III. BOOK the force of its first motion, should be able still to produce the effects which are seen in the world, and to keep it from tumbling, at least by degrees, into its pristine chaos? It was an infinite Power, I grant, which gave that first motion; but that it gave power to continue that motion till the conflagration of the world, remains yet to be proved. Some therefore finding, that, in the present state of the world, matter will not serve for all the noted and common phenomena of the world, have called in the help of a spirit of nature, which may serve instead of a man-midwife to matter, to help her in her production of things: or, as though God had a plurality of worlds to look after, they have taken care to substitute him a vicar in this; which is the spirit of nature. But we had rather believe God himself to be perpetually resident in the world, and that the power which gives life, and being, and motion to every thing in the world, is nothing else but his own providence; especially since we have learnt from Acts xvii. himself, that it is in him we live, and move, and have our being. 28. IV. Thus then we see a necessity of asserting Divine Providence, whether we consider the Divine nature, or the phenomena of the world; but yet the case is not so clear, but there are two grand objections behind, which have been the continual exercise of the wits of inquisitive men almost in all ages of the world. The one concerns the first origin of evil; the other concerns the dispensations of Providence, whence it comes to pass that good men fare so hard in the world, when the bad triumph and flourish. If these two can be cleared with any satisfaction to reason, it will be the highest vindication of Divine Providence, and a great evidence of the divinity of the Scriptures; which give us such clear light and direction in these profound specula tions, which the dim reason of man was so much to CHAP. seek in. III. cont. Cel I begin with the origin of evil; for if there be a hand of Providence which orders all things in the world, how comes evil then into it, without God's being the author of it? Which is a speculation of as great depth as necessity, it highly concerning us to entertain the highest apprehensions of God's holiness, and how far he is from being the author of sin; and it is likewise a matter of some difficulty so to explain the origin of evil, as to make it appear that God is not the author of it. I easily then assent to what Origen Origen. saith on this subject, when Celsus, upon some mistaken sum, l. iv. places of Scripture, had charged the Scripture with P. 207. laying the origin of evil upon God; εἴπερ οὖν ἄλλος τις τόπος τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐξετάσεως δεόμενος, δυσθήρατός ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἡμῶν, ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἡ τῶν κακῶν ταχθείη ἂν γένεσις. If any thing which calls for our inquiry be of difficult investigation, that which concerns the origin of evils is such a thing; and as Simplicius well begins his discourse on this subject, περὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τῶν κακῶν ὁ Simplic. in Epictet. λόγος μὴ καλῶς διορθωθεὶς, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβείας αἴτιος 0.34. ed. γέγονε, καὶ τῆς τῶν ἠθῶν εὐαγωγίας τὰς ἀρχὰς διετάραξε, καὶ Salmas. πολλαῖς καὶ ἀλύτοις ἀπορίαις ἐνέβαλε τοὺς μὴ καλῶς αίτιολοYouvras auTýv. The dispute concerning the nature and origin of evil, not being well stated, is the cause of great impiety towards God, and perverts the principles of good life, and involves them in innumerable perplexities, who are not able to give a rational account of it. So much then is it our great concernment to fix on sure grounds in the resolution of this important question; in which I intend not to launch out into the depth and intricacies of it, as it relates to any internal purposes of God's will, (which is beyond our present scope,) but I shall only take that account of it BOOK which the Scripture plainly gives in relating the fall III. of the first man. For the clearing of which I shall proceed in this method : 1. That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the author of sin. 2. That the account which the Scripture gives of the origin of evil, doth not charge it upon God. 3. That no account given by philosophers of the origin of evil, is so clear and rational as this is. 4. That the most material circumstances of this account are attested by the heathens themselves. 1. That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the author of sin. For if the Scriptures be true, we are bound without hesitation to yield our assent to them in their plain and direct affirmations; and there can be no ground of suspending assent, as to any thing which pretends to be a Divine truth, but the want of certain evidence whether it be of Divine revelation or no. No doubt it would be one of the most effectual ways to put an end to the numerous controversies of the Christian world, (especially to those bold disputes concerning the method and order of God's decrees,) if the plain and undoubted assertions of Scripture were made the rule and standard whereby we ought to judge of such things as are more obscure and ambiguous. And could men but rest contented with those things which concern their eternal happiness, and the means in order to it, (which on that account are written with all imaginable perspicuity in Scripture,) and the moment of all other controversies be judged by their reference to these, there would be fewer controversies and more Christians in the world. Now there are two grand principles which concern men's eternal condition, of which we have the greatest certainty from Scripture, and on which we may with safety rely, III. without perplexing our minds about those more nice CHAP. and subtle speculations, (which it may be are uncapa-. ble of all full and particular resolution;) and those are, That the ruin and destruction of man is wholly from himself; and, That his salvation is from God alone. If then man's ruin and misery be from himself, which the Scripture doth so much inculcate on all occasions, then without controversy that which is the cause of all the misery of human nature is wholly from himself too, which is sin. So that if the main scope and design of the Scripture be true, God cannot be the author of that, by which (without the intervention of the mercy of God) man's misery unavoidably falls upon him. For with what authority and majesty doth God in the Scripture forbid all manner of sin? With what earnestness and importunity doth he woo the sinner to forsake his sin? With what loathing and detestation doth he mention sin? With what justice and severity doth he punish sin? With what wrath and indignation doth he threaten contumacious sinners? And is it possible (after all this, and much more, recorded in the Scriptures, to express the holiness of God's nature, his hatred of sin, and his appointing a day of judgment for the solemn punishment of sinners) to imagine that the Scriptures do in the least ascribe the origin of evil to God, or make him the author of sin? Shall not the Judge of all the world do right? Will a God of infinite justice, purity, and holiness, punish the sinner for that which himself was the cause of? Far be such unworthy thoughts from our apprehensions of a Deity, much more of that God whom we believe to have declared his mind so much to the contrary, that we cannot believe that and the Scriptures to be true together. Taking it then for granted in the general, that God V. BOOK cannot be the author of sin, we come to inquire, WheIII. ther the account which the Scripture gives of the ori gin of evil, doth any way charge it upon God? There are only two ways, according to the history of the fall of man recorded in Scripture, whereby men may have any ground to question whether God were the cause of man's fall; either, first, by the giving him that positive law which was the occasion of his fall; or, secondly, by leaving him to the liberty of his own will. First, The giving of that positive law cannot be the least ground of laying man's fault on God; because, 1. It was most suitable to the nature of a rational creature to be governed by laws, or declarations of the will of his Maker: for, considering man as a free agent, there can be no way imagined so consonant to the nature of man as this was, because thereby he might declare his obedience to God to be the matter of his free choice. For where there is a capacity of reward and punishment, and acting in the consideration of them, there must be a declaration of the will of the lawgiver, according to which man may expect either his reward or punishment. If it were suitable to God's nature to promise life to man upon obedience, it was not unsuitable to it to expect obedience to every declaration of his will; considering the absolute sovereignty and dominion which God had over man as being his creature, and the indispensable obligation which was in the nature of man to obey whatever his Maker did command him. So that God had full and absolute right to require from man what he did, as to the law which he gave him to obey; and in the general we cannot conceive how there should be a testimony of man's obedience towards his Creator, without some declaration of his Creator's will. Secondly, God had full power and authority not only to govern man |