cape the danger, even by doing an act also dangerous, and from which injury results, is not contributory negligence, such as will prevent him recovering for the injury sustained, if the attempt was one which a person acting with ordinary prudence might under the same circumstances make. This is to be determined from the circumstances as they appear to the passenger at the time. That his attempt to escape resulted in injury to him, and that if he had not made the attempt he would not have been injured, may be considered by the jury in determining whether the attempt was one which a person acting with ordinary prudence would make; but these facts do not necessarily prove the act an imprudent one. On the last point, see note, 25 Am. Rep. 164. The Quite similar was the case of Cotrill v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, Wisconsin Supreme Court, November 28, 1879, 3 Northw. Rep. 644. The plaintiff intestate was a locomotive engineer in the employ of the defendant, who came to his death by staying at his post instead of jumping off, as it was proved the fireman did, in safety, and as the jury found the deceased might have done. The court said: "According to the common appreciation of human conduct and character, this evidence presents an example of heroic bravery and fidelity to duty, at the post of danger, most praiseworthy and commendable, and an occurrence worthy of lasting record in the book of heroic deeds. very employment of the locomotive engineer, with its manifold and sudden and unexpected dangers, requires the highest type and best qualities of true manhood, invincible bravery and greatest integrity, and it is but just to say, that as a rule, those who are selected for and engaged in this responsible employment, possess the full measure of these qualities, and the exceptions are very rare. "Their standard of ordinary care and prudence must be fixed and measured by the dangers and responsibilities of such an employment, and not by the common accidents of less responsible service. The question which should determine their reasonable care, or want of common care, is, how would careful and prudent locomotive engineers ordinarily and commonly act at such a time, in such a place, and under such circumstances, and not how firemen or other employees would or should." "Can it be said in this case that the deceased had reason to know, or the means of knowing, that by remaining at his post he would be injured, and that by jumping off he would not? Who shall sit in judgment upon this brave engineer to coolly determine the alternative risks and chances which he is compelled to take instantly, with scarcely a moment of time for deliberation in such a terrible emergency? It will not do to establish a rule by which the duty of an engineer in such an emergency may be measured and dictated by cowardice and timidity, and by which his standing at his post and facing danger will be carelessness and negligence." In Holden v. Freedman Savings and Trust Co., decided a few days ago by the United States Supreme Court, the question of interest after maturity on contracts reserving a rate of interest different from the statutory rate, is discussed. We published a communication on this subject last week, and shall give another soon. This case arose in the District of Columbia, where the statutory rate is six per cent, but parties are permitted to stipulate for a different rate not exceeding ten per cent, and the note was at ten per cent, saying nothing about interest after maturity. The court said: We "The rule heretofore applied by this court, under the circumstances of this case, has been to give the contract rate up to the maturity of the contract and thereafter the rate prescribed for cases where the parties themselves have fixed no rate. Brewster v. Wakefield, 22 How. 118; Bernhizel v. Furman, 22 Wall. 170. Where a different rule has been established it governs, of course, in that locality. The question is always one of local law. This subject was fully examined in the recent case in this court of Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351. need not go over the same ground again. Here the agreement of the parties extends no further than to the time fixed for the payment of the principal. As to every thing beyond that it is silent. If payment be not made when the money becomes due, there is a breach of the contract and the creditor is entitled to damages. Where none is agreed upon, applied in all such cases. the law fixes the amount according to the standard It is the legal rate of interest where the parties have agreed upon none. If the parties meant that the contract rate should continue, it would have been easy to say so. In the absence of a stipulation such an intendment cannot be inferred. The analogies relied upon to support the case in hand." a different view are obviously distinguishable from The case of Perigo v. Chicago, etc., Railroad Co., October 27, 1879, 3 Northwestern Rep. 663, involving the doctrine of contributory negligence, decided by the Iowa Supreme Court, is worthy of special note. The evidence showed that the defendant erected a coal platform between two of its tracks at Winterset, and for convenience in unloading and taking on coal placed it so near one of the tracks that a passenger car moving along the track passed within seven inches of the platform at one end, and within four and one-half inches of it at the other end. At the time of the accident the platform had been erected and in the same position for two or three years. The deceased was a baggage man on the defendant's passenger train, and it was his duty to assist in making up the trains. He had been in this employment more than two years, and had assisted in making up the train nearly every day during that time. In making up the passenger trains the cars were moved along the track past the coal platform. The evidence showed that the deceased, in making up the train, was knocked off the car by the coal platform, and injured to an extent resulting in his death. The only negligence complained of on the part of the defendant was the erection of the coal platform so close to its tracks. Held, that the employee had waived the defect by remaining in the employment without protest or promise of amendment. The court say: "This waiver cannot be affected by the particular situation in which the employee may be placed, or the rapidity and promptness with which he may be required to act at the time of the accident. Those questions may very properly bear upon the question of the contributory negligence of the employee, but they can have no bearing upon the question whether the defendant has been guilty of negligence about which the employee has a legal right to complain." USURY BY AGENT. II. In Algur v. Gardner, 54 N. Y. 360, where the facts were as in the two preceding cases, as to the agency, the court charged that if the agent was authorized to make the loan at lawful interest, and did so make it, defendant knowing of the agency, the loan was not usurious, although at the same time the agent made a separate agreement with the defendant that he should pay for the agent's benefit $10 over and above the lawful interest, provided plaintiff did not know or sanction such agreement. Held, error, as there was no error of such separate agreement. The Commission of Appeals remarked of Condit v. Baldwin: "Although that case, as can be readily shown, has no application to the one we have now to consider, its authority for any principle was seriously questioned and impaired by the same court in which it was decided, in Bell v. Day, 32 N. Y. 165. But we think Condit v. Baldwin is not decisive of the present case. There, the agent, Williams, being a lawyer, with the knowledge and concurrence of the borrower, loaned the money of his principal upon the independent agreement that he should be paid a given sum as a sort of imaginary fee for services rendered the borrower. This was entirely outside of his agency, and his principal had no knowledge of the transaction, and was in no respect bound by it, as the court, we think properly, decides. In the case before us, there is not, so far as I can discover, the slightest evidence going to show that any separate arrangement was made between Gardner and Mrs. Childs, as to the application of the extra ten dollars paid her; and it was obviously a part of the contract of loan; and if the case had been properly submitted to the jury, they must have found for the defendants." One of the commissioners agreeing in this opinion was Earl. In Estevez v. Purdy, 66 N. Y. 446, the facts were as in the preceding cases as to the agency, and the doctrine of Condit v. Baldwin, and Bell v. Day, was reiterated. It was held that the case was not distinguishable from those because the agent professed to take the bonus for his principal, nor because the principals knew of the agent's exactions before suit. Algur v. Gardner is distinguished. As to the reason of the cases, the court, per Earl, J., formerly commissioner, said: "It is not important to consider whether the construction of the usury laws of this State, given in the cases above cited, is the wisest or soundest, or whether there is not much that can be said against it. It has been followed in many cases, and has doubtless furnished a rule of action in many transactions between lenders and borrowers, and these authorities must be respected upon the principle of stare decisis." In Baxter v. Buck, 10 Vt. 548, it was held that where an agent, authorized to settle a debt due an estate, takes a note to the administrator for the principal sum due, and one to himself for usurious interest, the first note is not void unless the administrator knew of and assented to the usury. This was without citations or discussion, and is perhaps obiter, for the court said it appeared extremely doubtful that more than lawful interest was reserved, "but if it was otherwise," then as above expressed. In Austin v. Harrington, 28 id. 130, the defendant borrowed of the complainants, through the latter's general agent, a sum of money and gave his note for it; at the same time, but without the knowledge of the complainant, he purchased a span of horses belonging to the agent, worth only $225, for $400, and gave his note therefor, which he subsequently paid; this purchase was on the agreement with the agent to give $175 more than the horses were worth for the purpose of procuring the loan. Held, usurious. The court distinguished Baxter v. Buck on the ground that the agent there was only a special agent for one transaction. The court say: "This is not a case in which it can be said that Mrs. Austin is not bound by his contract, or in which she can claim exemption for the legal consequences of his acts because she had not actual knowledge of them at the time, for he was acting within the general scope of his business which she had intrusted to him. In such case she is bound by his acts, though done without her knowledge, and contrary even to her instructions." Muir v. Newark Savings Institution, 16 N. J. Eq. 537, was exactly like Baxter v. Buck in decision, the court saying they were not satisfied that usury was proved, but if it was, then it could not affect the principal without his knowledge and participancy in the benefit. No citations nor discussion. Conover v. Van Mater, 18 id. 481, appears to be a case where the agent was the borrower's agent, who procured the loan and received payment out of it of his own claim against the borrower. The court hold that this would not furnish any basis of usury, the lender not receiving or agreeing to receive any part of the usurious interest, and they further say: "There is no evidence, even, that he knew of it, though if he had known that his brother, Sidney, had received this or any other amount of illegal brokerage for effecting this loan, it could in no wise have tainted this loan with usury." No citations. The doctrine of the New York cases is supported by Rogers v. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 81, the court taking the distinction raised in Austin v. Harrington, between a general and a special agency. Here the agency was general, but it not being found as a fact that the agent was authorized to take the usurious excess, it was held that it would not affect the principal unless he knew of or ratified it. The point is not discussed, and no cases are cited. The New York and Connecticut cases were cited and followed in Gokey v. Knapp, 44 Iowa, 32. The court say: "Although Danforth may have been the agent of Knapp for the purpose of loaning the money, and may have contracted for more than ten per cent interest, yet the loan was not necessarily usurious. An authority to loan money at a legal rate of interest does not include by implication the authority to loan it at an illegal rate. An authority to violate the law will never be presumed. When Danforth exacted, in addition to the ten per cent interest, which was embraced in the note, something for the benefit of himself, he went outside of the legitimate purposes of his agency; and as Knapp did not authorize it, either expressly or by implication, he should not be affected thereby." In Philo v. Butterfield and Butterfield, 3 Neb. 256, it was said: "Now the question presented for our consideration on the facts of this case is: Will the lender of money at a lawful rate of interest be affected with the vice of usury, when, without his knowledge or consent, the agent of the borrower applies for and negotiates a loan, and receives from the borrower a sum of money which the borrower previously contracted with him to secure the loan? "It is a settled rule of law which will not be questioned, that in all cases where a person employs another as his agent to loan money for him, and places the funds in the hands of the agent for such purpose, the principal is bound by the acts of his agent; and if the agent charges the borrower of such money unlawful interest, or even demands and receives from the borrower a bonus for such loan, and appropriates it to his own individual use, either with or without the knowledge of his principal, the principal is affected by the act of his agent. "In contemplation of law, the acts of the agent in such transactions are the acts of the principal, because the nature of the business which he has placed in charge of his agent furnishes the means of violating the law. In such business transaction by agency, there cannot be an agreement between the lender through his agent and the borrower, and a separate, distinct contract between the agent and the borrower, because it is in consideration of the loan that the unlawful interest or bonus is paid, and hence the whole transaction must be a single individual proposition, it is but one contract only. "It is said that, in all cases in which the frauds and injuries of servants have been held to affect their employers, it appears that the employment afforded the means of committing the injury.' Dunlap's Paley's Agency, 306. "But I apprehend, that when the person who negotiates the loan acts only as the agent of the borrower, who has employed him and contracted with him to pay him a stipulated price to secure the loan, the rule is different, and the lender, if he loans the money in good faith, at a lawful rate of interest, is not affected by the vice of usury. I think, that in such a case, as between the borrower and his agent, there is a substantive, independent contract, entirely different from any unlawful contract for money; and to connect such contract with that of the loan, would be to connect distinct and independent transactions with each other, and thereby make two contracts, each one of which may be fair and legal in itself, into one which is prohibited by law. It is not the purpose of the law to inflict a loss or punishment upon an innocent person, who has not, by himself or his agent, participated in any transaction prohibited by law, nor by any employment on his part afforded the means of infringing the law. Hence, in accordance with these rules of law, and in their application to the facts of this case, as they appear from the record, I think that the question above propounded must be answered in the negative; and that the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial." In Cheney v. White, 5 Neb. 261; S. C., 25 Am. Rep. 487, it was held, on the authority of Philo v. Butterfield, without much discussion, that where one intrusts his money to another to loan, and the agent, without the knowledge of his principal, receives unlawful interest or a bonus, which he appropriates to himself, the transaction is usurious. court pronounce it a "wholesome rule." To the same effect is Cheney v. Woodruff, 6 Neb. 151. The Mr. Tyler (Usury, 170) observes, after commenting on the first two of the New York cases: "From the strength of the dissenting members, and the able and well-fortified opinions delivered in opposition to the conclusions arrived at in the cases, it is doubtful whether they will be readily acquiesced in by the courts of other States." In our opinion, nothing but the prejudice against the plea of usury would ever have caused them to be uttered, and nothing but a natural tendency to follow where others have led would ever have caused an acquiescence in them. A INTEREST ON MATURED CONTRACTS. VERY important question that has been somewhat discussed, but not to the extent that its importance demands, is what will be the rate of interest to be collected after the 1st day of January next on all matured and overdue obligations? Can the holder demand seven per cent according to the tenor of the original contract, or must he be content with six per cent, the rate then to be allowed by law? In Cook v. Fowler, L. R., 7 H. L. 27, decided in 1874, where an action was brought on a warrant of attorney given to secure the payment of £1,330 "on the 2d of June next, with interest at five per cent per month," judgment to be entered up forthwith, the House of Lords held that the legal rate governed after maturity. Lord Chancellor Cairns, Lord Chelmsford and Lord Hatherley, seriatim, delivered opinions. Following them Lord Selborue said: "Unless it can be laid down as a general rule of law that upon a contract for the payment of money borrowed for a fixed period, on a day certain, with interest at a certain rate down to that day, a further contract for the continuance of the same rate of interest after that day until actual payment, is to be implied, the decision of the Vice-Chancellor is not erroneous. I entirely agree with those of your lordships who have preceded me, that no such contract is to be implied, unless there is something to justify it upon the construction of the words of the particular instrument." In accordance with this decision, Byles on Bills, 6th London edition, 240, original paging, lays down the law thus: "Interest when not made payable on the face of the instrument is in the nature of damages for the retention of the principal. But in an action of debt, if the instrument be payable by the terms of the instrument, it is recoverable, not as damages, but as debt." The same doctrine has been announced by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Brewster v. Wakefield, 22 How. 118, a note was payable at a future day with interest at two per cent a month, nothing was said about the rate of interest after maturity; the court held that after maturity the note drew only the statutory rate. Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivering the opinion of the court, says that when the note is entirely silent as to the rate of interest thereafter, if it is not paid at maturity the creditor is entitled to interest after that time by operation of law and not by virtue of any promise that the debtor has made; that if the right to interest depended upon the contract, the holder would be entitled to no interest whatever after the date of payment. See, also, Burnhisel v. Firman, 22 Wall. 170. In Maine the same question arose on a note payable at a future day with interest at eight per cent. In Eaton v. Boissonault, 67 Me. 540; 24 Am. Rep. 52, the court held that such obligations after maturity draw interest only at the statutory rate, unless the special rate is expressly agreed to be paid after maturity. In Rhode Island, in Pearce v. Hennessy, 10 R. I. 223, this rule has been followed. The court say that if the parties to the note or other contract for the payment of money intend that it shall carry the stipulated rate of interest till paid, they can easily entitle themselves to it by saying so in so many words. In Connecticut, in 1872, it was "lawful to contract for payment or receipt of any rate of interest," providing that only six per cent should be recovered, unless a greater rate should be agreed upon. In 1873 it was enacted that no greater rate of interest than seven per cent per annum should be recovered or allowed for the time after the money loaned became due. In Suffield Eccl. Soc. v. Loomis, 42 Conn. 570, the note was payable in three years after date, with no contract for interest after maturity. The contract rate was above the legal rate after the note fell due. The court held that the plaintiff could recover, after maturity, only the legal rate of interest. In Pennsylvania a case arose where the agreed interest was less than the statutory interest. A note was made payable at a future day with interest at the rate of three per cent per annum, and nothing was said about the rate of interest thereafter. It was held in Ludwick v. Huntzinger, 5 Watts & Serg. 51, that if such an obligation was not paid at maturity, it will draw the interest named till maturity, and after that the usual or statutory rate. In South Carolina a legacy was made payable at a certain date with five per cent interest, and the court held in accordance with Pennsylvania decision, that it bore legal rate after maturity. Henderson v. Laurens, 2 Dess. (S. C.) 170. In Alabama the decisions have accorded with the foregoing. See Henry v. Thompson, 1 Minor (Ala.), 209; Kitchen v. Branch Bank of Mobile, 14 Ala. 233. On the other hand, in Massachusetts, in a recent case, the court held that when a recovery is had upon a note bearing ten per cent interest, the plaintiff is entitled to interest at the same rate till the time of verdict. Brannon v. Hursell, 112 Mass. 63. The reason given is that "the plaintiff recovers interest both before and after the note matures, by virtue of the contract, as an incident or part of the debt, and is entitled to the rate fixed by contract." Judge Walton delivering the opinion in the Maine case above cited, commenting on this decision, says: This reasoning is at variance with the reasoning of the House of Lords, with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States, and with the reasoning of the Massachusetts court itself in Ayer v. Tilden, 15 Gray, 178." In Virginia, a sealed note payable at a future day with twelve per cent interest was lawfully made. Subsequently the general rate was fixed by legislation at six per cent. The court held in Cecil v. Hicks, 29 Gratt. 1; 26 Am. Rep. 391, that the "contract ought to be construed precisely as if the words 'till paid' had been inserted therein after the words from date,' and that such was their obvious meaning," aud gave judgment for the rate agreed upon. In the opinion no case outside of the Virginia reports is cited. · In Mississippi the law provided: "No greater rate of interest than six per cent shall be received on any contract or obligation, unless" otherwise agreed upon. Code, 1944. In Overton v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 762; 24 Am. Rep. 367, this statute was under consideration in an action on a note payable at a future date with twelve per cent interest, and the court held that the note bore the conventional and not the statutory rate both before and after maturity. After reviewing several of the cases holding the contrary view, the court say that the views they hold are based "upon much stronger and better reasons; and reasons too which approximate more nearly and more naturally the obrious intention of the parties contracting." In Texas, in the case of Pridgen v. Andrews, 7 Tex. 461, it was held that a note payable on or before a future date with interest at ten per cent, carried conventional interest until judgment. This doctrine was extended to the time of payment in Hopkins v. Crittenden, 10 Tex. 189, on the construction of its interest law fixing the rate "when no specific premium or rate of interest is expressed." Dig., art. 1607, a rate being expressed in the note. In Wisconsin, in Spencer v. Maxfield, 16 Wis. 178, it was held that "where a party has given his obligation for the payment of a sum of money by a certain day with interest at a higher rate than that allowed by law; in the absence of any agreement on that subject such higher rate of interest will continue not only until the money is due, but so long as it is held or detained by the debtor, though such obligation is entirely silent as to the rate of interest after its maturity." This decision was approved and followed in Pruyn v. City of Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 367. In Illinois, Judge Breese, in Etnyre v. McDaniel, 28 Ill. 201, reviews the authorities and holds that "conventional, not legal interest, was the contract to attach to the debt until it should be fully paid, and so long as it remains a note." In Iowa two cases came before the Supreme Court, in each of which the court below had allowed statutory interest only from maturity of the obligation sued upon, and the judgments were reversed. Hand v. Armstrong, 18 Iowa, 324; Thompson v. Pickel, 20 id. 490. In the first cited case the court expressly disapprove of the decision in 22 How. (U. S.) 118. In California the same doctrine has been announced, but the case decided, Kohler v. Smith, 2 Cal. 597, turns entirely upon the language of the statute, and does not aid in any general construction of the question. In Nevada, in Cox v. Smith, 1 Nev. 161, and McLane v. Abrams, 2 id. 199, the same result is reached for the same reason, although the court hold, "after breach, in the absence of a continuing contract as to interest, the statute fixes the damages to be recovered." Chief Justice Lewis delivering the opinion, after citing 22 How. (U.S.) 118, and other authorities on the same side, says: "To the correctness of these decisions under the statutes upon which they were made we give our ready assent." It will, therefore, be observed that England, the United States courts, Maine, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Alabama have decided in favor of the statutory rate. Massachusetts, Virginia, Mississippi, Texas, Illinois, Wisconsin and Iowa have decided in favor of the contract rate. California and Nevada do not count. The question has been before our own courts, but we imagine not in a manner to make the decision one that will bind the Court of Appeals as stare decisis. In Miller v. Burroughs, 4 Johns. Ch. 436, where the contract allowed six per cent, in a per curiam opinion the court held that "interest must be decreed according to the contract of the parties until the contract ceases to operate by being merged in the decree." This decision is cited approved in Van Beuren v. Van Gaasbeck, 4 Cow. 496. An action was brought by The United States Bank v. Chapin upon two promissory notes, the clerk of the court in assessing damages computed the rate of interest at seven per cent after maturity. A motion was thereupon made to set aside the assessment of the clerk, and the motion was denied, the court holding that the clause in the charter of the bank limiting the rate of interest to six per cent referred only to discounts in the ordinary course of business; that the contract with the bank having been broken, the defendant was liable to pay the rate of interest fixed by the lex loci from the time that the debt became due." 9 Wend. 471. And see, also, the decision on a motion made to correct the judgment for an error in omitting part of the interest where the question was raised whether the interest should be six or seven per cent, in Mechanics' Bank v. Minthorne, 19 Johns. 244. To the same effect is Macomber v. Dunham, 8 Wend. 550. This question has been before the Court of Appeals in a case where it was not necessary to make any determination, and Folger, J., delivering the opinion in Ritter v. Phillips, 53 N. Y. 590, after citing the contrary decisions on the subject in this State, says: "It is not necessary now to determine which of these sets of cases declares the law correctly." So it remains with us an open question. WM. HENRY ARNOUX. CONDITIONS IN DEEDS FORBIDDING SALE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, OCTOBER TERM, 1879. COWELL, Plaintiff in Error, V. THE COLORADO SPRINGS COMPANY. 1. A condition in a deed conveying land, that intoxicating liquors shall never be manufactured, sold, or otherwise disposed of as a beverage in any place of public resort on the premises; and that if this condition be broken by the grantee, his assigns, or legal representatives, the deed shall become null and void, and the title to the premises shall revert to the grantor, is not repugnant to the estate granted, nor is it unlawful or against public policy. 2. Upon breach of the condition the grantor had a right to treat the estate as having reverted and bring ejectment for the premises, without previous entry upon them or demand for their possession, such entry or demand being unnecessary under the statute of Colorado, where the premises are situated. 3. When a patent for land, issued by the United States, adds to the name of the patentee the word "trustee" without mention of any trusts upon which he is to hold the property, such addition does not prevent the legal title from passing by the patentee's conveyance. trust be in fact created, it is for the cestui que trust, and no one else, to complain of the patentee's action. If any 4. By the general comity which, in the absence of positive direction to the contrary, obtains through the States and Territories of the United States, corporations created in one State or Territory are permitted to carry on any lawful business in another State and Territory, and to acquire, hold, and transfer property there equally as individuals. 5. When a corporation is authorized by statute to hold real property necessary to enable it to carry on its business. the inquiry whether any particular real property is necessary for that business is a matter between the government of the State and the corporation, and is no concern of third parties. 6. When a grantee of land from a corporation by a deed, which contains a condition that if he manufactures or sells intoxicating liquors, to be used as a beverage, at any place of public resort on the premises, the title shall revert to his grantor, goes into possession of the land under the deed, he is estopped, when sued by the grantor for the premises, upon breach of the condition, from denying the corporate existence of his grantor, or the validity of the title conveyed by his deed. אן N error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Colorado. The facts appear in the opinion. Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. In May, 1873, the plaintiff in the court below, the Colorado Springs Company, sold and conveyed to the defendant, Cowell, two parcels of land, situated in the town of Colorado Springs, in the then Territory of Colorado. The deed of conveyance stated that the consideration of its execution was two hundred and fifty dollars, and an agreement between the parties that intoxicating liquors should never be manufactured, sold, or otherwise disposed of as a beverage in any place of public resort on the premises. And it was expressly declared that in case this condition was broken by the grantee, his assigns, or legal representatives, the deed should become null and void, and the title to the premises conveyed should revert to the grantor; and that the grantee in accepting the deed agreed to this condition. The defendant went into possession of the premises under the deed, and soon afterward opened a billiard saloon in a building thereon, which became a place of public resort, where he sold and disposed of intoxicating liquors as a beverage. The grantor thereupon brought the present action of ejectment for the possession of the premises, the title to which it claimed had reverted to it upon breach of the condition contained in its deed; and it recovered judgment. It does not appear that the company had made any previous entry upon the premises or any demand for their possession. The principal questions, therefore, for our determination are the validity of the condition, and on its breach, the right of the plaintiff to maintain the action without previous entry or demand of possession. The validity of the condition is assailed by the defendant as repugnant to the estate conveyed. His contention is, that as the granting words of the deed purport to transfer the land, and the entire interests of the company therein, he took the property in absolute ownership, with liberty to use it in any lawful manner which he might choose. With such use the condition is inconsistent, and he, therefore, insists that it is repugnant to the estate granted. But the answer is, that the owner of property has a right to dispose of it with a limited restriction on its use, however much the restriction may effect the value or the nature of the estate. Repugnaut conditions are those which tend to the utter subversion of the estate, such as prohibit entirely the alienation or use of the property. Conditions which prohibit its alienation to particular persons, or for a limited period, or its subjection to particular uses, are not subversive of the estate; they do not destroy or limit its alienable or inheritable |