tions of a treaty, and at others without such stipulations. The general doctrine laid down by text-writers on international law, who have considered this subject at all, is that extradition confers only a special jurisdiction, and that the party surrendered is to be tried and punished only for the crime or crimes specified in the demand and delivery, and hence that, when the object for which he was extradited has been gained, he should be permitted to return to the jurisdiction from which he was removed. Mr. Wharton, in his Criminal Law, seventh edition, vol. 3, p. 34, section 2956 a, says: "The sole object of extradition is to secure the presence of the fugitive in the demanding State for the purpose of trying him for a specified crime. The process is not to be used for the purpose of subjecting him collaterally to criminal prosecutions other than that specified in the demand." The same doctrine is stated by Foelix, Kluit and Heffter.

The uniform practice, where extradition is regulated by treaty, is to make a list of extraditable offenses, and specify upon what evidence any party charged with one or more of these offenses shall be delivered up. The implication from such a treaty is that no person will be surrendered, except for one or more of the offenses enumerated, and that the party who is surrendered should be dealt with only in respect to the crime or crimes specified in the extradition proceedings. When this special jurisdiction has gained its end, the party, unless committing some other crime subsequently to his extradition, and before his discharge, is entitled "to depart in peace." This is the doctrine laid down by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in The Commonwealth v. Hawes, 13 Bush, 697, with reference to the tenth article of the treaty of 1842 between the United States and Great Britain. The court held that, although such an immunity is not expressly stated in the treaty, it is, nevertheless, implied in its general terms.

If it would be an abuse of the extradition remedy to obtain the custody of a party on a given charge of crime, and then put him upon trial on another and different charge, it certainly would not be less an abuse virtually to use this custody for the purpose of surrendering him to another nation that might demand him as a fugitive criminal. The courts have sometimes held that a party, extradited for one crime, might be tried for another; but there is no instance in international extradition, so far as we know, in which they have held that the custody thus obtained could be used for the purpose of a second delivery to another nation demanding him. Such an act would be deemed a monstrous perversion of the remedy, and would doubtless be followed by an earnest protest of the nation that made the first delivery.

Inter-State extradition does not differ, in the essential principles involved, from that which is international. The States of this Union, except for the general purposes contemplated in the Constitution, are foreign to each other, being distinct and separate sovereignties, and enacting and executing their own laws, independently of each other. Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 586; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 id. 657; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 76; and The Collector v. Day, 11 id. 124. Extradition is a transaction between these sovereignties through their respective executive authorities. The Constitution and the law of Congress specify in what cases and for what purpose persons shall be extradited from one State to another. A demand must be made; a crime must be charged; this charge must be in a certain form; a copy of this form must be duly authenticated; and when all the requisite conditions are supplied, then the party is to be delivered up to "the State having jurisdiction of the crime" charged. The whole transaction is special in its nature and relations. It is for a single purpose, and for no other purpose; and that purpose is set forth

in the proceedings, alike in the State demanding the fugitive and in the State surrendering him. The object and the only object of the extradition, as provided for by the Constitution and the law, or as specified in the proceedings, is that the party may be tried for the offense charged, by the State having jurisdiction of this offense.

To use the custody thus acquired for any other purpose is an abuse of the remedy. To extradite a person on the charge of forgery, and then try him on the charge of burglary, or arrest and hold him in a civil action, would be an act of bad faith as between States. It would be so regarded if the thing had been planned beforehand; and yet this would not essentially change the nature of the act, considered in relation to the Constitution and the law. If it be permissible at all, the fact that it has been planned is not a sufficient reason why it should not remain so.

And if such an act would be inconsistent with the nature of the extradition remedy, and also with the plain intent of the Constitution and the law of Congress, then it is difficult to see how the custody, acquired over a fugitive criminal by his surrender from one State to another, can in effect be used for the purpose of surrendering him to another State. The moment he is properly discharged from this custody the whole purpose of his extradition has been answered; and to grab him at that moment by another process of extradition is to take advantage of his presence there, and, in the language of Judge Cooley, "subject him to legal demands or legal restraint for another purpose." He is there lawfully. He was legally brought there, and is legally discharged there, by acquittal, or by having suffered the penalty imposed upon him, or by being pardoned. This being the fact, he has the right, the immunity, the privilege of peaceful and unmolested departure, so far as legal restraints are concerned in respect to any causes or matters that preceded his extradition. The process that brought him there against his will has entirely exhausted itself, and to seize him at the point of this exhaustion for another purpose, especially for the purpose of transportimg him to another State, and on another charge of crime, as a fugitive criminal, is to make such a use of this process as amounts to a gross abuse. He is thus seized, if at all, by the same State authority that has just released him, having accomplished the entire purpose for which it gained possession of his person, and then immediately following its own act of release with seizure and arrest for another purpose, thus taking advantage of the fact that the party cannot instanter withdraw his person from its territorial jurisdiction.

Judge McAllister says that "the Governor [of Illinois] was under no duty to return him [Suydam] to New York, or guarantee a safe return." This, with all respect to the learned judge, is not the question. The point to be determined is not whether it was the duty of the Governor of Illinois to make any provision for Mr. Suydam's return to New York, after he had been discharged in Illinois, but whether he had the right, immediately after this discharge, to order his arrest and delivery to the authorities of Pennsylvania, and thus prevent his return to New York by his own action.

The purpose of this article has been to show that no such right existed. The grounds of this opinion are these: 1. That no such right is conferred by the Constitution, or by the law of Congress. 2. That the assumption of such a right is inconsistent with the nature and purposes of the extradition remedy, and that too, whether the extradition be international or interState. Judge McAllister speaks of the case as being "novel." It is undoubtedly such; and it is to be hoped that Mr. Suydam will find some method for submitting to the courts of Pennsylvania the legal question involved in it.

COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY V. JOHN GIBSON'S SON & Co. The statute of Pennsylvania gives to the owner of property destroyed by a mob a right of action for damages against the county where such property was situated. But no person can recover if it appears that the destruction was caused by his illegal or improper conduct, nor unless it appears that upon knowledge of the intention to destroy it, if there be sufficient time, notice be given to the sheriff or other specified officials. Held, (1) that the property-owner is not in default for not giving notice unless he had first knowledge of the intention to destroy; (2) that the improper conduct to prevent recovery must be the proximato cause of the destruction, and the assertion of a legal right in a legal manner would not be improper conduct; (3) that the fact that the riot was wide-spread and beyond the power of local authorities to anticipate or subdue did not constitute a defense; (4) that the owner of personal property in transitu, though a non-resident, was entitled to the benefit of the statute, and (5) that such property destroyed in a county by a mob was situated in the county.

ACTION of trespass to recover for the value of

whisky destroyed by a mob at Pittsburgh during the riots of 1877, brought by John Gibson's Son & Co. against the county of Allegheny. The whisky was at the time of its destruction in the possession of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company in transit to Philadelphia. The railroad company, on the evening of the day that the property arrived in Pittsburgh, notified the sheriff of the county of the danger of a riot, and the sheriff endeavored to disperse the mob, but was unable to do so. The action was brought under the following statutory provisions, enacted in 1841, and extended by act of March 20, 1849, to Allegheny County: "Sec. 7. In all cases where any dwellinghouse or other building or property real or personal has been or shall be destroyed within the county * * in consequence of any mob or riot, it shall be lawful for the person or persons interested in and owning said property to bring suit against said county where said property was situated and being, for the recovery of such damages as he or they sustained by reason thereof." * **** "Sec. 8. No person or persons shall be entitled to the benefits of this act, if it shall appear that the destruction of his or their property was caused by his or their illegal or improper conduct, nor unless it be made to appear that he or they, upon the knowledge had of the intention or attempt to destroy his or their property, or to collect a mob for such purpose, and sufficient time intervening, gave notice thereof to a constable, alderman, or justice of the peace, of the ward, borough, or township, in which such property may be situated, or to the sheriff of the said county." * * * Sufficient other facts appear in the opinion.

Daniel Agnew, George W. Biddle and Geo. Shiras, Jr. (with them S. H. Geiger), for plaintiff in error. Thomas M. Marshall, M. W. Acheson and D. T. Watson, for defendants in error.

PAXSON, J. This was one of the cases brought against the county of Allegheny to recover damages for property destroyed by the mob during the riots of 1877. The particular property which is the subject of this suit consisted of sixty barrels of whisky belonging to the plaintiffs below. It was wholly destroyed, and its value is not disputed. A verdict and judgment were had in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendants have removed the record to this court for review. The questions it presents are of grave importance.

The plaintiffs have no common-law remedy. They

must recover, if at all, by virtue of act of May 31, 1841 (P. L. 416), which provides that in "all cases where any dwelling-house or other building or property, real or personal, has been or shall be destroyed within the county of Philadelphia, in consequence of any mob or riot, it shall be lawful for the person or persons interested in and owning said property to bring suit against said county where said property was situated and being for the recovery of such damages as he or they sustained by reason of the destruction thereof, and the amount which shall be recovered in said action shall be paid out of the county treasury on warrants drawn by the commissioners thereof, who are hereby required to draw the same as soon as said damages are finally fixed and ascertained." The provisions of this act were extended to the county of Allegheny by the act of March 20, 1849 (P. L. 184). A somewhat similar act had been in force in Philadelphia since 1836. (See Pamphlet Laws, 711, § 36.) We are charged with no duty of vindicating the wisdom of this legislation. It is proper to say, however, that the principle embodied in the act is not new. As early as 1285 the Parliament of England, by Statute of Winton, or Winchester (1 Stat. 13 Edw. I, p. 2, ch. 3, see 1 Hawk. P. C., ch. 68, § 11), provided a remedy against the hundred, county, etc., in which a robbery should take place, for the damages caused thereby, to be recovered by the party robbed in any action against any one or more of the inhabitants. This statute was re-enacted by 28 Edward III, ch. 2. Subsequently the statute 27 Eliz., ch. 13, § 2, provided for the assessment of the damages against all the inhabitants of the hundred after a recovery against one or more. Next we have the famous Riot Act of 1 George I, ch. 5, §§ 1 to 7, which was passed by reason of the tumult attendant upon the accession of that king to the throne, and which made it a felony, without benefit of clergy, for any person unlawfully to assemble and demolish any church or dwellinghouse. The sixth section of the same act provided that in case such church or dwelling-house should be destroyed, the inhabitants of the hundred in which it was situated should be liable for its value. This was followed by the act of George II, ch. 10, § 1, and the laws upon this subject were consolidated in 1827 by 7 and 8 George IV, ch. 31. It will thus be seen that we have imported the principle of the act of 1841 from that country from whence we derive the great body of our common law. That it was not transplanted at an earlier date is perhaps due to the fact that new countries sparsely settled do not early develop riotous tendencies.

[The court here discuss the question whether the statute controverts or was repealed by the Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1874. The argument possesses only a local value.]

It is said that the plaintiffs did not prove any notice to a constable, alderman, or a justice of the peace of the ward, borough or township, or to the sheriff of the county in which their property was situated, of any intent to destroy their property, or of the fact that a mob had been collected for such purpose. Nor did they prove that sufficient time had not intervened to enable them to do so; and that, in the absence of such proof, it was error in the court below to charge the jury, that, under all the evidence in the case, if believed by them, the plaintiffs were entitled to re

cover.

It is provided by the 8th section of the act of 1841, that "no person or persons shall be entitled to the benefits of this act if it shall appear that the destruction of his or their property was caused by his or their illegal or improper conduct, nor unless it be made to appear that he or they, upon the knowledge had of the intention or attempt to destroy his or their property, or to collect a mob for such purpose, and sufficient time intervening, give notice thereof to a constable,

alderman, or justice of the peace of the ward, borough or township in which said property may be situated, or to the sheriff of the said county, and it shall be the duty of said sheriff, alderman, constable, or justice, upon the receipt of such notice, to take all legal means to protect said property so attacked or threatened,"

etc.

It is manifest that a property-owner cannot be in default for want of having given notice under this act, unless, first, he had knowledge of an intention on the part of the mob to destroy his property; and second, that there was sufficient time intervening to give the notice contemplated by said act. It is equally clear that the object of such notice is to inform the proper officer, so that the property may be protected. These positions are fully sustained by authority, both in this State and in New York where a statute similar to the act of 1841 exists. In Donoghue v. The County of Philadelphia, 2 Barr, 230, it was said by Mr. Justice Sergeant: "The next question is as to the notice. The act of Assembly requires that notice be given to the sheriff, alderman, justice or constable, where there is sufficient time intervening. But in what cases is the party required, by the act, to give this notice? When he has knowledge of the intention or attempt to destroy his property, or to collect a mob for such purpose. It would be strange to require him to give notice when he has not such knowledge, and therefore, in such case, he is not debarred from his remedy, though he has not given such notice." In St. Michael's Church v. County of Philadelphia, Brightly's Rep. 121, the defendant offered to prove that several days before the property was burned notice was given to two of the trustees of the church of such intention, and that they had neglected to give any notice to the sheriff. Rogers, J., rejected the offer because the knowledge was not had by or notice given to the trustees in their corporate and officia! capacity. It would be equally unnecessary to give notice to the sheriff or other officer where he already had knowledge of the facts, or such notice would be unavailing for the purpose of protection. Newberry v. New York, 1 Sweeney, 369; Schiellein v. Kings Co., 43 Barb. 491. That the sheriff of Allegheny county had knowledge of the mob and of their intention, clearly appears from the testimony of that officer, offered by the defendants themselves. The sheriff had visited the mob on the evenings of July 19th, 20th, and 21st. When he saw the mob on the evening of the 19th they had commenced their work by the forcible seizure and retention of possession of the property of the railroad company. When he ordered them to disperse, they refused to do so, and told him "they were going to hold that road, and that they were going to wade in blood to their waists." The sheriff adds: The mob remained in possession of the road and increased in numbers, and that continued until Saturday evening. Mr. D. M. Watt was examined on behalf of the plaintiffs, and said that he called upon the sheriff in company with Hon. John Scott, of counsel for the company, on Thursday night, July 19th, and informed that officer "that the property of the company was in possession of a mob at Twenty-eighth street, and that we were unable to move our trains or get possession of the switches, and that we desired protection. Mr. Scott called upon him, on the part of the company, for a proper force to protect the property of the company, and to protect the company in the movement of their business." "No destruction of property took place until after five o'clock P. M. of July 21st." It is manifest therefore that the objection that proper notice was not given under the act of 1841 is without foundation.

It was further objected that the plaintiffs' bailees, the Pennsylvania R. R. Co., were guilty of improper conduct, within the meaning of the act of 1841. The eighth section of that act provides that "no person

* * * shall be entitled to the benefit of this act if it shall appear that the destruction of his property was caused by his * * * illegal or improper conduct." It was contended that by using the words "illegal or improper conduct," the law makes a distinction between conduct which is actually illegal and that which, although not technically unlawful, may be still improper. Just what is "improper conduct" within the meaning of the act of 1841 is a nice question. We are not without rulings in our own State and elsewhere, where similar statutes exist, that may throw some light on the question. In Donoghue v. Philadel phia, supra, Chief Justice Gibson placed his rulings on the legal rights of the owners of the property, and when it was urged that the introduction of armed men into the house, under the excitement existing at the time of the firing upon the mob, was injudicious, he replied, in his charge to the jury: "That it was justifiable to introduce men and arms into the house as the exercise of a freeman's privilege, whether there was an apprehension of danger or not; and that if the mob was not fired on until after it had begun the attack, this part of the defense had failed." To the same effect are the rulings of Mr. Justice Rogers, in The Hermits of St. Augustine v. Philadelphia County, Brightly, 116, and St. Michael's Church v. Philadelphia County, id. 121. It would seem to be clear that in order to defeat a recovery upon this ground for property destroyed by a mob, the "improper conduct must have been the proximate cause of the destruction. Was caused" is the language of the act. In Lavery v. Philadelphia County, 2 Barr, 233, it was said by Mr. Justice Sargeant: "In order to debar a person from the remedy provided by the act of Assembly of 31st of May, 1841, it must be made to appear, in the words of the act, that the destruction of his property was caused by his illegal or improper conduct." In the State of New York the statute reads, that "no person shall be entitled to recover, if it shall appear upon the trial thereof that such destruction was occasioned, or in any manner aided, sanctioned or permitted by the carelessness or negligence of such person." Ely v. The County of Niagara, 36 N. Y. 297, was decided upon this act. It was an action for the destruction of a dwelling-house. The county, in the court below, offered to prove that the house was a notorious bawdy house, kept by the plaintiff as such; that it was the resort of prostitutes, thieves, and murderers; that prior to its destruction a policeman of the town was found murdered in front of the house, and that he was so murdered by some one who made the house a resort, and during a drunken debauch therein; that when this fact became known the citizens were so enraged that in a body they assembled and destroyed the house. The court below rejected the offer, and this ruling was affirmed, both in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and it was held that the act of the plaintiff, which would prevent her recovery, must be the proximate cause, and the loss the natural and necessary consequence. See, also, Blodgett v. City

of Syracuse, 36 Barb. 526. It has never yet been held that the assertion of a legal right, in a legal manner, in pursuit of a legal and ordinary business, was such "improper conduct" as would prevent the owner of property destroyed by a mob, from recovering its value, under the act of 1841, or similar statutes. It is not pretended that the plaintiffs did any improper act. They were hundreds of miles away, and knew nothing of the destruction of their property until it was accomplished. But it is said they are responsible for the act of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, their bailees. Conceding this to be so for the purposes of this case, what act of the company was illegal or improper within the meaning of the statute? It was said that the mob was fired upon. Granted. But by whom? Not by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, but by

the military sent there by the governor of the State, in response to a telegram from the sheriff of Allegheny county, asking for troops to assist in quelling the riot. Whether the firing was judicious under the circumstances, we are not called upon to say. It is no part of this case. It is enough for us to know, that whether judicious or otherwise, it was an act for which neither the company nor the plaintiffs are responsible. But it is said that the company reduced the wages of their employees, and in the face of the dissatisfaction produced thereby, endeavored to move their trains in opposition to the will of the mob. A more untenable position than this could not well be imagined. For some days cars loaded with freight from distant points had been accumulating in the yards at Pittsburgh by reason of the strike and the refusal of the strikers to allow them to move forward to their destination. The result was a blockade, paralyzing the business of the country, upon this, one of the greatest arteries of commerce. In such a vast collection of freight there must have been much of a perishable nature. It was the duty, involving a legal responsibility on the part of the company, to forward it. In doing so they were but asserting a legal right and performing a legal duty which they owed to shippers and consignees. Their action was neither illegal nor improper under the act of 1841.

It was further objected that "where an insurrection is by reason of its nature and extent beyond the power of the local authorities to anticipate or subdue, a county cannot be held liable for the loss of property destroyed during and in consequence of it." This proposition is a crystallization of the offers of evidence contained in the fourth and fifth assignments of error. To which may be added the point, pressed upon the argument, that after the appearance of the military of the State upon the scene, in obedience to the order of the executive authority, the responsibility of the county of Allegheny ceased. The word "insurrection" in this connection is not applicable. The meaning of it is: "A rising against civil or political authority; the open and active opposition of a number of persons to the execution of law in a city or State; a rebellion; a revolt."-Worcester. There was nothing of the kind here. It was a mob, and nothing more. It has never been held that the responsibility of a city or county for the violence of a mob depends upon its size or formidable character, or that the failure of the civil authorities to suppress it, or that their calling upon the military authorities for aid relieved them from liability. History furnishes three notable instances which go far to establish the contrary view. The first one to which I refer was the "No Popery " riots of London, in June, 1780. This was the most extensive riot of which we have any record. For several days, the mob, numbering 60,000 persons, had complete control of London. The authorities were paralyzed. The immediate cause of the tumult was the presentation of a petition by Lord George Gordon to Parliament for the repeal of Sir George Saville's act for the relief of Catholics. The riot commenced on June 2d and continued until June 8th. It was not confined to the city of London, but spread throughout the kingdom. The whole city was in a state of anarchy. On the evening of June 6th thirty-six different fires were raging caused by the mob. The famous prisons of the Fleet and King's Bench were fired, and the prisoners released; all the public buildings threatened; many private houses sacked, including that of the chief magistrate of the highest criminal court in the kingdom, Lord Mansfield, whose furniture, pictures, books and papers, were all burned. More than 450 persons were killed. It was only by the vigorous use of the military power that the mob was finally subdued. The courts of England held that the loss fell

within the statute, and the respective hundreds were liable. Another instance is the Philadelphia riots of 1844. Here again the civil power was wholly inadequate to suppress the mob, and it was only put down at last by the stern use and display of the military arm. Said the late Judge King, in his charge to the grand jury: "Our city during these scenes of violence has exhibited the appearance of a town of war, instead of the pacific seat of science and literature, of commerce and the industrial arts." The amount of property destroyed was large, for all of which the city was held liable under the Act of 1841. Later still we have the draft riots of New York in 1863, when an entire army corps was withdrawn from the front, where it was sorely needed, to hold in check the rebellious elements of that city. In numerous cases the Court of Errors and Appeals held the city liable. Newberry v. New York, 1 Sweeney, 369; Davidson v. The Mayor, 2 Rob. 230; Darlington v. The Same, 31 N. Y. 164. Some idea of the extent of the damages caused by the mob during this riot may be inferred from the fact that upon the argument of the case last cited, counsel representing the plaintiffs in nine hundred and fifty other cases were heard. It may be that the point now under discussion was not made in any of the suits growing out of the three great riots above referred to. I do not find any trace that it was. In view of the hundreds of cases, of the large interests involved, of the number of eminent counsel employed, not only in England, but in New York, and in this State, the fact that no such point has ever before been made, is persuasive evidence that there is nothing in it. This, however, is not conclusive, and in view of the gravity of the issue involved, we will consider it as a new question.

The Act of 1841 is both a remedial and penal statute. It is remedial so far as it provides for compensation to the person whose property has been destroyed, and penal so far as it throws the burden of that compensation upon the municipality within whose borders the destruction took place. It is but an extension of the ancient English law, which made the inhabitants of the respective hundreds responsible for robberies committed therein. Formerly, as we have seen, a person robbed had his remedy against any inhabitant of the hundred; that is to say, the inhabitants were jointly and severally liable. Then the law was so changed that damages recovered against an individual could be assessed against all the inhabitants, so as to compel contribution. Afterward it was still further modified so as to give the right of action against the hundred. The principle upon which this legislation rested was that every political subdivision of the State should be responsible for the public peace and the preservation of private property; and that this end could be best subserved by making each individual member of the community surety for the good behavior of his neighbor, and for that of each stranger temporarily sojourning among them. The effect was to make each citizen a detective, and on the alert to prevent as well as to detect and punish crime. There was no exception in favor of robberies committed by overwhelming numbers, and by such a show of force as to overawe and overpower the limited constabulary of the hundred, or such as were committed by strangers. In either case the hundred was liable to the person robbed, however difficult or impossible it might be for the inhabitants to anticipate or prevent it. It was evidently a police regulation, based upon grounds of public policy, and enforced without regard to the hardships of particular cases. Our act of 1841 is also a police regulation, and rests upon like grounds of policy. Under our political system the State grants a portion of its sovereignty to certain municipalities. It clothes them with certain of its power, and exacts from them in return the performance of certain duties. Among the powers granted is

are

that of maintaining a police force. Among the duties exacted is that of preserving the public peace. There is an implied contract between the State and every municipality, upon which it bestows a portion of its sovereignty, that such municipality shall preserve the public peace, and maintain good order within its borders. The State lends its aid when the local authorities are overborne, and a call for assistance is made in the manner pointed out by law. But it is entirely within the power of the sovereign to make such communities responsible for the preservation of order. The privileges conferred must be taken with such burdens as the law-making power chooses to annex thereto, and where liability for mob violence is imposed without qualification, it is not within the scope of judicial power to write exceptions into the law which the legislature, in its wisdom, has not seen proper to place there. It may seem a harsh rule to hold a community responsible for the effects of mob violence, which apparently, at least, they had no power to prevent, yet not more so than to hold every inhabitant of the English hundred liable for a robbery of which he knew nothing, and had no means of arresting. In both cases it is a police regulation. It is based upon the theory that with proper vigilance the act might and ought to have been prevented. That this is true with mobs, as a general rule, is well known. A mob is always cowardly, and usually of slow growth. It increases in size and courage just in proportion as the authorities evince hesitation or timidity. That this hesitation is often the result of indifference, if not of open sympathy, is unfortunately too true. It is rare that a mob is without a large body of sympathizers at its commencement. This is because its fury is generally directed against an unpopular object. In populous communities, especially in large cities, there always antagonisms of race, religion, politics or social condition, which enable the demagogue to fan the fires of popular discontent, and incite the disorderly to acts of violence. It is because of this sympathetic feeling that mobs are often enabled to get the mastery, the fact being overlooked that a mob when once aroused, and maddened by success, becomes, like a wild beast, dangerous alike to friend and foe. There is nothing upon the face of this record to show that the Pittsburgh riots of 1877 were an exception to this rule. We see no evidence of any serious attempt upon the part of the local authorities to suppress it at the time of its commencement. A feeble attempt was made by the sheriff, resulting in the enrolment of some half dozen deputies. But there was no proclamation calling upon the body of the county to come to his assistance in preserving the public peace. No one doubts at this day that if a proper effort had been made at the proper time the mob could have been held in check. No one doubts that it would have been, had the citizens of the county realized that they were responsible for the loss. But this act of assembly, folded away among the pamphlet laws, was probably forgotten or overlooked, even by those who knew of its existence. In the end the mob that had defied the military power was put down in the main by the civil authorities, after the citizens had been aroused by a sense of common danger. The law will not tolerate the spectacle of a great city looking on with indifference while property to the value of millions is being destroyed by a mob. To prevent just such occurrences was one of the objects of the Act of 1841. The fact that the State, when called upon, rendered its assistance, and sent a portion of its military to the scene, did not absolve the county from its implied obligation to preserve the peace, nor from its responsibility for a neglect of that duty. Were it otherwise, it might be to the interest of a municipality to increase

the size of the mob.

The right of the plaintiffs to recover is further resisted upon the ground: 1. That being non-residents,

they are not entitled to the benefit of the Act of 1841; and 2. That the property having been shipped at Cincinnati for Philadelphia, and destroyed on the cars en route, was not "situate" in the county defendant, within the meaning of the act. The first ground of objection appears to be based upon a mistake of the fact. The "history of the case,' " furnished by the defendant, asserts that the plaintiffs are citizens of Philadelphia. I notice, however, that in the case of Webb & Son, argued with this, the plaintiffs are citizens of Baltimore, Md. As therefore the point must be met in that case, I will dispose of it here.

No authority has been cited, nor has any sufficient reason been shown, why the act should not apply to the property of non-residents. It is broad enough in its terms to cover it. "In all cases," is the language of the statute. There is nothing in the spirit or reason of the act to discriminate against non-residents. The stranger robbed had his remedy against the hundred as well as if he had been an inhabitant thereof. Our entire system of law, for the protection of person and property, places the citizen and stranger upon the same plane of security. It has never yet said to a mob: You must not touch the property of A because he is a citizen of the State, but you may work your will upon the property of B, because he is a non-resident. On the contrary, it protects the property of the stranger stopping for a single night at a hotel-so far as he brings it with him- precisely as it protects that of a lifelong citizen. Any other rule would be churlish and inhospitable, and if successfully asserted, would very materially lessen the business of the State, by diverting passengers and freight into channels where a more liberal rule of law prevailed.

Was the property situated within the county? Strictly speaking, personal property cannot be said to have a situs. It is situated wherever it may happen to be for the time being. This is all that the word means in the act of assembly, as applicable to personal property of this description. The act, as before stated, is remedial as to the sufferer. Similar acts have been invariably so regarded, and have been construed liberally. In Hyde v. Cogan, 2 Doug. 699, which was one of the cases growing out of the Lord George Gordon riots of 1780, the statute was largely considered, and all the judges, except Lord Mansfield, gave an opinion. Said Willes, J.: "The sixth clause I rather consider as remedial. It may be said to be penal as to the hundred, but is certainly remedial as to the sufferer." Ashland, J.: "The purpose of this act is remedial, and, therefore, it ought to receive a liberal construction." Butler, J.: "The statute is so penned that the words might possibly admit of two constructions, and therefore it is material to consider whether it is penal or remedial, because there is a well-known difference in the rule of construction, as applied to the laws of the one sort and of the other. When they are remedial the interpretation is to be liberal, so as best to apply to the end. *** If the clause upon which this case arises (6) is remedial, which I think it is, the most extensive sense must prevail, and it was so held in both cases cited at bar. Radcliffe v. Eden; Wilmot v. Horton. But independent of authority, as the clause is remedial, it must receive a liberal construction." "It was accordingly held in that case that under the statute of George I, commonly called the 'Riot Act,' which inade it felony without benefit of clergy for any persons unlawfully, riotously and tumultuously assembled together, to the disturbance of the public peace, unlawfully and with force to demolish or pull down any church or chapel, or any building for religious worship, etc., if any persons riotously assembled in part demolish and pull down a dwelling-house, and at the same time destroy goods and furniture in the house, although such goods and furniture were not destroyed by means of the pulling