know we but thousands of histories have been lost, that confuted all that we now have concerning the greatness of Rome? What know we but that Rome was destroyed by Carthage, or that Hannibal quite overthrew the Roman empire? or that Catiline was one of the best men in the world, because all our present histories were written by men of the other side? How can we tell but that the Persians destroyed the Macedonians, because all our accounts of Alexander's expedition are originally from the Greeks? And why might not we suspect greater partiality in all these cases, when the writers did not give a thousandth part of that evidence for their fidelity that the first Christians did? And yet what should we think of such a person, who should call in question the best histories of all nations, because they are written by those of the same country? By which, it seems, you will never allow any competent testimony at all; for if such things be written by enemies and strangers, we have reason to suspect both their knowledge and integrity; if written by friends, then, though they might know the truth, yet they would write partially of their own side so that upon this principle no history at all, ancient or modern, is to be believed; for they are all reported either by friends or enemies; and so not only Divine, but all human faith will be destroyed. I am by no means a friend to unreasonable credulity; but I am as little to unreasonable distrust and suspicion: if the one be folly, the other is madness. No prudent man believes any thing because it is possible to be true, nor rejects any thing merely because it is possible to be false but it is the prudence of every man to weigh and consider all circumstances, and according to them to assent or dissent. We all know it is possible for men to deceive, or to be deceived; but we know there

is no necessity of either; and that there is such a thing as truth in the world; and though men may deceive, yet they do not always so; and that men may know they are not deceived. For else there could be no such thing as society among mankind; no friendship, or trust, or confidence in the word of another person. Because it is possible that the best friend I have may deceive me, and the world is full of dissimulation, must I therefore believe nobody? This is the just consequence of this way of arguing, that we have reason to suspect the truth of these matters of fact, because there have been many frauds in the world, and might have been many more than we can now discover for if this principle be pursued, it will destroy all society among men, which is built on the supposition of mutual trust and confidence that men have in each other; and although it be possible for all men to deceive, because we cannot know one another's hearts, yet there are such characters of honesty and fidelity in some persons, that others dare venture their lives and fortunes upon their words. And is any man thought a fool for doing so? Nay, have not the most prudent and sagacious men reposed a mighty confidence in the integrity of others? And without this no great affairs can be carried on in the world; for since the greatest persons need the help of others to manage their business, they must trust other men continually; and every man puts his life into the hands of others, to whom he gives any freedom of access, and especially his servants. Must a man therefore live in continual suspicion and jealousy, because it is possible he may be deceived? But if this be thought unreasonable, then we gain thus much, that, notwithstanding the possibility of deception, men may be trusted in some cases, and their fidelity safely relied upon. This being

granted, we are to inquire what that assurance is which makes us trust any one; and wherever we find a concurrence of the same circumstances, or equal evidence of fidelity, we may repose the same trust or confidence in them. And we may soon find that it is not any one's bare word that makes us trust him, but either the reputation of his integrity among discerning men, or our long experience and observation of him: this latter is only confined to our own trial; but the former is more general, and reaches beyond our own age, since we may have the testimony of discerning persons conveyed down to us in as certain a manner as we can know the mind of a friend at a hundred miles distance, viz. by writing. And in this case we desire no more than to be satisfied that those things were written by them; and that they deserved to be believed in what they writ. Thus, if any one would be satisfied about the passages of the Peloponnesian war, and hath heard that Thucydides hath accurately written it, he hath no more to do than to inquire whether this Thucydides were capable of giving a good account of it, and for that he hears that he was a great and inquisitive person that lived in that age, and knew all the occurrences of it; and when he is satisfied of that, his next inquiry is, whether he may be trusted or no? And for this he can expect no better satisfaction, than that his history hath been in great reputation for its integrity among the most knowing persons. But how shall he be sure this was the history written by Thucydides, since there have been many counterfeit writings obtruded upon the world? Besides the consent of learned men in all ages since, we may compare the testimonies cited out of it with the history we have, and the style with the character given of Thucydides, and the narrations with other credible histories of those times;

and if all these agree, what reason can there be not to rely upon the history of Thucydides? All learned men do acknowledge that there have been multitudes of fictitious writings; but do they therefore question whether there are any genuine? Or whether we have not the true Herodotus, Strabo, or Pausanias, because there is a counterfeit Berosus, Manetho, and Philo, set forth by Annius of Viterbo? Do any suspect whether we have any of the genuine works of Cicero, because an Italian counterfeited a book, De Consolatione, in his name? Or whether Cæsar's Commentaries were his own, because it is uncertain who writ the Alexandrian War that is joined with them? By which we see, that we may not only be certain of the fidelity of persons we converse with, but of all things necessary to our belief of what was done at a great distance of time from the testimony of writers, notwithstanding the many supposititious writings that have been in the world.

But it may be said, that all this only relates to mere matters of history, wherein a man is not much concerned whether they be true or false: but the things we are about are matters that men's salvation or damnation are said to depend upon, and therefore greater evidence should be given of these, to oblige men to believe them.

To this I answer, 1. That my design herein was to prove, that, notwithstanding the possibility of deception, there may be sufficient ground for a prudent and firm assent to the truth of things done at as great a distance of time, and conveyed after the same manner, that the matters of fact reported in the New Testament are; and hereby those general prejudices are shewed to be unreasonable. And all that I desire from this discourse is, that you would give an assent of the same nature to the history of the Gospel, that you do to Cæsar, or

Livy, or Tacitus, or any other ancient historian. 2. As to the greater obligation to assent, I say it depends upon the evidence of Divine revelation, which is given by the matters of fact which are delivered to us. And here give me leave to ask you, 1. Whether it be any ways repugnant to any conception you have of God, for him to make use of fallible men to make known his will to the world? 2. Whether those men, though supposed to be in themselves fallible, can either deceive or be deceived, when God makes known his mind to them? 3. Whether, on supposition that God hath made use of such persons for this end, those are not obliged to believe them, who do not live in the same age with them? If not, then God must either make no revelation at all, or he must make a new one every age: if they are, then the obligation lies as much on us now to believe, as if we had lived and conversed with those inspired persons.

2. That there is no reason to suspect the truth of those matters of fact which are reported in the New Testament; for since it is universally agreed among men, that human testimony is a sufficient ground for assent, where there is no positive ground for suspicion, because deceiving and being deceived is not the common interest of mankind, therefore we are to consider what the general grounds of suspicion are, and whether any of them do reach the Apostles' testimony, concerning the matters of fact reported by them. And the just grounds of suspicion are these: 1. If the persons be otherwise known to be men of artifice and cunning, full of tricks and dissimulation, and that make no conscience of speaking truth, so a lie tends to their greatest advantage; which is too much the Papists' case in their legends and stories of miracles. 2. If they temper and suit their story and doctrine to the humour