60 NEGROES AS CONTRABAND OF WAR. the British nation had a right to expect.* The first movement of the armed forces proved that the question of slavery was destined to be as omnipresent in war as it had been in politics. Immediately after Butler took command at Fortress Monroe, negroes began to escape from the Confederate lines and to apply for protection to Butler. Soon a Confederate flag of truce appeared with the request that three negro field hands, belonging to a Colonel Mallory, be returned. Butler replied that since Virginia claimed to be a foreign power the fugitive Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. v., pp. 38-40; Rhodes, United States, vol. iii., pp. 536-538. Pollard says: "This outrage, when it was learned in the South, was welcome news, as it was thought certain that the British government would resent the insult, and as the boastful and exultant tone in the North, over the capture of the commissioners, appeared to make it equally certain that the government at Washington would not surrender its booty. War between England and the North was thought to be imminent. Providence was declared to be in our favor; the incident of the Trent was looked upon almost as a special dispensation, and it was said, in fond imagination, that on its deck, and in the trough of the weltering Atlantic, the key of the blockade had at last been lost. These prospects were disappointed by the weakness of the government at Washington, in surrendering the commissioners and returning them to the British flag. The surrender was an exhibition of meanness and cowardice unparalleled in the political history of the civilized world, but strongly characteristic of the policy and mind of the North."- First Year of the War, p. 208. Russell says: "The bubble has burst. The rage of the friends of compromise and of the South, who saw in a war with Great Britain the complete success of the Confederacy, is deep and burning, if not loud; but they all say they never expected anything better from the cowardly and braggart statesmen who now rule in Washington."- My Diary North and South, p. 593. slave law could not possibly be in operation there, and declined on that ground. If Mallory would come to the fort and take the oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, Butler would deliver the men up to him and endeavor to hire their services of him.* Thus Butler claimed that, as the negroes belonged to a State offering resistance to the Federal Government and had been compelled to labor in the construction of a battery, they were contraband of war. Though not strictly in accordance with legal doctrine, the application of this phrase was at once taken up by the people as an effective solution of a vexing question. A few months more of active campaigning merely shortened the formula, and every negro in and about the army was designated a "contraband." This question of colored fugitives quickly grew in importance. On May 27 General Butler reported to General Scott that he had slave" property " in his hands to the value of $60,000.† As he was greatly in need of laborers, he received all who came, employed the able-bodied, and kept an account of the value of their services and the cost of their maintenance. The Government approved this course and the *Official Records, vol. ii., pp. 649–650. † Official Records, vol. ii., p. 53; Greeley, American Conflict, vol. ii., p. 238. Williams, The Negro Race in America, vol. ii., pp. 250-251. See Cameron's letter of May 30, in Nicolay and Hay, Life of Lincoln, vol. iv., pp. 389–390; Williams, The Negro Race in America, vol. ii., p. 251. CAMERON'S INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING FUGITIVE SLAVES. 61 negroes were set to work on the intrenchments. On July 30 the negroes under Butler's control numbered 900, whereupon he wrote to Cameron asking for instructions.* On August 8 Cameron replied that in cases of fugitives from the loyal slave States the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law under ordinary judicial proceedings must be respected by the military and civil authorities. In the States wholly or partly insurrectionary, where the ordinary laws temporarily failed, rights to service, like other rights, were to be subject to military necessity, if not wholly forfeited by trea son. The military authorities must obey the confiscation act, refusing to recognize any claim to service forfeited by treason. In insurrectionary States where the laws were suspended, claims to service could not be decided safely by the military authorities.t Lincoln had signed the confiscation act with reluctance, for one reason because it did not make provision for fugitives escaping from loyal masters in disloyal States. Cameron instructed that care should be taken to protect such owners. This was of little practical moment to them, but it shows Lincoln's careful regard for vested rights when the case was placed before him for decision. Public opinion in the North supported the President in striking at the root of * Moore, Rebellion Record, vol. ii., Docs., p. 437. † Moore, Rebellion Record, vol. ii., Docs., p. 493; Official Records, series iii., vol. i., pp. 402403. the trouble should the war be prolonged, and in spite of the murmurs of the abolitionists and radical Republicans, a large majority in the North acquiesced in his policy as a wise temporary expedient. Hardly had the North expressed its acquiescence in Lincoln's policy when the question was reopened by Frémont's proclamation in Missouri. Before we narrate the circumstances of this proclamation it is necessary to glance at conditions in this section. As previously stated, Governor Jackson had been put to flight by General Lyon at Booneville, whence he retreated to the southwestern portion of the State, collecting adherents as he went. General Price went westward from Booneville to Lexington where he found a camp of volunteers. Jackson and Price then united their forces and proceeded toward Carthage. Meanwhile General Lyon was in close pursuit, and before leaving St. Louis sent an expedition of 2,500 men under General Thomas W. Sweeny to Rolla and thence to Springfield. On June 28, with the 3d Missouri, General Franz Sigel arrived at Sarcoxie, southwest of Springfield and 15 miles southeast of Carthage. Here Sigel learned that Price with about 800 Missourians was near Neosho, 22 miles south, and that Jackson with other State troops was about 15 miles beyond Lamar, marching southwest to join Price. Accordingly, Sigel determined to disperse Price's force and then to turn north on Jackson, hoping thereby to prevent 62 THE BATTLE OF CARTHAGE. the junction of the two forces and to open communication with Lyon, then marching south from Booneville. After starting on the morning of the 29th he learned that Price had retreated and therefore went after Jackson, continuing his march to Neosho where he was joined a few days later by Colonel Charles E. Salomon with the 5th (Union) Missouri. A company of the 3d Missouri was left to hold Neosho, and on July 4 Sigel with two regiments and two batteries of 4 guns each marched to Spring River, a short distance southeast of Carthage, where he learned that Jackson with more than 4,000 men was but nine miles to the front in the direction of Lamar. On the morning of the 5th with 1,000 men and 8 guns Sigel advanced slowly, driving back the Confederate skirmishers, and about nine miles beyond Carthage came upon Jackson's troops which had been formed in four divisions under command of Generals James S. Rains, John B. Clark, M. M. Parsons, and W. Y. Slack. Of Jackson's force about 1,800 were mounted men armed with shotguns and judiciously posted on the flanks of the infantry. After some skirmishing Sigel at 10 o'clock opened fire with 7 guns, which brought an ineffective reply from the Confederates, since, from want of ammunition, the latter had charged their cannon with pieces of chain, iron spikes, broken iron and stones. After a desultory fire of three hours the Confederate cavalry, making a wide circuit. to avoid Sigel's artillery, began to close in on him and threaten his train about three miles in the rear. Disposing of 4 guns in rear and 2 on either flank Sigel fell back until he reached Carthage where he attempted to make another stand. But, as the enemy was still working on both flanks and threatening the road to Springfield, he again fell back three miles beyond Carthage, where pursuit ended. Sigel then marched to Sarcoxie, and later by way of Mount Vernon to Springfield, where he was joined by Lyon on the 13th. In the battle of Carthage the Union loss was 13 killed and 31 wounded besides the loss of a company of 94 men left at Neosho which was surprised and captured on the 5th by Churchill's Arkansas regiment. The Confederate loss was about 30 killed and 125 wounded.* Al The Confederate authorities had ambitious plans for the West. ready possessing Arkansas, they now hoped to secure Missouri. Major General Leonidas Polk was stationed at Memphis early in July to command the Mississippi, and as the neutrality policy in Kentucky for the moment left the Tennessee contingent idle, Jackson appealed to Polk to make immediate preparations for a campaign in Missouri. On July 23 Polk signified to the Confederate government his purpose to send two strong columns into Missouri - one of 25,000 men under General Ben McCulloch *Official Records, vol. iii.; Battles and Leaders, vol. i., pp. 268-269. FREMONT SENT TO MISSOURI, against Lyon at Springfield and the other under Generals Gideon J. Pillow and William J. Hardee into southwestern Missouri, where it was estimated they could collect a force of 18,000 men. These two columns were to seize St. Louis, cut off Lyon's return from the West, then enter Illinois and make a rear attack on Cairo.* But this projected expedition was considerably curtailed because Governor Jackson had exaggerated the available forces fully one-half. Hence positive action in Kentucky was deferred until the first week of September. While the Confederates had blockaded the Mississippi River, the Union forces had garrisoned and fortified Cairo and were building gunboats, organizing regiments and planning for a desperate resistance. To aid the rapid completion of these plans General Frémont was ordered to take charge of the Western department. In many respects no more popular appointment could have been made for the West where Frémont's name carried considerable weight and would be certain to enlist much enthusiasm and earnest support. Frémont arrived from Europe about July 1 and though sorely needed in the West remained in New York three weeks absorbed largely in personal affairs; in fact, two weeks had passed before he sent his letter of acceptance and oath of office. On July 25 he arrived at St. Louis and found chaotic •Official Records, vol. iii., p. 613. 63 conditions.* The recruiting offices were full, but the State governor and commanders of departments were quarreling over the driblets of arms and equipments remaining in arsenals. There were not a sufficient number of educated and experienced officers of the late regular army familiar with organization and routine to furnish the necessary officers for the newly organized companies. Hence error, extravagance, delay and waste ensued; regiments were sent to the front without arms, rations or reinforcements, and sometimes without being mustered into service. Furthermore, a destructive guerilla warfare had broken out, degenerating into neighborhood and family feuds, and bloody personal reprisal and revenge known as bushwhacking. The suppression of these disorders was left to the local administration, but there was so much unfortunate jealousy and rivalry between the factions of radicals and conservatives that the authorities were greatly embarrassed and often thwarted. As time passed the animosity between these factions. increased and their antagonistic attitude continued throughout the entire war. This situation produced no end of complications requiring the direct interference of President Lincoln and taxed to the utmost his great forbear 64 THE BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK. York Brigadier-General John Pope was ordered to the northern part of Missouri to settle the neighborhood troubles there and, when Frémont reached St. Louis, Pope had eight Illinois regiments employed in this duty.* Within a few days after his arrival Frémont gathered all the available forces (about eight regiments) and personally conducted them to Cairo, the strategic key of the whole Mississippi valley. While this was a proper precaution, Frémont should first have seen to the safety of Lyon at Springfield in southwestern Missouri. When the latter left St. Louis he knew that his force was inadequate for the purpose in view, but he believed that the troops being organized in the contiguous free States would be rushed to his aid. When he combined his troops with those under Sigel who had retreated from Carthage, Lyon had a force of about 6,200 men. Unfortunately, however, his numbers were daily growing less by the expiration of the term of enlistment of the three months' volunteers. Many immediately enlisted under the three years' call, but there was a considerable shrinkage of numbers and Lyon found himself in a discouraging position. To make matters worse, he was 120 miles from a railroad, provisions and supplies had not arrived as expected, and a formidable force of Confederates was just beyond the Arkansas line. He sent several * dispatches to Frémont requesting aid, but the latter responded feebly. Instead of rushing all available troops and plenty of supplies to Lyon, Frémont sent these troops to Cairo and merely set two regiments in motion toward Lyon. Lyon's danger lay in the junction of the various Confederate leaders just beyond the Arkansas line. General McCulloch had been given three regiments to conquer Indian Territory, but instead decided to organize a campaign of his own. On July 30 he reported that he was on his way toward Springfield with his own brigade of 3,200 troops under the command of General N. B. Pearce and the forces under General Price, which brought the total up to about 11,000 men. On August 1 Lyon heard of their advance and marched out on the Cassville Road to meet them with about 6,000 men and 18 guns, hoping to attack the largest and most advanced force, drive it back on the others and strike them in detail. Accordingly he set out from Springfield, advancing about 20 miles southwestwardly, and on the afternoon of August 2 his advance met and had a lively encounter with Price's advance under General Rains at Dug Spring. The engagement, though not long, was sharp and decisive and resulted in the retreat of the Confederates. After advancing several miles Lyon thought best to retire to Springfield, whence he reported the condition of affairs to Frémont, asserting that he would Official Records, vol. iii., pp. 395, 397. |