that France had no right to bring prizes within our ports, and secondly, that permitting her, out of our grace, to exercise such a privilege, we not only had the right, but it was our duty as a neutral nation, to extend the same privileges to England. Both of these contentions were in the very teeth of the express provisions of Article XXII of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce.

Whatever reasoning, good or specious, may be used to justify or excuse our Government for the violation of these special provisions of the two treaties, it is well, in the interest of candor and truth, that everybody should cease to deny that they were violated. The fact ought to be admitted simply because it is a fact, and not be glossed over. The material results of the violation were happy for us, and, it may be, for the entire world; happy for us, because our States were perhaps then too loosely united to have withstood the convulsions of a foreign war, which would have been accompanied undoubtedly by internal dissensions. New England would have taken, had we stood by our