back the force which had been detached against Sherman, or else see that any harm it might do Sherman was compensated for in another direction.

rear.

So, as other news came, and Ossabaw Sound seemed likely to become Sherman's destination, supplies were sent thither, and Grant sent a messenger to the same spot with orders to await his arrival and communicate with him at the earliest possible moment. All this was building entirely on probability, for as yet it was far from certain that Sherman would not turn to the Gulf of Mexico. When word came, in the form of Confederate news, that Sherman had captured Millen and that Schofield had gained a victory over Hood at Franklin, Tenn., Grant looked upon the situation as one favorable for starting Canby, then at Vicksburg, into Mississippi, and thus preventing the gathering of a force in Sherman's He also forced his Wilmington expedition the harder, for the objects already stated. On December 3d, 1864, his letter to Sherman told of his preparations against Wilmington, and that Bragg had gone to Georgia. On December 4th, his letter to Butler read:-"I feel great anxiety to see the Wilmington expedition off, both on account of the present fine weather, because Sherman may now be expected to strike the sea coast at any day, leaving Bragg free to return." In the above letter of December 3d, he sketched for Sherman a general plan for future action, without giving minute instructions and said: "With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes from East to West, possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. This condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other part to the East of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls a force from there will cooperate with you." Again when the Richmond papers showed Sherman to be east of the Ogeechee, he urged Butler to make all haste with the

Wilmington expedition, lest he should "lose the chance of surprise and a weak garrison." On December 17th Grant received a long despatch from Thomas announcing his victory at Nashville and on the same date one from Sherman to the effect that he had captured Fort McAllister, opened communication with the fleet and invested Savannah. He (December 18th) congratulated both his generals. To Sherman he said, "I congratulate you and the brave officers and men under your command, on the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign. I never had a doubt of the result. When apprehension for your safety was expressed by the President, I assured him that with the army you had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but that you would strike bottom on salt water, some place; that I would not feel the same confidence and security-in fact, would not have trusted the expedition to any other living commander."

When we consider the thoroughly cooperative spirit of these two military masters, how it operated to the extent of intense anxiety, even when the one could do no more than follow in his imagination the track of the other, the above letter of congratulation contains a meed of praise worth more than all other etters and resolutions combined.

CHAPTER XIV.

THROUGH THE CAROLINAS.

The end of the great rebellion was fast approaching. The giant of secession which had for four years withstood the blows of Union armies, was reeling in the arena. Sherman

had reached the sea; Hood had gone down before Thomas; the supplies of foreign sympathizers had been stopped at Wilmington; every dangerous Confederate force had been cut off outside of Virginia. The confederacy had not received one staggering blow, but a succession of blows which carried dismay to its centre. Its generals were making the sad confession of irretrievable calamities. Its soldiers wer deserting. It even proposed, as a last resort, to arm the slaves. Its leaders, from President down, were at daggers points as to a final policy of salvation. On December 19th, 1864, Grant telegraphed to Sherman: "Jefferson Davis is said to be very sick; in fact, deserters report his death. I credit no part of this, except that Davis is very sick, and do not suppose that reflections on the military situation soothe him any."

The correspondence between Grant and Sherman, after the capture of Savannah, has been sufficiently set forth. Grant's design was to have Sherman come to Richmond by water. Sherman's suggestions and the impossibility of procuring transports led to a modification of the plans of the generalin-chief. Sherman had gone so far as to map a campaign by land, through the Carolinas, more rapid in time than by

water, and more fruitful of results in a military point of view. But as yet he had not received from Grant or Halleck such sanction of it as warranted his going ahead. The necessary sanction came on January 2d, 1865, in the shape of a letter from Grant, which read as follows: "Before writing you definite instructions for the next campaign, I wanted to receive your answer to my letter written from Washington. Your confidence in being able to march up and join this army pleases me, and I believe it can be done. The effect of such a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent the organization of new armies from broken fragments. Hood is now retreating with his army broken and demoralized. His loss in men has probably not been far from 20,000, besides deserters. If time is given, the fragments may be collected together, and many of the deserters reassembled. If we can we should act to prevent this. Your spare army, as it were, moving as I proposed, will do it.

In addition to holding Savannah, it looks to me that an entrenched camp ought to be held on the railroad betweeen Savannah and Charleston. Your movement towards Branchville will probably enable Foster to reach this with his own force. This will give us a position in the South from which we can threaten the interior without marching over long narrow causeways, easily defended, as we have heretofore been compelled to do. Could not such a camp be established at Pototaligo or Coosawhatchie?

"I have thought that Hood being so completely wiped out for the present, I might bring A. J. Smith here with fourteen to fifteen thousand men. With this increase I could hold my lines and move out with a greater force against Lee. It would compel Lee to retain all his present force in the defence of Richmond, or abandon them entirely. This latter

contingency is probably the only danger to the success of your expedition. In the event you should meet Lee's army, you would be compelled to beat it or find the sea-coast, of course. I shall not let Lee's army escape if I can help it, and will not let it go without following to the best of my ability.

"Without waiting further directions then, you may make your preparations to start on your northern expedition without delay. Break up the railroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies now operating against Richmond as soon as you can. I will leave out all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing that your information, gained daily in the course of events, will be better than any that can be obtained now.

"It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg; but failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coast ports in North Carolina now held by us. From there you could take shipping. It would be decidedly preferable, however, if you could march the whole distance. From the best information I have, you will find no difficulty in supplying your army until you cross the Roanoke. From there here is but a few days' march, and supplies could be collected South of the river to bring you through. I shall establish communications with you there by steamboat and gunboat. By this means your wants can be partially supplied. I shall hope to hear from you soon, and to hear your plan and time of starting."

To this Sherman promptly replied, submitting a private plan of campaign, which embodied all of Grant's ideas, and those which he was at entire liberty to advance. It ran :

1. Right wing to move men and artillery by transports to head of Broad River and Beaufort; reestablish Port Royal ferry and mass the wing in the neighborhood of Pocotaligo.

Left wing and cavalry to work slowly across causeway to