"The durability of the mind," fays our author, " may be infer red from her individuality and diftinct exiftence. The powers of nature can neither increase nor diminish the stock of beings: they may throw them out of their order, and diffolve the compounds formed thereby, or deftroy the fecondary qualities refulting from their compofition; but what has existence cannot be annihilated, and what is one cannot be divided; nor can primary properties effential to the subject be ever taken from it." P. 176.

If by the powers of nature the author mean those inftruments by which the numberless proceffes of natural chemistry are perpetually carrying on, we have indeed no reason to fuppofe that by them the human mind can be annihilated; for they have not annihilated one atom of matter since the beginning of the world. But if the human foul be a created being, it may certainly be annihilated by the mere change of that volition, which must be confidered as abfolutely neceffary to continue the exiftence which it originally produced. Tucker, however, feems to confider the human foul not as a created being, but as a portion of the anima mundi, though he does not, with fome of the ancients who held that opinion, believe that it will be abforbed in the parent foul-the To -immediately on the death of the body. On the contrary he thinks that it will pafs into fome new ftate of individual exiftence, to which, from the mere contemplation of its nature, he finds no reason to suppose that it will carry any thing more than its two primary powers of perceptivity and activity. All memory and experience may be left behind us.

"We may be like a blind man turned out into a crowded freet, having nothing but chance to direct our steps, infenfible to approaching mifchiefs, or not knowing which way to efcape them. We may be toffed about among the elements, driven along by ftreams of air, or whirled round in circles of fire; the little corpufcles of light may hurt us, and the ether teafe us with its continual repulfion; in short, we have every thing to fear and little to hope for." P. 178.

If he had not given to his foul the property of extenfion, he could hardly have conjured up fuch extravagant phantoms as thefe; but having introduced them, he naturally enough adds, that "the mere difcovery of our durable and percep

*He writes very inconfiftently on this anima mundi, and, in the vifion to be noticed afterwards, makes Pythagoras pronounce it the creature of Jove.

tive nature affords no comfort; for while we confine ourfelves to that, the profpeét lies difmal, dark, and uncertain before us."

To brighten this profpect the author proceeds to inquire into the evidence furnished by the light of nature for the existence, attributes, and providence of God. This inquiry is begun in the third chapter, which, in the abridgment, is entitled Caufes and Effects, but, in the original work, more properly Effects and Caufes. In rerum natura, the cause muft indeed be prior to the effect; but in the progrefs of human inquiry this order is neceffarily reverfed; for it is only in their effects that we difcern the existence of causes. When we obferve a change or event in nature, we infer, by an irrefiftible law of human thought, that there is fomewhere a caufe from which it has proceeded; but we do not neceffarily infer an effect from the prefence of a being that we know to be capable of producing it. When we fee a flar flying through the air, it is impoffible to doubt that its motion was produced by fome projectile force, though we may not be able to fay by what force; but we cannot infer, on feeing a man with a ftone in his hand, that he will actually throw it into the air, merely from our knowledge of his ability to do fo. Even in the contemplation of physical caufes and effects, where the energies of volition come not imme diately into view, we are not under the fame neceffity of inferring an effect from the prefence of a fubftance which we have known to be the cause of a fimilar effect, that we are of inferring the reality of fome caufe for every change or event that we obferve. Were we to fee a piece of iron moving near the furface of a theet of paper, though we might not be able to difcover whether it proceeded from the motion of a magnet below the paper or from fome other invifible caufe, it would be as impoffible to fuppofer that the motion of the iron proceeded from no caufe, as to fuppofe that things might be equal to one and the fame thing, and yet not be equal to one another. Either fuppofition involves an abfurdity, as being in direct contradiction to a fundamental law of human thought. But though we know from experience, that the motion of a magnet on one fide of a fheet of paper carries along with it a finall piece of iron on the other, there is no abfurdity or contradiction in fup. pofing that the cafe might be otherwife: nay, we apprehend that, previous to all experience, the natural fappofition, if any could be formed on the fubject, would be, that no fuch effect as the motion of the iron would be produced by the motion of the magnet.

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BRIT. CRIT, VOL. XXXI. MAY, 1858.

Neither

Neither Tucker nor his abridger has confidered the relation of effects to caufes in this point of view. Taking it for granted that impulfe, which they certainly never witneffed, neceffarily produces motion, they puzzle themfelves with hypothefes how the impulse of ether may produce the cohefion of the parts of bodies that appear in maffes, as well as the gravitation, towards each other, of bodies at a diftance; though there is no evidence that fuch an ether as they defcribe any where exifts; an evidence amounting to demonftration, that, fuppofing its exiftence, it could not produce the effects, which they attribute to it. This chapter, therefore, though on a most important fubject, is of very little value; nor is the next, which treats of chance, neceffity, and defign, entitled to higher praise.

It is indeed true, as we are there taught, that the word chance" ferves only to exprefs our ignorance of the manner in which other caufes operate;" that "neceffity is at moft but a channel of conveyance tranfmitting efficacy from cause to effect;" and that "the order of the univerfe," as this author calls it, "muft have proceeded from intelligence fuperior in degree, and in fome refpects different in mind from human reafon, which can only combine ideas fuggefted by things already exifting. But thefe truths are now controverted by no man, who is likely to employ one hour in ftudying either Tucker's Light of Nature or the abridgment of it, and are therefore hardly worthy of notice.

In the fifth chapter, which is entitled First Caufe, we meet with nothing that is new, nor with any thing that is reprehenfible. The author has adopted Clarke's notions of neceffary existence; but, in our opinion, he thinks more rationally of time and of fpace. The chapter, though very fhort, certainly contains all that is valuable in the original; but the introduction, or rather the want of introduction, to the reafoning, gives an abruptnefs to the abridged chapter, which is the more offenfive, as it might have been avoided by one or two fentences, with which Tucker himfelf introduces the fubject.

In the fixth chapter, which treats of the attributes of God in general, we meet with fome very judicious reflections on what, in the language of philofophy, is called the nature of things.

"For my own part," fays the author, "I can understand nothing effectively by the nature of things, but the properties of fubftances, the fituations given them, and motions impreffed upon them, together with the mutual operations refulting thence; and thefe being given to them at or after their creation, could not

controul the acts of the Almighty.That there is a scale of beings I know, but that it reaches within one step of divinity I neither know nor believe; nor if it did, could I afcribe it to any thing else but the good pleasure of the Creator; for I fee no neceffity but that all beings might have been made of the fame fpecies. Therefore the capacity of man, his faculties of reafon and appetite, the various orders of beings, the properties of fubftances, &c. could not prefcribe rules to the Almighty, from whofe power and appointment they proceeded." P. 193.

If the great purpose of the Almighty in creating the univerfe, was to communicate happinefs (and it is not eafy to conceive what other purpofe fuch a Being could have) it may be doubted whether in any limited fpace, however great, an equal quantity of happinefs could have been produced by making all beings of the fame fpecies, as by making them of different orders rifing gradually above one another. Every thing elfe however in this extract is indifputable; for, as it feems to be abfurd to conceive any thing finite as reaching within one ftep of infinity, fo can we affign no higher caufe for the various orders of beings, and their mutual relations, than the will and good pleasure of the Creator. Towards the conclufion of this chapter, the author fays,

"Some writers, particularly Bishop Beveridge and Dean Sherlock, endeavour to heighten our idea of omnipotence, by afferting, that God is not only the Creator, but the continual fupport of all fubftances whatever. The bishop, after his ufual manner, fpeaks pofitively, as if he knew the thing by ocular demonstration; and ufes the comparison of a book held in one's hand to explain his meaning. For,' fays he, if I take away my hand, the book will fall to the ground, without any act of mine to throw it down: fo I myself fhould inftantly drop into nothing, were God to withdraw his fuftaining power from under me without his doing any thing to thruft me out of being.' Now, in the first place, the argument is a bad one, because the book does uot fall to the ground of itself, but would remain where it is but for the attraction of the earth drawing it downwards; and as to the doctrine itself, it does not feem greatly to enhance our idea of the Creator; for it fuppofes that fubftances may as it were annihilate themselves, and thus undo the act of the Almighty." P. 196.

Had this been the language of Tucker;-had the man, who compares the energies of the mind on the body to the

See King's Effay on the Origin of Evil.

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operations

as

operations of a miller turning the ftream on the wheel of overfhot mill, fpoken thus contemptuously of the comparison by which the bishop illuftrates his opinion of Providence, we fhould have deemed his impudence at least equal to his ingenuity; but this is neither the language nor the reasoning of Tucker He holds indeed the opinion which is here attributed to him; but he neither holds it with the unbecoming confidence of the abridger, nor fupports it by fuch abfund reafoning. Tucker knew what we thought all men had now known, that a heavy body falling to the earth is not literally drawn downwards, as a boat may be drawn towards the fhore by means of a rope; that gravi tation, though fometimes called attraction, is not confidered a metaphyfical or real caufe, but merely as a law of nature, according to which bodies tend towards each other; and that the force of this tendency diminishes exactly as the fquare of the diftance increafes, which is not true of drawing by means of a rope. When it is faid that a book or any other body gravitates towards the earth, nothing more is meant, than that fuch is the nature of the book and the earth, that the former muft fall to the latter if not fupported by a foreign force. The bifhop's parallel, therefore, holds throughout, and his argument is unanswerable. The book falls to the earth by its own nature, and not by foreign drawing; and every created being-even the highest angel in heaven-as it had not of itself existence, cannot of itself have perpetuity of exiftence, but would inflantly by its own nature drop, as the bishop expreffes it, into nothing, were God to withdraw from under it that power, which at firft created and has ever fince fuftained it.

Tucker himfelf feems, on this fubject, to have been mifled partly by his notions of the mundane foul, and partly, as others have been before him, by not diftinguishing accurately between arrangement and creation. A watch or clock, it hath been faid, continues to go after the watchmaker has given it out of his hands; and are the works of nature fo much lefs perfect, than the works of art as to require the perpetual fupport of the Creator? But between thefe two cafes there is no parallel-hardly indeed any analogy. The watch-maker confers neither existence nor a Jingle power or quality on the materials of the watch; he only brings thofe materials together, and arranges them in fuch a manner, as that by the laws of nature they fhall produce motions for the meafuring of time. When he withdraws from them, their arrangement is preferved and themselves fupported, as every thing elfe is preferved and fupported by

the