learned, at the fame time, our reveries in Italy, in Germany, in Holland, and even in La Vendée, without its appearing that any proper meafure had been taken to arreft the courfe of the misfortunes which threatened even the existence of the republic.

Meanwhile the vizier advanced from Damafcus. On another quarter, about the middle of October, a fleet appeared before Damietta. It difembarked about 4000 Janizaries, who were to be followed by an equal number, but time was not left for their arrival. The firft were attacked, and completely defeated in less than half an hour: the carnage was terrible; more than 800 of them were made prifoners. This event did not render the negociations more eafy. The vizier manifefted the fame intentions, and did not fufpend his march any longer than was neceffary for forming his eftablishments, and procuring the means of transporting his troops. His army was then estimated at 60,000 men; but other pachas were following him, and were recruiting his army with new troops from all parts of Afia, as far as Mount Caucafus. The van of this army foon arrived at Jaffa.

Commodore fir Sidney Smith wrote me about this time, that is to fay, fome days before the debarkation of Damietta; and as I knew all the influence which he had over the vizier, I thought it my duty not only to answer him, but even to propose to him, as a place for holding conferences, the thip which he commanded: I was equally repugnant to receiving in Egypt English or Turkish plenipotentiaries, or to fending mine to the camp of the latter: my propofition was accepted,

3

and then the negociations affumed, a more fettled afpect. All this, however, did not stop the Ottonian army which the grand vizier conducted towards Gaza.

During all this time the war continued in Upper Egypt, and the beys, hitherto difperfed, thought of joining themfelves to Mourad, who, conftantly purfued and conftantly defeated, alluring to his caufe the Arabs and the inhabitants of the province of Benniffoeuf, continued to keep fome troops together, and to give difturbance. The plague also threatened us with its ravages and already was weekly depriving us of feveral men at Alexandria and other places.

On the 21ft December, general Deffaix and citizen Pouffielgue, whom I had appointed plenipotentiaries, opened the conferences with fir Sidney Smith, on board the Tigre, to whom the grand vizier had given power to treat. They were to have kept on the coaft between Damietta and Alexandria, but a very violent gale of wind having obliged them to get into the open fea, they remained out at fea for eighteen days: at the end of this time they landed at the camp of the vizier. He had advanced against El-Arisch, and had poffeffed himself, on the 30th December, of that fort. This fuccefs was entirely owing to the remarkable cowardice of the garrifon, which surrendered without fighting, feven days after the attack. This event was fo much the more unfortunate; as general Regnier was on his march to raise the blockade before the great body of the Turkish army had arrived.

From that moment it was impoffible to hope to protract the negociations to any length. It was ne

ceffary

ceflary to examine maturely the danger of breaking them off, to lay afide all motives of perfonal vanity, and not to expofe the lives of all the Frenchmen intrufted to me, to the terrible confequences which farther delay would render inevitable.

The most recent accounts ftated the Turkish army to amount to 80,000 men, and it muft ftill have increased: there were in it twelve pachas, fix of whom were of the firft rank. Forty-five thousand men were before El-Arilch, having fifty pieces of cannon, and waggons in proportion: this artillery was drawn by mules. Twenty other pieces of cannon were at Gaza with the corps of referve: the remainder of the troops were at Jaffa, and in the neighbourhood of Ramli. Active foraging parties fupplied the vizier's camp with provifions: all the tribes of the Arabs were emulous of affifting this army, and furnifhed it with more than 15,000 camels I am affured that the diftributions were regularly made. All thefe forces were directed by European officers, and from 5000 to 6000 Ruffians were every-moment expected.

To this army I had to oppofe 8500 men, divided on the three points, Katich, Salachich, and Belbeys. This divifion was neceffary, in order to facilitate our communications with Cairo, and in order to enable us to grant affiftance fpeedily to the poft which fhould be firft attacked: in fact, it is certain that they all might have been turned or avoided. This is what Elfii Bey has recently done, who, during the negociations, entered with his Mamalukes into the Charkie, in order to join the Billis Arabs, and to re

join Mourad in Upper Egypt. The remainder of the army was diftributed as follows: 1000 men, under the command of general Verdier, formed the garrifon of Lefbe, and were employed to raise contributions of money and provifions, and to keep in obedience the country between the canal of Achmoun and that of Moes, blindly directed by the fheik Lefkam. Eighteen hundred men were under the command of General Launfee, to fupply with provifions the garrifons of Alexandria, Aboukir, and Rofetta, to reftrain the Delta and the Batrira. Twelve hundred men remained at Cairo and Gaza, and they were obliged to furnish escorts for the convoys of the army; and, finally, 2500 men were in Upper Egypt on a chain of more than 150 leagues in extent: they had daily to fight the beys and their partifans. The whole formed 15,000 men. Such, in fact, eftimating them at the higheft, may be reckoned the number of the difpofable combatants in the army.

Notwithstanding this difproportion of forces, I would have hazarded a battle, if I had had the certainty of the arrival of fuccours be fore the feafon of a debaikation. But this feafon having once arrived without my receiving reinforcements, I fhould have been obliged to fend 5000 men to the coafts. There would have remained to me 3000 men to defend a country open on all parts, against an invasion of 30,000 cavalry, feconded by the Arabs and the inhabitants, without a fortified place, without provifions, money, or fhips. It behoved me to forefee this period, and to ask myself what I could then do for the prefervation of the army. No means

of

Sir Sidney Smith to Citizen Pouffielgue, Adminiftrator-general of the Finances.

On board the Tigre, March 8, 1800. Loft not a moment to repair to Alexandria as foon as I could complete the provifioning of my fhips, in order to inform you in detail of the obftacles which my fuperiors have opposed to the execution of convention fuch as I thought it my duty to agree to, not having received the inftructions to the contrary, which reached Cyprus on the 22d of February, bearing date the 10th of January.

As to myself, I fhould not hesitate to pass over any arrangement of an old date, in order to fupport what took place on the 24th and 31ft of January; but it would be only throwing out a fnare to my brave

and conciliatory difpofition, which facilitated our former agreement, in order again to fupport my reafonings refpecting the impoffibility of revoking what has been formally fettled after a detailed difcuffion and a mature deliberation. I then prcpofe, fir, that you fhould come on board, in order to confult on what is to be done in the difficult circumftances in which we are placed. I view with calmnefs the heavy refponfibility to which I am fubject; my life is at ftake-I know it; but I fhould prefer an unmerited death to the prefervation of my exiftence, by expofing both my life and my honour..

I have the honour to be, with perfect confideration and high efteem, fir, your very humble fervant,

(Signed) Sidney Smith.

them to embark. I owe it to the French army, and to myself, to acquaint them with the ftate of things, which, however, I am endeavouring to change. At any rate, I ftand between them and the falle impreffions which have dictated a

Keith.

On board the Confiance, 13 Germinal (April 19.)

My lord,

T the moment of

the liberality of my fuperiors, I doubt not that I fhall produce the fame conviction on their minds that I feel myself, refpecting the bufinefs which we concluded. A converfation with you would enable me to communicate the origin and nature of this reftriction; and I propofe that you should proceed on board an English frigate to the commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, who has newly arrived, in order to confer with him on the fubject.

I depend much on your abilities
VOL. XLII.

virtue of the convention figned at El-Arifch, I learned at Alexandria the obftacles which your orders had raised to the execution of that convention, although it had already been partly carried into effect, with that good faith which the candour of the contracting parties must have inspired.

I refolved to proceed directly to you, my lord, to request you to revoke your orders. I wish to explain to you all the motives that fhould induce you to adopt this Q

measure;

The lives of 50,000 men are at ftake, who may be deftroyed without any motive, fince, according to the folemn treaty made with the English, Ruffians, and Turks, all hoftilities had terminated.

I have not powers ad hoc for the ftep I have taken; but there is no neceffity for claiming what would be confidered as a right between nations the leaft civilized. The demand appears to me fo juft and fo fimple, and befides fo urgent, that I have not thought it neceffary to wait for the orders of general Kleber, who, I am certain, would not confent to the fmalleft modification of the treaty, though his fidelity in executing it has rendered his pofition much lefs advantageous.

At the moment we concluded the convention at El-Arisch, under the fimple pledge of English good faith, we were far from fufpecting that obftacles would be ftarted by that fame power, the moft liberal of thofe with whom we had to

Lord Keith's Answer.

Minotaur, April 25.

I have this day received the letter which you have done me the honour to write. I have to inform you, that I have given no orders or authority against the obfervance of the convention between the grand vizier and general Kleber, having received no orders on this head from the king's minifters. Accordingly I was of opinion, that his majesty fhould take no part in it; but fince the treaty has been concluded, his majefty, being defirous of fhowing his refpect for his allies, I have received inftructions to allow a palfage to the French troops, and I loft not a moment in fending to Egypt orders to permit them to return to France without moleftation. At the fame time I thought it my duty to my king, and thofe of his allies whofe ftates lie in the feas through which they are to pafs, to require that they fhould not return in a mafs, nor in fhips of war, nor in armed fhips. I wished likewife that the cartel fhould carry no merchandife which would be contrary to the law of nations. I have likewife afked of general Kleber his word of honour, that neither he nor his army fhould commit any hoftilities against the coalefced powers; and I doubt not that general Kleber will find the conditions perfectly reasonable.

Captain Hay has received my orders to allow you to proceed to France with adjutant-general Cambis, as foon as he arrives at Leghorn.

(Signed)

Keith.

Kleber,