moment the prince was confined to his house, which he was not permitted to leave, even to take a walk. He was next called upon to restore the crown to his father, which he did without hesitation, protesting that he had never intended to deprive him of it. The old king was the first to perceive the abyss into which he had plunged, as he was the first of whom the sacrifice of his rights was demanded, in favour of Napoleon. It threw him into a paroxysm of rage, but he was obliged to yield. The sense of his disgrace, and the confusion of mind produced by an upbraiding conscience, deprived him of all power of resistance. He signed his abdication, and exchanged, one of the finest kingdoms on earth, for a castle in France. After all the princes of the royal house had likewise renounced their titles, with the exception of the prince of the Asturias, the infant Don Francisco, the same who has been mentioned above, threw himself at the feet of his brother. He conjured him by the glory of his ancestors, by the manes of Charles V, not to submit to this deed of shame. He represented, that the abdication of the others was of no consequence, but that he, presumptive heir of the crown, and the idol of his subjects, owed to them an example of firmness, at a moment when they were all arming themselves in defence of his rights: That his renunciation would complete the work of iniquity, would cover him with disgrace, in the eyes of all Europe, and extinguish the love of his people. Ferdinand promised his brother not to yield, but his resolution was insufficient to withstand the threat of Napoleon, that he should be treated like the duke d'Enghien, if he did not resign instantaneously. "I must have your head, or your seal." Such was the language of Bonaparte, for the genuineness of which I can vouch. The prince chose dishonour, and signed. My task is ended. I have had no other aim, than to promulgate the truth. 306 rican Government. Ac mihi quidem, si proprium et verum nomen nostri mali quæratur, fatalis quodam calamitas incidisse videtur et improvidas hominum mentis occupavisse. (Cic. Pro Lig.) EMBARGOES, of the form and character which they have acquired in this country, are political measures so singular and novel, and, at the same time, in their consequences, so serious, as to be particularly deserving of a careful examination in all their bearings and effects. Much has been said on the subject, in desultory debate, but we do not know of any satisfactory investigation of it on record, nor do we think that it has been at all considered, under some of its most important aspects. A new embargo, just laid for three long months, at the very moment when the navigation opened, after an interruption for an unusual length of time, in consequence of a protracted winter,* has revived the interest of the discussion, or rather, the terror of the measure, from which a great proportion of the community had scarcely begun to recover. Under these circumstances we flatter ourselves, that a number of our readers will be gratified by the attempt we shall now make, to lay before them, with perspicuity, and precision, the principal reflections, which these extraordinary, and, in our opinion, most ill judged political expedients, can scarcely fail to force upon the attention of every intelligent, and unbiassed observer. An embargo is either, like the continental system of Napoleon, a war measure, the direct object of which is to distress the nation, with whom we are dissatisfied, by depriving her of the advantages, resulting from an intercourse with us; or else it must be a measure of safety; or a measure preparatory for war. If intended as the first, we have then to ask, what injury is it likely to cause to our enemy,-in the instance before us to Great Britain-and what to ourselves? Now, the trade of Great Britain with us, forms only a part, and not even the principal part of her trade. That, which the embargo destroys for us, is all our trade, at least all our fo *The very first sloop which descended the Hudson from Albany this spring, met, at New York, the news of the embargo. reign trade. Thus, even this broad view of the question, gives us reason to apprehend, that our embargoes will prove infinitely more prejudicial to ourselves, than to those against whom they are levelled. A further investigation will corroborate this inference. Great Britain can only suffer from our determination to shut ourselves up at home, on account of her not receiving, in this case, the usual supply of those commodities, the productions of our soil, which we have generally furnished; and, on account of her losing our market, for so much of her manufactures, as we used to take from her in exchange. On the score of freights and insurances she will hardly lose any thing, because these we have long been in the habit of earning ourselves. It is a safe basis of political calculation to assume, that the value of all imports for home consumption, is generally equal to that of all native exports; and, considering that our importations from the East Indies, from South America, the West Indies, the Mediterranean, France, the North of Europe, &c., are of great magnitude, whilst our exports of native commodities to countries other than Great Britain, her dependencies, or allies, amounted, during the year preceding the first of October, 1811, only to 6,719,366 dollars,* or, to speak in round numbers, to six millions and a half, it is a very liberal admission, to take it for granted, no more than that the value of all our importations from Great Britain for home The following is the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury to the House of Representatives of the 21st January, 1812, warranting this state ment. SIR, Treasury Department, January 21, 1812. I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of goods, wares and merchandise, exported from the United States, during one year, prior to the first day of October, 1811, and amounting to 61,316,833 dollars. The goods, wares and merchandise, of domestic growth or manufacture, included in this statement, are estimated at And those of foreign growth or manufacture, at $45,294.043 16,022,790 $61,316,833 The articles of domestic growth or manufacture may be arranged under the following heads, viz. Produce of the sea, forest, agriculture, Manufactures, Uncertain, consumption, is equal to the whole amount of native productions furnished to herself, her dependencies and allies, which was in the year just mentioned, agreeably to the Treasury Report referred to above,-38,574,677 dollars, or thirtyeight millions and a half. The real value of the exports of Great Britain-taking the average of the five years from 1805 to 1809-amounted to 54,121,626% sterling, or to 240,000,000 dollars, annually.* Her own consumption of domestic manufactures may be estimated at nearly double that sum.† The total value of the annual produce of her manufacturing industry falls little short of seven hundred millions of dollars. The amount, therefore, which we take from Great Britain, even under the most favourable supposition, is not quite one sixth part of her annual exports; not quite one eighteenth part of the total annual production of her manufacturing industry. The amount of native commodities, which Great Britain, her dependencies and allies together receive from us, on the principle, that generally speaking, the exports and imports of And they were exported to the following countries, viz. Great Britain, Spain and Portugal, Ditto Ditto Ditto To all other countries, or not distinguished, The goods, wares and merchandise of foreign growth or manufacture, were exported to the following countries, viz. To the dominions of Russia, Prussia, Sweden and Denmark, 5,340,117 1,573,344 5,772,572 1,712,537 1,624,220 $16,022,790 The honourable the Speaker of the ALBERT GALLATIN. * See Report, together with minutes of evidence and accounts, from the select committee, appointed to inquire into the cause of the high price of gold bullion, &c. London 1810. Account LXXIII. of the Appendix. †See Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. IV. It is stated at 240 millions sterling, in the Quarterly Review for June last. (Review of Pasley on the Military Policy of Great Britain.) The same Review computes that only one eleventh part of the commercial prosperity of Great Britain, is derived from customers over whom she has no control. a nation, square, cannot reach one sixth part of the annual importations of Great Britain alone. But, of the commodities which we furnish, not a single one is exclusively the production of our country. Those of the Southern states-cotton, rice, tobacco-succeed almost equally well in some parts of South America, in the East and West Indies, along the Asiatic shores of the Mediterranean. Naval stores and potash can be obtained from Canada and the North of Europe. Our exports of grain-in the natural or manufactured state-without which, we sometimes imagine that the armies of Portugal and Spain would perish with famine, and Great Britain herself be brought to the eve of starvation, are trifling in amount, when compared with the total annual consumption of Great Britain, to which our largest known contributions in grain, in any one year, have scarcely borne a greater proportion than one fiftieth; or with the vast quantities, which are actually shipped every year, or may be procured, from Chili, from the coast of Barbary, from the shores of the Black Sea, or from the North of Germany and Poland. At the two ports alone of Taganrock and Odessa, in the Black Sea, from eight hundred to one thousand vessels of two hundred tons burthen each, load every year with small grain, and chiefly with wheat.* Great Britain may the more readily relinquish all apprehensions, with regard to the want of many raw materials, and grain, since an extensive licensed trade is now regularly established between that country and France, as it were, in derision and contempt of the United States, particularly on the part of Napoleon. For, with him, this licensed trade amounts · to an infraction of his continental system, no doubt from motives of superior, or more pressing interest, while he leaves no means untried, to make us subservient to the extension of that system, though at the expense of our own political consequence and prosperity. The supplies, therefore, of such native commodities as we can furnish to Great Britain, are taken from us, because we bring them, even before they are called for. Our vigilance, thanks to the enterprising spirit of our merchants, anticipates every want abroad. We are so prompt, and, on account of our wide-ranging activity, can be satisfied with such small profits, that it becomes the interest, of those with whom we trade, to receive our produce, rather than seek for the same commodi * See Thomas Mac Gill's Travels in Turkey, Italy, and Russia. London 1808. |