336 ENGAGEMENT AT UPPERVILLE. advanced and occupied Aldie Gap with infantry. On the 20th Stuart concentrated his five brigades about three miles west of Middleburg, Pleasonton remaining at Middleburg. On the morning of the 21st, however, he moved out of Middleburg, Buford's division by the road through Union to turn Stuart's left, Gregg's division, supported by Vincent's infantry brigade, going on the main road to Upperville. Buford encountered W. H. F. Lee's and Jones' brigades and drove. them back, and Gregg met Hampton's and Robertson's brigades, driving them steadily to Goose Creek, where they remained several hours, when they again fell back to effect a junction at Upperville with Jones and W. H. F. Lee, who were retreating before Buford. As Pleasonton neared Upperville the fight increased in severity, and Stuart was driven through the town to Ashby's Gap. The Union. loss during the day was 12 killed, 130 wounded, and 67 missing. On the 22d Pleasonton fell back to Middleburg and Aldie. The Union loss June 17-21 was 883 killed, wounded, and missing; the Confederate loss was 65 killed, 279 wounded, and 166 missing, an aggregate of 510.* On the 24th Longstreet moved by way of Berryville, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 25th and 26th and marched to Hagerstown, thence on the 27th to Chambersburg. * Official Records, vol. xxvii.; Doubleday, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, pp. 99–104; McClellan, Life of Stuart. A. P. Hill remained at Fredericksburg until the 14th when, Hooker having fallen back, he moved down the Shenandoah Valley, crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown and joined Longstreet at Chambersburg. Stuart was left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge and to watch Hooker, being instructed to harass the latter as much as possible if an attempt were made to cross the Potomac. At the formal surrender of Chambersburg Early laid it under contribution, receiving 1,000 hats, 1,200 pairs of shoes, 1,000 socks, nearly $30,000 in money and three days' rations of all kinds.* By the middle of June Lee's movements warned the North of the approaching invasion. Ewell's march spread the wildest terror and consternation among the rural population on his route. As early as June 15 President Lincoln, foreseeing the invasion, had called upon the States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland and West Virginia to furnish 100,000 militia for the service of the United States to serve for six months. The Secretary of War asked also for aid from the governors of 13 of the other States. The response was prompt, especially *Rhodes, United States, vol. iv., p. 272. "So hopeful were the leaders of the rebellion in the success of this their project that they did not deem it necessary to keep their intentions a secret. Many weeks before their attempted invasion their newspapers freely referred to it as an event that would surely happen, and boasted loudly of the manner in which they would fatten on the spoils they would take from the rich farmers and well filled storehouses of the North." Jacobs, Notes on the Rebel Invasion, p. 6. NORTHERN ALARM; REMOVAL OF HOOKER. after word was received that Lee's Starting from the Rappahannock on the 13th Hooker moved cautiously back toward the Potomac to cover Washington. On the 25th, 26th and 27th he crossed this river at Edward's Ferry near Leesburg and on the 28th grouped his army about Frederick with Slocum's corps on the left near Harper's Ferry. He desired to send Slocum's corps and the 10,000 men comprising the garri 337 son at Maryland Heights, which commanded Harper's Ferry, against Lee's rear to cut his line of communications. He saw no reason why Maryland Heights should be held,* but Halleck did not approve its abandonment" except in case of absolute necessity." Hooker contended that he was unable with the means at his disposal to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington and at the same time to fight an enemy in his front superior to himself; hence he must request to be relieved of his command. Halleck referred this matter to the President who immediately sent an order relieving Hooker and appointing George Gordon Meade, commander of the 5th corps, in his place. This appointment was satisfactory to the officers of the army and they gave Meade hearty support. At the same time Halleck granted Meade's request to utilize the garrison at Maryland Heights and Meade ordered the abandonment of the place and the transfer of the garrison to Fredericksburg and Washington. Meade's resolution was prompt. On the morning of the 29th, under the impression that all of Lee's army was along the Susquehanna, Meade marched by three divergent roads in that direction and on the night of the 30th his forces were distributed as follows: Buford with two brigades of cavalry was in advance of Gettysburg; Reynolds' 1st corps was on * Official Records, vol. xxvii., pt. i., p. 58. † Ibid, p. 59. 338 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. Marsh Creek, 5 miles southwest of Gettysburg; Sickles' 3d corps was at Taneytown, 13 miles south of Gettysburg; and Howard's 11th corps was at Emmitsburg. These three corps, constituting the left wing of the army, were under command of General Reynolds. Hancock's 2d corps was at Uniontown; Sykes' corps was at Union Mills; Sedgwick's 6th corps was at Manchester, and Slocum's 12th corps at Littlestown. Gregg's cavalry division was at Westminster, and Kilpatrick's division, after a fight with Stuart's cavalry at Hanover, bivouaced near that place. The first mistake in Lee's campaign arose from the absence of Stuart's cavalry. Unable to get information. of Hooker's movements and to retain him on the east side of the mountains after he had entered Maryland, Lee had instructed Ewell on the 24th to send a division across the South Mountain to threaten Baltimore. Early's division which was detailed for the purpose went as far east as York, the other two divisions of the corps marching from Chambersburg to Carlisle. The cavalry of Jenkins. and White were in advance at Wrightsville and above, on the Susquehanna, threatening to cross and take Harrisburg. Lee now made preparations to advance upon Harrisburg, but on the night of June 28 a scout brought him word that the Union army had crossed the Potomac and was moving northward, its head of column already being at South Moun tain. Not daring to allow the interception of his communications with Virginia, Lee resolved to prevent the progress of the Union army by concentrating his own on the east side of the mountains. Accordingly he ordered Ewell back from his projected attack upon Harrisburg and directed him and Longstreet and Hill to march to Gettysburg on the south side of the South Mountain range. On the night of the 30th Rodes' division of Ewell's corps was at Heidlersburg, eight miles northeast of Gettysburg and near him were Early's and Johnson's divisions. Longstreet was still at Chambersburg and Hill was at Fayetteville and Cashtown, eight miles from Gettysburg. When Buford arrived at Gettysburg with his cavalry he had passed through the town and pushed out reconnaissances west and north to ascertain the movements of Lee's army. Throwing out pickets along the Chambersburg road he went into camp just beyond the western limits of the town. At 5 o'clock on the morning of July 1 Heth's division, the advance of Hill's corps, moved from Cashtown and at about 9 o'clock came in sight of Buford's skirmishers, whereupon Buford fired his first gun as a signal for his skirmishers to open fire and the battle of Gettysburg began. Heth slowly drove Buford back, but Reynolds came up with Wadsworth's division and a desperate encounter ensued. Reynolds did not live to see the outcome of the battle, for before noon he received a bullet in his brain . THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. and died instantly. After Reynold's death matters went badly with the Union troops who continued the contest under the command of Doubleday. Two other divisions of the corps came up at 11 o'clock, followed at 12:45 by Howard's corps, one division of which was placed in reserve at Cemetery Hill while the other two formed on Doubleday's right along Seminary Ridge. Meanwhile Hill had arrived. with the remainder of his corps and at 2:30 Ewell arrived with Early's and Rodes' and immediately formed on Hill's left. Hill then assaulted Doubleday from the west while Ewell moved against Howard from the north. Both these attacks were repulsed, but finally after desperate fighting and great losses on both sides Early struck Howard in flank, causing him to give way and the entire Union. line was driven back through the town to Cemetery Hill which Howard had chosen as a rallying point for the 2d corps and upon which he had placed one of his own divisions. Probably the chief reason for the defeat, at least an important one, was that there was no directing mind.* All was confusion, and disaster seemed to be the portion of the Union troops when Hancock arrived on the field. When Meade heard that Lee's advance had reached Gettysburg and that Reynolds had been killed he was at Taneytown, 14 miles away, preparing to take up a defensive line along 339 Pipe Creek. He immediately ordered Hancock to ride forward and take supreme command. Hancock arrived at Gettysburg as the Union troops were retreating through the town. Noting the advantages of Cemetery Hill as a place for a defensive battle he determined to hold it and so notified Meade, sending one of Doubleday's small brigades to hold Culp's Hill on the right and making an ostentatious display of Buford's cavalry on the extreme left. This show of force together with the enormous loss of the Confederates (over 7,000) caused Lee to defer operations. At dark two divisions of Sickles's corps came up and about the same time. Slocum's corps arrived on the field, whereupon, being the ranking officer, Slocum assumed command while Hancock rode back to report to Meade that Gettysburg was the proper place to fight a battle. The corps of Hill and Ewell on the Confederate side were all up by night and Longstreet had bivouaced four miles in the rear of Hill. Lee's greatest mistake was in not taking Cemetery Hill. Probably if the Confederates had been prompt they might have carried the height, and Lee sent a suggestion to Ewell to assault the hill if he thought such a movement was practicable, but warning him against bringing on a general engagement until the arrival of the rest of his force. Ewell awaited the arrival of General Edward Johnson so that all the latter part of the after |