local defence. Early in the year, Sir Henry Clinton made some movements up the North River, which indicated an intention of attacking the posts in the Highlands; but in proportion as these were threatened, Washington concentrated his force for their defence. This was done so effectually, that no serious direct attempt was made upon them. Clinton, hoping to allure the Americans from these fortresses, sent detachments to burn and lay waste the towns on the coast of Connecticut. This was done extensively. Norwalk, Fairfield, and New London, were destroyed. Washington, adhering to the principle of sacrificing small objects to secure great ones, gave no more aid to the suffering inhabitants than was compatible with the security of West Point.

Though the force under his immediate command throughout the campaign of 1779, was unequal to any great undertaking, yet his active mind sought for and embraced such opportunities for offensive operations, as might be attempted without hazarding too much.

The principal expedition of this kind, was directed against the Six Nations of Indians, who inhabited the fertile country between the western settlements of New York and Pennsylvania, and the lakes of Canada. These, from their vicinity and intercourse with the white people, had attained a degree of civilization exceeding what was usual among savages. To them, many refugee tories had fled, and directed them to the settlements, which they laid waste, and at the same time massacred the inhabitants. In the early period of Washington's life, while commander of the

Virginia troops, he had ample experience of the futility of forts for defence against Indians, and of the superior advantage of carrying offensive operations into their towns and settlements. An inva

sion of the country of the Six Nations being resolved upon, the commander in chief bestowed much thought on the best mode of conducting it. The instructions he gave to Gen. Sullivan, who was appointed to this service, were very particular, and much more severe than was usual, but not more so than retaliation justified, or policy recommended. Sullivan, with a considerable force, penetrated into the country of the Indians in three directions, laid waste their crops, and burnt their towns. His success was decisive, and in a great measure secured the future peace of the frontier settlements. The late residence of the savages was rendered so far uninhabitable, that they were reduced to the necessity of seeking an asylum in 'the more remote western country.

While the British were laying waste Connecticut, Washington, after reconnoitring the ground in person, planned an expedition against Stony Point, a commanding hill projecting far into the Hudson, on the top of which a fort had been erected, which was garrisoned with about six hundred men. One of the motives for assaulting this work, was the hope that, if successful, it might induce the detachment which had invaded Connecticut, to desist from their devastations, and to return to the defence of their own outposts. The enterprise was assigned to Gen. Wayne, who completely succeeded in reducing the fort and captur*ing its garrison.

Sir Henry Clinton, on receiving intelligence of Wayne's success, relinquished his views on Connecticut, and made a forced march to Dobb's ferry, twenty six miles above New York.

The reduction of Stony Point was speedily followed by the surprise of the British garrison at Paules Hook. This was first conceived and planned by Major Henry Lee. On being submitted to Gen. Washington, he favoured the enterprise, but withheld his full assent, till he was satisfied of the practicability of a retreat, of which serious doubts were entertained. Lee, with three hundred men, entered the fort about three o'clock in the morning, and with very inconsiderable loss, took one hundred and fifty nine prisoners, and brought them off in safety from the vicinity of large bodies of the enemy.

The reasons already mentioned, for avoiding all hazardous offensive operations, were strongly enforced by a well founded expectation that a French fleet would appear on the coast, in the course of the year 1779. Policy required that the American army should be reserved for a co-operation with their allies. The fleet, as expected, did arrive, but in the vicinity of Georgia. The French troops, in conjunction with the southern army, commanded by Gen. Lincoln, made an unsuccessful

attempt on the British post in Savannah. This town had been reduced in December, 1778, by Col. Campbell, who had proceeded so far as to re-establish British authority in the state of Georgia. Soon after the defeat of the combined forces before Savannah, and the departure of the French fleet from the coast, Sir Henry Clinton proceeded

with the principal part of his army to Charleston, and confined his views in New York to defensive operations.

The campaign of 1779 terminated in the northern states as has been related, without any great events on either side. Washington defeated all the projects of the British for getting possession of the Highlands. The Indians were scourged, and a few brilliant strokes kept the public mind from despondence. The Americans went into winter quarters when the month of December was far advanced. These were chosen for the convenience of wood, water, and provisions, and with an eye to the protection of the country. To this end, the army was thrown into two grand divisions. The northern was put under the command of Gen. Heath, and stationed with a view to the security of West Point, its dependences, and the adjacent country. The other retired to Morristown in New Jersey. In this situation, which was well calculated to secure the country to the southward of New York, Washington, with the principal division of his army, took their station for the winter. The season following their retirement, was uncommonly severe. The British in New York and Staten Island no longer enjoyed the security which their insular situation usually afforded. The former suffered from the want of fuel, and other supplies from the country. To add to their difficulties, Washington so disposed his troops as to give the greatest possible obstruction to the communication between the British garrison, and such of the inhabitants without their lines as were dis

posed to supply their wants. This brought on a

partisan war, in which individuals were killed, but without any national effect. Had Washington been supported as he desired, the weakness of the British army, in consequence of their large detachments to the southward, in conjunction with the severity of the winter, would have given him an opportunity for indulging his native spirit of enterprise. But he durst not attempt any thing on a grand scale, for his army was not only inferior in number to that opposed to him, but so destitute of clothing as to be unequal to a winter campaign.