intended. Her Majesty's Ministers are probably acquainted with an able work by one of their colleagues, Mr. George Lewis, on the Government of Dependencies. In that work will be found a careful examination of the manner in which that provision has operated; and it will be seen how indefinite and indeterminate it was. But at all events it depended-not, as I apprehend it does now, on the dixit of the Colonial Office, or the mere opinion of the Law-Officers of the Crown, but, as being a question of the construction of a statute, on the ordinary course of law; and this makes the whole difference as to the confidence of the Colonists in the system, which is the main point, and that to which I shall further advert presently.

But the disallowing power exercised by the authority of the Crown at home is not to be found in the chartered constitutions I refer to. I shall not attempt to prove this in detail. It is admitted not to have existed in one of them, and that the best of all-Lord Baltimore's Charter for the government of Maryland. But I will take the Charter the most different from that of Maryland, and the case being proved with respect to that, I should submit that, à fortiori, it is proved with regard to the earlier ones. I take the Charter of Pennsylvania. That Charter was passed in 1681-a period of arbitrary power-a comparatively late period; and it is a Charter which undoubtedly is a very restrictive one, compared with the former ones, and which is said by Grahame, and other writers of authority, to differ from them in this very respect, that it contains this general disallowing power of the Crown. My Lords, this is an inaccurate statement. The Charter undoubtedly con

tains a provision, that all bills passed by the Colonial Legislature should be sent home to England for consideration. But for what purpose, and with what limitations? The following is the substance of the words: -"To the end the said Wm. Penn, &c., may not hereafter by misconstruction of the powers aforesaid depart from that faith and allegiance, &c., which they owe unto us, &c., by colour of any extent or largeness of powers hereby given, or of any laws to be made in such province by virtue of such powers: our will is that a transcript of such laws shall within five years after the making thereof be transmitted to the Privy Council, &c. And if any of the said laws be declared by us inconsistent with the sovereignty or lawful prerogative of us, &c., or contrary to the faith and allegiance due to the legal government of this realm from the said William Penn, &c. then such laws shall become void: otherwise the said laws shall remain and stand in full force," &c.*

Now, this is distinctly not a general disallowing power. It is a provision for doing that which we also propose to do in another way-namely, to distinguish between subjects of Imperial and those of merely Colonial concern; and to reserve to the Crown, as there ought to be reserved, control over the former, while it is relinquished over the latter class of subjects. I say, then, that this very Charter is the best proof of the position I advance.

Now, the first objection made to the removal of this disallowing power is founded upon the alleged prerogative of the Crown: that favourite bugbear, which her Majesty's Government, being such a very Whig Govern*Lucas's Charters of the Old English Colonies, p. 103.

ment, are perpetually thrusting in our faces. My Lords, we do not touch the prerogative of the Crown. That prerogative, as has so often been said, is not exercised by the Crown directly, but through its ministers and delegates; and we say, in this case, it should be exercised as fully as now, but not through the Minister at home, but through the Minister of the Crown on the spot, the Governor of the Colony. The power of the Crown over the Governor is absolute, both of appointment and dismissal; and I should propose that the connexion should be even more close than it now is, for that he should be paid, not as now, from the Colonial funds, but by the mother-country; and he should have full powers of suspension and veto over all the local legislation.

Then, it is said, that by this you would give nothing to the Colonies; for, if their legislation is to be absolutely controlled, it may as well be by the Colonial Office as by the Colonial Governor. And another form of this objection, which has been also applied by the noble Earl to the proposition of a Second Chamber, is, that no provision is made against the obstruction of the machine of government, which by this system would be in the power of one branch of the Legislature. Now, in the first place, there is a vast difference between an absolute power on the spot, and one 15,000 miles off. But in the next place of course, here is a theoretical difficulty, but it is no more than a theoretical difficulty; for if it is, why does it not apply further? Why does it not apply to this country? In this country, it is in the power of any of the branches of the Legislature to stop the progress of government. Why is it not done? We well know the reply. It is because of the public

opinion and feeling of the country generally, which acts upon the Legislature; so that in the long run, the people of this country are really self-governed. So it would be in the Colonies, if we would trust them. The objection is a part of that general notion by which we look upon the Colonists as children, as something inferior to ourselves, and therefore not fit to be trusted with political privileges; and this idea verifies itself, and they become not fit to be so trusted, because we will not deal with them as if they were.

How is it then under the actual system? No doubt, there is a public opinion in the colonies on these matters, but it cannot act. It can act, more or less, upon the Colonial Governor; but he gets out of the way of it; he declines from it, because he is not the real depository of power. He shelters himself, whenever he pleases, under the shadow of the Colonial Office, so that the public opinion of the Colony passes by him and cannot reach him. Nor can it act-I do not say in a few very great matters, but in the ninety-nine out of a hundred cases which are comparatively small, but which go to make up the ordinary political life of the Colony-upon the Colonial Office, which is the real depositary of power : because it is too weak to act with any effect. Thus, where it could act, it has nothing to act upon; and where it has something to act upon, it is too weak to do so.

Again, as to public feeling in this country, which might act upon the Colonial Office, it is simply nonexistent. On some few occasions of unusual importance about Colonial matters, a ferment and agitation is created here, proportioned to the magnitude of the subject and the ignorance of those who feel it; but, as

before, I am speaking of the great mass of subjects, and, concerning those, there is and can be no feeling in this country to interfere with the Colonial Office. That office, therefore—and I am speaking of things quæ ipse vidi, et quorum pars parva fui-is not only to the Colonies a distant power, with all the inconvenience of that distance, but practically an irresponsible power.

In order to assign to the Colonies themselves the control over matters of merely local concern, a distinction must be made between such matters and those of Imperial interest, which should be reserved for the Home authority. Now, it seems sufficient to those who oppose this proposition to say, "Oh, it is quite impossible you cannot make such a distinction; and when you had attempted it, you would only give occasion for endless litigation." On both points the objection seems to me insufficient. Why cannot you try? The noble Earl said lately of those to whom I belongthe members of the Colonial Reform Society-that on this question of the separation between Imperial and local matters, we are all split into sections, and that each has his crotchet as to how that separation should be made. But what we say is, that, take any of the systems so proposed, any of the crotchets that proceed on such a separation, and you would get a far better system than that which now prevails, and one open to further improvement. For after all, as regards the vast majority of cases, no doubt could possibly exist whether or not they were of only local interest. So far the classification could be made without difficulty or dispute; and the mere attempt to do so, and the knowledge that, at least with respect to the mass of