unless sent down to the Presbyteries, and by them approved. Admit that it was unconstitutional, and no doubt the Assembly had a right to abrogate it; and besides being lawful, the abrogation was certainly expedient, if the plan had introduced disorders, and threatened others still more serious. My clients say that it had. This being alleged by the Assembly, it was clearly an adequate ground for their proceeding. What objections are urged against the abrogation of the "Plan of Union ?" On the supposition that the plan was constitutional, it is contended that it was a compact; as if in agreements purely spiritual, there can be any consideration, by reason of which the compact can be enforced, though a party is desirous of rescinding it, because it is productive of mischief. When a contract or bargain is made between man and man, it is perfectly well understood that this is cognizable by the law: our constitution recognises such contracts, and you have a doctrine of consideration applicable to them. You may have a contract cognizable by the civil law, in which legal obligation mingles with that which is purely moral; but here you have no mixture, nothing whatever that is worldly: if binding at all, this agreement is binding only in conscience. Where you have nothing like a consideration, you can have no contract that can be enforced at law. You cannot keep joined by the sanction of law elements which have come together on the principle of voluntary association. How, then, is such an agreement to be determined? Evidently by the will of the majority. The majority on either side may resolve that its operation shall cease. The resolution then that I have read abrogated the plan of 1801, and it is abrogated: it ceases to have any force.

Next comes a series of resolutions, resting on the supposition that the "Plan of Union" was unconstitutional and void, which are merely administrative. I do not mean to say whether they are legislative or judicial, because we do not find the government of the Presbyterian Church divided, like our national government, into three distinct and well defined branches; but I call them simply administrative, as they were passed to carry into effect that which was already adopted. I might have referred to the protest against the other, but leave that for the present. Here is the first of the resolutions:

"That in consequence of the abrogation, by this Assembly, of the Plan of Union of 1801, between it and the General Association of Connecticut, as utterly unconstitutional, and therefore null and void from the beginning, the Synods of Utica, Geneva, and Genesee, which were formed and attached to this body, under and in execution of said "Plan of Union" be, and are hereby declared to be, out of the ecclesiastical connexion of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America, and that they are not in form or in fact, an integral portion of said church." Ante, 46.

On which resolution, the ayes and noes being called, it was carried by a majority of twenty-seven, one not voting. This, then, so far as I have gone, declares simply the practical effect of the abrogation. If such was its practical effect, all that the General Assembly did, in passing this resolution, was purely administrative. They made known to their own churches, and gave notice to those associated with them, what the effect of the abrogation was, and then adjudicated accordingly. What is the next resolution?

"2. That the solicitude of this Assembly on the whole subject, and its urgency for the immediate decision of it, are greatly increased, by reason of the gross disorders which are ascertained to have prevailed in those Synods, (as well as that of the Western Reserve, against which a declarative resolution, similar to the first of these, has been passed during our present session,) it being made clear to us, that even the Plan of Union. itself, was never consistently carried into effect by those professing to act

under it."

"It being made clear to us"-To whom else could it be made clear? Shall we bring the evidence of the fact before your Honours? Suppose we tell you, that these men who have come in under the "Plan of Union," are Baptists, or Episcopalians, Independents, or Roman Catholics, or Jews; your Honours will say, that you have no right to inquire into such matters. What business has any civil court to judge of a man's religious persuasion, to say that he is a disorderly member of a church? We are not a judicatory of the Presbyterian Church. We are not the Sanhedrin. We are not the representatives of any particular part of the Church, or the general representatives of the whole Church. An individual, or a Church, is deemed disorderly, because of a violation of the constitution of the Church. But such disorder cannot be presented to the sight of your Honours, acting under the law, because, in the eye of the law, every creed and every form of worship is fit and proper. How can a civil court resolve itself into a religious tribunal, and that the tribunal of a particular sect, to determine questions of doctrine and of conscience? I admit, that, in the case of trusts, your Honours must sometimes decide upon the identity of a Church. But, suppose you were called upon to make such a decision, what evidence could you have, that such persons were or were not, part of a denomination? Would not the judgment of the Church to which they professed to belong, owning or disowning them, be the best and only evidence? It must be so. Therefore, the statements made in the second resolution, must be taken as true: That the urgency of the Assembly is "greatly increased, by reason of the gross disorders which are ascertained to have prevailed; * * it being made clear to us, that even the Plan of Union itself was never consistently carried into effect, by those professing to act under it"-As your Honours see in the case of a person admitted to the Assembly, who was not entitled to a seat in it, either one way or the other.

"3. That the General Assembly has no intention by these resolutions, or by that passed in the case of the Synod of the Western Reserve, to affect in any way the ministerial standing of any members of either of said Synods." The Synods themselves are laid down and dissolved, but none of the ministers, unless such as have been guilty of falsehood in alleging themselves Presbyterians, are affected. "Nor to disturb the pastoral relation in any church." How then can it be said that these pastors and people have been subjected to such difficulties and penalties as have been described? "Nor to interfere with the duties or relations of private christians in their respective congregations; but only to declare and determine according to the truth and necessity of the case, and by virtue of the full authority existing in it for that purpose, the relation of all said Synods, and all their constituent parts to this body, and to the Presbyterian Church in the United States."

Then comes the fourth resolution: "That inasmuch as there are reported to be several churches and ministers, if not one or two Presbyteries, now in connexion with one or more of said Synods, which are strictly Presbyterian in doctrine and order, be it, therefore, farther resolved, that all such churches and ministers as wish to unite with us, are hereby directed to apply for admission into those Presbyteries belonging to our connexion which are most convenient to their respective locations; and that any such Presbytery as aforesaid, being strictly Presbyterian in doctrine and order, and now in connexion with either of said Synods as may desire to unite with us, are hereby directed to make application, with a full statement of their cases, to the next General Assembly, which will take proper order thereon."

Now in that part of the charge which refers to this last resolution (Ante 467), there seems to be an error in the printing, which has crept in somehow or other, I cannot see exactly how. But certainly the paragraph appears to involve a contradiction. His Honour says, "There is no mistaking the character of these resolutions. It is an immediate dissolution of all connexion between the four Synods and all their constituent parts, and the General Assembly. They are destructive of the rights of electors of the General Assembly. The connexion might be renewed, it is true, by each of the Presbyteries making application to the next General Assembly, but they are at liberty to accept or refuse them, provided they, the General Assembly, deem them strictly Presbyterian in doctrine and order." His Honour, I suppose, means to say that the Assembly might receive them if strictly Presbyterian. Here then, in the next sentence, I think there is an error. "As they had the right to admit them, they had the right, also, to refuse them, unless, in their opinion, they were strictly Presbyterian in doctrine and order." Now as I understood the meaning of this, it is, that the Assembly would have no right to refuse these Presbyteries if they were Presbyterians, which seems inconsistent with the previous sentence. Or, perhaps, the error is in the former part: certainly the Assembly never meant to refuse any strictly Presbyterian in doctrine and order.

Judge Rogers. They were to decide whether they were Presbyterian

or not.

Mr. Sergeant. But they were to receive them if they were Presbyterian, and I say, according to this resolution, they will receive all such that apply. If any are not Presbyterian, of course they will not be admitted into the Presbyterian Church. Thus these resolutions save the rights of both ministers and people, pastors and their flocks, so far as possible, inviting all who hold the Presbyterian doctrines to come into the Church, the Assembly promising to receive them with open arms. Never up to this time has any thing been done in degradation of the rights of such. But the "Plan of Union" has been productive of disorder. The disorder is charged not upon individuals, but upon the "Plan." Now the question is, whether the Assembly had the power thus to remedy the disorder.

Consider next the nature of the body by which the act was done.

As to one point there will be no dispute: that the General Assembly is the highest tribunal of the Presbyterian Church. What are its precise powers I shall not now attempt to define. What constitutes a church, in

its scriptural sense as it was established from the beginning, and exists at the present day I mean a Christian church? A body of men who profess sound doctrine, maintain good discipline, and enforce a right form of government. Each one of these is as essential as another: I do not suppose that a church was ever organized upon a different plan. I am aware that it is a very common thing to disregard doctrine, discipline, and government, to hold a rigid adherence to them as sectarism and bigotry, as an undue opposition to all other denominations. Exactly in proportion as zeal abounds are Christians charged with bigotry, with being zealots in an offensive sense-having too much zeal against their neighbours. If bigotry means a zeal for sound doctrine, and good discipline, I regret that we have not more of it. Sectarism was the very thing that the reformation sought and did accomplish-that those who thought alike should freely associate together. Is a character for zeal, attached to any sect, a reproach? If it engenders persecution it is to be deprecated: if it be only a deep conviction of the importance of sound doctrine, strict discipline and wise government, no matter how ardent it is: it will be ardent if it be sincere. Zeal is the very fuel of a pure and heart-dwelling religion. If a Church is without this fuel, it is without vital religion; and not only the outer court, but the whole temple is a place for merchandize: the desecration is worse than that of the temple at Jerusalem. The pursuits of this world are constantly inviting every man away from the duties of religion. Few have time for thought and reflection upon these important subjects, with the exception of the small company of devoted men, who, whether their motives be good or bad, have voluntarily resigned themselves to poverty-for so it is with the clergy of this landthat they may be ever ready to sound an alarm in the ears of those who are constantly in danger of disregarding, fatally disregarding, the great truths which so deeply concern all mankind. Though some may hold doctrine to be immaterial, discipline of no consequence, and government a trifling matter, they are very far from being so. Religion was made for man; and in a most admirable book written by Mr. Wilberforce, it is very truly said, that man's religion is nought if it does not enlist his feelings, as well as his reason and understanding. He says truly, that religion was made for man; and man is what we find him, a creature of feeling, appetite, passion, reason, and conscience, all of which exist in some few persons in measurable harmony, but in most keep up perpetual conflict, the voice of reason being too often drowned in the clamour of her more noisy companions. Therefore, discipline and government are absolutely necessary in the Church.

"A particular church," says the Constitution, "consists of a number of professing Christians with their offspring, voluntarily associated together, for divine worship and godly living, agreeably to the Holy Scriptures; and submitting to a certain form of government."-Form of Gov. Ch. II. Sec. 4. Such is the Presbyterian definition, and the true definition of a church. There must be submission to a particular form of government. This is the description of a church in general: there can be no doubt that the Presbyterian Church corresponds with the requirement. Here are enumerated all the particulars necessary to that Church: it " consists of a number of professing Christians, with their offspring, voluntarily associated together, for divine worship and godly living, agreeably to the Holy

Scriptures; and submitting to a certain form of government." There can be no single church without these. No judicatory can exist which is not the representative of such churches. The highest judicatory represents all the churches of this kind which voluntarily submit to its jurisdiction. Then, does it not follow that a system of government is absolutely necessary?

Of what are the judicatories of the Presbyterian Church composed? I do not mean to assert that this is better than any other Church: that is not a lawful argument, under our Constitution. It is a voluntary association; and those who compose it, may stay or go, just as they please. The question of its merits, is not the question here: that is, for its own members, a matter of opinion; and all who do not like its particular form of government, may withdraw at their own pleasure. How are its councils composed? Of ordained ministers only? Not so; but of ministers and elders: by them representing the Church, in its various judicatories, beginning with the lowest, the church-session, its government is conducted. Any body has a perfect right to find fault with this arrangement. It is good for those who like it: I believe that it is good in itself. If the preservation of the altar and the sacred flame, require a peculiar care, it is well that those who devote their lives to this service, should declare by a public and solemn ceremony, that they do intend thus to devote them; giving the only pledge in their power, that they indeed mean assiduously to watch over the spiritual concerns of the Church. If any say that mere laymen can as well execute this holy office, I will not dispute with them, but I will claim to be of a different opinion. Is there here any mixture of civil right? There is a church, but the people may attend it or not, just as they please, and it may be open, though they do not choose to attend. It does not follow, that because they do not come, the minister and elders may not offer them the opportunity of religious improvement, of hearing the dispensation of the Gospel. As to the mere building, the pews, the church does not pretend to have any thing to do with them: it is independent of the civil corporation by which they are held. Any one may have a sitting, or a pew, who chooses to pay for it. So, at least, it is in many Churches: perhaps there is but one, where none that are not of the Church, are permitted to hold pews. This, then, is the definition of a Church: First, it is a voluntary association; secondly, established "for divine worship and godly living, agreeably to the Holy Scriptures;" and, thirdly, "submitting to a certain form of government." All these are material to its existence; and they are things which, as I understand the Constitution of Pennsylvania, are by it left entirely to the Church itself, and to every man's conscience. What says the Constitution? This part of it has undergone no change, in the recent revision: I wish I could say as much of the whole. The third section of the Declaration of Rights, guarantees certain religious rights, reserved out of those delegated to the government-not granted to the legislature, the judiciary, or the executive.

"All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can, of right, be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and