are the basis of matter; to them are superadded Form, Motion, Position, and a host of other properties expressed in terms of these, Attractions and Repulsions, Hardness and Elasticity, Cohesion, Crystallization. Mental states and bodily states cannot be compared" (Ibid., pp. 125, 135).

These sound very much like Sir William Hamilton's phrases, but they are Bain's; and yet, turn on to the last and most emphatic paragraph of this book, and you find a proposition at which Sir William Hamilton or Hermann Lotze would only smile; namely, that there is in the universe but "one substance," " which has two "sides," whatever that word may mean," a physical and a mental," and so is "a double-faced unity." "The arguments for the two substances have, we believe, now entirely lost their validity. The one substance with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental, -a double-faced unity, would appear to comply with all the exigences of the case (Ibid., p. 196).

Not if the nature of things is yet as dazzling to us as it was to the eyes of Plato and Socrates and Aristotle and Liebnitz and Kant and Hamilton; not if axiomatic truth is as radiant to us as it is to Lotze and Helmholtz and Wundt and Beale and Dana; not if we are to adhere to the first of all logical laws, that, whatever stands or whatever falls, a thing cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same sense. [Applause.]

6. If matter is a double-faced unity, having a spiritual and physical side, there must co-inhere in one and

the same substratum extension and the absence of extension, inertia and the absence of inertia, color and the absence of color, form and the absence of form.

7. To assert that these fundamentally antagonistic qualities of matter and mind not only inhere, but coinhere, in one and the same substratum, is to assert that a thing can be and not be at the same time and in the same sense. [Applause.]

8. This limitless self-contradiction wrecks in this age, as it has wrecked in every age, the pretence that there is but one substance in the universe.

9. We know incontrovertibly that there are two sets of attributes, which, as diametrical opposites, cannot co-inhere in one substance, since extension and its absence, inertia, form, color, and their absence, cannot possibly co-exist in one and the same thing at the same time.

10. Every attribute, however, must belong to some substance.

11. Two irreconcilably antagonistic sets of attributes must belong to two substances.

This proposition is as venerable as the sword Excalibur of King Arthur. With it materialism of the older forms has been defeated on many a Waterloo of philosophy; with it materialism in its newest form has no battle but that which consists in flight from its deadly edge.

12. The axiomatic knowledge, we have of two such sets of attributes necessitates the conclusion that matter and mind are two substances,

13. In that inference from self-evident truth, all forms of materialism are shown to be absurd, as all forms alike assert that there is but one substance.

14. Professor Bain's fundamental error is the confusion of "close succession" with "union." He asserts "union" of the qualities of matter and mind in one substance with two sets of properties. He endeavors, but in vain, to show that this is not union in place; and then says (Ibid., p. 137), that "the only mode of union that is not contradictory is the union of close succession in time." Such succession is not union in any sense that can justify the assertion that there is but one substance in the universe with two sets of properties.

In the last pages of this weak book, Moleschott, Vogt, and Büchner, whom Germany regards as little men, are mentioned as among the recent bright lights of materialism. Bain admits distinctly, and yet, of course, without emphasis, that "it is not to be supposed that these writers are in the ascendant in Germany." His poor sketch of the history of materialism is intended to show that this system of thought may expect a successful future. That argument, however, with many others, stumbles, and falls flat over his concession, that the most intellectual nation, in which philosophy is a passion with scholars, and which has given to this subject more thought than all other nations combined, repudiates the latest as well as the oldest materialism.

Gentlemen, I know that thus far in this address the argument is metaphysical; but, in the audience

of scholars, it is not for that reason useless. Metaphysics is simply an articulate knowledge of the necessary implications of axiomatic truths, and is not only a very clear and exact science in itself, but the mother of all the other sciences. We must reject either self-contradiction or sanity. We must adhere to primary, self-evident truths, or fall into that ultimate form of scepticism which knows nothing except that it knows nothing, and does not know even that [laughter], except upon the evidence of these very axioms or intuitions, with which it plays fast and loose. The man who does not know much is a great character in our inquiring but unphilosophical times. When you trace a mind which rejects axioms up to its last refuge of oleaginousness, or ignorance, or weakness, you can ask, "Are you sure that you know nothing with certainty?"-"Yes," he replies, " I am sure." "But then there is one thing you know with certainty."-"No: I am "No: I am sure that I know nothing surely."-"But how are you sure that you are sure?" Only on the authority of the axiomatic, self-evident truths which dazzled the eagle eyes of the Acropolis; are presupposed in all reasoning; and are imbedded not only in the human mind, but in the very nature of things. Every change must have a cause. The whole is greater than a part. Mind exists. Matter exists. A thing cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same sense. A straight line is the shortest distance between two points. These are a few of the renowned fundamental principles, first truths, axioms, intuitions, eternal tests of

verity, of which metaphysics gives the list; and to conscientious consistency with these, it is the duty of religious science, which first elaborately studied axioms, to hold mercilessly all other sciences and herself.

Curiously, and yet not curiously, physiology and metaphysics tell the same tale whenever they speak on the same points. To test one science by another is the most important, and, intellectually, the most delicious, of all arts. Let us turn now to physical, concrete facts again, and observe the coincidence of their testimony with that of the primary mental facts or axioms. In the field of modern physiological research, materialism fails through hopeless and practically measureless self-contradiction.

1. If matter is a double-faced unity, having a spiritual and physical side, and is the only substance that exists in the universe, then, in matter, spiritual and physical qualities must not only inhere, but co-inhere, in the same substratum.

2. It must be true of every atom of matter that it has a spiritual and a physical side.

3. In every atom, therefore, spiritual and physical qualities must be found so inseparably conjoined, that the one side cannot be conceived to be taken away without carrying the other side with it.

4. If this be the true character of matter, then the physiological activities of the atoms must be at least co-extensive with the psychological activities displayed in connection with those atoms; that is, both the psychical and physical sides of the one substance