EXTINGUISHMENT OF
MUTUAL DEBTS.
FAMILY NAME, PROPERTY IN.
In England, the assumption of a name, the patronymic of a family, by a stranger, who had never be- fore been called by that name, is not the subject of a civil action, as by the English law there is no right of property in a person to the use of a particular name, to the extent of enabling him to prevent the assumption of his name by another.
Aliter, as to the exclusive use of a
name in connection with a trade or business, which right is re- cognized, and a party assuming it colourably, or otherwise, being an invasion of another's rights is a fraud, for which a remedy lies either at law or equity. [Du Boulay v. Du Boulay] -
See" COLONIAL LAW," 1.
A Prisoner having been tried and convicted of a capital Felony, by a Court of Oyer and Terminer in New South Wales, and sen- tence of death passed, and the judgment entered upon Record, an application was made to the Supreme Court, sitting in Banco, for a rule for a Venire de novo, on
an affidavit which stated, that one of the jury had informed the Deponent, that pending the trial, and before the verdict, the jury having adjourned to an hotel, had access to newspapers which contained reports of the trial as it proceeded, with comments thereon. The Supreme Court made the rule absolute, consi- dering that there had been a mis-trial, and ordered an entry to be made on the Record of the circumstances deposed to:-that the judgment on the verdict should be vacated, and a fresh trial had. On appeal to Her Majesty in Council, held, by the Judicial Committee, acting on the case of Reg. v. Bertrand (4 Moore's P. C. Cases (N.S ), 460), First, that the discretionary power of the Supreme Court to grant new trials does not extend to cases of Felony; and that a Ve- nire de novo cannot be awarded after verdict upon a charge of Felony, tried upon a good indict- ment and by a competent Tri- bunal;
Secondly, that if a Venire de novo
could be awarded upon an appli- cation by way of error on appeal, the proceeding in the Supreme Court was defective in form, and not warranted by the suggestion entered on the Record; and therefore,
Thirdly, that the Order for vacating the judgment, and for a Venire de novo, must be reversed. [Reg. v. Murphy]
FOREIGN ENLISTMENT. The Foreign Enlistment Act, 59 Geo. 3, c. 69, for prevention of enlisting into Foreign Service, or the fitting out or equipping in Her Majesty's dominions Vessels for warlike purposes provides, by sect 7, (1) That such Ship or Vessel must be acting without leave or license of the Sovereign of this Country; (2) That she must be equipped, furnished, fit- ted out, or armed, or there must be a procuring, or an attempt, or endeavour to equip, furnish, fit out, or arm the Ship; (3) That such equipment, furnishing, fit- ting out or arming, must be done with the intent or in order that the Ship or Vessel shall be em- ployed in the service of some "Foreign Prince, State, or Po- tentate, or of any Foreign Colony, Province, or part of any Province or People, or of any Person or Persons exercising, or assuming to exercise, any powers of Government in or over any Foreign State, Colony, Province,
or part of any Province or Peo- ple; " (4) That there must be an in- tent to employ the Ship or Vessel either as a Transport or Store- ship, or with intent to cruise or commit hostilities against any Prince, State, or Potentate, or against the subjects or Citizens of such Prince, &c., or the persons exercising, or assuming to exer- cise, the powers of Government in any Colony, Province, or part of any Province or Country, or against the inhabitants of any Foreign Colony, Province, or part of any Province or Country; (5) That such Foreign Prince, State, or Potentate, &c., is one with whom His Majesty should not
A Vessel having been seized under warrant from the Governor of the Bahama Islands, and proceeded against in the Vice-Admiralty Court there, for breach of the 7th section of the Foreign En- listment Act, was, upon the hear- ing of the cause, ordered to be restored, the Vice-Admiralty Court not being satisfied that the Vessel was engaged, within the meaning of that section, in aiding parties in insurrection against a Foreign Government, as such parties did not assume to exercise the powers of Govern- ment over any portion of the territory of such Government. Such decision overruled on ap- peal by the Judicial Committee, on the ground that it was estab- lished, that there was an insur-
rection in the Island of Cuba, the Foreign Government in ques- tion; that there were Insurgents who had formed themselves into a body of people, who formed part of the Province or people of Cuba, acting together, and under- taking and conducting hostilities; that the Vessel was employed as a Transport or Store-ship, in con- nection with, and in the service of, this body of Insurgents; and that the Judge of the Court below had miscarried in confining his attention to the second alter- native of the third branch of the section, which requires that the person or persons aided must be exercising, or assuming to exer- cise, the powers of Government. [The Salvador] - - 509
IMPLIED WARRANTY. Two of the Directors of a Joint- Stock Company, by a letter to the Company's Bankers, notified that their Manager had authority to draw cheques on account of the Company. Such two Directors did not form a majority of the Directors of the Company, as required by their Act of incor- poration, so as to bind the Com- pany. Although the Company's account was at the time over- drawn, and that fact was known to the two Directors, the Bankers honoured the Manager's cheques on the authority so given to them.
In an action brought by the Bank against the two Directors, for advances made on account of the Company upon the faith of their letter, the Court below held, that there was an implied warranty on their part, and that they were personally liable to the Bank, and judgment was given to the extent of the sums overdrawn by the Manager subsequent to the date of their letter. Such judgment sustained on appeal. [Cherry v. The Colonial Bank of Austra- lasia] -
INDIAN ACTS.
No. XIX. of 1859, s. 69; No. X. of 1866, s. 174.
See "COMPROMISE."
Of Owner of Vessel.
See "BOTTOMRY BOND," 3.
Suit brought to recover the amount of two Policies of Insurance upon the cargo and disbursements re- spectively of a Ship; both policies being for a total loss. The Ship having become a wreck, the Cap- tain, without taking any steps to save or discharge the cargo, deeming such impracticable, pro- ceeded to dismantle the Ship, and gave notice to the Insurers of the abandonment of the cargo, and sold both Ship and cargo by public auction. A large part of
The Court below held, that as the cargo might have been, and was, in fact, partially saved, there was no such total loss of the cargo and freight as entitled the Assured to recover on either of the Poli- cies. Such ruling, as regarded the cargo, affirmed, but as the Ship, when she was reduced to a wreck, was incapable of earning any freight, the Judicial Com- mittee were of opinion, that there was such a total loss of the dis- bursements, to be paid out of the freight, as to entitle the Assurers to recover on that Policy. The authority of Parmeter v. Tod- hunter (1 Camp., 541), with re- spect to the form of notice of abandonment, observed upon and questioned. [Currie v. The Bom- bay Native Insurance Co.] - 302 See "BAILMENT.”
INSURRECTION IN CUBA. See "FOREIGN ENLISTMENT."
See "COMPROMISE."
"IMPLIED WARRANTY."
JUDGE AND JURY,
Functions of. See "LIBEL."
the cargo was afterwards saved. The High Court of Admiralty has
written by the Defendant to the Colonial Secretary of the Island, stating that the Plaintiff was drunk and disorderly at a certain time and place. At the trial, the Letter was not given in evidence, or the publication proved, but the Judge told the jury that they had to find, whether it was a privi- leged communication or not, and directed them to decide, whether or not, the Defendant had taken sufficient care to ascertain the truth of the statement made to the Colonial Secretary, and upon this it would be for him to decide whether the Defendant's com- munication was a privileged one The jury found for the Plaintiff, with damages, and the Judge, a few days afterwards, gave judgment concurring with the verdict.
Held, that the proceedings were altogether irregular, and judg- ment arrested, the Judge having taken upon himself the functions of the jury, first, in leaving it to them to determine whether the alleged libel was contained in an official document and a privileged communication; and, secondly, in not leaving it to them to say, whether the Letter, if published, was bona fide; and if so found, then it was for him to determine whether, under all the circum- stances, it was not a privileged communication.
The Defendant did not apply to the
Court below for a new trial, but upon special application for leave,
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