the fortresses which resisted the Prussians in 1792, Longwy and Verdun, seem to have been in Charles the Fifth's days of no consequence whatever. The great Piedmontese fortress at this day is Alessandria, which I think hardly occurs in the military history of Piedmont previously to the wars of the French revolution. On the other hand, Turin itself, which was besieged so elaborately by Marshal Marsin in 1706, and so effectually relieved by Prince Eugene's victorious assault on the besiegers' lines, and the citadel of which was a fortress of some importance so late as 1799, is now wholly an open town, and its ramparts are become a promenade.

When speaking of the altered lines of roads, one is naturally led to think of the roads over great mountain chains, of which so many have been newly opened in our own days; and a few words on mountain warfare, which has been called the poetry of the military art, shall conclude this lecture. But by mountain warfare I do not mean the mere attack or defence of a mountain pass, such as we read of in the Tyrolese insurrection of 1809; but the attack and defence of a whole mountain country, comprehending a line perhaps of eighty or a hundred miles. You have here almost all the elements of interest in war met together; the highest exercise of skill in the general in the combination of his operations; the greatest skill and energy in the officers and soldiers in overcoming or turning to account the natural difficulties of the ground; and the picturesque and poetical charm of the grouping together of art and nature, of the greatest works and efforts of man with the highest magnificence of natural scenery. One memorable instance of this grand mountain warfare was the contest in the Pyrenees in 1813; another may be found in Napoleon's operations in the Apennines, in the beginning of the campaign of 1796, and those in the valley of the Adige in January, 1797; a third, and in some re

spects the most striking of all, was the struggle in Switzerland in 1799, when the eastern side of Switzerland was made as it were one vast fortress, which the French defended against the attacks of the allies. In such warfare, a general must bear constantly in mind the whole anatomy of the mountains which he is defending or attacking: the geographical distance of the several valleys and passes from each other, their facilities of lateral communication, their exact bearings and windings, as well as the details of their natural features, and resources. He must also conceive the disposition of his enemy's army, the force at each particular point, and the facilities of massing a large force at any one point in a given time. For a blow struck with effect at any one spot is felt along the whole line; and the strongest positions are sometimes necessarily abandoned without firing a shot, merely because a point has been carried at the distance of thirty or forty miles from them, by which the enemy may penetrate within their line and threaten their rear. And surely the moving forty or fifty thousand men with such precision, that marching from many different quarters they may be all brought together at a given hour on a given spot, is a very magnificent combination, if we consider how many points must be embraced at once in the mind, in order to its conception, and how many more are essential to its successful. execution. But lest I should seem here forgetting my own caution, and imitating the presumption of Hannibal's sophist, I will only refer you to General Mathieu Dumas' History of the Campaigns of 1799 and 1800, in which, illustrated as it is by its notes, you will find a very clear account of the particular contest in Switzerland, and some general remarks on mountain warfare, very clear and very interesting. (9)

The subject is so vast that it would not be easy to exhaust it; but enough has been said perhaps to fulfil my immediate object, that of noticing some of the questions and difficulties

which occur in military history; and I have lingered long enough upon ground on which my right as an unmilitary man to enter at all may possibly be questioned. Here then I shall end what I have to say with regard to external history: it follows that we should penetrate a little deeper, and endeavour to find some clue to guide us through the labyrinth of opinions and parties, political and religious, which constitute at once the difficulty and the interest of internal history.

NOTES

ΤΟ

LECTURE IV.

NOTE 1.-Page 183.

In one of the prefaces to his History of Rome, Dr. Arnold writes: **"I am well aware of the great difficulty of giving liveliness to a narrative which necessarily gets all its facts at second-hand. And a writer who has never been engaged in any public transactions, either of peace or war, must feel this especially. One who is himself a statesman and orator, may relate the political contests even of remote ages with something of the spirit of a contemporary; for his own experience realizes to him in a great measure the scenes and the characters which he is describing. And in like manner a soldier or a seaman can enter fully into the great deeds of ancient warfare; for although in outward form ancient battles and sieges may differ from those of modern times, yet the genius of the general and the courage of the soldier, the call for so many of the highest qualities of our nature, which constitutes the enduring moral interest of war, are common alike to all times; and he who has fought under Wellington has been in spirit an eye-witness of the campaigns of Hannibal. But a writer whose whole experience has been confined to private life and to peace, has no link to connect him with the actors and great deeds of ancient history, except the feelings of our common humanity. He cannot realize civil contests or battles with the vividness of a statesman and a soldier; he can but enter into them as a man; and his general knowledge of human nature, his love of great and good actions, his sympathy with virtue, his abhorrence of vice, can alone assist him in making himself as it were a witness of what he attempts to describe. But these even by

themselves will do much; and if an historian feels as a man and as a citizen, there is hope that, however humble his experience, he may inspire his readers with something of his own interest in the events of his history."

History of Rome, vol. ii. Preface.

NOTE 2.-Page 183.

"It is curious to observe how readily men mistake accidental distinctions for such as are really essential. A lively writer, the author of the Bubbles from the Brunnen of Nassau,' ridicules the study of what is called ancient history; and as an instance of its uselessness, asks what lessons in the art of war can be derived from the insignificant contests which took place before the invention of gunpowder. Now it so happens that one who well knew what military lessons were instructive, the emperor Napoleon, has selected out of the whole range of history the campaigns of seven generals only, as important to be studied by an officer professionally in all their details; and of these seven three belong to the times of Greece and Rome, namely, Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar. See Napoleon's 'Mélanges Historiques,' tome ii. p. 10."

Arnold's Thucydides, vol. iii. Preface, p. 20, note.

NOTE 3.-Page 185.

When Mentz was taken by the allied army in 1793, the French garrison was allowed to march out, without being made prisoners of war, and only under a stipulation that they were not to serve against the allies for a year. The consequence of which was, that these disciplined veterans were afterwards hurried, under the command of Kleber, into La Vendée, and against them, as Dr. Arnold has observed, the heroism and enthusiasm of the Vendeans, before victorious, was quickly found an unequal match. Goethe, who was present with the Duke of Brunswick during the siege, has given a curious account of the personal appearance of the veterans by whom this important fortress of Mayence had been stoutly defended. On one occasion, riding over the ground after a bold sortie in the night by the besieged garrison, he says, "The sun rose with a dull light, and