cumulate for a long time and claim payment before the mortgagee. The Grace Greenwood, 2 Bis. 131. District New Jersey. Adams v. Steamboat Wyoming. Opinion by Nixon, J.

TRADE-MARK-EXACT IMITATION NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE INFRINGEMENT.-In an action for the infringement of a trade-mark, held, that an injunction should be granted where the imitation is so close that by the forms, marks, contrasts, or by their special arrangement, or by the general appearance of the infringing device, purchasers exercising ordinary caution are liable to be misled into buying the article bearing it for the genuine one. It is not necessary for the complainants to show an exact imitation or similarity before they are entitled to the protection of the court. Νο matter how vague may be the resemblance, if it be sufficient to mislead the public, it is unlawful, and when unexplained, it is the duty of the court to infer intent, and to hold that the resemblance was adopted for the purpose of deception. Taylor v. Taylor, 23; E. L. & E. R. 282; Curtis v. Bryan, 2 Daly, 312. Held, also, that acquiescence of long standing is no bar to an injunction, although it precluded the party acquiescing from any right to an account for past profits. McLean v. Fleming, Otto, 245; Fullwood v. Fullwood, L. R., 9 Ch. Div. 176. Circuit New Jersey, June 20, 1879. Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Thomas. Opinion by Nixon, D. J.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. DAMAGES MEASURE OF-CONVERSION.-The defendants, as warehousemen, held for the plaintiffs corn belonging to them. G., an agent of the plaintiffs, obtained sixty quarters from the defendants, promising to forward to them a delivery order from the plaintiffs. T. subsequently contracted to purchase sixty quarters of corn from the plaintiffs, and having obtained from the plaintiffs a delivery order to himself, indorsed it to G., who forwarded it to the defendants as the delivery order which he had promised to send to them. T. was unable to pay for the corn, and G. never accounted to the plaintiffs for the price of the sixty quarters of corn which G. had obtained. Held (overruling the Exchequer Division), by Bramwell and Thesiger, L. JJ., that although there had been a conversion of the sixty quarters of corn by the defendants, the plaintiffs were entitled to only nominal damages. By Baggallay, L. J., that plaintiffs had not been damnified, and were not entitled to any damages. Exch. Div., May 13, 1879. Hiort v. The London and North Western Railway, L. R.,

4 Ex. D. 188.

MARITIME LAW-COLLISION-WARRANT TO ARREST MAIL PACKET BELONGING TO FOREIGN STATE-TREATYMAKING POWER OF CROWN—JURISDICTION.-A packet conveying mails and carrying on commerce does not, notwithstanding that she belongs to the sovereign of a foreign State, and is officered by officers commissioned by him, come within the category of vessels which are exempt from process of law; and it is not competent to the Crown, without authority of Parliament, to clothe such a vessel with the immunity of a foreign ship of war, so as to deprive a British subject of his right to proceed against her. Prob. Div., March 15, 1879. The Parliament Belge, L. R., 4 P. D. 129. NUISANCE -HOSPITAL FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES ASYLUM ESTABLISHED BY ORDER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD-LIABILITY OF MANAGERS-METROPOLI

TAN POOR ACT, 1867 (30 VICT., c. 6).—The defendants, under the powers given them by the Metropolitan Poor Act, 1867, built a hospital which they used for patients suffering from infectious diseases. In an action by adjacent land-owners the jury found that the hospital was a nuisance to such land-owners. Held, by Pollock, B., first, that the act did not make the defendants

mere irresponsible agents to carry out the orders of the local government board so as to exempt them from liability. Secondly, that they were not exempt on the ground that they acted bona fide in the discharge of a duty cast upon them by the act. Com. Pl. Div., Jan. 28, 1879. Hill v. Managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District, L. R., 4 Q. B. D. 433.

PARTNERSHIP-STYLE OF NAME OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBER SIGNATURE TO BILL OF EXCHANGE — LIABILITY OF FIRM - EVIDENCE.-If the name of a partnership firm be merely the name of an individual partner, proof that he signed such name to a bill of exchange is not enough to make the firm liable on the bill. To establish the liability, the holder of the bill must further prove that the signature was put to it by the authority and for the purposes of the firm. Com. Pl. Div., April 27, 1879. Yorkshire Banking Company v. Beatson; Leeds and County Banking Company v. Beatson, L. R., 4 C. P. D. 204.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

XXI. KANSAS REPORTS.

Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas. A. M. F. Randolph, Official Reporter. Vol. XXI. Containing cases decided at the July Term, 1878, and January Term, 1879. Topeka: Geo. W. Martin. Pp. xv, 810.

THIS

HIS volume comes promptly, and is, as these reports always are, well printed, and admirable in point of editing. We note the following cases: Fisher v. Conway, p. 18.-The court may not limit the number of witnesses on a side so as to deprive a party of the right to testify. Duncan v. Baker, p. 99.- Where an entire contract has been partly fulfilled, the party in fault may recover quantum meruit less the damages caused by the breach to the other party. Case v. Allen, p. 217.-An agister's lien is paramount to that of a chattel mortgage on the cattle kept. Williams v. Hadley, p. 350.-A voluntary assignment executed by A and B and their wives, individually, A and B being partners, conveys their partnership effects, and their separate property also, notwithstanding A and B are described as copartners in the instrument. Wicks v. Smith, p. 412.-Delay of a defrauded party in rescinding the fraudulent contract and returning the property obtained

under it, is immaterial unless meantime an innocent third party has acquired some interest in the property. Russell v. Anthony, p. 450. — A libel on one as a public officer is actionable after he has left his office. Butler v.

Austin, p. 521.— A voluntary conveyance by a man to his minor children, in view of marriage, will not be set aside some years after marriage, at the wife's suit, when she fails to show any fraudulent intent, or the amount of the defendant's property at the time of or since such conveyance; and quare, whether it would be set aside under any circumstances. School District v. Perkins, p. 536.-Under a law authorizing a school district board to purchase "necessary appendages' for a school-house, a contract to buy a stereoscope and stereoscopic views cannot be enforced City of Atchison v. Jansen, p. 560.-A city does not insure the stability of sidewalks laid over areas or openings, but only undertakes for reasonable care and diligence. State v. Ruth, p. 583.—In order to constitute rape, the utmost resistance is not necessary, if the woman submits through fear of threats of killing or great personal injury. Hollon v. Hopkins, p. 638.-A criminal sentenced to imprisonment, and escaping before incarceration, may be incarcerated on re-arrest, without further judicial proceedings, for the term of the sentence. Titus v. Corkins, p. 722.-In an action of assault and battery, the jury may give damages for the expenses of the litigation, without evidence thereof, and for any fear or feeling of insecurity created in the plaintiff by the assault. In re Scrafford, p. 735.-Where

a criminal trial is not finished, nor the cause submitted to the jury, at the conclusion of the term, and a verdict of guilty is returned at the next term, there is only a mis-trial, and the defendant cannot plead once in jeopardy. In City of Atchison v. Jansen, p. 577, the court read the counsel the following lesson, which might well be taken to heart by lawyers elsewhere: "We may remark, that in the preparation of instructions and questions to the jury, as well as in the preparation of the record for this court and the briefs of counsel, it appears as though the parties were actuated by the one desire of seeing how much paper and ink they could waste. The defendant submitted one hundred and twelve special questions and asked fifty special instructions, while the plaintiff submitted twenty-six questions and asked nineteen instructions. The petition in error extends over thirty-three pages, and contains one hundred and three specifications. The transcript stops at the 786th page, and the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error is a closely printed book of 122 pages. Now, when the facts are many and complicated, and the case presents a series of questions, new, important, and intricate, we have no disposition

to complain of the industry of counsel or the fullness of any record or brief; but in a case like the present, we think such prolixity au imposition upon both the trial court and this, and one that will often of itself justify an affirmance of the judgment. Indeed, we were no little inclined to think that such ought to be our disposition of this case; but on reflection we have concluded, for the errors noticed, that it was our duty to reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial, and it is so ordered."

RORER'S INTER-STATE LAW.

American Inter-State Law. By David Rorer, of the Iowa Bar, author of "Rorer on Judicial and Execution Sales." Edited by Levy Mayer, of the Chicago Bar. Chicago: Callahan & Co., 1879. Pp. Ivii, 400.

The author by his former work has secured a good hearing for this, on a subject of great importance and complexity. The work is divided into thirty-seven chapters, of which the following are some of the more important titles, viz.: Suability of States; Inter-State right of suit; Jurisdictional requisites; Concurrent civil jurisdiction, State and National; Inter-State equity jurisdiction and practice; Inter-State law of contracts; Inter-State proof of records, judicial proceedings and laws; Proceeding by foreign attachment; Inter-State insolvent discharged by State courts; Penal and statutory actions not enforceable in other States; Extra-territorial force of laws; Statutes of limitations; Marriage and divorce, Inter-State, validity thereof; Inter-State legal status of persons; Legal status and jurisdiction of personal property; Of real property: Criminal jurisdiction, etc., etc. Above 1,800 cases are cited, the substance being stated in the text, with references to titles in foot-notes, and the subject of each paragraph and subdivision indicated by preliminary catch-words in large type. The arrangement seems intelligent and methodical. There is an index and a table of cases, but for a wonder, no preface. As a gathering up of many scattered threads of legal principles and adjudications on many topics in one particular view, we think the work timely and well executed, and have no doubt that it will save the profession many hours of tiresome search. The volume is fairly printed on good paper.

CORRESPONDENCE.

ADMISSION TO PRACTICE.

To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal: SIR-I commenced the study of law July 16, 1877, and my certificate is filed as of that date. On the 28th day of September, 1877, the Court of Appeals amended

the rules in relation to the admission of attorneys and counsellors, by making the term of study five years before a student could be admitted as a counsellor.

In 1879 the Legislature of the State of New York passed a law to the effect that a student, who commenced the study of law before the amended rules were ordered, could be admitted as an attorney and counsellor after three years of clerkship, provided he was admitted before the 1st day of June, 1880. My three years of clerkship will not expire until the 16th day of July, 1880.

Now, Mr. Editor, will you be kind enough to give me your opinion, as to whether the General Term will allow me to be examined at the May General Term of 1880? or, if by waiting until the September Term of the same year I will come under the act of 1879 and be admitted both as an attorney and counsellor? Trusting that you will answer at your earliest convenience, I remain, yours respectfully, A STUDENT.

KINGSTON, September 12, 1879.

[Our impression is that our correspondent will hardly be able to accomplish his desire in either way.-Ed. A. L. J.]

COURT ORDERS AND JUDGES' ORDERS.

To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

SIR "C. W. S." (in to-day's issue) may be and probably is right in the distinctions he draws between an order of a judge and an order of the court, but that is not the point. The question is, whether a provision or requirement of a statute that certain orders of an ex parte character, which "may be made by a judge of the court," is not fully satisfied by such orders made by the court" in which the action is brought. If not, it is time the Code was so amended as to provide that whenever power or authority is given therein to a judge to do any particular act or to exercise any particular power or authority, the same may be done or exercised by the court of which that judge is a mem

ber.

It is preposterous that a judicial officer holding a court in due form, at the time and in the place, and with all the solemnities provided by law, shall be prohibited, or held to be without power or jurisdiction to do an act appertaining to his judicial office, and requiring the exercise of his judicial discretion, which he may do in his private office, in his bedroom, or on the public street. J. C. L.

NEW YORK, September 13, 1879.

DISCONTINUANCE OF HIGHWAY. To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

SIR-The following cases were tried at the Delaware Circuit, Sixth Judicial District, before Mr. Justice Follett, without a jury, the facts at the trial having been agreed upon: Elijah W. Davis et al., as Commissioners of Highways of Masonville, v. John C. Willis, Same v. Joshua S. Willis, Same v. Warren Kingsburry.

The facts are briefly these: Defendants were the owners of land through which a highway extended. Plaintiffs, by an order, which was void for non-compliance with the statute, discontinued said highway. Defendants fenced up and inclosed the land, and plowed the track of the road. Plaintiffs brought these three actions to recover the penalty given by statute for obstructing public highways. The defense was estoppel. The court held that inasmuch as the order of discontinuance was on its face regular, it protected those acting under it, and the plaintiffs were estopped from maintaining the actions. I examined all the road law I could find in the State, when making a brief on the defense of the above causes, and was unable to find any thing in point.

SIRIS section 403 of the new Code, as amended in 1879, adequate to effect its obvious design? That design is to consolidate, harmonize and preserve two differing provisions of the former statutes, viz.:

"The term of eighteen months after the death of any testator or intestate shall not be deemed any part of the time limited by law for the commencement of actions against his executors or administrators." 2 R. S. 448, § 8.

"If a person against whom an action may be brought die before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survive, an action may be commenced against his executors or administrator, after the expiration of that time, and within one year after the issuing of letters testamentary or of administration." Old Code, § 102, 2d sentence.

The new section, which reads as follows:

"§ 403. The term of eighteen months after the death, within the State, of a person, against whom a cause of action exists, is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of an action against his executor or administrator. If letters testamentary or letters of administration upon his estate are not issued, within the State, at least six months before the expiration of the time to bring the action, as extended by the foregoing provision of this section, the term of one year after such letters are issued is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of such an action," should give every creditor, holding a claim not barred at the time of the debtor's death, an extension of eighteen months, and a sufficient additional extension, when rendered necessary by delay in the issuing of letters. Under the existing section, if letters are issued before the expiration of the six months specified, no difficulty arises; but if letters are not so issued, it will be a melancholy consolation to the creditor, whose claim is now extinguished, that "the term of one year after such letters are issued is not a part of the time limited," etc.

If the concluding portion of the section, commencing with the words just quoted, were stricken out, and the words, "such an action may be commenced within one year after such letters are so issued," were substituted therefor, the creditor would be in no danger of losing his remedy without his own fault. For, if the letters were issued during the six months specified, the creditor would then as now have a minimum additional extension of six months, and a maximum of one year; if the letters were not issued until after the expiration of those six months, he would then have a minimum additional extension of one year, and a maximum commensurate with the delay. In the latter case, where is now his remedy? D.

NEW YORK, September 15, 1879.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

In re Cohn v. Wentworth.Judgment affirmed, with costs-Avery v. Town of Hope.-Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event-Donovan v. Van Demark.Order of General Term and Special Term reversed, and warrant of attachment, so far as it affects the individual property of Samuel T. Alberger, vacated, with costs--The Steuben County Bank v. Alberger. Appeal dismissed, with costs-People ex rel. Smith v. Town of Nelliston; McKay v. Jarvis.

NOTES.

E have been shown a Law Chart, issued by Dun,

and other business men, which seems very useful. It is mounted to hang on the wall like a map. At the left hand in a column are arranged alphabetically the names of the States and Territories, and opposite each are answers to the following questions: "If an account is forwarded for suit, must it be verified; if so, by whom? Is suit usually begun by attachment, or is attachment usually regarded as a provisional remedy? Jurisdiction of courts? Length of time required to obtain judgment when no defense is interposed? Can judgments be entered during vacation? Can execution issue immediately after judgment? When must he, the sheriff, return the execution? Can execution be stayed; if so, how long? Are there any courts whose judgments cannot be made liens on real estate by docketing in proper county? Can a commission to take testimony issue from a justices' court? Is the note of a married woman binding? When do notes, accounts and judgments outlaw? Are judgment notes allowed? Can interest be charged on open accounts? Can assignment be made preferring certain creditors? Will an assignment by a debtor dissolve an attachment previously issued? Will acceptance of dividend discharge the debt? Will a consent of a majority of the creditors enable the debtor to get a release from his debts? What are the exemption laws? Must chattel mortgages be filed?" Twenty pertinent questions well answered. We would suggest, however, in regard to the question, "Will a consent of a majority of the creditors enable the debtor to get a release from his debts?" the addition of a statement showing what number will produce the result; as, for example, in this State, two-thirds.

Quillets of the Law, published by Little, Brown & Co., has the following: "The ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, of August 2, 1879, contains a letter from Bishop Pinkney, of Baltimore, protesting against the probability of the story, in Harvey's Reminiscences, that Webster extorted an apology from Pinkney for language used in the court-room. We agree with Bishop Pinkney that the anecdote, as told by Harvey, does not comport either with the character of Pinkney or with that of Webster. But it is easy to imagine how it could have assumed its present shape from a very different foundation of fact. The gossipy and often-told anecdotes of Webster, which Harvey bound up into so attractive a sheaf, do not pretend to, nor merit, a reputation for weighty historical accuracy. The facts probably were, that Pinkney used language in court which wounded Webster; that the latter afterward went to Pinkney's room, and with impressive seriousness of manner stated his sense of injury; and that

Sept. 23, 1879:

Motion of appellant denied, without costs; appeal dismissed, without costs- In re petition of Andrew Stewart, adm., appellant, v. Isaac Van Winkle. -Motion to open default granted, upon payment by appellant to respondent's attorney, within ten days, of $10 costs; and, in default of payment within that time, motion denied, with $10 costs-Connolly v. Kretz.Motion denied, without costs-Van Gilder v. Van Gelder.-Motion for re-argument denied, with $10 costs-O'Gara v. Kearney.- Order affirmed, with costs-Ferguson v. Lee; Marvin v. Marvin (two cases);

it with an equally manly and voluntary This would be in accordance with the known character of the men, and is creditable to both of them. A gradual addition of such little touches of imagination as the raconteur uses to embellish and round out his stories may have brought the anecdote to the shape in which it has attracted Bishop Pinkney's criticism. As Harvey, like Webster and Pinkney, has passed beyond the reach of our challenge or inquiry, let us do conjectural justice to the great reputations in question by adopting the probable and nobler version of this incident herein suggested."

The Albany Law Journal.

WE

ALBANY, OCTOBER 4, 1879.

CURRENT TOPICS.

E published last week two communications from the Attorney-General of this State on the construction of our present interest law. He takes the ground that contracts made between the passage of the act and the 1st of January next, when the act is to take effect, may lawfully be made and enforced for seven per cent interest, although not maturing until after January 1st. In this we can

not agree, for the reasons pointed out ante, p. 21. We believe that it is perfectly competent for the Legislature to enact that at a specified date in the future a certain rate of interest shall prevail, and that the consequence is that contracts made after the passage of the act and before that date must conform to it. The reason of the prohibition against retroactive enactments does not apply to this. The citizen is warned beforehand. His rights secured by past contracts are not interfered with, but as to the future he is informed of the change. If he disregards the expressed intention, he does so with his eyes open, and cannot be said to have had his rights impaired by unforeseen legislation. It is only past contracts that cannot be "impaired" by legislation, and legislation which reaches ahead cannot be said to be "retroactive." These ideas find some support in Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick. 430. There a statute enacted in November, 1835, and not going into operation until May, 1836, and providing that actions upon judgments rendered in any court not of record should be barred unless commenced

within six years after the causes of action should have accrued, was held not to be void as impairing the obligation of contracts, because the creditor had an opportunity between November and May to bring his action on any judgment recovered more than six years before May. Holcombe v. Tracy, 2 Minn. 246, is to the same effect. In Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318, the doctrine of Smith v. Morrison was held not applicable in Michigan because of certain peculiar provisions in the Constitution of that State relative to the time when statutes shall take effect.

Although we believe that a contract, for more than six per cent, made after the passage of the act and before January 1st, and maturing after January 1st, cannot be enforced for more than six per cent after January 1st, yet it is our impression that it would not be void for usury, at least as to commercial paper. This is because in the fifth section of the old act (1 R. S. m. p. 772), which is the section pronouncing the penalty for reserving any greater interest "than is above prescribed," it is provided that "this act shall not affect such paper as has been made and transferred previous to the time it shall take effect." This provision is left undisturbed VOL. 20.-No. 14.

by the amendment, and probably must be held, in connection with the amendment, to speak from the taking effect of the amendment, i. e., January 1st.

The governor of this State convened an extraordinary General Term of the Supreme Court, of the First Department, to decide the political squabble in the city of New York over Police Commissioner Nichols' removal. The court consisted of Judges Counsel for the mayor Davis, Brady, and Barrett. moved for an ex parte order quashing the certiorari granted by Justice Westbrook, and staying Nichols' proceedings, or for an order prohibiting the Special Term from proceeding in the matter. The latter relief was asked under a statute passed in 1873 (chap. 70), authorizing the General Term of the Supreme Court to issue writs of prohibition to a single justice or Special Term of the same court, in the

same manner that such writs are issued to inferior tribunals. The court declined to hear the matter ex parte, and the matter has been argued on an order 29th ult., is that Justice Westbrook and the Special to show cause. The decision, pronounced on the Term are prohibited. The court, in its opinion, written by Judge Brady, avoid expressing any views on the merits of the grave questions involved, but base the decision on technical defects in the

proceedings, namely, the granting an order to show

cause for the certiorari returnable at a shorter time

than is required for regular notice of argument, and the making the order returnable at Special Term at chambers instead of Special Term in court. The opinion reviews the authorities upon writs of prohibition, and concludes that this is a proper case for the exercise of the power, under the statute of 1873.

The Journal of Jurisprudence and Scottish Law Magazine, for September, under the title, "Shall we Interrogate the Accused?" contains a strong argument in favor of allowing accused persons to testify on their own behalf; so strong, indeed, as to advocate for prisoners what the Irishman defined the press-gang, "forcing a man to turn volunteer." The Scottish lawyers have a queer notion of the rights of accused persons. The Faculty of Advocates, in March, 1878, by a vote of 27 to 17, decided that persons accused should be "competent though not compellable to be witnesses." At a subsequent smaller meeting, by a vote of about two to one, the saving clause, "not compellable" was modified to the effect that it should be "competent to examine a prisoner as a witness on the motion of the prosecutor." The writer says: "This must mean at least that though you may not compel an accused by ordinary penalties to answer your questions, you may, at the instance of the prosecutor, point out to him that he is called upon and bound to speak, and that his silence will legitimately tell against him." The writer also says: "Now it may be at once granted that if prisoners were allowed to tell their story a presumption would be created against those who refused to do it. But that this is a great and obvious objection' we deny, for the simple reason that

we believe it to be a very great and a very obvious recommendation. There would no doubt be such a presumption and there ought to be such a presumption. In every decent system of jurisprudence, and under every form of trial, the refusal (on the part of one who is accused by public authority of having committed a crime) to tell the facts which he knows, ought in reason and in equity to weigh against him." Passing by the natural inference that the omission of a prisoner to testify on his behalf, if he can, must inevitably create a prejudice against him, we think the provision of the statutes in this country theoretically much more humane than that proposed in Scotland.

Some new authorities have been discovered on the Domestic Relations, namely, Shakespeare and the Book of Common Prayer. In Snyder v. Snyder, the Common Pleas of Lackawanna county, Pennsylvania, on the question of the custody of children as between disagreeing parents, "dropped into poetry," and cited Shakespeare, and approved the citation by counsel of the Prayer Book, on the relations of husband and wife. In relation to Christianity and the common law the court said: "That law has been the product of our civilization through centuries of experience, and is founded on the common precepts of Christianity incorporated into it, and so far the common law of the land." The court then quote and proceed as follows:

Thy husband is thy lord, thy life, thy keeper, Thy head, thy sovereign; one that cares for thee, And for thy maintenance; commits his body To painful labour, both by sea and land, To watch the night in storms, the day in cold, While thou liest warm at home, secure and safe; And craves no other tribute at thy hands But love, fair looks, and true obedience.' This, which Shakespeare puts into the mouth of a woman, is poetry, but at the same time law. The man who uses this power to burden and not assist his wife becomes a tyrant, and not a husband. The woman who seeks no counsel from her husband, sets up her own authority against his, and does not with love, yield him homage and respect, has yet to learn the true nature of the relation into which she has entered." To the same effect, only more so, is St. Paul; but perhaps the court had not the authority

at hand.

We have received from an honored correspondent an expostulation on our views on the Sunday question. He says that he and other readers of the JOURNAL are grieved by our expressions, and that they want the Sunday of our fathers. There is not the slightest intention on our part to obstruct or interfere with any man's right to a quiet Sunday. Indeed, we want it ourselves. At the same time lawyers must be careful not to interfere with the right of every man to observe or pass Sunday in his own way, always subject to the condition that his way does not disturb others whose way is not his way.

We cannot compel men to go to church, or stay in the house if they do not go to church, or refrain from quietly sailing on a river, on Sunday. In

short, we cannot compel sentiment or religion by legislation. We can only compel those who have no sentiment nor religion to refrain from disturbing the physical quiet of those who have both, on the Lord's Day. This idea is well expressed by Mr. Benjamin Vaughn Abbott, in an article in the Christian Union, entitled, "Sunday Laws: what they mean," as follows: "There are, in the administration of civil law, many cordial recognitions of Christianity as being in fact the prevailing religion, and some adoption of religious forms and observances as congenial and germane to legal proceedings, but any purpose of compelling or even inducing persons to observe Sunday as a day of pious obligation and observance is, at the present day, entirely disavowed. The general belief that God desires or approves Sabbath observance is taken into view as a fact rendering legal protections of the day proper, but it is not a doctrine of the law. Sunday is named for the rest-day because the masses of the people have for centuries observed it, more or less fully, and the government can more easily secure and protect a day already popularly designated than establish a new one; not because they undertake to enforce a divine command."

We present this week the admirable address on The Relation of Christianity to the Common Law, delivered by the Rev. Dr. M. B. Anderson, president of Rochester University, at the late session of the Social Science Association, at Saratoga Springs. No man is better fitted than Dr. Anderson, by acquirements both theological and legal, by his unequalled experience as a teacher, by breadth of comprehension, and by a considerate spirit, to speak on this great topic, and we believe that our readers will not grudge the space we give to his excellent treatment of it.

NOTES OF CASES.

[N Tew v. Tew, Supreme Court of North Carolina,

January, 1879, it was held that under the statute a husband is not entitled to a divorce except upon a separation by the wife without the fault of the husband, and a living in adultery by the wife; and that the adultery of the wife after a separation caused by the husband's fault will not avail him to dissolve the bonds of matrimony, as divorces are granted only on the application of the party who has sustained injury. The court say: "But the plaintiff insists that his wife has committed adultery, and although committed only since the separation, he is entitled to have a divorce under the second class of cases enumerated in the section aforesaid of Battle's Revisal. The clause of the statute is a new provision, and first introduced into our law at the session of the Legislature of 1871-'72, and no case has arisen calling for its exposition and construction. It is in terms absolute, and separately considered it would seem to make the adultery of the wife good ground of divorce whensoever committed, whether before or after separation, and howsoever committed, whether in consequence of,