The dependence of the slave upon his master must naturally subject him peculiarly to his influence, whether from hope of reward or fear of punishment; so that his testimony in favor of his master would always be viewed with suspicion. If, contrary to this active interest, the slave testifies against his master, his testimony would seem to be worthy of peculiar consideration. But even where he testifies for his master, there can be no more reason for excluding his testimony than for excluding that of a child for a father or a mother, or of excluding that of a father or a mother for a child. Unquestionably, in each of these cases the bias is stronger than any that can exist on the part of a slave, as love is stronger than fear. Therefore there is no valid reason why a slave should not be permitted to testify for or against his master. The same considerations which determine the value of other testimony will suffice with regard to him; and thus, in every respect, the rule of exclusion becomes irrational and arbitrary.

But this rule, whether applicable to slaves or free colored persons, is still more irrational and unwarranted when it is considered that the testimony is submitted to the scrutiny of a jury of white persons, under the watchful observation of a court of white persons likewise, and that it can have no effect whatever except through assent of their judgment. The motive which actuates the slave, whatever it may be, whether revenge or interest or fear, must be open to discovery. It is therefore preposterous to argue that any white person, at any time or anywhere, especially in a Slave State, can be prejudiced by colored testimony, or that he can be convicted by a white jury under the eye of a white court, unless that testimony is strictly worthy of belief. The rule of

exclusion is not only an expression of tyranny and prejudice, but an insult to the understanding, and even to

common sense.

If this rule were only irrational and eccentric, it might be pardoned to immeasurable madness, and handed over to the derision of mankind. But even its absurdity disappears in its appalling injustice. Two things are obvious to the most superficial observation: first, that under its influence the slave is left absolutely without legal protection of any kind, the victim of lawless outrage; and, secondly, that even crimes against white persons may escape unpunished: so that in these two important cases justice must fail. But this failure of justice becomes intolerable, when it is considered that it is not from accident or temporary weakness, but that it is absolutely organized by law. Nor is it confined to slaves. It embraces in its ban free colored persons also, without regard to intelligence, property, or relations in life.

CONCLUSION.

SUCH is this proscription, as it appears (1.) in the various statutes of the Slave States, (2.) in the eccentricities of judicial decisions, (3.) in its consequences, (4.) in examples of history, and (5.) in the grounds on which it is founded. Regarding it in either of these aspects, it must be rejected. The statutes in which it is declared and the judicial eccentricities by which it is illustrated belong to the curiosities of an expiring barbarism. Its consequences shock the conscience of the world. The examples of history testify against it. The reason on which it is founded shows that it stands on nothing that is reasonable.

It is for Congress to determine whether this proscription shall continue in the courts of the United States, or, in other words, if a local rule, barbarous, irrational, and unjust, born of Slavery, shall be allowed to exist yet longer under the national sanction.

THE MISSION TO BELGIUM.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON AN AMENDMENT TO THE CONSULAR AND DIPLOMATIC APPROPRIATION BILL, MARCH 15, 1864.

MARCH 14th, the Senate having under consideration the bill making appropriations for the consular and diplomatic service, Mr. Sumner, in behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, moved the following amendment :

"That the President may, in his discretion, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the kingdom of Belgium, who shall receive no higher compensation than is now allowed to a minister resident."

The amendment was opposed by Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, to whom Mr. Sumner replied.1

March 15th, the debate was continued, and Mr. Sumner spoke several times. In reply to Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, he said :—

R. PRESIDENT,- There seems a perpetual dis

MR.

position in this debate to change the issue. I stated that the issue was how we shall best give efficiency to our representation in Europe. Now the Senator from Kentucky says that the issue is how we shall give our minister at Belgium an opportunity to get into a little better company. That is his imagination. Surely it is not the way the Committee directed me to state the case. It is not the way in which I have presented it at any time in this discussion. I hope that Senators will

1 Congressional Globe, 38th Cong. 1st Sess., pp. 1094 – 1096.

not be diverted from the real issue, which is simply, Will the public interests be promoted by this change? The Committee answer in the affirmative, and in my humble opinion the Committee is right.

MR. DAVIS. Will the Chairman specify in what respect the public interest will be promoted, in what respect the efficiency of our representative at the court of Brussels will be increased, and in what respect the increase of his grade will render this Government and its interests more acceptable to Leopold?

MR. SUMNER. In the same way, Sir, that the public interests are promoted at London, and also at Paris, by a plenipotentiary instead of a minister resident.

MR. DAVIS. According to that rule, we ought to have a first-class minister at every court in Europe and at every government in South America, and everywhere else where we send diplomatic representatives.

MR. SUMNER. No, the Senator will pardon me, - not at every court in Europe, but only at those where we have considerable interests. It all pivots upon that. What are our relations with different courts? With considerable interests, we should be represented accordingly. With inconsiderable interests only, there is no reason to raise the mission. We have first-class missions, according to our scale of rank, at London, Paris, Madrid, Turin, Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. And why?

MR. DAVIS. Will the honorable Chairman tell me the relative proportion between the commercial interests of the United States and England, the United States and France, and the United States and Belgium?

MR. SUMNER. There are interests of all kinds, commercial and political, differing in different countries. I need not remind the Senator that our interests with England and France are largely superior to those with any other European power,