battle in support of Mower's movement, for it proved to be directly along the only available line of retreat the enemy had. During that night the enemy beat a retreat in the direction of Smithfield, leaving his pickets as prisoners, his dead unburied and his wounded in the hospitals. The loss to Sherman in the Bentonsville engagements was 191 killed, 1,117 wounded and 296 missing. Johnston's loss, including prisoners, was 2,343.

On March 22d Sherman rode in the direction of Goldsboro, and when at Cox's Bridge he met General Terry with two divisions of the Tenth corps. The road was clear for his army to enter Goldsboro, and it moved thither. Sherman entered Goldsboro on March 23d to find Schofield in full possession with his Twenty-third corps. During the 23d and 24th his whole army came up, and entered the camps assigned them. By March 25th the railroad to Newbern was open and supplies began to pour in. Thus the long looked for junction between Sherman and Schofield was effected, and thus ended one of the longest and most important marches ever made by an organized army. Four hundred and twentyfive miles of hostile country had been traversed, and five large rivers had been crossed, at any one of which a small force could have offered serious impediments. The country was rendered doubly difficult by reason of swamps, which the rains had filled with water, and the roads were so impassable that corduroying afforded the only means of advance. Three important supply cities-Columbia, Cheraw and Fayetteville -had been captured. The evacuation of Charleston had been compelled. All the important railroads of South Carolina had been broken up, and an immense amount of military property destroyed. A section of country equal to forty miles in width had been devastated. Fifty days of midwinter had been spent in marching and ten in resting. The army had

arrived in splendid order, with men and teams as fresh as when they started from Atlanta or Savannah. Counting in with Sherman's successes those of Schofield and Terry in capturing Ft. Fisher, Newbern, Wilmington, etc., and opening the way to Goldsboro, the whole sea-coast from Savannah to Newbern had fallen into the National hands in the short space of sixty days, and an army of one hundred thousand disciplined and victorious soldiers were in position for further operations.

March 23d was memorable in the annals of the war as a consummation of those vast plans which for months had been in operation, and which had brought within supporting distance of Grant a force equal to any further emergency. The very next day he ordered that celebrated move which was to turn Lee's right and force him from his Richmond base. After joining Schofield, Sherman felt strong enough to encounter Johnston, even if it should happen that Lee made his escape and effected a junction with him. He regarded himself as virtual master of the situation.

On March 25th, Sherman went up to City Point, to communicate in person with Grant. It happened that President Lincoln was present, on a visit to the front. Sheridan had come in from his eventful Virginia raid. There was, therefore, a meeting of distinguished officials and a comparison of views which were to have immediate bearing on the future. On March 28th Sherman returned to his army, fully informed as to the part he was to play in the Spring campaign, then about to begin.

A volume might be filled with the letters of congratulation and information which awaited Sherman's arrival at Goldsboro, and with his replies to them. We can find room only for the gist of one or two, which show how wide awake Sherman was to his immediate surroundings, and to the possibilities of the near future. Under date of March 24th, he wrote

Grant: "I send you a copy of my orders of this morning, the operation of which will, I think, soon complete our roads. The telegraph is now done to Morehead City, and by it I learn that stores have been sent to Kinston in boats, and that our wagons are loading with rations and clothing. By using the Neuse as high up as Kinston, hauling from there twenty-six miles, and by equipping the two roads to Morehead City and Wilmington, I feel certain we can not only feed and equip the army, but in a short time fill our wagons for another start. I feel certain, from the character of the fighting, that we have got Johnston's army afraid of us. He himself acts with timidity and caution. His cavalry alone manifests spirit, but limits its operations to our stragglers and foraging parties. My marching columns of infantry do not pay the cavalry any attention, but walk right through it.

I think I see pretty clearly how, in one more move we can checkmate Lee, forcing him to unite Johnston with him in the defence of Richmond, or to abandon the cause. I feel certain, if he leaves Richmond, Virginia leaves the Confederacy. I will study my maps a little more before giving my positive views. I want all possible information of the Roanoke as to navigability, how far up, and what draught."

Admiral Dahlgren concludes a letter to Sherman, dated April 20th, and describing the coast operations in his (Sherman's) behalf, thus :

"No one can question the excellence of your judgment in taking the track you did, and I never had any misgivings, but it was natural to desire to go into the place with a strong hand, for, if any one spot in the land was foremost in the trouble, it was Charleston.

Your campaign was the final blow, grand in conception, complete in execution; and now it is yours to secure the last army which rebeldom possesses. I hear of your being in

motion by the 9th, and hope that the result may be all that you wish.

Tidings of the murder of the President have just come, and shocked every mind. Can it be that such a resort finds root in any stratum of American opinion? Evidently it has not been the act of one man, nor of a madman. Who have prompted him?"

CHAPTER XV.

JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER.

Sherman's interview with Grant, at City Point, on March 28th, 1865, must have been a most interesting one. Imagine the weighty subjects discussed there, and the suggestions and plans for the future-a future which could not but be pregnant with revelations. Grant foreshadowed what might take place in view of Sheridan's successful raid and the desperation engendered by Sherman's union with Schofield at Goldsboro. He also made known his intention of forcing Lee's right, and driving him to the alternative of starvation or cutting loose from Richmond. He was emphatic that a crisis impended, and his only apprehension was that Lee might not wait to catch the full effect of his intended blow. Sherman supplemented the views of his chief with the encouragement that he regarded his army as strong enough to fight both Lee and Johnston, provided Grant could come up in the rear within a day or two. He also pledged himself to be at Burksville in a fortnight, which point would cut off Lee's communication and force him into the open. Both Grant and Sherman agreed that one more bloody battle would have to be fought. Sherman supposed it would fall on him. Grant thought, that if Lee tarried for a few days it would necessarily fall on him. It turned out that Grant was right, for Five Forks settled the fate of Lee.

It was agreed at this interview that Sherman should be ready to move from Goldsboro by April 10th, and that then