FINANCIAL LAW.

ALTERATION-IMMATERIAL ONE WILL NOT INVALIDATE BOND.-An immaterial alteration in a bond, such as inserting the words "are held and firmly bound," where there were sufficient words already in the instrument to render it obligatory, held not to invalidate such bond. The court say that, as to the effect of such an alteration, it is claimed that Evans v. Foreman, 60 Mo. 449, by indorsing the rulings in Haskell v. Champion, 30 Mo. 136, places all possible alterations on the same level. The later case, however, did not indorse the language of the judge who delivered the opinion in Evans v. Foreman in every respect, but only his general conclusions with reference to material alterations apparently unimportant. Reference was also made to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Moore v. Lessee of Bickham, 4 Binney, 1, as being "in the same line of decisions as our own court." In that case the question was, whether a vendee was bound to accept a deed, duly acknowledged, in which the consideration was left blank. It was contended that the deed was sufficient, because the grantor's agent had authority to fill the blank after the acknowledgment. The court said: "Where a deed has been acknowledged before a magistrate appointed by law to take and certify the acknowledgment in order that the deed may be recorded, the parties have no right to make the most trifling alteration. An altered deed is not the same which is certified." Here was a question very far apart from the one now in hand. It was made still more so, if possible, by the court's declaration that "the consideration is a material part of the deed." The alteration, then, if permitted, would have been material. Reference is also made to other Pennsylvania decisions as sustaining the views expressed in Haskell v. Champion. But in every one of them the subject-matter was a material alteration, and so declared to be. Miller v. Gilleland, 19 Penn. St. 119; Neff v. Horner, 63 id. 327; Fulmer v. Seitz, 68 id. 237. St. Louis Court of Appeals, June 3, 1879. Western Building, etc., Association v. Fitzmaurice. Opinion by Lewis, P. J.

PROMISSORY NOTE- CONSTRUCTION OF CLAUSE FOR PAYMENT OF COSTS OF COLLECTION.- A promissory note contained this undertaking on the back, executed by defendant: "For value received, I promise the payment of the entire note at maturity, or at any time thereafter, with interest at ten per cent per annum, payable semi-annually until paid, and agree to pay all costs and expenses paid or incurred in collecting the same." Held, that the clause did not apply to the trouble incident to ordinary dunning. It was not intended to make the debtors liable for an amount not regulated by any certain standard. The design must have been to provide for such charges as the law has liquidated and defined. Such charges being definite, the debtors could prepare to meet them, and avoid the hazards and perplexities of uncertain obligations. It is not reasonable to suppose the parties meant to involve the contract in such uncertainty as would flow from the contrary construction. Michigan Sup. Ct., July 2, 1879. Witherbee v. Kusterer. Opinion by Graves, J.

INSURANCE LAW.

FIRE POLICY-BROKERAGE-WHEN PAYMENT TO BROKER BINDS COMPANY.- One Puschman, an insurance broker, represented himself to the plaintiff as an agent of the Lycoming Insurance Company. He examined plaintiff's property to see if the risk would be a safe one; he conducted himself in all respects as an agent clothed with authority to act; and after he had agreed with the plaintiff, to insure her property, he returned

with the policy which had been delivered to him by the company properly executed, ready for delivery. The plaintiff accepted the policy, paid the premium to Puschman in good faith, under the belief that he was the agent of the company. Puschman never paid the money received to the company. Held, that while Puschman may not have been in fact the agent of the company, still the company, by placing the policy in his hands for delivery, is estopped from claiming that the payment made to him upon delivery of the policy is not binding upon the company. Illinois Supreme Ct., June 21, 1879. Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Ward. Opinion by Craig, C. J.

CONDITION AS TO NON-OCCUPATION.-Under a fire insurance policy requiring notice to be given if the insured premises become vacant, and the assured fails for six weeks to give such notice, it is inexcusable neglect which will relieve the company from liability in case of loss by fire occurring within the period of the vacancy. Such notice must be given in a reasonable time. And it seems that a company would not be discharged from its obligation if no notice is given of a temporary interruption of continuous possession incidental to a change of tenants. North Carolina Sup. Ct. Alston v. Old North State Ins. Co. Opinion by Smith, C. J. (To appear in 80 N. C. Reports.)

CONDITION AS TO OVERVALUATION.-A fire policy contained the following stipulation: "And any false representation by the assured of the condition, situation or occupancy of the property, or any omission to make known every fact material to the risk, or an overvaluation, or any misrepresentation whatever, either in a written application or otherwise," shall avoid the policy. Defendant introduced evidence tending to show an overvaluation, and requested the court to charge that a substantial overvaluation would avoid the policy. The court refused so to charge, but charged that a misrepresentation, known by plaintiff to be such, and made with intent to deceive — a misrepresentation so substantial that defendant, had it known of it, would not have insured, would avoid the policy. Held, that by the contract itself the effect of an overvaluation upon the policy was determined. By this stipulation a substantial overvaluation of the property, that is, an overvaluation such as would not ordinarily arise from a difference of opinion, whether honestly or fraudulently made by the assured, avoids the policy. Such has been the holding of the courts in a large number of cases. Smith v. Bowdish Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 6 Cush. 448; Vose v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., 6 id. 42; Barrett v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 7 id. 175; Wilbur v. Bowdish Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 10 id. 446; Gould v. York Co. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 47 Me. 403; Carpenter v. American Ins. Co., 1 Story, 57; Catron v. Tennessee Ins. Co., 6 Humph. 176; American Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 27 Mich. 429. This holding is an application to this species of contracts of a well-settled principle of the law of contracts, that what the parties themselves have

declared material and sufficient to render the contracts void must be held material, and have such effect as the parties intended. Vermont Supreme Ct. Boutelle v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. Opinion by Ross, J. (To appear in 51 Vt. Reports.)

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

XI. PROFFATT'S AMERICAN DECISIONS. TT is hardly necessary to repeat the title-page of this

well-known and excellent series, or to reiterate our sense of its excellence. This volume was prepared by the late Mr. Proffatt. It contains cases from 2 Greenleaf, 1 Pickering, 20 Johnson, 7 Johnson's Chan

cery, 2 Halsted, 8 and 9 Sergeant and Rawle, 2 Hawks. It has elaborate notes on Conveyance to satisfy contract; Special plea as evidence in actions for slauder; Execution sale of equity of redemption; When tenant may remove fixtures; Executors' sales and liability for acts of co-executors; Legacies, specific and general, and ademption; Injunction against trespass; Trover, offer to return property, when title vests, measure of damages; Statements out of court as evidence; Evidence of laws of other States; and many minor notes. Mr. Freeman will commence his labors in the place of Mr. Proffatt on the 12th volume, and we have no doubt that he will keep the series up to the high standard set for it by its late editor.

WEEKS' DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA.

The Doctrine of Damnum absque Injuria considered in its relation to the Law of Torts. By Edwards P. Weeks, Counsellor-at-Law, author of a Treatise on Attorneys and Counsellors at Law;" and of Works on The Mining Legislation of Congress," "Mines, Minerals, etc." San Francisco: Sumner, Whitney & Company, 1879. Pp. xv, 333.

This work is divided into thirteen chapters, as follows: Introductory, definitions, general illustrations; Personal injuries, injuries to relative rights; Injuries to the liberty of the person; Injuries to health, nuisances; Injuries to reputation, slander and libel, malicious prosecution; Injuries to personal property; Injuries to owners and holders of stock and shares in incorporated companies, conversion, etc.; Injuries to real property; Injuries from mining operations; Injuries to water rights, subterranean and surface waters, artificial water-courses; Injuries from acts of public officers; Injuries from negligence; Deceit, fraud and misrepresentation. Mr. Weeks has struck an interesting vein, and he has worked it in an effective manner, getting out of it all it can afford. The book is one of the most readable we have recently taken up, for by virtue of its subject it treats mainly of exceptional cases, and includes many of singular interest. There are tables of contents and cases, and an index. The text is arranged in sections, with prominent catchwords, and references to foot notes. The substance of decisions is succinctly stated in the text. The publisher has done his work creditably.

V. BAXTER'S REPORTS.

Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Middle Division, at the December Term, 1875-6. Jere Baxter, Assistant Reporter. Vol. V. Nashville: Tavell, Eastman and Howell, 1879. Pp. xii, 723.

This volume reports only some forty cases, 566 pages being given up to State and Watson v. Bank of Tennessee, 444 pages being devoted to the arguments of counsel. This looks like padding. The decision is that when the common school fund was placed in the bank to constitute part of its capital, it became assets of the bank, to which the creditors of the bank had a right to look, and that these constituted a trust fund applicable to the payment of the debts of the bank. The act of the Legislature of 1866, which appropriated the assets of the bank as school fund, impaired the obligation of the contract between the bank and its creditors, and was therefore null and void, as was also the assignment made in pursuance of that act, so far as it gave preference to the school fund. In Stokes v. State, p. 619, the prosecution brought a pan of mud into court, and having proved that the mud was about as soft as the mud in a creek, where tracks, alleged to be those of the prisoner, were seen, the prosecuting attorney called upon the prisoner to put his foot in the mud in the pan, and upon objection, the court told the prisoner he could do so or not, as he chose; the prisoner refused; the judge charged that his refusal was

not to be taken against him; he was convicted; held, that he was entitled to a new trial. In Hoover v. State, p. 672, seven jurors had been impanelled, when the trial was temporarily suspended to enable the sheriff to summon jurors to complete the panel; to fill the interim, the court took up the case of the son of one of the seven jurors, indicted for assault and battery, and his father was allowed to sit with and aid his son's counsel on that trial; when it was finished this prisoner's case was resumed, and that juror sat in it; the prisoner being convicted, held, that there was no error. There is nothing else in the volume of particular interest or general application.

CORRESPONDENCE.

CRUELTY TO CONVICTS.

To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

SIR-I am glad to see in the last number of the LAW JOURNAL a communication from Mr. J. L. Potts, protesting against the abuse which of late has been heaped upon prison officials. The JOURNAL has already made a very fair reference to this matter, but has expressed no opinion as to the truth or falsity of the charges made against the officials. "If," it says, "a policeman or keeper is cruel or wanton, he should be punished;" and this "if," so far as it refers to the keeper, is of such vast dimensions that it blocks the way. Just here let me say that a wide distinction should be made between the treatment of persons charged with crime and the treatment of persons convicted of crime. The former are in the hands of officers for the purpose of trial; the latter are in the hands of officers for the purpose of punishment. The former are entitled to consideration as innocent; the latter are entitled to severity as guilty. The recent use of the club in New York has inspired a general wish that the heads of the police of that city might be subjected to a weekly visitation of their favorite weapon. But the reasoning which applies to those whose duty it is to discover the criminal does not apply to those whose duty it is to guard the criminal. Convicts who are disobedient or mutinous must be dealt with promptly and sternly. All this is said while fully agreeing with the remark above quoted from the JOURNAL, that "if a keeper is cruel or wanton he should be punished."

Since the publication of the charges against prison officials, the editors of various newspapers, desirous of proving that their heads are as soft as their hearts, have given way to violent fits of weeping over the sorrows of those unfortunate victims, who, crushed by a base legal and judicial conspiracy, have taken up their residence in certain State institutions, and who are vulgarly called "convicts." These legal martyrs are, to a certain extent, deprived of liberty. (Hinc illæ lachrymæ.) They are forced to work, whether they are so inclined or not. (More tears.) And sometimes, if they refuse to work, or assault a keeper, they are - they are p-p-placed in a dark, damp, d-d-dungeon (Long and passionate weeping.) These editorial Niobes advocate a lofty philanthropy; they believe in turning the left cheek when the right is smitten; they insist that criminals are proper subjects for moral suasion; and would rule the enemies of society by love. Whatever progress this age has made, the nauseous sentimentality for detected scoundrels, which has of late made its appearance, cannot be numbered among the improvements of the nineteenth century.

Not many years ago, under the old system, a State prison inspector entered one of our prisons at a time when the keepers were taking a convict to the dungeon. Being one of the large-hearted philanthropists, who believe in the reign of kindness, he was naturally horrified. "What has this man done?" he asked

affirmed, with costs-The People on Petition of Chemical National Bank v. Receiver of Merchants and Mechanics' Bank of Troy.—Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event-Koehler v. Adler.Orders reversed, with costs of both appeals-Seaman V. Whitehead.· - Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event, unless plaintiff stipulates to reduce recovery to $70 and interest thereon from May 9, 1877, without costs, in which event judgment as so modified affirmed, without costs to either party— Ayres v. Dixon.

A few facts should be borne to mind in considering this subject: 1. All couvicts are guilty. Centuries ago there was a chance that innocent men might suffer; but of late years respect for crime has been steadily increasing, and criminal legislation has been directed toward securing the escape of the accused. Were an innocent man to be found in our prisons, the fact would inspire the same awe as other miracles. 2. Convicts are almost always liars; the truth is not in them. This is the experience of all who have been connected with the management of prisons, and who speak from practice instead of theory. The word of a convict, unsupported by other evidence, is not worthy of a moment's consideration. 3. The object of punishment is to deter others from committing crimes; and this object is attained by making prisons forbidding instead of attractive. The Albany Penitentiary was a model prison, and I have heard convicted men, brought up for sentence, beg to be sent to any prison rather than that. 4. A prison is not a school. Discipline must be maintained by sternness, not kindness. For any disobedience or mutiny, punishment must be swift, certain, and severe enough to prevent a repetition of the offense.

If illegal modes of punishment are adopted, they should be abolished. But the public voice should be raised in protests against the illegality of the punishment rather than in lamentations over the sufferings of miscreants.

ROCHESTER, N. Y., Sept. 23, 1879.

H.

CONVENTION OF JUDGES TO REVISE RULES.

A Ta convention of judges, held on the first day of October, 1879, at the Capitol, in the city of Albany, pursuant to section 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, there were present: Hons. Joseph Mullen, William E. Curtis, John L. Talcott, John R. Brady, Joseph Neilson, James Sheldon, William L. Learned.

On motion of Judge Brady, Judge Mullen was appointed Chairman and Judge Curtis Secretary.

Judge Learned offered the following resolution: Resolved, That all persons desiring to suggest amendments to the present rules send a statement of the proposed amendment to Judge Mullen, at Watertown, N. Y., before the last Wednesday of May next. Adopted.

On motion the convention then adjourned to meet at the Capitol in the city of Albany, N. Y., on the last Wednesday of May, 1880, at 12 o'clock noon of that day. JOSEPH MULLEN, Chairman.

WILLIAM E. CURTIS, Secretary.

THE

NOTES.

HE leading article in the North American Review for October is by Francis Parkman, and is entitled "The Woman Question." It discusses the proposed extension of suffrage to women, and takes strong conservative ground. All the principal arguments against giving women the right to vote are brought together and exhaustively treated.-The Nation says: "McCalla & Stavely have in preparation The Refutation of Darwinism; and the Converse Theory of Development, based exclusively upon Darwin's facts,' by T. Warren O'Neill, of the Philadelphia bar, who, if successful, should lose no time in changing his profession." We don't see why. He would be none the worse in our profession, and rather the worse among the scientific men.-. A New London judge recently requested a jury to desist from eating peanuts in court, saying "this court is not a circus." It was probably a circuit.-Hon. Warren J. Woodward, one of the justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, died on the 22d ult., at the age of 59. He was regarded as an able and just judge.

An important, and what to many will be a surprising judgment as to the responsibility of parents for the acts of their children, was delivered at Nuneaton County Court, by Mr. F. Barrow, judge. The case in respect of which the decision was given, was one in which two miners, living at Bedworth, were sued by a clothier named Claverley, carrying on business at the same place, for 11s., damages, alleged to have been done to plaintiff's shop window by defendants' sons, two boys, each about five years of age. The youthful delinquents were also summoned. The case had been adjourned from the July court in order to give his honor an opportunity of ascertaining whether the men (like owners of noxious animals) were responsible for the damage done by the children, or whether the boys themselves were the only responsible parties. In giving judgment, his honor said he had looked into the case with very considerable care, and every thing he could find confirmed the impression he had in the first instance- that there was no ground of action against the fathers. The action would be against the boys, and if the plaintiff thought proper to go on against them he might get an order; but how were they to pay? He could not enforce the order, as, of course, he should not think of sending them to prison. As he had no remedy against the fathers, the plaintiff had better let the matter drop. Plaintiff stated he desired to do so. His honor said he should allow defendants no costs. The case would be simply struck out.-Birmingham Daily Post.-In an English court, in the course of an argument, a barrister remarked: "What does Kitty say?" "Who's Kitty," said the magistrate; "your wife?" "Sir, I mean Kitty, the

celebrated lawyer." "Oh," said the magistrate, t

suspect you mean Mr. Chitty, the author of the great work on Pleading." "I do, sir; but Chitty is an Italian name, and ought to be pronounced Kitty."

The Albany Law Journal.

WE

ALBANY, OCTOBER 11, 1879.

CURRENT TOPICS.

E receive more letters from law students, asking for relief from the rules of admission, than we can answer, unless we hire a clerk for that express purpose. One gentleman inquires if he cannot apply three months before the expiration of his regular term of clerkship, provided he takes no vacation during the last year. We should say no; we think the result would be the same if he proved that he studied nights and Sundays. Other gentlemen complain that they are left in the lurch of the two years' rule, and that in effect it is a sort of breach of contract on the part of the State to impose an additional term of study on those who entered upon study in the faith that only three years would be required. To all these discontented young gentlemen we say that they will live (at least we hope they will) to be glad of the rule of which they now complain. A great many things are spoiled by coming out" too soon, from a chicken to a young lady in society or a church member, and we have heard a great many regrets from mature persons that they had not postponed their debuts on various stages. Our profession is certainly worth more time in preparation than a mechanical trade. In three years' study of the law a young gentleman is tionally wise if he learns just one thing, namely, how to study; how to use his tools without cutting his own fingers or spoiling his materials; and it usually requires about two years more to take the conceit out of him at the expense of infatuated clients. We think it is quite generous enough in the public to grant an attorney's certificate at the end of three years, and that there is no tyranny in demanding two years' further study before granting a counsellor's diploma. On the start the rule must inevitably work inconvenience and disappointment to some, but it is better to have it so than to turn a horde of ill-educated and incompetent lawyers loose on the public, to wreak life-long regret to themselves and disgust to their clients. We hope our young friends will not abandon the law schools because they are no longer useful to shorten the term of study. The law school is still the truest way to learn law, and if the attendance on them diminishes it will be a strong proof of the wisdom and necessity of the present rules.

excep

There was no quorum at the convention of our judges to revise the rules of the Supreme Court, last week, and an adjournment was taken until the last Wednesday of May. The object of this long adjournment is to give an opportunity to adapt the rules to the nine chapters of the Code which still remain in abeyance, provided the Legislature shall adopt them again—and some governor shall not again veto them.

VOL. 20.- No. 15.

It

In the Legislative Council of New South Wales it was recently moved that prisoners on trial should not be compelled to enter a dock, unless there is reason to apprehend an escape or interruption of the ordinary conduct of the trial, and that in the opinion of the House prisoners on trial should be at liberty to sit or stand, at their option. The motion was rejected by fifteen to four. The London Law Journal pronounces the motion the "fanaticism of philanthropy," saying: "There is no real hardship in an innocent prisoner being put in the dock. is the place for all-the innocent, as well as the guilty to stand during trial. In the dock the prisoner is free from crowding or molestation, and he can see and hear what is going on. It seems to us that the guilty, and not the innocent, would deem it a hardship to be so placed as to be within view of the judge and jury, and to face the witnesses for the prosecution." The dock may be retained in some of our States- certainly not in this State and we think it a relic of barbarism. We contrive to let prisoners sit with their counsel in this State, and have never known it to hurt either prisoner or counsel. A prisoner can be just as effectually guarded out of the dock as in it. The idea that the dock is for the protection or pleasure of the prisoner is quite new and pleasant. To our minds it is a species of unnecessary and degrading imprisonment to shut a prisoner, presumably innocent, in a spiked cage, like a wild beast. At all events, to compel a prisoner to stand during trial, is a most gratuitous cruelty. But our British brethren regard the dock, like their own wigs, as one of the guarantees of the British constitution, and so says the Journal, "the dock grievance is imaginary, but not the less a good topic for declamation and stormin-teapot agitation." Perhaps, however, they will be persuaded after a while to give up the dock as they surrendered trial by battle, but reluctantly.

We had thought that the sensitiveness of human nerves had received its highest exemplification in the case in the city of New York, where one party undertook to get an injunction restraining another from trundling a baby-carriage in a room over the first party's head in the same boarding-house. But the case of Moody v. Steggles, ante, 272, goes ahead of that. The suit involved the question of the right of one to maintain a metal sign affixed to the house of another, it having been so affixed for forty years. In every case there is always a strong point and a weak point. In this case the denial of such an easement was the strong point; the weak point was that the sign creaked. The court gravely said: "It is said that the signboard creaks, and that the plaintiffs have no right to cause the annoyance which is produced by the creaking of the signboard. Now, it appears to me from the evidence, that the signboard, if I may use such an expression, creaks from its own nature. It is not easy, and probably not possible, to expose a wide surface of metal such as this signboard appears to be to the action of the wind down this passage without causing some creaking, and it

appears to have always creaked more or less. But the evidence goes to show that in the spring of last year it creaked rather more than usual, and then an interview took place between Mr. Vaughan, who was specially affected by it, and the plaintiff, Miss Moody, in which she seems to have offered him the use of the ladder, and to have invited him to grease it himself, which invitation he refused. The whole thing with regard to the creaking is of a trumpery description. It does not appear to me that there has been any creaking in excess of what is naturally incidental to a signboard, and certainly in the later exercise of the right the plaintiff has studiously desired to minimise the inconvenience to the defendant, because it has been erected with India rubber washers, which undoubtedly have diminished the noise to the greatest possible extent. Therefore, that defense appears to me to be insignificant and idle." It is seldom that an English court ventures on such a flight of humor as this, but perhaps after all the court meant it all in gravity.

"Our Divorce Courts; their Origin and History; why they are needed; how they are abused; and

how they may be reformed. By Charles Cowley." This is the title of a pamphlet, the historical portion of which was first published in this JOURNAL, ante, pp. 110, 131. The supplementary portion is devoted to straining the English language to its utmost capacity for vituperation, in commenting on Attorney-General Train; but to a woman it would be a very provoking performance, for it excites the curiosity without gratifying it. We cannot find out what Mr. Attorney has been doing. Even the author's reference to his own case of Cowley v. Train, 124 Mass. 226, does not enlighten us, except to the fact that the plaintiff was successfully demurred to by Mr. Attorney in an action of tort. We cannot agree with the author in his opinion that "settled mental aversion" ought to be a cause for divorce. Such a rule would speedily unhitch half the couples, who would avail themselves of so easy an escape in so congenial a way.

If "settled mental aversion" should become ground for divorce, we should not see many actions like that of Manning v. Manning, 79 N. C. 293. Mrs. Manning, at the age of 52-old enough to know better entertained a "settled mental aversion" toward her husband, and probably having no other available pretext for separation, she undertook to procure a separation from bed and board by an action of ejectment. The syllabus is as follows: "In an action by a wife against her husband to recover the possession of her lands of all which he had taken possession and control and was cultivating solely for his own use, and damages for withholding the same, held, that the action would lie. But the husband's marital right of occupancy cannot be impaired; his right of ingress and egress to the dwelling and society of his wife continues; and a writ of possession following a judgment must be so framed as to put the wife in possession without put

ting the husband out." Verily, here was a second Daniel come to judgment. The lady was accorded her pound of flesh, but she could not get rid of her husband so easily. The court indulge in a little quiet sarcasm on the subject as follows: "It presents the first instance in North Carolina where a wife becoming discontented with him, among other things, secks a judicial separation from her husband by an action of ejectment. For the relief in such an action consists not only in putting the plaintiff in possession, but also in expelling the intruding husband, bag and baggage, if he has any, from her dwelling and premises. If the wife is entitled to recover as claimed, the writ of possession following the judgment will be under her control, and if she prefers it she may be content with ejecting the husband from the lands only, and as to the dwelling-house concede him the privilege of ingress and egress, but as a matter of favor and not a right. If she beholds her husband with a sinister eye, however, and prefers to forsake him and cleave unto her property, she may direct the sheriff to use only so her bed and board, and put it down in the public much force as is necessary to remove his body from highway. Unless the court can undertake to control the judgment and writ of possession in such cases, which it has never heretofore done, the consequences which we have pointed out are inevitable." And they conclude, that the wife's proposition "is fraught with the most dangerous consequences to society, to wit, that a wife may under the forms, and with the sanction of law at her own dwelling and society because the house is her sepawill, and without cause, eject her husband from her rate property. I can never agree that either husband or wife can, without committing those offenses which the law designates as causes of divorce or separation, invoke the aid of the courts to render a

judgment, the unavoidable consequence of which would be a separation of man and wife. Nothing less than an express and positive statute to that effect can control or destroy that highest of all the obligations imposed in the marriage relation — that man and wife shall live together." That North Carolina court is right. This world would be insupportable if our wives could usurp our privilege, and turn us out of their houses in our old age, at their caprice.

A

NOTES OF CASES.

NOVEL point was decided in The Parlement Belge, 4 P. D. 129, March, 1879. It was there held that a packet, conveying mails and carrying on commerce, does not, notwithstanding that she belongs to the sovereigns of a foreign State, and is officered by officers commissioned by him, come within the category of vessels which are exempt from process of law; and it is not competent to the Crown, without the authority of Parliament, to clothe such a vessel with the immunity of a foreign ship of war, so as to deprive a British subject of his right to proceed against her. The action was for damages by collision. Sir Robert Phillimore,