made on our senses: but, supposing we were not sen- CHAP. sible of the different agitation of particles without us, it doth not at all follow that there is not a real alteration in the objects themselves; as that the fire doth not burn, if we do not feel the heat of it; and why that disposition in matter, which is apt to produce such a sense in us, may not be called an inherent quality, is not so easy to apprehend. But if there be such a real difference in bodies, as that one will make such an impression on our senses, and another will not, we cannot in reason say that there is no quality in things, but that it wholly depends on our apprehension. It is granted, That snow hath a greater disposition to reflect light outwards, than a coal or soot, when the sun shines upon all three. Now why this disposition should be called a distinct quality from what is in the other two, seems to me a dispute of no consequence. So if an echo be nothing but the cavity of a place, whereby it is disposed to reflect the sound back to the place from whence it came, although it must not be called the quality of the place which makes the echo, yet it cannot be denied to be the peculiar figure and disposition of the parts which make it. So that, if men will allow such inherent dispositions in things to produce what we call qualities in us, the difference will not be found worth the disputing. And I have wondered persons of judgment and skill in these matters lay so much weight upon it; as though the quality must be said to be only in us, when it is confessed to arise from a different disposition in the parts without us.

2. That there are no other qualities in bodies, but such as an account may be given of by the foregoing principles: for I do not find it possible for any person, by virtue of these principles, to give an account either of the make or composition of the bodies of animals, or

I.

BOOK of the disposition and relation of the inward parts, or of the instruments of nature for preservation of the individual or species; or of the diseases they are subject to, or of the proper methods of cure. And the more any person searches into all the mechanical attempts of this kind, the more unsatisfied he will find himself about them; and will see reason to conclude, as a Sydenham learned physician hath done, That we may know enough for our general direction what to do; but that the secret causes are so hidden from us, as we have reason to admire the supreme Artificer in what we know, and to adore him in what we do not.

de Hydrope, p. 160.

I.

Cart. Princip. part. ii.

n. 23.

II.

Ibid. n. 21.

III.

N. 34.

IV.

N. 36.

These things being premised, I come to the main point; which is, whether matter, being put into motion, can in a mechanical manner produce that frame of the universe which we see, and the several things which are in the heavens, and in this globe of earth and sea.

To make this matter as clear as we can, we must first consider the general principles, and then proceed to the account given of the several phænomena, as they are commonly called.

I begin with the general principles; which are these: That the matter of the universe is one and the same extended substance; and that all the properties we clearly perceive in it, are, that it is divisible, and capable of motion in its parts.

That this matter is without bounds, and that the idea of extension is the same with that of corporeal substance.

That it is capable of division into so many parts, as we cannot comprehend the utmost bounds of its divisibility.

That God alone is the first and universal Cause of the motion of matter; which continues the same in the whole, although it vary in the several parts.

That there are certain laws of motion, whereof these СНАР. are the chief :

1. That every part continues in the state it was in, unless moved by an external cause.

II.

V.

N. 37.

2. That all motion of itself is in a right line, but by N. 39. other bodies it becomes oblique; and all matter being in motion, it becomes circular.

3. That when two bodies meet, the weaker loses not N. 40. its motion, but changes its tendency, and the stronger loses so much as it gives to the weaker.

VI.

Cart. Prin

That the parts of matter were at first divided into many parcels of an equal and indifferent size, and cip.part. iii. had among them all that motion which is now in the world.

That these particles of matter could not at first be spherical, because then there must be a void space between them; but by force of motion and natural attrition they became so.

That those lesser particles, which came off from the angles of the bigger, fill up all the empty spaces between them, and have a quicker motion.

That, besides these, there are some particles which are larger and slower than the rest, being full of angles, and so more apt to stick to one another; which, by reason of their passage through the triangular spaces between the globular particles, become wreathed.

n. 46.

VII.

N. 48.

VIII. N. 49, &c.

IX.

N. 88.

n. 44.

And these are the three elements out of which he supposes all bodies to be made; and accordingly the ingenious author hath framed a system of the universe Part. iii. with great art and appearance of reason; but at some times he is content to let it pass as a bare hypothesis, agreeing with the phænomena of the world; but withal he saith, that he makes use of no principles but such as are most evident, and deduces nothing from them but by mathematical consequences. And in an Epistle

I.

N. 43, 44.

BOOK to Mersennus, to whom he opened his mind more freely, he saith, That he should think he knew nothing in physics, if he could only tell how things might be; if he could not demonstrate that they could be no otherwise. But to another person he calls it his romance Ep. tom. ii. of the world; which he confesses he was very well pleased with.

Ep. 37.

Ep. 103.

Cart. Prin

n. 23.

But so have not others been, who have taken great pains both in philosophy and mathematics; and although they cannot deny this hypothesis to be very consistent and well put together, yet they will by no means allow it to be a true and satisfactory account of the nature and formation of the world. But it is not my business to lay together the objections of others against the Cartesian hypothesis, but to shew the tendency of it to atheism in these two points.

1. In setting up a notion of matter, or corporeal substance, independent upon the power of God.

2. In undertaking to give an account of the phænomena of the universe from the mechanical laws of motion, without a particular Providence.

As to the former; his first principle is, That matter cip. part. ii. is one and the same through the universe; and is every where known by its essential property, which is extension: and therein he places the essence of a corporeal substance, (as will presently appear.) If then the very essence of matter be independent upon God's power, so that he can neither create nor annihilate it, what becomes of the creation of the world, according to this hypothesis?

Du Hamel

vet. et nov.

Some object against his notion of matter, and say, deConsensu that he hath confounded mathematical and physical Philosoph. bodies with one another. For, say they, the strength of his whole hypothesis depends upon the supposition Dissert. de that matter is nothing but extension, and therefore

1. i. c. 9.

n. 9.
P. Petiti

II.

Huet. Cens.

n. 4.

part. ii.

there can be no vacuity, because all space is extended, CHAP. and therefore matter is infinite, or, as he calls it, indePrincipiis finite; but so, as he positively saith, that the idea of Cart. p. 28. space is the same with that of corporeal substance, Philosoph. and that we can conceive nothing in it but extension. Cartes. c. 5. Which they say is true, if we speak of mathematical quantity, but not of real and physical. But, saith Princ. Phil. Des Cartes, men may pretend to distinguish corporeal n. 9. substance from quantity; but they utter that in words which they cannot comprehend in their minds; for either they mean nothing by substance, or attribute a confused notion of an incorporeal substance to a corporeal, and leave the true idea of corporeal substance to extension. But this is very far from clearing this matter; for himself lays it down as a fundamental principle, That it is capable of division into parts, and was actually divided by God himself. Now I desire to know what that was which was so divided. It must be something: and that not an incorporeal, but a corporeal substance: not pure extension, but a body that was extended; and of which the substantial parts of the universe are composed. Nay, his whole hypothesis depends upon the actual division of matter into parts Part. iii. that are equal, or very near it; without which his three elements could not be made, which arise from the motion and mutual attrition of those particles; and yet he affirms, in the conclusion of the second part of his Principles, That he owns no other corporeal matter Part. ii. but such as geometricians call quantity; and is the thing which their demonstrations are conversant about. But is there no difference between geometrical and physical quantity? It is true, that in mathematical quantity there is nothing but extension; but doth it therefore follow, that there is nothing more in a real and physical body? How can we imagine that God

n. 46.

n. 64.