WHEN UNLAWFUL.-Agreements in restraint of trade are against public policy and void, unless the restraint they impose is partial only, and they are made for good consideration, and are reasonable. Mitchel v. Rey indorser at his residence or place of business, and there is a misdelivery of the notice through lack of diligence by the holder in ascertaining the proper place of delivery, the indorser is discharged. But if the indorser receives the notice seasonably, though misde-nolds, 1 Sm. L. C. 406 (7th ed.); Gale v. Reed, 8 East, livered through lack of diligence, his liability remains. The holder of the note may fix the liability of the indorser by showing that he used due diligence to give notice, although notice never in fact reached the indorser, or by showing that notice was in fact received by the indorser in due season. Bank of the United States v. Corcoran, 2 Pet. 121; Dickins v. Beal, 10 Pet. 572; Bradley v. Davis, 26 Me. 45; Story on Prom. Notes, §§ 322, 347; Pars. on Notes and Bills, 483; Cabot Bank v. Warner, 10 Allen, 522; Manchester Bank v. Fellows, 8 Fost. 302. The purpose of the law in requiring notice to be given is, that the indorser may be informed of the presentation and non-payment of the note, and that the holder is looking to him for payment, that he may be able to secure himself against those who may be liable over to him. All the rules requiring the holder to use diligence are made and enforced that the indorser may be informed that his liability on the note has not been discharged by the party whose duty it was to pay the note at maturity. When, therefore, the indorser in fact receives notice in due season that the note has been duly presented for payment and protested, the purpose of the law has been accomplished, although the holder of the note has not complied with one of the established rules in regard to the use of diligence in giving notice. Vermont Supreme Court, February Term, 1879. First National Bank of North Bennington v. Wood. Opinion by Ross, J. RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. CARRIER OF PASSENGER-TICKET TAKEN FIXES CONTRACT AS TO DISTANCE TO BE TRAVELLED — TRAVELLING BEYOND TERMINAL STATION ON TICKET. - A passenger with a return ticket between any two stations on a line of a railway cannot travel on, upon that ticket, to a station beyond the terminal station mentioned therein, and from and to which the ticket was taken, without paying the extra fare for the farther 79; Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 743; Mallan v. May, 11 M. & W. 653; Price v. Green, 16 id. 346. An agreement to parcel out among the parties to it the stevedoring business of a port, and so to prevent competition among the parties, and to keep up the price of the work, is not necessarily invalid if carried into effect by proper means. A provision in such an agreement, that if the consignee of any ship should refuse to allow the stevedoring to be done by the party entitled to it under the agreement, and should require one of the other parties to do it, the party so required should give an equivalent to the party who lost the stevedorage, to be determined by arbitrators. Held, not to be unreasonable. But a provision that, in the case of ships passing out of the hands of the original consignees, if the merchant loading them should not choose to employ the party to the agreement, who, as between themselves, was entitled to do the stevedoring, all the parties to the agreement were to be deprived of the work. Held, to be bad, as being an unreasonable restraint, beyond any thing required by the legitimate interests of the parties. An arbitration clause which extended to all doubts, differences, and disputes which should arise touching the agreement, and stipulated that all matters in difference should be submitted to arbitrators, and that no action should be maintained in respect of the matters so submitted except for the amount by the said award determined to be paid. Held, to be a collateral and independent agreement, and therefore, that an award was not a condition precedent to an action except with respect to matters actually submitted to arbitration. Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 E. & B. 47 and 67; Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. 811. Privy Council, July 26, 1879. Collins v. Locke. Opinion by Sir Montague Smith, 41 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 292. АТ JURISDICTION OVER CLUBS. distance so travelled, notwithstanding that the charge THAT jurisdiction which has for some time past been exercised by the Court of Chancery over the employment of such private powers as those possessed by the committees of clubs and kindred associations seems to be steadily widening in its scope and application. What may be called the old common-law principle. as laid down in the case of Reg. v. The Governors of Darlington School, 14 L. J. 67, Q. B., has been long ago broken in upon, and may now be considered as obsolete. It was there held that the governing body, having exercised a sound discretion, and found a minister unfit, the court could not go behind that discretion or inquire into its exercise, but would uphold the decision that had been so obtained. This view was the re for a return ticket for the entire distance is the same as that paid by him for the ticket which he had taken. The respondent took, at the Westbourne Park station of the appellant company, a return ticket from that station to West Drayton, for which he paid the authorized fare of 2s. 6d. On his return journey he travelled on in the same carriage from Westbourne Park to Paddington, and declined to pay the extra single fare of 3d. demanded of him for so doing, on the ground that as the charge for a return ticket from Paddington to West Drayton was only 2s. 6d., the money which he had already paid for his ticket covered the whole distance, and entitled him to be carried on to Padding-sult of a long chain of authorities, but the whole printon without any extra payment. Held, by the Exchequer Division (Huddleston, B., and Hawkins, J., overruling the decision of the County Court judge), that the contract between the passenger and the company, of which the ticket was conclusive evidence, was to carry him from Westbourne Park to West Drayton and back, and that, upon his arrival, on the return journey, at Westbourne Park, the company's contract with him was fulfilled and at an end; and if he chose to go on to Paddington, he was bound and liable to pay the extra fare for being carried that farther distance. Exch. Div., Nov. 7, 1879. Great Western Ry. Co. v. Pocock. Opinions by Huddleston, B., and Hawkins, J., 41 L. T. (N. S.) 415. PUBLIC POLICY AGREEMENTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-AGREEMENT FOR PREVENTING COMPETITION, ciple upon which it is founded was first questioned by Lord Hatherley in its application to later cases in Dean v. Bennett, 24 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 169. There a bill had been filed to prevent the defendant, a minister, from taking possession of his chapel or acting therein after he had been expelled by a meeting of the governing party in the community. This was dismissed with costs by Vice-Chancellor James, and his decision was supported on appeal by the lord chancellor. Speaking of the Darlington case, Lord Hatherley said: "I do not feel myself so bound by that case as to hold that a discretion has been exercised by a meeting which, on charges mentioned for the first time, the person charged not being present, came to a vague general finding that he had been guilty of drunkenness." He could not find that the authorities had arrived at a sound judgment on that subject, or had exercised any discretion at all in such a strange and wholly irregular meeting. But beyond this Lord Hatherley used some very wide words about the English people being accustomed in some degree to the “ordinary principles of justice" in the conduct of meetings of this kind, and for this purpose, which words might be held to cover a general jurisdiction to inquire into the equity of all such and similar proceedings. These great principles have not, however, until lately been brought to bear upon clubs, and going back a few years, we find Lord Romilly, when master of the rolls, was far more chary of interfering with the action of their committees than his present successor has shown himself. In Hopkinson v. The Marquis of Exeter, 17 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 368, the action of the Conservative Club was called in question by the plaintiff. By their rules the committee were entitled to call a general meeting whenever the welfare or order of the club was endangered, and they also provided that any member might be removed by the votes of two-thirds of the persous present at such a meeting. The plaintiff had given his pledge to vote for a Liberal candidate at the coming election, and the club being a political one, this was deemed to be against its welfare, and the plaintiff was removed by a vote given at a meeting called under the rule. He then filed a bill praying to be re-instated in his rights as a member of the club, which was dismissed, the court holding that the meeting was fairly called, and the decision being arrived at bona fide and not through caprice, it was final, and the court had no jurisdiction to interfere. Lord Romilly said: It is clear that every member has contracted to abide by that rule which gives the absolute discretion to twothirds of the members present to expel any member. Such discretion must not be capricious or arbitrary discretion; but if the decision has been arrived at bona fide without any caprice or improper motive, then it is a judicial opinion from which there is no appeal. None but the members of the club can know the little details which are essential to the social well-being of such a society of gentlemen, and it must be a very strong case that would induce this court to interfere." This is a plain position plainly stated, and one about which there can be no mistake, while it was followed some few years later by the same learned judge in deciding a similar question. In Gardner v. Freemantle, 19 W. Rep. 256, which arose out of a dispute in the Junior Carlton Club, it was held that where the committee of a club have power to expel any member whose conduct is in their opinion injurious to the interests of the club, and they exercise that power, all that is required is that the committee should form their opinion in a bona fide way, and the question whether their opinion was just or unjust was immaterial. Here we find no trace of those ordinary principles of justice mentioned by Lord Hatherley, and lately brought forward by the master of the rolls, for the whole decision turns upon the fair exercise of a discretion vested in the committee. There Lord Romilly amplified the expression of his views as stated in the former case, and said: "In some cases this court will interfere with the exercise of that paramount authority, but only where there has been a moral culpability, as if the decision is arrived at from either a personal hostility or bias. But in cases of this description all that this court requires to know is that the persons who were summoned really exercised their judgment honestly. The court will not consider whether they did so rightly or wrongly." Coming now to the recent case of Fisher v. Keane, 41 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 335, we are met with rather different views of the court's jurisdiction, and seem breaking away from the older authorities and drifting into a very sea of doubt and difficulty. We need not consider the first point upon which the master of the rolls decided in favor of the plaintiff, as that only applies to the construction of certain rules; but the second point of his judgment lays down a principle generally applicable. It is really only adopting, though perhaps extending, the ruling in Dean v. Bennett, to which the master of the rolls referred when he said that a committee acting under such a rule are bound to do so according to the ordinary principles of justice, and are not to convict a man of a grave offense which shall warrant his expulsion from the club without fair, adequate and sufficient notice, and an opportunity of meeting the accusation brought against him. They ought not, as I understand it, according to the ordinary rules by which justice should be administered by committees of clubs or by any other body of persons who decide upon the conduct of others, to blast a man's reputation forever, perhaps to ruin his prospects for life, without giving him an opportunity of either defending or palliating his conduct. In my opinion upon this ground also the committee have not acted properly or fairly." No doubt the decision in this case was correct, and the conduct of the committee not to be defended; but how is the principle thus loosely laid down to be generally applied in practice? Where will the court stop in its inquiry as to the inner concerns of club life, and how far will it go into the merits of a case to see whether its interference is necessary or justifiable? The old notions that club committees knew best what was good for the clubs' interest, and that the court would only use its power upon strong provocation, seem here to be abandoned for the vague rules of natural justice. However, the conduct of club committees is likely soon to be again considered, and perhaps upon a fuller view of the question some plainer lines may be laid down for practical guidance than are traced at present.-London Law Times. NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION. MINUTES OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. THE following preamble and resolutions having been duly submitted to the members of the Executive Committee by correspondence, were duly adopted: WHEREAS, The Executive Committee of the New York State Bar Association is in receipt of a certified copy of a preamble and resolution, passed by the Commissioners of the New Capitol, of which the following is a copy, viz.: At a meeting of the Board of Commissioners of the New Capitol, held at the office of the Auditor, on the 19th day of November, 1879. Present Lieut.-Governor Dorsheimer, Auditor Schuyler, Attorney-General Schoonmaker. The Attorney-General offered the following preamble and resolution: WHEREAS, The New York State Bar Association is required by its charter to furnish copies of its Annual Reports to the libraries provided in the various counties of the State, for the use of the Justices of the Supreme Court; and WHEREAS, It is a voluntary and public Association for the benefit of the people of this State, and of the bench and bar of this State; therefore be it Resolved, That the Architects of the New Capitol be, and hereby are, directed to designate and prepare for the use of the State Bar Association, a convenient room in connection with those for the accommodation of the State Library, and connecting with the Law Department thereof; and that such room be and is hereby set apart for such use. Adopted November 19, 1879. [Copy.] JAMES MCINTYRE, Clerk to the New Capitol Commission. Therefore be it Resolved, That the New York State Bar Association accepts the said preamble and resolution of the Commissioners of the New Capitol, and the accommodations so to be set apart for its use in that edifice. Resolved, That the thanks of this Association are due and are tendered to the said Commissioners, and especially to Hon. Augustus Schoonmaker, the Attorney-General, for their and his action in the premises. Resolved, That the President of the Association, and the Chairman and Secretary of the Executive Committee, are charged with the duty of conferring with the Commissioners, and the said Architects, and perfecting with them at as early a day as possible the selection and furnishing of the space in the New Capitol so to be allotted for the use of this Association. Resolved, That a duly authenticated copy of these preambles and resolutions be sent by the Secretary to the Attorney-General, the said Commissioners and Architects respectively. To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal: In answer to the question of E. W. P. in last number of the LAW JOURNAL, I would refer him to a decision of the General Term of the Superior Court of Buffalo, rendered in the action of Poesch v. Eacher, April 24, 1877, wherein it was held that an action could not be maintained upon a judgment of a justice of the peace if brought within five years after its rendition, although judgment had been assigned to third party. Yours respectfully, BUFFALO, N. Y., December 13, 1879. J. V. S. Judgment affirmed, with costs-Scattergood v. Wood; Burkitt v. Harper.--Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event-The People ex rel. Daly v. Livingston.-Appeal dismissed, with costs-In the matter of the People by the Attorney-General v. The Security Life Ins. Co.- -Appeal dismissed, with costs in the Auchmuty case to abide event, and without costs in this court to either party on the other appeals -In the matter of Auchmuty and 17 others.-Motion denied, with $10 costs-Marvin v. Marvin. The court adjourned sine die. A new term will commence January 13, 1880. Hon. John Ordronaux, State Commissioner in Lunacy, for a copy of the Sixth Annual Report of that officer, transmitted to the Legislature last January. The New York Commercial Advertiser, in its issue of the 13th It., gave some notices of English lawyers as the result of an interview with a New York barrister, who had been some time in England. Lord Cairns is spoken of as the hardest-worked man in England, and if all that is tated of him were true, this would be so. He is described as sitting during the session in the House of Lords as a judge from eleven to four, then sitting on the Woolsack from five till midnight. He draws bills for the government, and speaks on every important measure before Parliament. His real greatness and independence were shown, it is said, in the appointment of Mr. Justice Bowen. Lord Coleridge, we fear, will be scarcely recognized in his American dress. It is said he was the last serjeant created. "His peerage was won by his masterly summing-up in the Tichborne case-for the whole 637 peerages of England hung with breathless suspense upon his words." "Lord Coleridge has the gift of music." "He is considerate, and even playful, to embarrassed witnesses." We wonder whether Lord Coleridge hoaxed our American visitor.-London Law Times. The Eighth Judicial District, of which Secretary McCrary has been appointed judge, comprises the States of Nebraska, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas, and Colorado. The salary of the circuit judge is $6.000 a year. Sessions of the Circuit Court are held twice a year at Omaha, St. Paul, Des Moines, St. Louis and Jefferson City, Leavenworth and Topeka, Little Rock, and Denver. But each of these sessions does not necessarily require the presence of the circuit judge, since the Circuit Court may be held by him, or by the Supreme Court circuit justice, or by the District judge alone, or by any two of these sitting together. The chief justice and associate justices of the Supreme Court are allotted among the circuits by an order of the court. It is the duty of each one to at tend at least one term of the Circuit Court in each district of the circuit to which he is allotted during every two years. The member of the Supreme Court now assigned to circuit duty in the eighth circuit is Mr. Justice Samuel F. Miller, of Iowa. The position which Judge McCrary will now assume has been filled during the past ten years by John F. Dillon, who was appointed in December, 1869, by President Grant. Though still a young man, having been born in Washington county, N. Y., in 1831, Judge Dillon has seen twenty-one years of judicial service, and has long been recognized as one of the foremost jurists in the country. His judicial career, which has just closed, temporarily at least, began six years after his admission to the bar, and when he was but 27 years of age. It was in 1858 that he was elected by the republican party as one of the district judges of Iowa. At the expiration of his term of four years he was re-elected without opposition. Before the close of his second term he was elected on the republican ticket to the Supreme Court of Iowa for a term of six years, and took his seat January 1, 1863. He was re-elected to this position in 1869, but soon after his election, and while he was filling the position of chief justice of Iowa, he was appointed United States circuit judge for the eighth circuit. For several winters Judge Dillon has delivered courses of lectures on medical jurisprudence before the law and medical classes of the lowa State University. Besides numerous articles on law subjects. he has published a digest of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Iowa, four volumes of United States Circuit Court reports, and a treatise on "Municipal Corporations." Judge Dillon, as is well known, left the bench to accept a professorship in the Columbia Law School, of this city.-New York Times. CASES IN FULL- Continued. 228 PAGE. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan. State legislation against Chi- Jones v. Jones. Proof of marriage; when reputa- 271 250 12 289 249 48 151 Jones v. Knauss. Exemption of non-resident wit- Knoxville Nat. Bank v. Clark. Maker of a raised 370 29 330 Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. McKeen. Proximate and 272 Morrill v. St. Anthony's Falls Water Power Co. Ripa- 409 Ogden v. Hall. Liability of agent for contract in his 511 Parry v. Smith. Liability for injury from dangerous allegations of fraud in actions on contract 219 People ex rel. Francis v. Common Council of Troy. Anderson, Dr., paper of.... 340 269 annuity table 340 Balaam's adviser speaks. 440 burden of proof of contributory negligence. 359 260 230 Phillips v. South Western Railway Co. Power of 209 discontinuance of highway. 259 Phillips v. South Western Ry. Co. New trial for in- exemption from execution. 300, 339, 359 filing undertaking in claim and delivery 358 332 Ready v. Koebke. The right to defend on the ground innkeeper and guest.. 100 interest question 358 49 Redondo v. Chaytor. Temporary resident cannot interest, new statute... 80 interest after maturity. 479 210 judge's opinion upon the facts. 199 Roach v. Van Riswick. Legislative power cannot be 433 Judiciary laws of the German Empire. 379 99, 239 Robertson v. Hay. Estoppel by certificate of no de- Lambertini case. 100 Langbein's demurrer. 379 Lawyer's bible class.. 440 178 legal partnership... 420 Sottomayor v. De Barros. Validity of marriage be- North and South orders of court and Code amendments. 139 180 State v. Kaufman. Waiver of right of trial by jury property in aerolites 299 rate of interest.. 319 291 Stillwell v. Aaron. Discharge of surety to promissory 186 365 two questions 139 United States v. Steffens; Same v. Willemann; Same Yates' contempt case... .180, 200 Wheeldon v. Burrows. Implied easements in vendor COVENANT, waiving exemption, validity of.. ...... 412 .110, 131 CRIMINAL LAW: CHATTEL MORTGAGES upon stocks in trade.. 506 abstracts of cases, 17, 58, 214, 236, 277, 291, 296, 338, 356, CHILD, Calvin G., on shifting uses from the stand- curious (see Leading Articles). CITIES (see Municipal ('orporations). abuse of criminals by policemen.... 123 admission to bar, rules of.. 281 Aldrich, Judge, charge of, in Spartanburg lynching 102 45 American Bar Association, annual meeting of...123, 161 842 |