III. opinion concerning the origin of evil, which did sup- CHAP. pose a necessity of it in nature, as flowing from that passive principle out of which the world was produced. Hence it was that Heraclitus, as Plutarch tells us, attributed the origin of all things to discord and antipathy, and was wont to say, that when Homer wished Ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔριν, ἔκ τ ̓ ἀνθρώπων ἀπολέσθαι, Plutarch. de Isid. et That all contention were banished out of the world, Osiride. that he did secretly curse the wished the ruin of the world. origin of things, and the active principle which did good, harmony and friendship, but the other Νεῖκος οὐλόμενον καὶ δῆριν αἱματόεσσαν, Carm. p. 21. et 25. by which he makes it to be a quarrelsome, pernicious, ed. Steph. and bloody principle. The same Plutarch tells us of these two renowned philosophers, Pythagoras and Plato. Thence he tells us the Pythagoreans called the principle of good τὸ ἓν, πεπερασμένον, τὸ μένον, τὸ εὐθὺ, τὸ περισσὸν, τὸ τετράγωνον, τὸ δεξιὸν, τὸ λαμπρὸν, Unity, finite, quiescent, straight, uneven number, square, right, and splendid; the principle of evil they called rv dváda, tò ἄπειρον, τὸ φερόμενον, τὸ καμπύλον, τὸ ἄρτιον, τὸ ἑτερόμηκες, τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ ἀριστερὸν, τὸ σκοτεινὸν, The binary, infinite, moving, crooked, even, long of one side, unequal, left, obscure. The opinion of Plato, he tells us, is very obscure, it being his purpose to conceal it; but he saith in his old age, in his book de Legibus, où di aivyμõv, ovdè ovμßoλikes, without any if's or and's he asserts the world to be moved by more than one principle; by two at the least, τὴν μὲν ἀγαθουργὸν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν ταύτῃ, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων δημιουργόν. The one of a good and benign nature, the other contrary to it both in its nature and operations. Numenius in Chalcidius thus delivers the opinions of Pythagoras and Plato de Chalcid. originibus, as he speaks; Igitur Pythagoras quoque, p. 394. in Tim. III. BOOK inquit Numenius, fluidam et sine qualitate sylvam esse censet; nec tamen ut Stoici naturæ media, interque malorum, bonorumque viciniam, sed plane noxiam; Deum quippe esse (ut etiam Platoni videtur) initium et causam bonorum; sylvam malorum: so that, according to Numenius, both Plato and Pythagoras attributed the origin of evil to the malignity of matter, and so they make evils to be necessarily consequent upon the being of things. For thus he delivers expressly the opinion of Pythagoras; Qui ait, existente providentia, mala quoque necessario substitisse, propterea quod sylva sit, et eadem sit malitia prædita: Platonemque idem Numenius laudat, quod duas mundi animas autumet; unam beneficentissimam ; malignam alteram sc. sylvam. Igitur juxta Platonem mundo bona sua Dei, tanquam patris liberalitate collata sunt; mala vero, matris sylva vitio cohæserunt. Plutarch. But Plutarch will by no means admit that Plato attriprocreat. e butes the origin of evil merely to matter; but he de Animæ Tim. makes the principle of evil to be something distinct from matter, which he calls τὴν ἄτακτον, καὶ ἀόριστον, αὐτ tokívntov dè kai kivntik'èv åρxèv, ▲ confused, infinite, selfmoving, stirring principle; which (saith he) he elsewhere calls necessity, and in his de Legibus, plainly, ψυχὴν ἄτακτον καὶ κακοποίον, a disorderly and malignant soul; which cannot be understood of mere matter, when he makes his hyle ἄμορφον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ πάσης ποιότητος καὶ δυνάμεως οἰκείας ἔρημον, without form or figure, and destitute of all qualities and power of operation: and it is impossible (saith he) that that which is of itself such an inert principle as matter is, should by Plato be supposed to be the cause and principle of evil; which he elsewhere calls ἀνάγκην πολλὰ τῷ Θεῷ δυσμαχοῦσαν καὶ ἀφηνιάζουσαν, Necessity which often resisted God, and cast off his reins. III. So that, according to Plutarch, Plato acquits both God CHAP. and Hyle from being the origin of evil, τήν γε ὕλην δια φορᾶς ἁπάσης ἀπαλλάττων, καὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν ἀπωτάτω τιθέμενος, and therefore attributes it to that malignant spirit which moves the matter, and is the cause of all the disorderly motions in the world. But what this spirit should be, neither he nor any one else could ever understand. What darkness and ignorance then was there among the wisest of philosophers concerning the origin of evil, when they were so confused and obscure in the account which they gave of it, that their greatest admirers could not understand them! in Tim. But though Plato seemed so ambiguous in his judg- XII. ment of the origin of evil, whether he should attribute it to the hyle, or some malignant spirit in it, the Stoics were dogmatical, and plainly imputed the cause of evil to the perversity of matter. So Chalcidius tells us, Chalcid. that the Stoics made matter not to be evil in itself, p. 395as Pythagoras, but that it was indifferent to either; perrogati unde igitur mala? perversitatem seminarium malorum esse causati sunt: they made the perversity of matter the origin of evil; but as he well observes, nec expediunt adhuc unde ipsa perversitas, cum juxta ipsos duo sint initia rerum, Deus et sylva. Deus summum et præcellens bonum; sylva ut censent, nec bonum nec malum. They give no rational account whence this perversity of matter should arise; when, according to the Stoics, there are but two principles of things, God and matter: whereof the one is perfectly good, the other neither good nor evil. But this perversity, they tell us, is something necessarily consequent upon the generation of things. Tavтa yáp Ταῦτα ἐστι πάθη τὰ τῇ γενέσει προεπόμενα ὥσπερ ἴος τῷ χαλκῷ, καὶ ὁ punòs ti owμati. These are affections (viz. the disorders in the world) which follow the generation of Tyr. Serm. Provid. c. 5. ad Natur. Quæst. BOOK things, as rust comes upon brass, and filth upon the III. body, as the counterfeit Trismegistus speaks; so MaxMaxim. imus Tyrius saith that evils in the world are où téxvns XXV. Epya, åλλ' vàŋs náðŋ, not any works of art, but the affecSeneca de tions of matter. Non potest artifex mutare materiam, saith Seneca, when he is giving an account why God. suffers evils in the world: and elsewhere gives this Idem Præf. account why evils came into the world, non quia cessat ars, sed quia id, in quo exercetur, inobsequens arti est. So that the origin of evil, by this account of it, lies wholly upon the perversity of matter, which it seems was uncapable of being put into better order by that God who produced the world out of that matter which the Stoics supposed to be eternal. And the truth is, the avoiding the attributing the cause of evil to God, seems to have been the great reason why they rather chose to make it matter necessary and coexistent with God; and this was the only plausible pretence which Hermogenes had for following the Platonists and Stoics in this opinion, that he might set God far enough off from being the author of sin. But I cannot see what advantage comes at all by this hypothesis, but it is chargeable with as many difficulties as any other for, 1. It either destroys God's omnipotency, or else makes him the approver of evil; so that if he be not auctor, he must be assentator mali, Tertull. ad- as Tertullian speaks against Hermogenes, because he suffered evil to be in matter; for, as he argues, Aut enim potuit emendare sed noluit; aut voluit quidem, verum non potuit infirmus Deus. Si potuit et noluit, malus et ipse, quia malo favit; et sic jam habetur ejus quod licet non instituerit; quia tamen si noluisset illud esse, non esset; ipse jam fecit esse, quod noluit non esse. Quo quid est turpius? si id voluit esse quod ipse noluit fecisse, adversum semetipsum vers. Her- ed. Pam. III. egit, cum et voluit esse quod noluit fecisse, et noluit CHAP. fecisse quod voluit esse. So that little advantage is gained for the clearing the true origin of evil by this opinion; for either God could have taken away evil out of matter, but would not, or else would but could not. This last destroys God's omnipotency, the former his goodness; for by that means evil is in the world by his consent and approbation; for if God would not remove it when he might, the being of it will come from him; when if he would have hindered it, it would not have been; and so God, by not rooting out of evil, will be found an assertor of it; Male si per Ibid. voluntatem; turpiter si per necessitatem. Aut famulus erit mali Deus, aut amicus: if God's will were the cause why sin was, it reflects on his goodness; if God's power could not hinder it, it destroys his omnipotency. So that by this opinion God must either be a slave or a friend to evil. 2. This principle overturns the foundations of religion, and all transactions between God and men's souls, in order to their welfare, because it makes evil to be necessarily existent in the world; which appears from hence, in that evil doth result from the being of matter, and so it must necessarily be as matter is supposed to be; for whatever results from the being of a thing, must be coexistent with it; and so what flows from what doth necessarily exist, must have the same mode of existence which the being itself hath; as is evident in all the attributes of God, which have the same immutability with his nature: now then if evil did exist from eternity together with matter, it must necessarily exist as matter doth, and so evil will be invincible and unavoidable in the world; which if once granted, renders religion useless, makes God's commands unrighteous, and destroys the foundation of God's proceedings in the day of judgment. |