THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK. probably be compelled to abandon Springfield and fall back to St. Louis or into Kansas. McCulloch had refused to support Price in the affair at Dug Spring and now refused to advance unless he were given supreme command. Price consented to this arrangement and at midnight of the 5th the Confederate army advanced, hoping to surprise Lyon.* Finding that he had retired, however, McCulloch followed and on the 6th went into camp on Wilson's Creek about 10 miles from Springfield. As the Confederates showed no disposition to advance, Lyon proposed to make a night march on the 9th and attack the Confederate left at daybreak of the 10th. After this plan had been agreed upon, Colonel Sigel persuaded Lyon to permit him with his two regiments, a 6-gun battery, and two companies of cavalry, to make a flank march around the Confederate right and attack from the south while Lyon attacked from the north. Accordingly Sigel made his detour to the left by way of the Cassville Road and at daybreak was within a mile of the Confederate rear. At 4 A. M. Lyon struck the advance picket of Rains' Missouri command which gave the alarm and at 5:30 one of the most stubborn battles of the war began. The position on Wilson's Creek was held by General Price with about 3,200 men including Henry Guibor's and Hiram M. Bledsoe's batteries, reinforced later by T. J. Churchill's regiment and W. E. Wood Carr, Missouri, pp. 327-328. 65 ruff's battery, both from Arkansas. At Price's right, north of the creek, was McCulloch's brigade; Pearce's Arkansas brigade was on McCulloch's left and rear and on the same side of the creek; while in Pearce's rear, on the south side of the creek, were Churchill's regiment and Green's and J. P. Major's cavalry. With about 4,000 infantry and cavalry and the two batteries of James Totten and John V. Dubois General Lyon advanced more than a mile, attacked the Confederate right and drove it from the crest to the foot of the ridge. At the same time Captain Joseph B. Plummer with 300 regulars and 200 home guards, while moving on the left and beyond the creek, was attacked by the 3d Louisiana and other parts of McCulloch's brigade and was checked, his command later being withdrawn. At about 8 o'clock Price attempted to turn Lyon's right, but was repulsed. Meanwhile Sigel, having gained the Confederate rear, drove Churchill, Major and Green from their camps, crossed the creek, and, marching to the Springfield and Fayetteville Road, was there attacked by a battalion of mounted Missourians and some Texans and a part of the 3d Louisiana. Bledsoe's battery opened on his front, J. G. Reid's battery joined in the enfilading fire, the Louisianians charged and captured five of his guns, and his troops were driven from the field, he himself narrowly escaping capture. Colonel Salomon with 450 men made a wide detour and 66 THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK. when the Confederates gave way a short distance, to re-form and make another effort. This, however, resulted in a disastrous repulse, but Sturgis, deeming too hazardous any attempt to hold the field, retreated to Springfield. Upon his arrival there Sturgis yielded the command to Sigel, who, the next morning, marched toward Rolla, over 100 miles distant. McCulloch refused to pursue Sturgis, and Price, resuming command of the Missourians, on the next day took possession of Springfield. As officially reported the Union loss was 223 killed, 721 wounded, and 291 missing; the Confederate loss was 265 killed, 800 wounded, and 30 missing. Revised statements make the Union loss 258 killed, 873 wounded and 186 missing, while Price's adjutant-general placed the Confederate loss at 279 killed and 951 wounded.* This disaster turned public attention and criticism sharply upon Frémont's department and administration. Less than a month had sufficed to show Frémont's intellectual weakness and his utter incapacity for a responsible command. Instead of bringing order into the chaotic conditions, he set methods and routine at defiance, issued commissions and awarded contracts in so irregular a Official Records, vol. iii.; Battles and Leaders, vol. i., pp. 269-273, 289-306; Snead, The Fight for Missouri; Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. iv., pp. 406-411; Carr, Missouri, pp. 324333; the biography of General Lyon in National Cyclopædia of American Biography, vol. iv., p. 203; Ashbel Woodward, Life of General Nathaniel Lyon (1862). FRÉMONT'S PROCLAMATION OF EMANCIPATION. way as to bring a protest from the Frémont to Lincoln, September 8, Official Records, vol. iii., p. 477. For the proclamation see Official Records, vol. iii., pp. 466–467. See also Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. iv., pp. 416-417; Williams, The Negro Race in America, vol. ii., pp. 255256. Diary of John Hay quoted in Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. iv., p. 415. || Moore, Rebellion Record, vol. iii., p. 129. 67 the Government had as yet no fixed policy in this respect. Nevertheless, though the act was one of insubordi nation, Lincoln decided not to act harshly against Frémont. In a letter dated September 2 he informed Frémont of the danger that might come from the proclamation and requested that he modify it so as to conform to the confiscation act of August 6, 1861.* In reply Frémont said that the proclamation had been issued only after full deliberation and that he would not modify it unless openly directed to do so by Lincoln. Accordingly, on September 11, Lincoln issued the order.‡ Whatever temporary * Official Records, vol. iii., pp. 469-470. Ibid, pp. 485-486; Williams, The Negro Race in America, vol. ii., pp. 256-257. 68 THE SIEGE OF LEXINGTON. of Price's northward movement Frémont ordered to Lexington a force of 2,800 men with 7 6-pounder guns in command of Colonel James A. Mulligan, of the 23d Illinois. Mulligan threw up intrenchments on College Hill northeast of the city which on the morning of the 12th were bombarded from four different points by Price. After a sharp skirmish Mulligan's outworks were captured and his troops driven behind the main line. At the end of the day Price withdrew to await reinforcements and ammunition; and Mulligan strengthened his position and prepared for a siege. On being reinforced to 25,000 men and his ammunition coming up, Price moved on the city on the 18th, took possession, closed in upon Mulligan and began a siege. To the east, northeast and southwest of Mulligan's works were the divisions of Rains and Parsons; on the river bank and immediately beneath Mulligan's works was Benjamin A. Rives' division, supported by James H. McBride's command and a part of Harris'. From a dwelling on the bluff, 125 yards from the works, fire was opened on the Confederates but the latter charged and captured the house and also the bluff immediately north of it. This house was retaken by the Union troops, but was soon regained and the adjoining heights fortified. Firing continued all day of the 19th; the water supply gave out but Mulligan encouraged his men to hold on until reinforcements arrived. It was no use, however, and at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 20th, being without water or rations and short of ammunition, Mulligan displayed a white flag. In this siege Mulligan lost 42 killed, 108 wounded and 1,624 prisoners, besides 7 guns, many horses and a large amount of stores. Price's loss was 25 killed and 72 wounded. Price remained at Lexington until September 30, when, pressed by the Union advance from Jefferson City, he abandoned the place and retreated toward Arkansas, leaving a guard of 500 men with the prisoners taken. On October 16 a squadron of cavalry under Major F. J. White surprised the party, captured 70, and released the prisoners.* The first impression of the people in the North on the publication of Frémont's proclamation was favorable to it, but, when Lincoln modified it, opinions changed, so strong were his reasons and so strong a hold did he have on the people. If Frémont had been honest and patriotic the annulment of his decree would have ended the matter; but his mismanagement of the western department and the charges of corruption at St. Louis imperatively demanded correction. When Blair and Meigs reached St. Louis on September 12 it did not take the Postmaster long (even though he was decidedly friendly to Frémont) to make up his mind that the removal of Frémont would be for the benefit * Official Records, vol. iii.; Battles and Leaders, vol. i., pp. 273, 307-313; Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. iv., p. 426 et seq.; Confederate Military History, vol. ix., pt. ii., pp. 64-66. of the country. THE REMOVAL OF FREMONT. Colonel Francis P. Blair, brother of Montgomery Blair, had been firmly convinced of Frémont's incapacity and in public print sharply criticised his action. Frémont placed Blair under arrest, whereupon the latter preferred formal charges against the general and the latter in turn entered formal countercharges against Blair.* Thereupon President Lincoln determined to obtain more complete and exact knowledge of the state of affairs, and sent Secretary of War Cameron and Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas to investigate. On their arrival Cameron and Thomas were informed by General David Hunter that the latter's division of the army, though then under orders to march, could not be put in proper marching condition for a number of days. Hunter stated also his opinion that General Frémont was not fitted for the command and that though he himself was second in command he knew nothing whatever of the plans and purposes of his chief.t The letters of General Pope to Hunter and of Brigadier-General Samuel R. Curtis to Lincoln were of the same purport. Thus the opinions of three experienced army officers coincided with the general drift of evidence which had come to the President from civilian officers and citizens. On October 21 Cameron and Thomas arrived 69 at Washington and made their report. The President could no longer hesitate and on October 24 directed that Frémont be relieved and that General Hunter be called temporarily to take his command. This letter was to be delivered to Frémont unless when the messenger reached him he should have "under personal command fought and won a battle or [should] then be actually in a battle or [should] then be in the immediate presence of the enemy in expectation of a battle."'* As none of these conditions prevailed, the order was given to General Frémont and on November 2 he turned over his command to General Hunter. Upon taking command Hunter learned that ostensible preparations had been made and orders issued for a battle under assumption that the enemy was at Wilson's Creek advancing to an attack. Hunter sent a reconnoissance to Wilson's Creek and found that no enemy whatever was there or was expected there, Frémont having been duped by his own scouts. Accordingly after Frémont had taken his leave of the army, Hunter drew back the Federal army from Springfield to Rolla and a large part of it was afterward transferred to another field of action.t * Lincoln to Curtis, October 24, 1861, Official Records, vol. iii., p. 553. Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. iv., pp. 433-439; Rhodes, United States, vol. iii., pp. 476-482. Regarding the abandonment of Springfield see Greeley's opinion in his American Conflict, vol. i., p. 594. He calls the retreat “sneaking back to our fastnesses along the lines of completed railroads and within striking distance of St. Louis." |