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command, joined Floyd on September 29 and assumed command. The two opposing armies that lay opposite each other upon the crests of Big Sewell, separated by a deep gorge, were about equal in number, but each commander had exaggerated ideas of

pressed forward, deploying to the left and coming under a sharp fire from the right of the enemy's guns. He made some spirited charges upon these works but was repulsed, and then called for help. Rosecrans hastened up with the brigades of Colonels E. P. Scammon and R. L. McCook, and going to the front was surprised to learn that his head of column had been engaged before he had time to plan an attack. It was too late to withdraw without giving the appearance of defeat, and attacks were made in which Scammon and McCook participated, but darkness was rapidly coming on, the men were exhausted after their long march, and Rosecrans ordered the troops to withdraw, intending to renew the fight in the morning. Floyd, however, had reported that his position could be subjected to a destructive cannonade, and during the night he retreated across the Gauley, destroyed the foot bridge behind him and also the flat boats, and retreated with Wise to Sewell Mountain. The Union loss in this engagement was 17 killed and 141 wounded, while the Confederates, being well protected behind their works, had none killed and only 21 wounded.*

After some delay Rosecrans advanced to the top of Big Sewell Mountain, 34 miles from Gauley Bridge, and began skirmishing with the Confederates. Lee, with a part of Loring's

#

the strength of the other, and it was difficult for either to make an offensive move. On the night of October 5 Rosecrans began to fall back and at the end of four days his brigades were in camp between Hawk's Nest and Gauley Bridge. When Lee discovered Rosecrans' retreat he ordered the cavalry to follow; when satisfied that he had gone clear to Gauley Bridge he began repairing the road from Sewell Mountain to Lewisburg,

Official Records, vol. v.; Battles and Leaders, vol. i., pp. 145-146; Confederate Military History, vol. ii., chap. iii., pp. 37-39.

and projected a campaign for Floyd down the left bank of New River and then to the mouth of Loop creek, the head of navigation of the Kanawha to intercept Rosecrans' communications, while an effort was being made to press him in front. Floyd lost no time; on October 10 he started and after a difficult march over mountain roads, crossed New River at Richmond Ferry, and toiled over the Raleigh, Fayette and Kanawha turnpike, through Fayetteville, and on the 22d camped on Cotton Hill, five miles beyond Fayetteville, in the elbow south of the junction of the New and Gauley rivers. On November 1 he opened on the post at Gauley Bridge with artillery.* The ordnance stores at the post were moved into a gorge out of range of the Confederate guns and a battery was established high up on Gauley Mountain to reply. This artillery duel continued for ten days. Meanwhile, hoping to capture Floyd by turning his position from below, the brigades of Benham and Robert C. Schenck were sent forward, while Cox, who was in command at Gauley Bridge, was to coöperate. On the 10th Cox crossed his brigade in boats over New River, and after a sharp fight of two days drove Floyd from Cotton Hill. The coöperative movement on the part of Benham and Schenck's brigades on Floyd's left and rear failed because Floyd, learning of the movement, retreated on the 12th, abandoning wagons and supplies. *Battles and Leaders, vol. i., p. 147.

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and did not cease his retreat until he reached the Holston Valley Railroad.*

In the northeast General B. F. Kelley, who had been guarding a part of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, marched from New Creek on the night of October 25 with detachments of Ohio and West Virginia troops and two companies of cavalry for the purpose of occupying Romney, West Virginia. After a sharp engagement on the 26th the Confederates were driven from their intrenchments and the town was captured together with all the Confederate trains, 2 guns, 300 stand of arms, and much camp equipage. A supporting column of the 2d Maryland under Colonel Johns, marching from the mouth of Patterson's Creek through Frankfort and Springfield, was met by the 114th Virginia militia under Colonel A. Monroe at the bridge over the south branch, 7 miles from Romney, was defeated and fell back to Patterson's Creek with a loss of 6 or 8 in killed and wounded. On the approach of winter Lee was placed in charge of the Southern coast defences; Wise was ordered to Richmond, and most of the Confederate forces were withdrawn except a small one under Floyd. The others went into winter quarters. Meanwhile General McClellan had assumed command of the division of the Potomac (July 27) and was energetically working to make Washington secure and to

*Battles and Leaders, vol. i., p. 148; Confederate Military History, vol. ii., pt. ii., p. 34 et seq.

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organize the army of the Potomac. In a letter to Cameron, he says:

"I find no army to command. A mere collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat at Bull Run. Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the Southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. The troops were not only undisciplined, undrilled and dispirited; they were not even placed in military position. The city was almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry."*

of his soldiers by his winning personality, and inspired a remarkable affection and regard in everyone from the President to the humblest orderly. But he was pursued by a hallucination that the enemy largely outnumbered him and that they would attack his position on the Virginia side of the Potomac and also cross the river north of Washington.* Though on October 27 he reported an aggregate of strength of 168,318 men, of whom 147,695 were present fit for duty,† and

"When I assumed command in Washington on the 27th of July, 1861, the number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000 infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, and 650 artillerymen, with 9 imperfect field batteries of 30 pieces. There was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the city from heights within easy range."+

*

General McClellan came to his work with large prestige and great things were expected of him by all. He had remarkable executive ability, an aptitude for system, and an immense capacity for long continued labor. He was surrounded by an able and willing staff, all heartily devoted to him and inclined to give him the greater share of credit for their own work. In the saddle a larger part of the day, he visited the several camps and came thoroughly to know his officers and men. He was a man of great personal attractiveness, soon gained the love

time was as large as the Union force, McClellan seemed to fear being overwhelmed by a superior army. On August 16 he wrote to his wife: "I am here in a terrible place; the enemy have from three to four times my force."t On the 25th he wrote: "Friend Beauregard has allowed the chance to escape him. I have now some 65,000 effective men; will have 75,000 by the end of the week. Last week he certainly had double our force. I feel sure that the dangerous moment has passed." Nevertheless, at this time the total effective force of the Confederate army was less than 41,000.§

Early in October General McClellan ordered a reconnoissance to ascertain

* Official Records, vol. xi., part iii., p. 3. See also McClellan's Own Story, p. 84; Battles and Leaders, vol. ii., pp. 112-122.

† Official Records, vol. v., p. 10. See also Rhodes, United States, vol. iii., p. 492; Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. iv., p. 442. McClellan's Own Story, p. 87.

|| Ibid, p. 89.

§ Johnston's Narrative, p. 81.

the enemy's strength on the right in the neighborhood of the Potomac. General Charles P. Stone, having his headquarters at Poolesville, was within easy striking distance of Conrad's and Edwards' Ferries which, some four miles from each other, afforded the means of crossing the Potomac at this part of its course. Midway between the two ferries was Harrison's Island, about three miles long and 200 yards wide, Conrad's Ferry being at the upper end of the island. On the 19th, in accordance with his instructions, General George A. McCall moved forward and occupied Dranesville, 17 miles west of Washington in Fairfax County, Virginia. This being accomplished, McClellan sent a telegram to Stone informing him of McCall's movement, that heavy reconnoissances would be sent out the same day from Dranesville, and directing him to keep a sharp watch on the enemy who had moved away from Leesburg. "Perhaps," he added, "a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them."* Accordingly on the evening of October 20, Stone sent General Willis A. Gorman to make a demonstration of crossing at Edwards' Ferry, while a scouting party of the 15th Massachusetts crossed from Harrison's Island to within about a mile of Leesburg, returning with the report that they had found a small camp of the enemy in the woods. Thereupon Stone ordered

* Official Records, vol. v., p. 290.

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Colonel Charles Devens, of the 15th Massachusetts, to take five companies over in the night to destroy this camp at daybreak. When proceeding to execute this order Colonel Devens found that the scouting party had made an erroneous report and when Stone learned of this he sent over the rest of the regiment and later the 20th Massachusetts (Colonel William R. Lee) and Colonel Milton Cogswell's Tammany regiment (42d New York), the whole being under the command of Colonel Edward D. Baker of the 71st Pennsylvania (the "California regiment," Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac J. Wistar). At At daylight Colonel Devens with 650 men reached the top of the bluff (Ball's Bluff) but found the Confederate camp to have no existence, and about noon he retired near the bluff where he was soon reinforced. Meanwhile about 2 o'clock in the morning Baker marched to Conrad's Ferry and there experienced great difficulty in transporting his troops over the river. Instead of arriving on the field early in the morning, it was 2 o'clock in the afternoon. He immediately took command and, although he was at a great disadvantage, determined to fight. By this time Devens had fallen back in line with Baker's, Lee's and Milton Cogswell's regiments, and a new disposition was made of all the troops on the ground to resist the enemey then advancing. In making this new arrangement both flanks were left exposed and the reserves were placed in an unprotected