$39.

ernments

mite in the eye of intern. law.

A state may sustain relations to other states, and perform its offices generally under any form of govern. All forms of gov legiti ment. The law of nations preserves an entire indifference to constitutions, so long as they do not prevent fulfilment of obligations. Every state is in its eye legitimate. And in matter of fact the countries which profess to be bound by the Christian or European law of nations, differ exceedingly from one another in their constitutions, which contain specimens of absolute and constitutional hereditary monarchy, of confederated democracies, and of an elective eoclesiastical principality.

only goverments

de facto.

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Hence it follows that if a state has altered its form of govIntern. law knows ernment, or by some revolution, peaceable or violent, has suffered a disruption, or has become united with another, all these things are beyond the province of international law, whose only inquiry is, whether a certain community or organization is in matter of fact a separate independent existence, discharging the functions of a state, and able to take upon itself state responsibilities. The question of a state's right to exist is an internal one, to be decided by those within its borders who belong to its organization. To bring the question before external powers, not only destroys sovereignty, but must either produce perpetual war, or bring on the despotism of some one strong nation or strong confederacy of nations, requiring all others to conform their constitutions to the will of these tyrants. Moreover, it is a question outside of the law of nations, which presupposes the fact that nations exist and have rights, and therefore cannot first inquire into their right to exist. On the other hand, the fact of the existence of a state is in general an open one, easy to be judged of, one which involves no decision in regard to the advantages of one form of government over another, and the only fact which nations need to know, in order that they may enter into and fulfil reciprocal obligations.

With these principles the practice of nations on the whole, and in the long run, agrees. All in the end acknowledge the government de facto. Of course, nations which dread revolu tion will be more slow to allow the title of a revolutionary government, or of one where a family of princes of the same blood, or who have been long allies, are driven from the throne; but they must submit at last to the inexorable facts of divine Providence and history. And if this rule could be overthrown, if a nation or set of nations should act on the plan of withholding their sanction from new nations with certain constitutions, such a plan would justify others who thought differently in refusing to regard the former any longer as legitimate states.

All history is full of examples of such recognitions. Holland and Switzerland, long after their independence was acknowledged in the diplomacy of most European states, were formally admitted into the brotherhood of nations at the era of the peace of Westphalia. The United States, the Spanish states of South America, the two French empires, the kingdom of Greece, all arose from revolutions, and have been acknowledged to possess the full functions of states. Such, too, has been the case in regard to states which have changed the succession, as England in 1688, Sweden in 1818, and also where a disruption has taken place, as that between Holland and Belgium in 1830; nay, such iniquities as the partitions of Poland have become facts of history, into which the law of nations claims no right to look.

It is almost needless to say that this rule cannot have its application, as long as there is evident doubt whether a government is a fact. If the question is still one of armed strife, as between a colony and a mother country, or between a state and a revolted portion of it, to take the part of the colony or of the revolted territory by recognition is an injury and may be a ground of war; but every nation must decide for itself whether an independent state he really established, and needs not to wait until the party opposing the revolutionary effort has accepted the new order of things. It is a safe rule in contests

involving the violent separation of a state into parts, that when the mother country, in the case of a colony, or the leading portion of the state, in the case of disruption, gives up active efforts to restore the old order of things by war, other states may regard the revolution as perfected, and a new state as having come into the world. (Note 1.)

vinces, etc. in re

volt.

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No state is authorized to render assistance to provinces or Assistance to pro- colonies which are in revolt against the established government. For if the existence and sovereignty of a state is once acknowledged, nothing can be done to impair them; and if the right of interference,-in favor of liberty, for instance,-be once admitted, the door is open for taking a part in every quarrel.

On the other hand, there is nothing in the law of nations which forbids one nation to render assistance to the established government in such case of revolt, if its assistance is invoked. This aid is no interference, and is given to keep up the present order of things, which international law takes under its protection. It may be said that this rule, together with the unlawfulness of taking the side of a revolutionary party in another state, must prevent wholesome reforms, that the partizans of despotism may thus use their power against free institutions, while the partizans of the latter may not oppose despotism. That this effect may follow is quite possible; still the rule is an impartial one, as it applies to any existing state, whether free or absolute, to attempts against existing liberty as well as against existing tyranny. The only other conceivable rules of action for states are, that in internal quarrels every foreign state may take which side it pleases, or that no state may assist either party. The former course of action will find no advocates; the other, which the law of nations cannot be expected,―for the present at least,—to recognize, must indeed prevent some revolutions from being undertaken, but cannot prevent a change of government when demanded by a nation's united voice.

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of non-interfer

The rule of non-interference in the affairs of other states is then an established principle. But the exceptions Exceptions to rule to it which are admitted, or which are claimed to ence." exist, are of great importance, and there is considerable difficulty in determining what is lawful interference and what is unlawful. For, first, there may be interference without a show or pretence of justice. In the second place, a nation which has or pretends to have causes of war with another, aids its revolted provinces in the exercise of the war-right of crippling its enemy. In the third place, there are instances of interference which can be explained neither on the ground of injustice, nor of a state of war, and which the usage of Christian or of many Christian states tolerates.

Interference when

Whatever be the interference, it can be justified only as an extreme measure, and on one of the two following grounds. (1.) That it is demanded by self- justified. preservation; (2.) That some extraordinary state of things is brought about by the crime of a government against its subjects. And upon these grounds we must judge, not only of the lawfulness of interference at any time pro re natâ, but also of the lawfulness of treaties contemplating such interference in the future. From the nature of these grounds it appears that they are more or less vague and under the influence of subjective opinion. The danger to a state's existence from the designs of another, or of others, evidently cannot be measured. While on the one hand mere suspicion, or calculation of remote probabilities, can be no justifying cause of action; on the other, it is hard to say, just as in cases of individual morality, how much evidence is sufficient to sanction that procedure, which in ordinary times is unlawful. Thus much may be laid down, that a danger resulting from the healthy and prudent growth of

* If the principles of intervention cannot stand, treaties of guaranty, which con ten plate such intervention, must be condemned also; for they have in view a resist. ance, at some future time, to the endeavors of third parties to conquer or in some way control the guaranteed states in question. An agreement, if it involve an unlawful act, or the prevention of lawful acts on the part of others, is plainly unlawful

another state is no reason for interference whatever, and that good evidence of unjust designs, drawn from conduct, ought to be obtained before any measures may be taken to prevent them.

The extreme case of extraordinary crimes, committed by a government against its subjects, is still less capable of exact definition. Here, however, the danger of erring is less than in the other instance, because interference here is more disinterested; and the evil results of a mistake are less, because such cases are comparatively rare.

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Having premised thus much in regard to justifying pretexts for interference, let us look now at the actual cases in which international law gives, or is claimed to give to it a sanction We shall consider first the balance of power.

power.

sitions.

The meaning of the balance of power is this: that any 1. Interference for European state may be restrained from pursuing the balance of plans of acquisition, or making preparations lookTo prevent acqui- ing towards future acquisitions, which are judged to be hazardous to the independence and national existence of its neighbors. In further explanation of the system we may say, (1.) That it matters not whether the actual ratio of power between states is in danger of being disturbed by unjust or by just means, provided only the means are poli tical, not economical and strictly internal. If, for instance, the sovereign of a powerful state should in a just way seat one of his family on the throne of a neighboring state, the justice of the transaction would not be a sufficient protection against the interference of other powers. (2.) That acquisitions outside of Europe have not hitherto been drawn into this policy. England has by degrees become a predominant power in several quarters of the world without provoking the interference of the Continent. The reason is, that foreign acquisitions affect the political balance only in an indirect way. (3.) The system has been applied to power on the land, and not much to power on the sea. England has acquired, undisturbed, a great pre