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MR. INGERSOLL'S ARGUMENT.

THURSDAY MORNING, MARCH 21ST-10 O'CLOCK.

With submission to your Honour-Gentlemen of the Jury-Perhaps I cannot better break the formality of an opening to a mere business argument, than by making a very inadequate acknowledgement to the learned counsel who has preceded me. All who have heard him must feel themselves to be his debtors. His clients cannot fail to be grateful for the ability with which he has argued their cause. The court and the jury must be conscious, that their labours will be lightened by the learning and talents which he has brought in aid of their investigations. Even his antagonists will confess, that while they have occasionally suffered from the power of his argument, they have enjoyed the graces and the vigour of his eloquence. If they have smarted from the severity of his blows, they have admired the brilliancy of his weapons, and the dexterity with which they have been used. No one, perhaps, owes him so small a measure of gratitude as myself; for he has left me the duty of addressing you, with scarcely the privilege of having any thing to say. While he has reaped the harvest with an avaricious hand, he has committed to me the humble and unprofitable task of gathering only the scattered and imperfect gleanings of the field. But I should do injustice to my own feelings, and to the bar, of which we are for the occasion fellow members, if I did not unite in offering him my cordial acknowledgments for the example he has afforded to us all. Not so much for an example of abilities, learning, and eloquence-these are qualities which we might vainly endeavour to emulate-but through the whole course of an arduous and protracted controversy, he has manifested a distinguished courtesy; a fair, honourable, and urbane deportment; the due appreciation and imitation of which will, at all times, contribute to the delightful, and as I firmly believe, to the true administration of justice.

It is important in the outset to exhibit the essential differences between the parties to the cause. Not the mere abstract differences, the mutual claims of right, and imputations of wrong, which exist in every controversy. Much less the subtle and inscrutable varieties arising from the alleged preponderance in purity of motive. Each side might there safely challenge investigation, in the consciousness that no human tribunal is competent to the decision. But the visible and acknowledged points of difference, radiating, as it were, from the pleadings and the evidence which the parties have chosen to put forth and to fight under, as the sign and the standard of its cause. Engaged as we are in the active struggles of a divided and militant Church, we naturally seek for the respective manifestos which went out before the present state of hostile conflict began. They are not difficult of discovery, and to them we may advantageously apply all that has since been said or done by the respective hosts. The plaintiffs are bound to show who are the present Trustees of the

General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. They are bound to show that they are themselves entitled to that office against all competitors. But there are certain preliminary or constituent principles, the resolution of which will resolve the final inquiries. These are found in two positions, connected with the two principal events, which stand forth as the prominent circumstances in the history of the controversy. These positions the plaintiffs must assume and maintain. Reducing them to the fewest possible words, they are,

1. That the proceedings of the General Assembly of 1837, declaring four Synods to be out of the ecclesiastical connection of the Presbyterian Church, are null and void.

2. That on the 17th of May, 1838, a lawful change was affected in an existing General Assembly, and that a new one was substituted for it, which carried away the entire powers of the original body, and exercised them fully in another place.

The defendants deny both of these positions. They maintain that the proceedings of 1837 were valid and effectual. They assert, however, that even if they are wrong in this denial, their antagonists are as remote as ever from the object of their seeking, since they must not only demonstrate the invalidity of our proceedings, but the propriety of their own. They must create as well as destroy. If the transactions of 1837, which we undertake to sustain, are impugned effectually, those of 1838, which our antagonists must justify, are still defective and fruitless; for these last transactions made no effective change in the existence or powers of the duly organized body, but amounted only to a voluntary secession, and a distinct, independent, coexistent, and therefore abortive organization.

It will be readily perceived that the labour of proof is, throughout, assumed by the plaintiffs. It is incumbent on them to establish each of the propositions which have been stated. It is not perhaps very material to add, that in doing so, they have to make out, not only an affirmative but one of a compound character, inasmuch as each of their points is composed of a series of distinct yet dependent positions, no one of which can be made available unless it can both give support to the rest, and derive it from them.

I propose to consider, first, the proceedings of 1837. They are the earliest in date, and naturally precede in the course of discussion, those of a later period; and they are an indispensable foundation for the other parts of the plaintiffs' cause.

Look for a moment at the character of the General Assembly, its powers, and the nature of its proceedings. It was a competent and constitutional body, distinguished for wisdom and piety, containing some of the most virtuous and intelligent men of their order, made up of delegates, sufficient in point of number, and amply invested with authority, fully instructed as to the desires and interests of their constituents, and able to maintain their rights and vindicate their wrongs. It was entitled to especial confidence. In matters of this sort it is the very kind of tribunal that ought to be supreme. Where else can religious men look for authority and wisdom in religious matters, if not to the collected intelligence of the wise and pious of their especial sect? Every Christian Church has, what may be termed, its hierarchy: a system of ecclesiastical polity, which is necessary for its well being. In all ages of Christianity, the

highest council has been in its influence supreme; and it has been looked to as the safest guide and the best instructor. If there be infallibility any where, the Roman Catholic believes it to rest in general councils. Luther the great reformer, the founder of Protestantism, appealed to them with unhesitating confidence. Even Calvin, the apostle of Presbyterianism, maintained that the universal Church is infallible, and that God must annul his solemn promises if it were otherwise. Whether attained with the gorgeous splendour of one class of Christians, or the studied simplicity of another, the effect is the same. None are bound by the decrees of these religious assemblies, but those by whom they are sought; but upon those who seek them, their influence is greater even than that of temporal courts of justice, for they affect not only the conduct but the conscience also. This kind of jurisdiction, however powerful in its peculiar sphere, implies no disrespect towards the laws of the land, or the tribunals that administer them, and occasions not the slightest interference with them. Individuals may by mutual consent submit their controversies to other individuals not more competent to judge wisely than themselves. Yet the judgments of the humblest tribunal, owing its existence merely to voluntary selection and submission, dignified by no judicial title, strengthened by no commission, clothed with no official power, possess a stability as complete as those of the ermined judge, who is surrounded with the implements and the insignia of office. All this is because the unofficial tribunal has been voluntarily selected by the parties. Can the effect be less certain when the umpire is of a more dignified and exalted character? Is the decision of a church council, so well chosen, so full of piety, so sound in judgment, so tried in experience, less entitled to respect than that of the commonest reference?

It is among a particular class of persons only that the determinations. of an ecclesiastical body can be expected to be effectual. All the parties to this cause are, I presume, of that character. They are religious men, otherwise the decisions referred to would have no sanction. Talk to the profligate and the infidel of the judgments of the Church, and he disregards, if he does not deride its authority. The thunders of the Vatican traverse the Atlantic unheeded by those who are strangers to the Roman Church; but they sound as awfully in the ears of those who worship in its faith, as the communications of the law once did to the ancient people of Israel. It is the power of conscience which gives effect to these decrees. They do not influence by the dread of temporal penalties. They have no power to inflict a pecuniary fine, or to direct a moment's imprisonment. But they may exclude from Church fellowship, or deny a participation in the Holy Communion, and thus attain results more impressive than any of a merely temporary character.

When these Church councils have not exceeded their jurisdiction, and have duly exercised the authority voluntarily confided to them, no appeal can be taken from their decisions to any court sitting under the law of the land. In this country the tribunals of justice are not competent to interfere with them. There is no danger of an imperium in imperio. In such an independent exercise of authority as this case demonstrates, there was nothing like collision with the ministers or the principles of the temporal law, and there was the clearest evidence of the utility of the separation in civil government between Church and State. Well settled

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authority will show that exalted as may be the court before which we are all now arraigned, it cannot reverse, because it cannot reach the proceedings of the General Assembly of 1837. It has no jurisdiction over them. The best elementary writers inform us that the sovereignty of the state cannot interfere with these matters unless they first interfere with a Church establishment, such as has no existence here. "Let us remember," says Vattel," that religion is no farther an affair of state, than as it is exterior and publicly established: that of the heart can only depend on the conscience. It is a principle of fanaticism, a source of evils, and the most notorious injustice for weak mortals to imagine that they ought to take up the cause of God, maintain his glory by acts of violence, and revenge him on his enemies. "Let us only give to sovereigns," said a great statesman and an excellent citizen, "let us give them for the common advantage, the power for punishing whatever is injurious to charity in society. It does not belong to human justice to become the revenger of the cause that belongs to God." Cicero, who was as able, and as great in state affairs, as in philosophy and eloquence, thought like the Duke of Sully. In the laws he proposed relating to religion, he says, on the subject of piety and interior religion, " If any one commits a fault, God will revenge it:" but he declares the crime capital that should be committed against the religious ceremonies established for the public affairs, and in which the whole state is concerned. The wise Romans were very far from persecuting a man for his creed; they only required that people should not disturb the public order." Vattel's Law of Nations, B. I. Ch. xii. § 133. Deorum injuria Diis curæ, was the wise maxim of the Romans. Let the gods avenge their own wrongs. What is it to the government, in any of its departments, that I may have been dismissed from the communion table? or that any number of persons may have been excluded from a religious assembly, where it has not exceeded its jurisdiction and authority? In the case of St. Mary's Church, decided in the Supreme Court of this state, the subject was much discussed, Judge Duncan in his opinion

says,

"Yet in deciding on the temporal rights of any religious society, it becomes their duty to inquire into the articles of their government and discipline; for no society can exist without some government, give it what name you please, call it ecclesiastical council, convocation, presbytery, synod, general assembly-some claiming the right to govern the church jure divine, or by apostolical institutions, and others with more humble pretensions, claiming spiritual authority from things merely human; each has a discipline and church government of its own, some platform, but this is confined to spiritual matters, and exercised pro salute animae.

"This is a principle well settled in this court. On a writ of error from the Common Pleas of Huntingdon county, Riddle et al v. Stephens, 2 Serg. & Rawle, 542, it is stated with great clearness and strength by the Chief Justice. The demand of the plaintiff below, Stephens, was for services rendered the defendants as their pastor. The Chief Justice observed, 'the Presbytery, according to the rules and discipline of the Presbyterian Church, had power to suspend the functions of the plaintiff, or even to remove him from his ministry;' so far as respected his suspension or

removal, the jury were directed to consider the proceedings as evidence, but no regard was to be paid to the details of evidence before the Presbytery; the particular facts alleged or proved, were to have no effect on the verdict. The decision of the Presbytery, as to the suspension or removal of the plaintiff, was the only matter to be regarded.

"Every Church has a discipline of its own-it is necessary that it should be so; because, without rules and discipline, no body composed of numerous individuals, can be governed. But this discipline is confined to spiritual matters; it operates on the mind and conscience without pretending to temporal authority. No member of the Church can be fined or imprisoned; but be he layman or minister, he may be admonished, reproved, and finally ejected from the society. So he may retire from it at his own free will. Under these restrictions, religious discipline may produce much good, without infringing on civil liberty. Both plaintiff and defendants were subject to the laws of the Church, both as to the induction and removal of the plaintiff; it was not in the power of the defendants alone to remove the plaintiff; the Presbytery alone could do it, with a right of appeal to the Synod, and in the last place to the General Assembly. This being the case, it was to no purpose to enter into the plaintiff's conduct before the jury; the cause had been heard and decided by the Presbytery, and so far as regarded the plaintiff's continuance in the ministry, the decision is binding, subject to appeal."-7 Serg. & Rawle's Rep. 556.

In the case of Field v. Field, 9 Wendell's Rep. 400; The court says, "So long as the forms and modes of proceeding, by the association under whose direction the original contributors placed the fund, are strictly complied with in its management and controul, a court of law are incompetent to interfere." Had the association undertaken to fine or imprison an offender, or levied a distress to compel the payment of ecclesiastical dues, they would have overstepped the magic circle of their jurisdiction, and would have interfered with civil rights. But when it appears that the parties have chosen, for certain purposes, a government for themselves, have voluntarily submitted to a spiritual assembly, they must be bound by its decrees, in all matters within its jurisdiction, and it is not in the power of man to afford relief. The rights and the obligations attendant upon such a connexion, are perfectly reciprocal. Dissatisfied members are not compelled to adhere to an alliance which is oppressive in reality, or which is, even in their opinion, vexatious. Those who have voluntarily connected themselves with any religious denomination, may, at pleasure, dissolve the connexion; the door is always open for their departure.

Authority upon this point is equally satisfactory. 5 Watts, 43, Ebaugh v. Hendel. "Where the acts of a corporation are in conformity to the charter, there is, perhaps, no choice for a dissatisfied corporator, but that which lies between submission and secession." Thus, the Church cannot punish any one who does not choose to submit to its discipline; it cannot extend censures beyond its own pale. Almost every man is attached to some Church; yet he is not bound to it by ties stronger than his own desires. When the Pilgrims, after their long and perilous voyage, landed on the rock of Plymouth, they formed a religious establishment, in accordance with the notions which they brought with them