facility put themselves in direct communication with those passages in Cobden's speeches, in which he foretells the consummation of his dreams, "that other nations would become free-traders." 1

If such, then, be the case, and there can be no doubt of its accuracy, we have to deal now with a set of conditions which Cobden never even hinted at as being possible.

The people, or part of the people, trusted their leader's judgment. That judgment was unsound. But it required time to prove it. The free-traders of to-day reply, that our partial free-trade system is beneficial to the country. The choice, therefore, has to be made between "Cobden's ideas of free trade and present ideas," between "Cobden's universal free trade and his successors' system of free imports." Who can question the fact that out of the so-called free-trade prosperity much political capital was made, and that it was by falsely assumed effects that the Gladstonian party was maintained so long a period in power? And who can doubt but that upon the security of free-trade doctrines depends the vitality of what once was a great party in the State?

The political implication of the problem is thus of large importance. There is reason, therefore, why the Radical free traders give political answers to economical questions. The malt-tax is the tax which blots the "fair pages" (so they describe it) of their free-trade work. The free-traders sacrificed in suc

1 The prediction was more than once uttered by Cobden, vide Speeches, pp. 207 and 242. It was not a mere boast, but a "belief," therefore.

cession all those interests which had been, from the paper interest down to the interest of our sugarrefiners, supported by the immediate and powerful assistance of protection. By protecting the interests of the brewers and the licensing system, they succeeded in raising up a vast political force. By its means they diverted popular attention into the channels of political reform. The final effort was one which was intended to make the Liberal party supreme-to destroy Conservatism, and to create a parliamentary dictator. But that effort was neutralised by "redistribution." Now it is quite possible that this final struggle for a new lease of political existence was the result of exhaustion, from past endeavours to pander to the assumed wants of the multitude. And that, being unable to convert any more "fixed" into "floating" capital (which afforded Mr Gladstone the opportunity of reducing the three and a half to three per cents) by the mass of money thrown upon the markets; being unable any further to cause a miserable cheapness of goods, to the detriment of the small trader and to the injury of the national labour,—the free-trade economists left the field of finance, and, to acquire an unworthy power, whereby to support their fiscal revolution, pointed to reform in the constitution of the country. Invested with this power, which might bring them back to the government of the people, or at least arrest any attempt to repair the havoc done to the sources of the national wealth, they occupy at present an uncertain position. And it seems to be their desire to achieve by popular enthusiasm what they cannot gain by the instrument of

reason.

The hollowness of such a procedure will be evident to the impartial. The mass of the people, if uninfluenced by false enthusiasm and arguments constructed to inflame their imagination, find themselves in an equivocal position. But let them discern the trick which produced the appearance of prosperity without the substance. Let them learn that all those financial changes were changes which affected solely the principal organs of the distribution of wealth, and that they directly injured the sources of production. Let them decide whether or not a nation can continue prosperous, the sources of whose annual income are constantly diminishing. Let them revolve these matters, and perceive that but one choice is open to them-the choice between "production" and "distribution."

§ 39. It is more important for the labourer to regard himself as a producer than as a consumer.—It was certainly a strange sort of "ideal" policy which excluded the most important element of all from its scope of action. "Protection," whatever else might be assumed concerning it, at least tended to effect a due proportion between the functions of production and distribution. By the protection of industries, even the most insignificant, the results of the circulation of capital were experienced in the narrowest channels of labour. Prices were relatively high, but the employment of labour was ensured!

But as soon as a reimposition of duties is mentioned, the free-trader plunges into a vivid description of the horrors of war. Does the free-trader suppose that our system of free imports tends to keep off war from us?

He must indeed be more than confident who trades in such dangerous falsehoods! By growing our own corn, we should throw much of foreign corn-land out of cultivation.1 We thereby do an injury to our neighbours, who have expended their capital on the expectation that our free-trade system would remain a permanent one. Now, to estimate the nature of that injury, we must inquire, What was the condition which determined this country to receive the corn of other countries? This is an important consideration, as we shall endeavour to show.

The British Parliament was led, from motives of expediency, to permit the entry of foreign corn. But there was, in the background, the anticipation that, if we showed the way in freeing our trade, all other nations would follow our example. So that Cobden's description was taken to be the basis of the initial progress of a universal free trade. "We take your food; and you take our manufactured goods in return. The principle of exchange is equality. You take a certain value of our goods, and, in return, we take an equivalent of your corn."

And here we may allude to another of the interesting products of free trade. By telling the nation that it was to our interest "to buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest," Cobden impressed many with the soundness of his views. Our selling markets would be dear, because we should have no competitor; our buying markets would be cheap, because many nations would compete for our corn demand.

1 Is it not a fact that our manufacture has been checked through the imposition and increase of foreign duties? There can be no injustice, therefore, in taxing corn. It is but a proper retaliation.

The anticipation has not been verified. Those "other nations" of Cobden have seen through the trick of attempting to divert competition all into our own favour. For if any other nation bought our manufactures dear and sold its corn cheap, how could it be said, on the doctrine of free trade, to buy in the cheapest market, when it buys only in one; and to sell in the dearest market, when it has to compete with others for the privilege ?1

If it was on this expectation that the British people were persuaded by the artifices of a leader desirous of fame to risk their material prosperity, surely it is in the power of that people to reverse 2 their former decision, when they learn that the expectation has not been fulfilled, and that our partial system of free imports is injurious to the interests of labour.

But a party stands between the employment of the British labouring classes and starvation-a party committed to the free-trade doctrines, all which, because they are universal, are not equally applicable to succeeding, and oftentimes so altered as to be new, sets of conditions. And that party threatens 3 the nation with evils worse than those which it at present experiences. Not only will war be directly fostered, but our exports, at present in a deplorable condition, will be further decreased. But can our export trade be under worse

3

1 1 I.e., Cobden did not place other nations in England's position. He treated the problem from our, not from their point of view.

2 Cf. Cobden, p. 253: "If events should happen to change the circumstances of the country, there is no reason why we should not next year reverse the decision we may come to in the present."

3 The old story of threats and menaces handed down from Cobden.