Goods imported from England into
Quebec, consigned to M. & S., and
stored in the Customs Warehouse
there, according to the Customs
regulations for freight, duties, and
storage, were, by a contract in
writing, pledged by M. & S. for
advances made to them by G. &
K, and a note of such pledge

Superior Court allowed such op-
position, holding that the Oppo-
sants, G. & K., were Pledgees of
Such
the goods in question.
judgment, though overruled by
the full Court, and afterwards by
the Court of Queen's Bench in
Lower Canada on appeal, upheld
by the Judicial Committee, who
were of opinion, that the circum-
stances of the case and the deal-
ings of the parties constituted a
constructive delivery, and that the
judgment which dismissed the
opposition of G. & K., and gave
effect to the seizure under the
execution to their prejudice as
Pledgees, could not be supported.
[Young v. Lambert]

LIGHTS,

- 416

Officer of the Customs, specifying

the conditions on which the loan
was made, with a request to such
Officer to hold the goods subject

See "SHIP AND SHIPPING," 3.

LIQUIDATORS,

paying the duty and storage
charges before removal. L., a
creditor of M. & S., obtained
judgment in an action against
them, and, under a fieri facias,
seized the goods so in bond,
the execution of which was op-
posed by G. & K., who made an
application main levée to the
Court, on the ground, that by the
above contract the property of
M. & S. in the goods in question
was conveyed to them to secure
repayment of the advances made
by them. The Judge of the

On

a class of contributories. [The
Bank of Hindustan, China and
Japan v. The Eastern Financial
Association]

. 114

See COLONIAL LAW," 2, 3, 7.

MARINE INSURANCE

cargo

and disbursements. Pos-
effect of,

sible recovery of cargo,
on Policy. [Currie v. The Bombay
- 302
Native Insurance Co.] ·

who was a Decorator and Gar-
dener in his service, to perform
for him certain work. The De-
fendant drove, and while on the
road the kingbolt of the Carriage
broke, the Horses bolted, the
Carriage was overturned, and the
Plaintiff injured. There was no
evidence of gross neglect on the
part of the Defendant :- Held,
(overruling the judgment of the
Court below),

First, that in the absence of any
evidence of gross negligence on
the part of the Defendant, the
Plaintiff was not entitled to re-
cover damages.
Secondly, that the evidence did not
disclose such negligence as to
render the Defendant, perform-
ing a gratuitous service for the
Plaintiff, responsible.

The case of Scott v. The London and
St. Katharine's Docks Company
(3 H. & C. 596) distinguished.
[Moffatt v. Bateman] -- 369

NEW TRIAL
See "FELONY."
"LIBEL."

NOTICE.

1. Necessity of by Master of Ship
to Owner, before resorting to
Bottomry. [The Karnak] - 136
2. Of abandonment as for total
loss. [Currie v. The Bombay
Native Insurance Company] - 302
3. By Master to Owner necessary,
when practicable, before resort-
ing to Bottomry Bond. Notice

A Patentee, a Foreigner, patented
his invention first in England
and afterwards in France, which
latter patent, at the date of the
application for a prolongation of
the English patent, had a year to
run-Held by the Judicial Com-
mittee, that they could not re-
commend the Crown to extend
the term upon the chance of the
French patent being extended :
Held, further, that if the French

patent had expired there was no
power in the Committee to re-
commend an extension of the
English patent.

On the merits, held, that an As-
signee of the Patentee who had
taken an assignment of four-

1. In an action against a Surety
to recover a part of a debt, by
the first and second counts, the
Plaintiffs declared as indorsees
of a Bill of Exchange drawn by
them, and accepted by H, in-
dorsed by the Plaintiffs to the
Defendant, and by him to the
Plaintiffs; the third and fourth
counts were upon another Bill of
Exchange; and the fifth count
was upon a deed whereby the
Defendant bound himself to
secure payment by H. of his two
acceptances. The counts upon
the two Bills averred, that the
Plaintiffs indorsed the Bills to
the Defendant without considera-
tion, in order that they might be
indorsed by the Defendant to the
Plaintiffs for the purpose of the
Defendant becoming surety for
the payment of the Bills by the
acceptor, H., to the Plaintiffs.
As to a sum of £4,606, part of
the money so alleged to have
been secured by the Bills and
Deed, the Defendant, to the five
counts, pleaded, on equitable

grounds, that the two Bills which
were guaranteed by the Defen-
dant had been given for the
balance of the purchase-money
for certain Stations in New South
Wales, previously purchased by
H. from the Plaintiffs, under an
agreement which provided, that
in case of any dispute between
the Vendors and the Purchaser
as to any matter connected with
the sale, such dispute should
not annul the sale, but should be
referred to arbitration in the
manner therein stated; and the
plea further stated, that a dispute
had arisen as to the extent of
land comprised in the Stations,
that H. had appointed one S. as
his Arbitrator, that the Plaintiffs
neglected to appoint an Arbi-
trator, and that S. made his
Award concerning the dispute,
and thereby awarded that the
Plaintiffs should pay to H.
£4,606, in satisfaction of his
claim. The plea also stated, that
H., before the commencement of
the suit, claimed and offered to
deduct and set off the sum of
£4,606 against an equal amount
in price :-

Held, first, that the plea constituted

a good equitable defence to the
action, as, from the nature and
terms of the Contract set forth
in the plea, the compensation ad-
mitted to have been awarded was
an abatement of the price of the
Stations, and reduced pro tanto
the amount of the purchase-
money then unpaid, and as in

equity the Defendant might have
claimed the benefit of the amount
of compensation awarded as a
deduction, he was entitled to put
this forward as a defence, on
equitable grounds, to so much of
the cause of action as was
covered by that amount.
Secondly, that it was not necessary
to the validity of the plea, that it
should expressly aver that no
more of the purchase-money was
due than the amount secured by
the Bills, or that, in the absence
of an express averment, it must
by the rule of pleading be taken
against the Defendant, that the
fact was otherwise, as the rule
does not apply to the pleading of
facts which lie peculiarly within
the knowledge of the opposite
party.

Thirdly, that as the Plaintiffs did
not reply and avoid the plea on
equitable grounds, but demurred,
the allegations in the plea were
to be taken without any denial
or qualification, and every fair
and reasonable intendment made.
Held, further, that in considering
the validity of the equitable plea
with respect to parties, it was
necessary to bear in mind that
H. was not a necessary party to
the action, as a Court of Equity
could, without making H. a
party, grant an unconditional in-
junction restraining the Plaintiffs
from suing out execution upon a
judgment, so far as related to the
sum of £4,606 to which the plea
applied. [Murphy v. Glass] 1